pass over at once and directly to the region concerned with _the
government of human conduct_, with the view of illustrating in what
respects human life differs from merely animal life. On this single
test, I must here be content to rest an argument for the insufficiency
of physiology, and the necessity for observation of our own experience,
if we are to have an intelligible account of the most familiar
characteristics of human life. By way of securing a sharp contrast
serviceable for illustrative and argumentative purposes, I take an
extract from Mr. Darwin. His statement is this,--"There is no evidence
that any animal performs an action for the exclusive good of
another."[DG] Alongside of this statement, for the purpose of comparison
and contrast, let me place this. It is an essential law of human life,
having daily application, that man shall so act as to make the good of
his fellowman the express end of his action. This is a law of moral life
which we do not dream of applying to any lower order of beings, but
which we do regard as binding on all men equally. Explicit testimony to
this law of human life may be drawn from the philosophy of Greece and of
China in times so remote as to precede the Christian era, or from the
teaching of our Saviour, or from the daily life of men in any land in
this nineteenth century. The contrast is thus sharp enough, and it
presents the most perplexing difficulty for physiologists of the school
of Hæckel; while it affords the strongest line of evidence for that
philosophy which accounts for the higher characteristics of human life
by reference to mind as distinct from brain, and immeasurably higher in
function.
Whether Mr. Darwin's account of animal conduct will be uniformly
accepted by naturalists, need not concern us, as the possibility of
dissension would not seriously affect the argument, the main stress of
which must fall on these two points, that the law of pure benevolence is
a law of human life, and that the mere recognition of this law (I do not
say _obedience to it_, which is a stage further in advance), can not be
included within the functions of brain.[DH]
From what has been written by some naturalists as to the "benevolence"
of animals, it is probable that some may be prepared to take exception
to the statement of Mr. Darwin. There is no need for here entering upon
discussion which might thus be raised, and which would entail the task
of criticising multitudes of statements made in a singularly loose and
unscientific manner. There is not any more careful observer than Mr.
Darwin, the whole record of whose observations gives confidence in his
testimony, and his patient reflection on the real significance of what
he has seen. We may, however, leave this matter to naturalists, that
they may decide whether this conclusion as to animals requires some
modification. The purpose of the present argument is to show that an
authoritative law of benevolence does apply to human life, in direct
contrast with the ordinary law of animal life, giving special force to
the struggle for existence as witnessed in the history of the lower
orders of beings.
One possible entanglement for the present argument must, however, be
carefully shunned. In the comparison between man and animal, we are apt
to diverge into a discussion of what men and animals severally _do_.
This is a question considerably different from that now under
discussion, and yet it lies in such close proximity as to afford the
greatest facilities for confusion of thought. We are not here comparing
what animals do, with what men do; we are comparing the actions of
animals with what we _know men ought to do_. It is this question of
_ought_ which appears as the outstanding and distinguishing feature in
human life, on which we are now seeking to direct attention with all the
concentration which physiologists secure when the microscope is directed
on brain tissue. The true feature here is elevation and complexity of
_intellectual_ action, and the possibility of assigning this to brain
action. The question is no doubt concerned with conduct both in the
animal, and in man,--but what we wish to ascertain is, how far action or
conduct in the two cases throws light on the exercise of intelligence
possible to man and to animal. It is admitted that to act on a law of
benevolence requires a higher exercise of intelligence, than to act
under a law of desire or sensitive impulse; and we wish to reach
definite conclusions on two points; _first_, and subordinately, whether
animals ever act on the higher law; _second_, and chiefly, whether such
action does not involve as its condition an intellectual exercise of a
higher order than can be assigned to brain. The former of these
questions, subordinate to the present inquiry, may be left to
naturalists. The second concerns us directly here, in the more
important discussion as to man.
With the view of completing the defence against disturbing entanglement,
it may be well further to insert here the explicit statement that men do
very commonly act in neglect of the law of benevolence, and even in
violation of it. The fact is too well known in society to be overlooked.
It may be enough, however, in the present connection, to admit that men
do often act like the animals; or, to state the fact more precisely in
form, the animal nature is often found governing men, so as to make
their action resemble that of the lower animals in the struggle for
existence.
These lines of severance will now make clear what is our main
question,--Is man capable of recognizing a higher law of life? Does a
law of benevolence apply to him as a rational creature, as it can not
apply in the history of the animals around us? And if this question be
answered in the affirmative, does such answer imply the exercise of a
higher power than can be scientifically assigned to brain cells?
