AFFAIRS IN PANAMÁ.
1551-1600.
REVOLT OF THE CIMARRONES—PEDRO DE URSUA SENT AGAINST THEM—A
SECOND REVOLT—BAYANO CAUGHT AND SENT TO SPAIN—REGULATIONS
CONCERNING NEGROES—COMMERCIAL DECADENCE—RESTRICTIONS ON
TRADE—HOME INDUSTRIES—PEARL FISHERIES—MINING—DECAY OF
SETTLEMENTS—PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE PORT OF ENTRY—ITS REMOVAL
FROM NOMBRE DE DIOS TO PORTOBELLO—CHANGES IN THE SEAT OF
THE AUDIENCIA—TIERRA FIRME MADE SUBJECT TO THE VICEROY OF
PERU—DEFALCATIONS IN THE ROYAL TREASURY—PREPARATIONS FOR
DEFENCE AGAINST CORSAIRS AND FOREIGN POWERS.
[Sidenote: THE CIMARRONES.]
It has already been stated that Las Casas was the first to urge the
substitution of African for Indian slavery, and as early as 1517 such
a measure was authorized by the crown. The natives lacked the physical
strength needed to meet the demands of their taskmasters, and negroes
from the Portuguese settlements on the coast of Guinea were largely
imported into the Spanish West Indies. Numbers of them were driven by
ill-usage to take refuge in the forests and mountain fastnesses, where
they led a nomadic life or made common cause with the natives, and when
attacked by the Spaniards neither gave nor accepted quarter. About the
middle of the sixteenth century the woods in the vicinity of Nombre de
Dios swarmed with these runaways, who attacked the treasure-trains on
their way across the Isthmus, defeated the parties sent against them
by the governor of the province, and lurked in wait for passengers,
assailing them with poisoned arrows, and cutting into pieces those who
fell alive into their hands. Organized as marauding companies they
became widely known as _cimarrones_[XXII‑1] or Maroons as they were
called in Jamaica and Dutch Guiana. At times they would unite their
forces and ravage a wide extent of country, leaving ruin on every side.
Houses were burned, plantations destroyed, women seized, merchandise
stolen, and settlers slain. Such was the attendant terror that masters
dared not chastise their slaves, nor did merchants venture to travel
the highways except in companies of twenty or more.[XXII‑2] In the year
1554 many hundreds of them were thus banded in Tierra Firme alone.
About this time the new viceroy of Peru, Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza,
marqués de Cañete, opportunely arriving at Nombre de Dios from Spain,
en route for his capital, resolved on the subjugation of these outlaws.
Not long before his arrival, Pedro de Ursua, a brave and distinguished
soldier, had taken refuge from his enemies in the province of Cartagena,
where he had founded the city of Pamplona and made discoveries. The
viceroy, believing Ursua to be unjustly persecuted and recognizing
his eminent fitness, authorized him to raise troops and march against
the offenders. Accordingly Ursua equipped upward of two hundred men,
and set out from Nombre de Dios. The cimarrones had mustered under
Bayano,[XXII‑3] a man of their own race, of singular courage, who had
been elected king by those occupying the mountains between Plagon and
Pacora, and whose number now exceeded six hundred.
Bayano retreated slowly and warily, posting ambuscades at every
favorable point, and engaging the foe in frequent encounters, the
negroes fighting with desperation and the Spaniards advancing with
the coolness of well disciplined soldiers. For two years Ursua[XXII‑4]
carried on the campaign with unwearied patience, and at last surrounded
the remnant of the cimarrones and compelled them to sue for peace.
Bayano was sent a prisoner to Spain. In 1570 his followers founded the
town of Santiago del Príncipe. A cédula of June 21, 1574, declared that
on full submission and on condition of their leading a peaceful life
the negroes should be free men. One of the articles of a treaty which
was concluded at Panamá binds the emancipated slaves to capture runaways
and return them to their masters.
