COMMISSIONED IN THE NAVY--HOISTS THE FIRST FLAG--EXPEDITION TO NEW
PROVIDENCE--ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GLASGOW.
The honor of initiative in the origin of the American navy belongs to
Rhode Island, a doughty little State which, for its area, possesses
more miles of seaboard than any other. On Tuesday, October 3, 1775,
the delegates from Rhode Island introduced in the Continental Congress
a resolution which had been passed by the General Assembly of the
province on August 26th of the same year, in which, among other
things, the said delegates were instructed to "use their whole
influence, at the ensuing Congress, for building, at the Continental
expense, a fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these
colonies, and for employing them in such manner and places as will
most effectually annoy our enemies, and contribute to the common
defense of these colonies."
Consideration of the resolution was twice postponed, but it was
finally discussed on the 7th of October and referred to a committee.
On the 13th of October the committee reported, and Congress so far
accepted the Rhode Island suggestion that the following resolution was
passed:
"_Resolved_, That a swift sailing vessel, to carry ten carriage guns
and a proportionate number of swivels with eighty men, be fitted with
all possible dispatch for a cruise of three months, and that the
commander be instructed to cruise eastward for intercepting such
transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for
our enemies, and for such other purposes as the Congress shall
direct." Another vessel was also ordered fitted out for the same
purpose.
Messrs. Deane, Langden, and Gadsden were appointed a committee to
carry out the instructions embodied in the resolution. When the
committee submitted a report, on the 30th of October, it was further
resolved "that the second vessel ordered to be fitted out on the 13th
inst. be of such size as to carry fourteen guns and a proportionate
number of swivels and men." Two other vessels were also ordered to be
put into service, one to carry not more than twenty and the other not
more than thirty-six guns, "for the protection and defense of the
United Colonies, as the Congress shall direct."
This may be considered as the real and actual beginning of the
American navy. There had been numerous naval encounters between
vessels of war of the enemy and private armed vessels acting under the
authority of the various colonies; and Washington himself, with the
approval of the Congress, which passed some explicit resolutions on
the subject on October 5th, had made use of the individual colonial
naval forces, and had issued commissions to competent men empowering
them to cruise and intercept the transports and other vessels laden
with powder and supplies for the enemy, but no formal action looking
to the creation of a regular naval force had been taken heretofore.
Congress had long clung to the hope of reconciliation with the mother
country, and had been exceedingly loath to take the radical step
involved in the establishment of a navy, for in the mind of the
Anglo-Saxon, who always claimed supremacy on the sea, a navy is
primarily for offense. To constitute a navy for defense alone is to
invite defeat. Aggression and initiative are of the essence of success
in war on the sea. Now, in the peculiar condition in which the United
Colonies found themselves, a naval force could be used for no other
purpose than offense. The capacity of any navy which the colonies
could hope to create, for defensive warfare, would be so slender as to
be not worth the outlay, and the creation of a navy to prey upon the
enemy's commerce and to take such of his armed vessels as could be
overcome would controvert the fiction that we were simply resisting
oppression. It would be making war in the most unmistakable way.
It is a singular thing that men have been willing to do, or condone
the doing of, things on land which they have hesitated to do or
condone on the sea. The universal diffusion of such sentiments is seen
in the absurdly illogical contention on the part of the British
Government subsequently, that, although a soldier on land was a rebel,
he could be treated as a belligerent; while a man who stood in exactly
the same relation to the King of England whose field of action
happened to be the sea was of necessity a pirate.
At any rate, by the acts of Congress enumerated, a navy was assembled,
and the plan of Rhode Island was adopted. It was Rhode Island, by the
way, which, by preamble and resolution, sundered its allegiance to
Great Britain just two months to a day before the Declaration of
Independence. To the naval committee already constituted, Stephen
Hopkins, Richard Henry Lee, John Adams, and Joseph Hewes were soon
added. The committee at once undertook the work of carrying out the
instructions they had received. On the 5th of November they selected
for the command of the proposed navy Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, a
brother of the famous Stephen Hopkins who was a member of the
committee and one of the most influential members of the Congress.
Other officers were commissioned from time to time as selections were
made, and commissions and orders were issued to them by the committee,
subject, of course, to the ratification or other action by the
Congress. Paul Jones' commission as a lieutenant, as has been stated,
was dated the 7th of December, 1775.