That man recognizes a law of benevolence as determining personal
conduct will not be formally disputed by any one. Yet so very much
bearing on the present argument is involved in the interpretation to be
assigned to this admission, that it is desirable to present at least in
outline, the evidence on which the statement rests. If we look at the
facts in view of the ordinary actions of the lower animals, a series of
contrasts is presented. The animals are seen to compete with each other
for what is a common object of desire, such as a favorite article of
food; and to fight with each other for possession; the consequence is
that the strongest and most daring get what they seek, while the weaker
and more timid must be content with what is of less value for
gratification of their desire. These facts are so conspicuous and so
constant in their influence on the whole race of animals that the theory
of the origin of species by descent founds upon them. A complete
contrast appears in what man recognizes as the rule of his conduct, when
he admits the obligation to benevolence. There is a reflective exercise
concerned with the right and wrong in human conduct which regards it as
a wrong thing for a man to snatch from another the enjoyment within his
reach, or subvert his opportunity for happiness in order to increase his
own pleasure. On the other hand, there is an exercise of thought which
contemplates effort for the good of others as right, even extending the
application of this law of moral life so far as to require self-denial,
and, in circumstances of special importance, self-sacrifice, for the
good of others. These are facts so elementary, that the statement of
them would be felt to be uncalled for, were we not seeking to
distinguish the elements of our ordinary experience. In accordance with
what has been said, we are agreed in regarding it as a wrong done to
another if we deprive him of enjoyment simply for the sake of our own
satisfaction. Such conduct is what we condemn as _selfishness_ in the
agent, and a _wrong_ to the sufferer. When on the contrary we
subordinate personal pleasure in order to secure the happiness of
another, we commend the benevolent disposition in which the act
originates, and we honor attention shown to the rights of a fellowman.
As the contrary lines of conduct are so often followed, and even
vindicated as permissible in the competitions of life, we need to show
with some care that the law of benevolence is uniformly regarded as a
law of human conduct even when its requirements are unfulfilled. This
becomes obvious if we look along another line of observation. If we pass
from what a man does to his fellowmen to what he is seen to expect of
them, we at once perceive that the authoritative feature alleged to
belong to the principle of benevolence is admitted by him. He resents
the selfishness from which he has suffered, complains of the unmanly act
which found its pleasure in his injury, and an appeal to public opinion,
on any occasion sufficiently important to involve a question of the
interests of society, at once calls forth general condemnation of the
selfish act as a real injustice.
That such a form and direction of thought belongs naturally to man has
been further shown by the ready assent of the young to the law of
benevolence, and their unhesitating test of their seniors by reference
to it. If their irritability and resentment have been stirred, it may
be difficult to gain their assent to the special application of the law
of benevolence in the circumstances. This, however, is only an example
in early life, of what we find in more advanced years, that it is hard
to do the right, and easy to excuse the wrong we do, while resenting the
wrong done to us. But, apart from exciting causes, and simply in the
exercise of a quiet reflection, the child recognizes the duty of
benevolence; and, notwithstanding the disadvantages of weakness and
inexperience, proceeds to test others by this standard, and is felt by
others to be powerful by reason of the force belonging to the law,
however superior in years, and in authority may be the persons of whom
the child expects that he be kindly treated. These are in very condensed
form the facts of human life, which are as outstanding as the contrary
facts insisted upon as characteristic of animal life. We need an
explanation which shall put the nature of man as truly in contrast with
the nature of the animal, while it is at the same time allowed that man
has an animal nature which may operate to the influence of his conduct,
in neglect of this higher law of intelligence.
Now the most advanced results of physiological science carry no
explanation of this simple, ordinary fact, man's recognition of a law of
benevolence as authoritative. After we have assigned full value to the
_sensibilities_ of a physical nature overspread with a sensitive
nerve-system; after we have made account of the motor activity possible
to an animal possessed of a complicated muscular system controlled by
motor nerves, we have not come near a region in which the reflective
process takes place which applies the law of benevolence for the
regulation of conduct. We discover within the range of physiological
possibility, sensitiveness to impression from without, and to the
influence of the cravings and appetites of a nature requiring support
and satisfaction, and impelling power which urges to action for the sake
of present satisfaction. All these things we find easily explained under
the teaching of physiology; but we have no explanation of the act of
intelligence in perceiving a law of benevolence and owning submission to
it. We do not even find a scientific account of the subordinate
intellectual exercises involved in the application of the law of
benevolence when recognized. There is a form of discrimination here,
including the distinction of men as persons, the claims involved in
personal rights, and the phase of individual duty ascertained while
contemplating the circumstances in the midst of which it is needful to
act. All this is outside the range of the formulated results of
physiological research. There can be no hesitation in accepting all that
has been established as to nerve-sensibility,--the subjection of human
life to the interaction of external influences,--and the inevitable
forms of experience which result in individual history. But we see in
these, only conditions in the midst of which man by exercise of his
