Produced by Keith G Richardson
CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY:
EMBRACING A SERMON
ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION,
AND SEVERAL NUMBERS,
FORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL.
BY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D.
NEW-YORK,
PUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON,
For the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office, 200
Mulberry-street.
_J. Collord, Printer_.
1835.
"Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh and
T. Mason, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern
District of New-York."
CONTENTS.
Advertisement
Sermon on Predestination and Election
I. Reply to the Christian Spectator
II. A proposition to Calvinists
III. Indefiniteness of Calvinism
IV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism in
this country
V. Same subject continued
VI. Predestination
VII. Predestination, continued
VIII. Moral agency and accountability
IX. Moral agency and accountability, continued
X. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions
of grace
XI. Same subject continued
XII. Objections to gracious ability answered
XIII. Regeneration
XIV. Regeneration, continued
XV. Regeneration, continued
ADVERTISEMENT.
The numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, were
written at different times, and in some instances at quite distant
intervals from each other. This will be received, it is hoped, as an
apology for any want of connection or uniformity of style, which the
reader may notice. And if any farther apology be necessary, it may be
found in the fact, that the entire contents of the volume as it is now
presented, were written in the midst of other pressing duties.--And the
same reason has prevented my giving the work such a thorough revision,
as it should have had, before it was presented to the public, in the
more set and imposing form of a book. Such a form was not originally
thought of--and now that this is called for, the author is well aware
that the public might expect a careful revision and correction of the
whole. From this however, he must, of _necessity_, be excused. He has
been able to do little more than correct the typographical errors. If
the public have it, therefore, it must go "with all its imperfections on
its head." Only let it be understood, that _I do not send it out_. The
publishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The
doctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture,
although some of the arguments by which they are defended may be found
defective.
It was my original design to have added one or two numbers on election;
but upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough had been said
in the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if Calvinian
predestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency and
regeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole superstructure must
fall of course. On these points therefore, we may safely rest the entire
question between us and the Calvinists.
W. Fisk.
_Wesleyan University, April_ 28, 1835.
A DISCOURSE
ON
PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.
According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the
world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.
Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ,
to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4,
5.
In this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election
are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting
them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational
view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present
discourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole
ground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the
various arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the
most able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that
can now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form
and manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the
circumstances of the present congregation.
It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the
spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and
Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a
desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to
point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable
influences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth
should be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject,
nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these
views, we come to our subject, by examining,
I. Predestination in general;
II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of
election.
I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to
bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has
knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future
events; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be
used in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is
that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity,
respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and
creatures of the universe.--That God hath a predetermination of this
kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be
no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to
which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this
subject, says, "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by
the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was
ordained by him." The Assembly's Catechism is similar:--"God did, from
all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass." And Mr. Buck
defines predestination to mean, "The decree of God, whereby he hath, for
his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass." With these
definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the
Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of
predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have
objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings,
so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not
definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose
and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe,
with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the
physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all
the various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that
it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human
will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us,
they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon
them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of
their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1]
The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a
threefold argument--the foreknowledge of God--the necessity of a
plan--and Scripture testimony.
1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes
contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This,
however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is
self-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations;
and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms,
they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct
operations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind,
unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an
entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among
men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible
argument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily _implies_
predestination. "For how," they ask, "can an action that is really to
come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every
thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had
not so determined it." "God," says Piscator, "foresees nothing but what
he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says,
"God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he
has decreed they shall come to pass." But to this idea there are
insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the
Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential
to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make
a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection
of his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him,
that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be,
under any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd,
then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend
upon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend
upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument,
that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought,
and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute
preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be
exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous
conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with
it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine
events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent
on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived,
independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the
effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of
those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will
not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous
to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this
conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us,
therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of
cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent
upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of
his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth
from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords
with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did
predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according
to the foreknowledge of God the Father." In these passages
predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on
foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows
in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to
foreknow.[2]
But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. "The
foreknowledge of God," it is said, "is tantamount to a decree; because,
inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take
place--his knowledge makes it certain." This is indeed shifting the
argument; for if God's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is
not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing
contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge,
which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at,
that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd.
Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God's
foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse
than unmeaning: "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate," would
mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate"--and, "Elect
according to the foreknowledge of God," would only mean, "that the
decree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!" the
absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged,
farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge
cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in
making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the
certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that
knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a
connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will
undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event
take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will
take place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain
because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it
certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for
he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert
that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to
that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be
foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that
foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain.
Since, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not,
according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a
consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain,
no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the
doctrine that _God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass_.
2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. "It
cannot be conceived," it is said, "that God would leave things at
random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place
upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way." But this
argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes
what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been
proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that God
has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one
part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without
controlling their will, by a fixed decree--to punish the incorrigible,
and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the
necessity of a change, "on condition that his creatures act in this or
that way?" If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in
order to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen
to be false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity
and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities
and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his
plan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does
not, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of
his subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no
knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and
extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government
undergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of
the subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of
the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate
the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The
truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of God; for the
perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the
imperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords
well with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and
through eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge--as he is in
every point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long
eternity--and can such a God be disappointed?
3. "But," say the advocates of this system, "supposing there are
difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages which
at once prove the doctrine." If this is true, then indeed we must
submit. But the question is, where are these passages? After such a
strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one
unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single
passage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever
comes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in
Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because God
hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all
things. All those passages then which have been so frequently quoted as
proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God hath
predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the
passages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say
of certain events that have come to pass, that God did not _command_
them, nor _will_ them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems
altogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however,
that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are
held responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of God's
predetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are.
This general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises;
nevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from
Scripture that God holds his creatures responsible for the results of
his own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward
off the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is
consistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible for
one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same
principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all
were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, "As for you," says
Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, "ye thought
evil against me, but God meant it for good." Now without stopping here
to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are
ready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures
which teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, God
had a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them
subservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power "to make the
wrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath." But
does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary
to the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that
because a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer
from the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government
decreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of
the nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and
control the _results_ of an act is altogether different from making the
act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power.
Again it is said, "The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even
the wicked for the day of evil." That the Lord hath made all things for
his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust,
by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this
passage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted
at all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked,
that he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the
text speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to
explain it thus--The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil,
and this shall be for his glory.
But there is another class of passages like the following:--"He doeth
according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants
of the earth." "He worketh all things after the counsel of his will." "I
will do all my pleasure." But these passages establish nothing, in
opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other
passages, or in some other way, that it is God's will and pleasure to
work _all things_, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures
prove that all _God's works_ are in accordance with his own will and
pleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of
sinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave
the responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this
he will do, for "he will do all his pleasure."
But there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to favour
the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those passages
which seem to represent God as bringing about and procuring the
wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:--"And I will harden
Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let the people go." "Now therefore
the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy
prophets." "He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts." "Him,
being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye
have taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain." On these
and similar passages it may be remarked, that God blinds men and hardens
their hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their
agency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does
not make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree
of wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this
hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men
and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and
tormenting each other; and therefore God gives them power and liberty to
go abroad, "deceiving and being deceived." But how does this prove that
God hath decreed sin? The idea that God hath made sin and wicked spirits
the instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and
finally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of
affinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this
hardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit.
As to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ
was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or
any other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ
by wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God. If any think otherwise, let them prove it.
Having stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments in
favour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge against
this doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and insufficient,
but also that the system itself is liable to the most serious and
formidable objections.
1. This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin. Some
acknowledge this, and expressly assert, that God is the "_efficient_
cause" of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word.