Esek Hopkins, who was born in 1718, was therefore fifty-seven years of
age. He had been a master mariner for thirty years. He was a man of
condition and substance who had traded in his own ships in all the
then visited parts of the globe. As a commander of privateers and
letters of marque he was not without experience in arms. He had been
created a brigadier general of the Rhode Island militia on the
threatened outbreak of hostilities, a position he resigned to take
command of the navy. On the 22d of December Congress confirmed the
nomination of Hopkins as commander-in-chief, and regularly appointed
the following officers:
Captains:
Dudley Saltonstall,
Abraham Whipple,
Nicholas Biddle,
John Burroughs Hopkins.
First Lieutenants:
John Paul Jones,
Rhodes Arnold,
---- Stansbury,
Hoysted Hacker,
Jonathan Pitcher.
Second Lieutenants:
Benjamin Seabury,
Joseph Olney,
Elisha Warner,
Thomas Weaver,
---- McDougall.
Third Lieutenants:
John Fanning,
Ezekiel Burroughs,
Daniel Vaughan.
These were, therefore, the forerunners of that long line of
distinguished naval officers who have borne the honorable commission
of the United States.
In addition to the regular course pursued, other action bearing upon
the subject of naval affairs was had. On Saturday, November, 25th,
Congress, enraged by the burning of Falmouth, adopted radical
resolutions, looking toward the capture and confiscation of armed
British vessels and transports, directing the issuance of commissions
to the captains of cruisers and privateers, and creating admiralty
courts and prescribing a scheme for distributing prize money. On
November 28th resolutions prescribing "Regulations for the Government
of the Navy of the United Colonies" were adopted, the first appearance
of that significant phrase in the records, by the way.
On December 5th the seizure of merchant vessels engaging in trade
between the Tories of Virginia and the West Indies under the
inspiration of Lord Dunmore, was ordered. On December 11th a special
committee to devise ways and means for "furnishing these colonies with
a naval armament" was appointed. Two days later the report of the
committee was adopted, and thirteen ships were ordered built, five of
thirty-two, five of twenty-eight, and three of twenty-four guns. They
were to be constructed one in New Hampshire, two in Massachusetts, one
in Connecticut, two in Rhode Island, two in New York, four in
Pennsylvania, and one in Maryland; the maximum cost of each of them
was sixty-six thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six
and two thirds cents. They had a fine idea of accuracy in the
construction corps of that day.
But, while Congress had been therefore preparing to build the navy,
the regular marine committee had not been idle. By strenuous effort
the committee assembled a squadron. A merchant vessel called the Black
Prince, which had lately arrived from London under the command of John
Barry (afterward a famous American commodore), was purchased and
renamed the Alfred, after King Alfred the Great, who is commonly
believed to be the founder of the British navy. She was a small,
stanch trading vessel, very heavily timbered, and with unusually stout
scantlings for a ship of her class, although of course not equal to a
properly constructed ship of war. The committee armed her with twenty
9-pounders on the main deck, and four smaller guns, possibly 6- or
4-pounders, on the forecastle and poop, and she was placed under the
command of Captain Dudley Saltonstall. Jones, whose name stood first
on the list of first lieutenants, was appointed her executive officer.
Hopkins selected her for his flagship. Jones had been offered the
command of one of the smaller vessels of the squadron, but elected to
fill his present station, as presenting more opportunities for
acquiring information and seeing service. His experience in armed
vessels had been limited; he knew but little of the requirements of a
man-of-war, and deemed he could best fit himself for that higher
command to which he aspired and determined to deserve by beginning his
service under older and more experienced officers--a wise decision.
The next important vessel was another converted merchantman,
originally called the Sally, now named the Columbus, after the great
discoverer. She was a full-rigged ship of slightly less force and
armament than the Alfred, commanded by Captain Abraham Whipple,
already distinguished in a privateering way. In addition to these
there were two brigs called the Andrea Doria and the Cabot, commanded
by Captains Nicholas Biddle and John Burroughs Hopkins, a son of the
commander-in-chief. The Andrea Doria and Cabot carried fourteen
4-pounders each.
Hopkins arrived at Philadelphia in December, 1775, in the brig Katy,
of the Rhode Island navy, which was at once taken into the Continental
service and renamed the Providence, after the commander's native town.
She carried twelve light guns, 4-pounders. There were also secured a
ten-gun schooner called the Hornet, and the Wasp and Fly, two
eight-gun schooners or tenders, one of which Jones had refused. The
work of outfitting these ships as generously as the meager resources
of the colonies permitted had been carried on assiduously before the
arrival of the commander-in-chief, whose first duty, when he reached
Philadelphia, was formally to assume the command.