intelligence is to undertake the management of life on a higher level
than that of animal life. We clearly recognize the laws of motor
activity, including the full bearing of outward influences, and inward
tendencies upon human action. But with these things we see what is meant
when it is recognized that intellect must govern passion: while we see
physiological science laying open to us only the laws of passion, and
not the law for its government. We admit the convincing nature of the
evidence by which it is shown that our nature with all the special
phases of individuality, often involving strange perils and
perplexities, has been inherited by us, gathering within the boundaries
of our life a task which we would willingly have shunned. We perceive in
this a science of the specialities of individual nature, standing
alongside the science explaining the common characteristics of man which
come within the range of physiological research. But it is beyond this,
that the problem arises concerning the moral government of life, so that
equally what is common, and what is peculiar to man shall be regulated
according to rational law. For this all see to be true, excepting always
cases of manifest infirmity and disorder, that equally the common and
the special powers of the individual are to be regulated by the law of
benevolence. There are no exemptions for special temperament, whatever
diversities there may be in the task which application of the law may
involve for some. The _ought_ has ascendency over human life;[DI] the
bare perception of this grand reality, taken with all the distinctions
involved in its application to personal conduct, and all the forms of
personal control exercised for its fulfilment, lies apart from the
discoveries of physiology. In these things we see most clearly what mind
is, and what mind does in the management of human life. We discover
clearly thus what it is which makes human life superior to the life of
the animals around us; what it is which makes the best in human life
stand essentially connected with the subordination of the animal nature
to a higher nature within; and in what respect it stands true that
physiology is a science of only a part of our nature, and that the
lower, because the subject part. In this man knows, apart from all
science, and quite independently of philosophy too, that he has a higher
life, working, rejoicing, and advancing to nobler excellence, just as he
governs his body, keeping it in subjection, while revering an ideal of
moral and spiritual excellence towards the attainment of which it is the
duty and honor of humanity to strive.
FOOTNOTES:
[CX] Hæckel's _Evolution of Man_, vol. i. p. 129.
[CY] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 198.
[CZ] _Human Anatomy_, i. p. 199.
[DA] From which motor nerves emerge.
[DB] _Human Anat._, i. p. 200.
[DC] _Human Anat._, i. p. 201.
[DD] _Ib._ p. 282.
[DE] See Appendix XII.
[DF] _Evolution of Man_, i. p. 129.
[DG] _Origin of Species_, 6th ed. p. 208.
[DH] Whether some of the animals may possess an inferior order of mind,
is a question which need not be here discussed.
[DI] See Appendix XIII.
LECTURE VIII.
RELATION OF SCIENCE TO OUR CONCEPTIONS OF DIVINE INTERPOSITION FOR MORAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD.
The view given in previous lectures of the most prominent features of
the recent advances in scientific knowledge most intimately concerning
our religious conceptions of the origin and government of the world, may
afford some aid towards forming a judgment of the points of contact and
apparent conflict. A brief summary will afford the best introduction to
the lines of inquiry with which the present discussion may be brought to
a close.
First, as to the inorganic in the universe, recent investigations favor
the conclusion that neither the matter in the world, nor the energy, can
be increased or diminished by operation of any laws known to apply to
such existence. The laws under which these two forms of being hold their
place in the world involve only change of distribution and relation.
Both matter and energy are, however, perpetually undergoing change or
transformation, and whether the change be for the better or for the
worse in the history of the universe as a whole, the fact of unceasing
change in subordination to fixed law, is clear evidence that matter and
energy are not eternal or self-subsisting, but are dependent on some
transcendent existence imposing the laws determining their relations.
Second, as to organized existence, recent researches go to prove that
there is in all animals a measure of adaptability to surrounding
conditions of life, providing for "adaptive changes" in the organism,
which become fixed, and are transmitted to succeeding generations of the
same order under the law of heredity. On warrant of the evidence for
this, it is to be taken as certain that the various orders of animals
now familiar to us did not at first come into being with all the
characteristics now pertaining to them. The law of their life has
provided for a progression in development, in accordance with which we
have distinct orders of the pigeon, the dog, and the horse, with
variations in animals of every class. This law of development,
applicable to all animal life, admits of greater or less diversity of
result in the history of distinct races, according to the complexity of
the organism.
Third, as to the relations of different orders in the scale of animal
life, it is proved that all vital organism has been modelled on a common
plan as appears in the arrangement and functions of the nerve system,
providing for sensibility and motor activity. In accordance with this,
we find in different orders of animal life not merely analogies or
resemblances in structure, but homologies or examples of complete
identity of structure and function. Thus the brain, and the two sets of
nerve lines, namely sensory and motor, are the same in nature and
functions in all animals, from the frog to man inclusive, and they
differ only in complexity of arrangement within the central organ, and
extent of ramification of the nerve lines. Diversity of nature thus far
appears in the relative complexity of organism. This is a conclusion
which assigns to man his place in the scale of animal life; that is, in
so far as we regard man exclusively by reference to his animal nature,
he stands highest in the scale of organism,--first in rank, judged
simply by complexity of brain structure, and minuteness of nerve system.