Take for instance the words of Calvin. "I will not scruple to own," he
says, "that the will of God lays a necessity on all things, and that
every thing he wills, necessarily comes to pass." In accordance with
this, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, that "God
procures adultery, cursings, and lyings"--"God is the author of that
act, which is evil"--"God, by his working on the hearts of the wicked,
binds them and stirs them to do evil." They deny, however, that God is
the author of sin, because they say, "God necessitates them to the
_act_, and not to the _depravity_ of sin:" or, that "God does not sin
when he makes men sin, because _he_ is under no law, and therefore
cannot sin." But these are miserable shifts. Has not the _deformity_ of
sin come to pass? Then God has decreed this deformity. To deny this, is
to give up the doctrine. But to acknowledge it, is to own that God is as
much the author of the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, God
doubtless decreed that sin should be _sin_, and not _holiness;_ and it
came to pass as sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the
direct procuring cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are
nothing but evasions. The _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as certainly
as it made the world.
We are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that
these are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and that
they ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the fact is, we
make them accountable only for the logical consequences of their own
doctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, "God foreordains
whatsoever comes to pass." For he that, by his will and decree, produces
and causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of his plan, and is the
author of the very elements and materials of his own plan, must be the
proper and sole cause of sin, or we have yet to learn the definition of
common words, and the meaning of plain propositions. The distinction
therefore, of _ancient_ and _modern_, of _rigid_ and _moderate_
Calvinists, is more in word, than in reality. And it would add much to
the consistency of this system, if all its advocates would acknowledge,
what is evidently deducible from the premises, that God is the efficient
cause of sin.
2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of
course the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was seen
and acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And the
opposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently assailed them on this
subject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the
Calvinists called this doctrine of free will, "a cursed doctrine"--"the
most God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine of the day"--"one of
the prominent features of the beast"--"the enemy of God"--"the offspring
of the wicked one"--"the insolent brat of hell." Others, and the greater
part of the Calvinists of the present day, endeavour to reconcile the
ideas of _necessity_ and _free agency_. Man, they say, sins voluntarily,
because he chooses or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence
they exhort sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they
will. By which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is
in their will--their _cannot_ is their _will not_. This has led many to
think that there is no difference, between their preachers and the
Arminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if there is
not some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of words. God,
according to this doctrine, secures the end as well as the means, by his
decree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin says, "every action
and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God."
The will, therefore, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly
controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling
arrangement. It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency
under such a constitution; the very spring of motion to the whole
intellectual machinery is under the influence of a secret, invincible
power. And it _must_ move as that power directs, or it is the hand of
Omnipotence that urges it on. He _can_ act as he _wills_, it is true,
but the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the
result of God's propelling power. He wills as he is _made_ to will--he
chooses as he _must_ choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon
him. And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged
principles of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is
argued, I know, that man is responsible, because he _feels_ that he acts
freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that
this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are
free--but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath
deceived us. He has made us _feel_ that we might do otherwise, but _he
knows_ we _cannot_--he has _determined_ we _shall not_. So that, in
fact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it does
not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the
Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man
is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral agent, to be
free, must be possessed of a self-determining principle. Make the will
any thing short of this, and you put all the volitions, and of course
the whole moral man, under foreign and irresistible influences.
3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays
God's secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men not to
sin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets before
them, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for the express
purpose, as he informs us, "that they sin not;" but by his
predestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an
opposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine informs us,
to secure their transgression. _His_ rule of action is in direct
opposition to _our_ rule of duty. And yet he is the author of both! Is
God at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his
creatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the premises are
false? When or where has God ever taught us, that he has two opposing
wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not,
without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adorable
Jehovah. In his word, we are taught, that he is "of _one_ mind"--that
his "ways are equal;" and who can doubt it? We are told, it is true, to
relieve the difficulty, that this seeming contradiction is one of the
mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a _seeming_
contradiction, it is a _real_ one; not an insolvable mystery, but a
palpable absurdity. _God prohibits the sinful act--God ordains and
procures the sinful act--God wills the salvation of the reprobate, whom
he has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death!_ When I
can embrace such opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can
believe that two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less
than the whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at
the same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of God's
incomprehensible nature.