This assumption of command entailed the putting of the ships in
commission by publicly reading the orders appointing the commodore,
and assigning him to command, and hoisting and saluting the flags. The
officers previously appointed had been proceeding somewhat
irregularly, doubtless, by going on with their preparations prior to
this important ceremony. At any rate, in the latter part of December,
1775, or the early part of January, 1776--the date not being clear,
the authorities not only differing, but in no single case venturing
upon a definite statement--all things having been made ready,
Commodore Hopkins with his staff officers entered the commodore's
barge, lying at the foot of Walnut Street, and was rowed to the
flagship. The wharves and houses facing the river were crowded with
spectators to witness so momentous a ceremony as the commissioning of
the first American fleet.
It has been recorded that it was a bright, cold, clear winter morning.
The barge picked its way among the floating ice cakes of the Delaware,
and finally reached the Alfred. The commodore mounted the side,
followed by his staff, and was received with due honors in the gangway
by the captain and his officers in such full dress as they could
muster. The crew and the marines were drawn up in orderly ranks in the
waist and on the quarter deck. After the reading of the commodore's
commission and the orders assigning him to the command of the fleet,
Captain Dudley Saltonstall nodded his head to John Paul Jones, his
executive officer. The young Scotsman, with, I imagine, a heart
beating rarely, stepped forward and received from the veteran
quartermaster the end of the halliards, to which, in the shape of a
neatly rolled-up ball, was bent a handsome yellow silk flag, bearing
the representation of a rattlesnake about to strike (and perhaps a
pine tree also), with the significant legend "Don't tread on me." With
his own hands the young lieutenant hauled the rolled-up ensign to the
masthead, and then, with a slight twitch, he broke the stops and there
blew out in the morning breeze, before the eyes of the commodore, his
officers, the men of the ships, and the delighted spectators on shore,
the first flag that ever flew from a regularly commissioned war ship
of the United Colonies. The grand union flag, a red and white striped
ensign with the English cross in the canton, was also hoisted. The
flags were saluted by the booming of cannon from the batteries of the
ships, and with cheers from the officers and men of the squadron and
the people on the shore, and thus the transaction was completed, and
the navy of the United States began to be.
The ships were slight in force, their equipments meager and deficient,
and of inferior quality at best. The men had but little experience in
naval warfare, and their officers scarcely much more. There were men
of undoubted courage and capacity among them, however, and several to
whom the profession of arms was not entirely new. At least two of
them, Jones and Biddle, were to become forever famous for their
fighting. Compared with the huge and splendid navy of England, the
whole force was an unconsidered trifle, but it was a beginning, and
not a bad one at that, as the mother country was to find out. The
outfitting of the squadron was by no means complete, and, though the
commodore with the others labored hard, the work proceeded slowly and
with many hindrances and delays; it was never properly done. Then the
ships were ice-bound in Delaware Bay, and it was not until nearly two
months had elapsed that they were able to get to sea.
The principal difficulty in the rebellious colonies, from the
standpoint of military affairs, was the scarcity of powder. There were
guns in respectable numbers, but without powder they were necessarily
useless. The powder mills of the colonies were few and far between,
and their output was inadequate to meet the demand. It is now well
known that although Washington maintained a bold front when he
invested the British army in Boston, at times his magazines did not
contain more than a round or two of powder for each of his guns. His
position was a magnificent specimen of what in modern colloquialism
would have been called a "bluff." There was, of course, but little
powder to spare for the improvised men-of-war, and most of what they
had was borrowed from the colony of Pennsylvania. To get powder was
the chief end of military men then.
On February 17, 1776, the little squadron cleared the capes of the
Delaware, and before nightfall had disappeared from view beneath the
southeast horizon. It appears that the orders were for Hopkins to sail
along the coast toward the south, disperse Dunmore's squadron, which
was marauding in Virginia, pick up English coasting vessels, and
capture scattered English ships cruising between Pennsylvania and
Georgia to break up the colonial coasting trade and capture colonial
merchantmen. But it also appears from letters of the Marine Committee
that another object of the expedition was the seizure of large stores
of powder and munitions of warfare which had been allowed to
accumulate at New Providence, in the Bahama group, and that Hopkins
sailed with much discretion as to his undertaking and the means of
carrying it out. The Bahama project was maintained as a profound
secret between the naval committee and its commodore, the matter not
being discussed in Congress even.