Fourth, in respect of moral life, that is, ability to contemplate a law
of life absolutely authoritative as well as universally applicable
amongst intelligent beings,--such for example as the law of benevolence;
ability to control the whole animal nature so as to subject it to this
higher law of benevolence; ability to strive after the harmonizing of
all dispositions and actions in accordance with the law of
benevolence,--man occupies a distinct place in the order of beings
existing in the world, no other living being standing associated with
him. There are innumerable forms of organized being in the world; but
only a single representative of moral life in it. No being save man
contemplates a general law of life, making its fulfilment a deliberate
end of action; no being save man possesses a conception of duty or
oughtness, which, if it be regarded simply as an intellectual exercise,
can be apprehended only under application of a law of conduct such as
benevolence. That man stands entirely alone in these respects, and is,
therefore, to be ranked as a distinct order of being, appears from the
following definite lines of evidence: no animal contemplates a general
law of conduct, or intelligible rule of life applicable for the
government of the order to which it belongs; no animal subordinates
physical impulse at the bidding of such a law; no animal aims at the
perfecting of its nature under a general conception of the excellence of
its own nature, as dog, horse, or ape. Therefore we conclude that man
alone of all living beings known to us in this world is a moral being.
Taking now these four aspects of existence as known to us in this
world,--without advancing to deal directly with the phases and
conditions of religious life,--the whole four can be freely accepted by
religious men in strict harmony with all the requirements of religious
thought. The three first named are distinct advances in the history of
physical science, and will be generally admitted to include the most
important accessions to our knowledge of the physical universe having
any bearing on the conceptions lying at the basis of religious thought.
The fourth is the product of philosophical inquiry, proceeding in
accordance with direct observation of personal experience, and by means
of simple analysis of our intelligent activity as that is concerned with
the government of personal life, especially in view of the relations
subsisting in society. This last as a philosophic conclusion, not
attained by physiological research, not properly any part of physical
science, but reached only by distinguishing properly certain contents of
our every-day thought, may be liable to rejection from those who rely
only on the methods peculiar to physical science. But such treatment of
the propositions has no bearing on their truth; as denial of them will
not deliver any man from the obligations of benevolence, or exempt him
from the demands of his fellowmen, requiring that in seeking his own
satisfaction he shall not be selfish, and certainly not harsh, as if the
strongest might have all they desire, and the weakest must be content to
wait on their pleasure. Denial of the recognition of a law of
benevolence will not exempt him from the experience consequent on the
expectations of his fellowmen as they seek help for the suffering, or
sympathy for the sorrowful, or rescue for the perishing. Though what
has been said as to the law of benevolence implies that it is
universally authoritative, there is no express philosophic theory here
introduced as to the mode by which this knowledge is attained, or the
grounds on which its universality is asserted. The bare fact that each
man expects his fellowman to be benevolent is enough for the present
purpose. The simple declaration that the man who seeks only his own
gratification, setting at defiance all the rights of his fellowmen, is
unworthy the name of man and acts a brute's part, is all that any one
needs who would make good the argument that human nature is distinct
from that of the brutes. No man can escape the obligation to benevolent
disposition; no man except the man of gross character attempts to live
as if he regarded the violation of it as capable of vindication. These
two things being so, the testimony is as strong as that establishing the
elementary truths of science, which demonstrates that man owns a
universal moral law, and so distinguishes himself from the animals. The
conditions of human life are too clearly recognized, and too constantly
insisted upon in ordinary society, to allow cover for ambiguities, and
denials which would favor the position of those who accept only what is
ascertained by the methods of physiological investigation. Hence it
happens that popular favor runs deeply and strongly for the kind and
good; and science itself must yield when the testimony of the race is
uniform.
Before closing this inquiry, it is desirable to pass over from the
outstanding conceptions of science and philosophy, to distinctive and
prominent conceptions belonging to religious thought, with the view of
considering whether these can be held in harmony with the teaching of
science. Of these, reference may be made specially to two which
encounter opposition on professedly scientific grounds:--Miracle as an
evidence of the Messiahship of our Lord Jesus Christ; and the efficacy
of Prayer in the economy of spiritual life. These two conceptions have
encountered strong opposition on the allegation of inconsistency with
the unchangeableness of the laws of nature. It becomes, therefore, an
important part of the present investigation, to ascertain how far these
two articles of Christian faith, miraculous testimony to the divinity
of our Saviour, and habitual answer to the prayer offered to God by
those who approach Him in the merit of the Redeemer, are consistent with
the teaching of science. These two conceptions are naturally included in
the one question as to the compatibility with the laws of nature of the
interposition of supernatural agency for attainment of moral and
spiritual ends in the history of the world.