4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added,
that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of
God. If he holds men responsible for what is unavoidable--if he makes
laws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for
their transgressions--if he mourns over the evils of the world, and
expostulates with sinners, saying, "How can I give thee up--my heart is
melted within me, my repentings are kindled together,"--"O Jerusalem!
Jerusalem! how oft would I have gathered you, and ye would not,"--and
still he himself "impels the will of men," to all this wickedness--if I
say God does all this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where
is his justice? What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant?
What, of the most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does
this doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out
into its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough
to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the supporters
of this system _must_ adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their
eyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them
wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical
and practical errors. Indeed, in many instances it has done this--which
leads to another objection to this doctrine.
5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in
their sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason thus:
Whatever God decrees is according to his will, and therefore right. And
God will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever God decrees
is unavoidable, and God will not punish his creatures for what is
unavoidable. But "every action and motion of every creature is governed
by the hidden counsel of God." Therefore God will not punish any of his
creatures for any of their acts. Now, who can point out any fallacy in
this reasoning? If therefore predestination be true, Universalism is
true, according to the universally acknowledged principles of justice.
And it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is
prevailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support
on the doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought,
that the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, and
that matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, inasmuch
as men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their sins, have
leaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and philosophical
necessity. I have personally known numbers who have been driven, by the
doctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And it is well known, that
the doctrine of fate, which is closely allied to Calvinian
predestination, is the element in which infidelity "lives and moves and
has its being." And can this be the doctrine of the Bible? How much is
it to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim fathers should have sowed
this Geneva seed in our happy country! The evils done to the Church are
incalculable.
These, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this
doctrine--objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that you
may well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? It is,
doubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the doctrine of
unconditional election, and what have been called by Calvinists "the
doctrines of grace." But for unconditional election, predestination
would not be desired, even by those who now hold to it; and but for
predestination, unconditional election could not be maintained. Hence
these have very properly been called "twin doctrines," and must stand or
fall together. Let us pass then to the next proposition.
II. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to
election.
Several kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is an
election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by
God:--thus Christ was God's elect, for the redemption of the world; and
Cyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an election of
whole communities and nations to the enjoyment of certain peculiar
privileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating of course to this
life:--thus Jacob and his descendants were God's chosen people, to the
enjoyment of religious and national privileges, from which Esau and his
descendants, together with the whole Gentile world, were excluded; and
thus, too, subsequently, the middle wall of partition, made by the
former decree of election between Jew and Gentile, being broken down,
the Gentiles became equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the
new covenant, called the "election of grace." This election is
unconditional, and is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and
many other passages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more
particularly in another place.
There is a third election--an election unto eternal life, and this is
the one which has given rise to the great controversy in the
Church.--Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us,
maintain that, "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his
glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and
others foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that are
predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world, hath
chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, _without any foresight of
faith or good works_." Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that
"God did decree from the beginning, to elect, or choose in Christ, all
that should believe unto salvation, and this decree proceeds from his
own goodness, and is not built on any goodness of the creature; and that
God did from the beginning decree to reprobate all who should finally
and obstinately continue in unbelief." Thus it is seen, from the
statement of the two doctrines, that ours is an election of character,
and so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them only as they
are foreseen to possess that character; whereas the other relates
directly to individuals, without any reference to character. It is an
absolute act of sovereignty--God elects them for no other reason or
condition than because he chooses. He makes no account of man's agency
or responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is
entirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. Our
views of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally dependent on
the responsible agency of man. In the one case, the sinner is made to
receive Christ, because he is elected; and in the other, he is elected,
because he receives Christ. From this difference, too, proceed other
differences. The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself,
requires that, as the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be
also--hence the doctrines of irresistible grace, effectual calling, and
infallible perseverance. Calvinian election, therefore, stands
intimately allied to Calvinian predestination; and the whole forms a
chain of doctrines differing materially from ours. And here we
acknowledge we have a position to prove as well as our opponents. We
assert that election to eternal life is conditional; they, that it is
unconditional. We will first attempt to prove our position--then state
and answer the arguments in favour of unconditional election--and
finally, urge some objections against unconditional election and
reprobation.