With that end in view the commander-in-chief, by orders published to
the fleet before its departure, appointed the island of Abaco, one of
the most northerly of the Bahama group, as a rendezvous for his
vessels in case they became separated by the usual vicissitudes of the
sea. The scattered ships were directed to make an anchorage off the
southern part of the island, and wait at least fourteen days for the
other vessels to join them before cruising on their own account in
such directions as in the judgment of their respective commanders
would most annoy, harass, and damage the enemy.
Shortly after leaving the capes the squadron ran into a severe
easterly gale off Hatteras, then, as now, one of the most dangerous
points on the whole Atlantic seaboard. The ships beat up against it,
and all succeeded in weathering the cape and escaping the dreaded
perils of the lee shore. If lack of training prevented the officers
from claiming to be naval experts, there were prime seamen among them
at any rate. When the gale abated Hopkins cruised along the coast for
a short time, meeting nothing of importance in the way of a ship.
Rightly concluding that the fierce winter weather would have induced
the enemy's vessels to seek shelter in the nearest harbors, and his
cruise in that direction, if further continued, would be profitless,
he squared away for the Bahamas, to carry out the second and secret
part of his instructions.
It was for a long time alleged that he took this action on his own
account, and one of the charges against him in the popular mind was
disobedience of orders in so doing; but he was undoubtedly within his
orders in the course which he took, and it is equally certain that the
enterprise upon which he was about to engage was one in which more
immediate profit would accrue to the colonies than in any other. He
should be held not only guiltless in the matter, but awarded praise
for his decision. On the 1st of March the squadron, with the exception
of the Hornet and the Fly, which had parted company in the gale,
reached the island of Abaco, about forty miles to the northward of New
Providence.
No part of the western hemisphere had been longer known than the
Bahamas. Upon one of them Columbus landed. The principal island among
them, not on account of its size, which was insignificant, but because
it possessed a commodious and land-locked harbor, is the island of New
Providence. No island in the great archipelago which forms the
northeastern border of the Caribbean had enjoyed a more eventful
history. From time immemorial it had been the haunt of the buccaneer
and the pirate. From it had sailed many expeditions to ravage the
Spanish Main. It had been captured and recaptured by the successive
nationalities which had striven for domination in the Caribbean, and
in their brutal rapacity had made a hell of every verdant tropic
island which lifted itself in the gorgeous beauty peculiar to those
latitudes, above the deep blue of that lambent sea. It had come
finally and definitely under the English crown, and a civilized
government had been established by the notorious Woodes Rogers, who
was himself a sort of Jonathan Wild of the sea, but one remove--and
that not a great one--from the gentry whose nests he broke up and
whose ravages he had put down. It had been taken since then by the
Spaniards, but had been restored to the British.
The town of Nassau, which lies upon the northern face of the island,
is situated upon the side of a hill which slopes gently down toward
the water. The harbor, which is sufficiently deep to accommodate
vessels drawing not more than twelve feet, is formed by a long island
which lies opposite the town. There are two entrances to the harbor,
only one of which was practicable for large ships, though both were
open for small vessels. At the ends of the harbor, commanding each
entrance, two forts had been erected: Fort Montague on the east and
Fort Nassau on the west. Through culpable negligence, in spite of the
quantity of military stores it contained, there was not a single
regular soldier on the island at that time, and no preparations for
defense had been made.
It was proposed to make the descent upon the western end of the island
and then march up and take the town in the rear. Paul Jones, however,
in the council which was held on the Alfred before the debarkation,
pointed out the greater distance which the men would have to march in
that case, the alarm which would be given by the passage of the ships,
and advised that a landing be effected upon the eastern end of the
island, whence the attack could be more speedily delivered, and, as
the ships would not be compelled to advance, no previous alarm would
be given. Hopkins demurred to this plan on the ground that no safe
anchorage for the ships was afforded off the eastern end. The Alfred
had taken two pilots from some coasting vessels which had been
captured, and from them it was learned that about ten miles away was a
small key which would afford the larger vessels safe anchorage. As
Hopkins hesitated to trust the pilots, Jones, at the peril of his
commission, offered in conjunction with them to bring the ships up
himself. His suggestions were agreed to, his offer accepted, and when
the vicinity of the key was reached he took his station on the
fore-topmast crosstrees of the Alfred. He had sailed in the West
Indian waters many times, and was familiar with the look of the sea
and the indications near the shore. With the assistance of the pilots,
after a somewhat exciting passage, he succeeded in bringing all the
ships to a safe anchorage. That he was willing to take the risk, and,
having done so, successfully carry out the difficult undertaking,
gives a foretaste of his bold and decisive character, and of his
technical skill as well.
Preparations for attack were quickly made. Commodore Hopkins, having
impressed some local schooners, loaded them with two hundred and fifty
marines from the squadron, under the command of Captain Samuel
Nichols, the ranking officer of the corps, and fifty seamen under the
command of Lieutenant Thomas Weaver of the Cabot, and on March 2d the
transports with this attacking force were dispatched to New
Providence.[3] They were convoyed by the Providence and the Wasp, and
a landing was effected under the cover of these two ships of war.
Unfortunately, however, some of the other larger vessels got under way
at the same time, and their appearance alarmed the town.
It never seems to have occurred to any one but Jones that the west
exit from the harbor should be guarded by stationing two of the
smaller vessels off the channel to close it while the rest of the
squadron took care of the eastern end. It seems probable from his
correspondence that he ventured upon the suggestion, for he
specifically referred in condemnatory terms to the failure to do so.
At any rate, if he did suggest it, and from his known capacity it is
extremely likely that the obvious precaution would have occurred to
him, his suggestion was disregarded, and the western pass from the
harbor was left open--a fatal mistake.
The point where the expedition landed without opposition was some four
and a half miles from Fort Montague. It was a bright Sunday morning
when the first American naval brigade took up its march under Captain
Nichols' orders. The men advanced steadily, and, though they were met
by a discharge of cannon from Fort Montague, they captured the works
by assault without loss, the militia garrison flying precipitately
before the American advance. The marines behaved with great spirit on
this occasion, as they have ever done. Instead of promptly moving down
upon the other fort, however, they contented themselves during that
day with their bloodless achievement, and not until the next morning
did they advance to complete the capture of the place.
The inhabitants of the island were in a state of panic, and when the
marines and sailors marched up to attack Fort Nassau they found it
empty of any garrison except Governor Brown, who opened the gates and
formally surrendered it to the Americans. During the confusion of the
night Brown seems to have preserved his presence of mind, and rightly
divining that the powder would be the most precious of all the
munitions of warfare in his charge, he had caused a schooner which lay
in the harbor to be loaded with one hundred and fifty barrels, the
limit of its capacity, and before daybreak she set sail and made good
her escape through the unguarded western passage. A dreadful
misfortune that, which would not have occurred had Jones been in
command.
[Illustration: Map of attack on New Providence in the Bahamas.]
However, a large quantity of munitions of war of great value to the
struggling colonies fell into the hands of Hopkins' men, including
eighty-eight cannon, ranging in size from 9- to 36-pounders, fifteen
large mortars, over eleven thousand round shot, and twenty precious
casks of powder. The Americans behaved with great credit in this
conquest. None of the inhabitants of the island were harmed, nor was
their property touched. It was a noble commentary on some of the
British forays along our own coast. Hopkins impressed a sloop,
promising to pay for its use and return it when he was through with
it, which promise was faithfully kept, and the sloop was loaded with
the stores, etc., which had been captured.
His own ships were also heavily laden with these military stores, the
Alfred in particular being so overweighted that it was almost
impossible to fight her main-deck guns, so near were they to the
waterline, except in the most favorable circumstances of wind and
weather.
Taking Governor Brown, who was afterward exchanged for General Lord
Stirling, and one or two other officials of importance as hostages on
board his fleet, Hopkins set sail for home on the 17th of March. He
had done his work expeditiously and well, but through want of
precaution which had been suggested by Jones, he had failed in part
when his success might have been complete. Still, he was bringing
supplies of great value, and his handsome achievement was an
auspicious beginning of naval operations. The squadron pursued its way
toward the United Colonies without any adventures or happenings worthy
of chronicle until the 4th of April, when off the east end of Long
Island they captured the schooner Hawk, carrying six small guns. On
the 5th of April the bomb vessel Bolton, eight guns, forty-eight men,
filled with stores of arms and powder, was captured without loss.