1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal life,
is drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of God
are predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, that the decree of
election to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the
Divine prescience. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through
sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood
of Jesus Christ." "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be
conformed to the image of his Son." These scriptures seem to us
decisive, that the decree of election rests on foreknowledge, and that
this election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on
the ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore,
that men are predestinated to eternal life, "without any foresight of
faith or good works," must be false.
2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, can
only exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free
moral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man must
believe and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to believe and
obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do this, and
criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doctrine of
free agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, if it
has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its
responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will.
And if this view of the will be correct, there is an _utter
impossibility_ of an unconditional election. For the very act of God,
imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible,
in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral
agent, unconditionally. The argument stands thus--The Scriptures make
man a responsible moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be
controlled by foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so
controlled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining
principle, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This being
established, we argue again--The doctrine of unconditional election
necessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely impelling and
controlling the will. But this would be to counteract God's own work,
and to destroy man's accountability; therefore there is no such
irresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional election. And
since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the Scriptures,
it follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, that this
election is conditional.--Hence we may bring forward, in one
overwhelming argument, all the numerous and various Bible conditions of
salvation, as so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election.
3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, and
the possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture proofs of a
conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted "to take heed
lest they fall?" "lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in
departing from the living God?" "lest a promise being left of entering
into rest, any should come short?" lest _they_ should "also be cut off?"
Why should St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he
should be a castaway? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's
being lost. If not, then all these passages are not only without
meaning, but savour very strongly of deception. They are false colours
held out to the elect, for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear
is. Will it be said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of
the elect, and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be
cautioned and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and
no promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to _stand
fast_, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates
against the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it intimates
a very ungracious work for the "Spirit of grace" to be engaged in,
clearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the decree of
reprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these scriptures mean?
Will it be said, as some have argued, that these warnings and cautions
are all consistent, because they are the very means by which the decree
of election is made sure? But let it be understood, that the end is
fixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that this election
is "independent of any faith or good works foreseen," and that "God's
decree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he wills
necessarily comes to pass," and is therefore sure, "because he has
decreed it." The moment, therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes
sure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a
falsehood, or that God's decree can be _broken_. But Calvinists, I
presume, will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or
frustrating the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the
elect's coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and
warnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours and
deceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who
undertake to frighten their children into obedience, by superstitious
tales and groundless fears. God knows, when he is giving out these
intimations of danger, that there is no such danger; his own eternal,
unchangeable decree had secured their salvation before the means were
planned--all this if election is unconditional. But far be this from a
God of truth. If he exhorts his creatures to "make their election sure,"
_he_ has not made it sure.--If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail
of the grace of God, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion
therefore is irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of
election to eternal life, on conditions; "He that believeth: shall be
saved."
4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that produces
much fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? Why does he
feel that there is but a step between him and destruction? Is it fancy,
or is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm is
founded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the Spirit
of God hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, in
order to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion
of one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said,
that it is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the
decree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore,
it is conditional.
5. Express passages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We have
time only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, "For many are called,
but few are chosen." This passage, with the parable of the wedding that
precedes it, teaches that the _choice_ was made subsequently to the
call, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen had actually and
fully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding duly
prepared. John xv, 19, "If ye were of the world, the world would love
you, but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of
the world, therefore the world hateth you." This passage teaches that
Christ's disciples were once of the world, and that he had chosen them
out of the world, and this _choice_ evidently refers to that time when
they became of a different character from the world; for then it was,
and in consequence of that election, that the world hated them.--2
Thess. ii, 13, "Because God hath from the beginning, _chosen_ you to
salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the
truth." Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an election
_unto_ sanctification, but an election _through_ or _by_ sanctification
and faith unto salvation.
From the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine
attributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to an
unconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election.
In opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of
unconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, which, as
they think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in favour of their
system. And as these scriptures are their strong and only defence, it is
proposed that they should be noticed. The limits of this discourse,
however, will admit of but a short notice, and that not of individual
texts, but of classes of texts.