On the 6th, shortly after midnight, the night being dark, the wind
gentle, the sea smooth, and the ships very much scattered, swashing
along close-hauled on the starboard tack between Block Island and the
Rhode Island coast, they made out a large ship, under easy sail,
coming down the wind toward the squadron. It was the British sloop of
war Glasgow, twenty guns and one hundred and fifty men, commanded by
Captain Tyringham Howe. She was accompanied by a small tender,
subsequently captured. The nearest ships of the American squadron
luffed up to have a closer look at the stranger, the men being sent to
quarters in preparation for any emergency. By half after two in the
morning the brig Cabot had come within a short distance of her. The
stranger now hauled her wind, and Captain John Burroughs Hopkins, the
son of the commodore, immediately hailed her. Upon ascertaining who
and what she was he promptly poured in a broadside from his small
guns, which was at once returned by the formidable battery of the
Glasgow. The unequal conflict was kept up with great spirit for a few
moments, but the Cabot alone was no match for the heavy English
corvette, and after a loss of four killed and several wounded,
including the captain severely, the Cabot, greatly damaged in hull and
rigging, fell away, and her place was taken by the Alfred, still an
unequal match for the English vessel, but more nearly approaching her
size and capacity.
The Andrea Doria now got within range and joined in the battle. For
some three hours in the night the ships sailed side by side, hotly
engaged. After a time the Columbus, Captain Whipple, which had been
farthest to leeward, succeeded in crossing the stern of the Glasgow,
and raked her as she was passing. The aim of the Americans was poor,
and instead of smashing her stern in and doing the damage which might
have been anticipated, the shot flew high and, beyond cutting the
Englishman up aloft, did no appreciable damage. The Providence, which
was very badly handled, managed to get in long range on the lee
quarter of the Glasgow and opened an occasional and ineffective fire
upon her. But the bulk of the fighting on the part of the Americans
was done by the Alfred.
Captain Howe maneuvered and fought his vessel with the greatest skill.
During the course of the action a lucky shot from the Glasgow carried
away the wheel ropes of the Alfred, and before the relieving tackles
could be manned and the damage repaired the American frigate broached
to and was severely raked several times before she could be got under
command. At daybreak Captain Howe, who had fought a most gallant fight
against overwhelming odds, perceived the hopelessness of continuing
the combat, and, having easily obtained a commanding lead on the
pursuing Americans, put his helm up and ran away before the wind for
Newport.
Hopkins followed him for a short distance, keeping up a fire from his
bow-chasers, but his deep-laden merchant vessels were no match in
speed for the swift-sailing English sloop of war, and, as with every
moment his little squadron with its precious cargo was drawing nearer
the English ships stationed at Newport, some of which had already
heard the firing and were preparing to get under way, Hopkins hauled
his wind, tacked and beat up for New London, where he arrived on the
8th of April with his entire squadron and the prizes they had taken,
with the exception of the Hawk, recaptured.
The loss on the Glasgow was one man killed and three wounded; on the
American squadron, ten killed and fourteen wounded, the loss being
confined mainly to the Alfred and the Cabot, the Columbus having but
one man wounded. During this action Paul Jones was stationed in
command of the main battery of the Alfred. He had nothing whatever to
do with the maneuvers of the ships, and was in no way responsible for
the escape of the Glasgow and the failure of the American force to
capture her.
The action did not reflect credit on the American arms. The Glasgow,
being a regular cruiser and of much heavier armament than any of the
American ships, was more than a match for any of them singly, though
taken together, if the personnel of the American squadron had been
equal to, or if it even approximated, that of the British ship, the
latter would have been captured without difficulty. The gun practice
of the Americans was very poor, which is not surprising. With the
exception of a very few of the officers, none of the Americans had
ever been in action, and they knew little about the fine art of
hitting a mark, especially at night. They had had no exercise in
target practice and but little in concerted fleet evolution. There
seems to have been no lack of courage except in the case of the
captain of the Providence, who was court-martialed for incapacity and
cowardice, and dismissed from the service. Hopkins' judgment in
withdrawing from the pursuit for the reasons stated can not be
questioned, neither can he be justly charged with the radical
deficiency of the squadron, though he was made to suffer for it.
While the Glasgow escaped, she did not get off scot free. She was
badly cut up in the hull, had ten shot through her mainmast, fifty-two
through her mizzen staysail, one hundred and ten through her mainsail,
and eighty-eight through her foresail. Her royal yards were carried
away, many of her spars badly wounded, and her rigging cut to pieces.
This catalogue tells the story. The Americans in their excitement and
inexperience had fired high, and their shot had gone over their mark.
The British defense had been a most gallant one, and the first attack
between the ships of the two navies had been a decided triumph for the
English.
Paul Jones' conduct in the main battery of the Alfred had been
entirely satisfactory to his superior officers. He, with the other
officers of that ship, was commended, and subsequent events showed
that he still held the confidence of the commodore.