After a short-lived peace the cimarrones again took the field,
reënforced by maltreated or discontented negro fugitives from the mines,
and committed such depredations that the king resolved on a war of
extermination against them and their allies. In a cédula dated 23d of
May 1578 he appointed his factor and veedor Pedro de Ortega Valencia,
captain general of the forces levied for that purpose, with instructions
not to desist until the rebels were vanquished. Funds were to be drawn
freely from the royal treasury. Panamá and the adjoining provinces
of Quito and Cartago were enjoined to provide all necessary supplies,
and the Casa de la Contratacion de Seville was to furnish four hundred
arquebuses and a supply of ammunition. The Spaniards were only partially
successful, and in the following year the king found it necessary to
address the president and oidores of the audiencia, urging them to
renewed efforts, but in vain. In 1596 the cimarrones, in concert with
buccaneers, opened a road from their own town to the Chagre River only a
league below the highway to Venta de las Cruces, their object being to
steal and secrete treasure and merchandise. On the 25th of August the
king peremptorily orders the destruction of the road and the execution
of the ringleaders, but nevertheless the cimarrones in collusion with
English corsairs for years set the Spaniards at defiance.
[Sidenote: SLAVE-DEALING.]
The regulations framed during the sixteenth century concerning negroes,
whether bond or free, prescribed with the utmost minuteness their
deportment, their social relations, and the restrictions under which
they were to live.[XXII‑5] It was provided in the case of runaways
that pardon should only be extended once, and never to the leaders of a
revolt. One fifth of the cost incurred in their capture was to be met by
the royal treasury and the remainder by the owners; and all expeditions
were to be conducted by experienced officers, the property value of
the negro being so great that his recovery could not be intrusted to
inferior hands.
To engage in the importation of slaves it was necessary first to
obtain a royal license, a privilege jealously guarded, and seldom if
ever granted to Spain's ancient rivals, the Portuguese, but freely
bestowed on the English, who gradually monopolized the trade. So
great were the profits that Portuguese and English alike were found
continually violating the law and setting the king at defiance.[XXII‑6]
The regulations embraced also their intercourse with Indians, so as to
discourage as much as possible their association with lawless bands,
dangerous to Spanish security, and prejudicial to peaceable natives;
for, with the presumption so common among lower races and classes, the
negro failed not to take advantage of any privilege he might obtain
over his red-skinned neighbor.[XXII‑7] Such checks proved of little
use, however, since they also applied in part at least to Spanish
task-masters. Indeed, in a royal cédula issued in 1593, attention
is called to the fact that no one had been brought to justice for
any of the extortions or cruelties to which the Indians had been
subjected.[XXII‑8] Other stringent laws were issued, but they came
too late, or were neglected like the rest. Under the yoke of their
various oppressors the native population of the Isthmus gradually
disappeared, and toward the close of the century their numbers had
become insignificant.
* * * * *
In the affairs of Panamá, we enter now an era of decline. Progress
hitherto on the Isthmus has been on no permanent basis. For a time
the gold and pearls of seaboard and islands kept alive the spirit of
speculation, which was swollen to greater dimensions by the inflowing
treasures from Peru and Chile, and from scores of other places in South
and North America. When these began to diminish, commerce fell off, and
as it had little else to depend upon there was necessarily a reaction.
Panamá had comparatively but little indigenous wealth and was largely
dependent for prosperity on Spain's colonial policy. Unfortunately
this was characterized by a short-sightedness which eventually proved
disastrous both to the province and the empire. The great fleets which
arrived from Spain came in reduced numbers, at longer intervals, and
with depleted stores. In 1589, ninety-four vessels reached the Isthmus
laden with merchandise; sixteen years later the fleet mustered only
seventeen ships.[XXII‑9] To the depredations of buccaneers which will be
hereafter described this state of affairs may in part be attributed, but
other causes were at work. The king of Spain had already appeared before
his subjects at Panamá in the character of a royal mendicant;[XXII‑10]
and now he laid restrictions on their trade which could not fail to
prove disastrous to the commercial interests of the city.
[Sidenote: ASIATIC TRADE.]
Hitherto there had been a large and lucrative traffic with the
Philippine Islands, yielding often six-fold increase to the fortunate
trader.[XXII‑11] But the cupidity of the monarch prompted more and more
restrictive measures, until it was altogether forbidden to Panamá, and
indeed to all the West Indies save New Spain, the king being determined
to have what was known as the Asiatic trade monopolized by Castilian
merchants.[XXII‑12] No Chinese goods were to be brought to Panamá and
the other provinces, even from New Spain. None were to be used there,
except such as were in actual use at date of the royal commands, and
any surplus was to be carried to Spain within four years.
Of course the American provinces were gradually developing home
industries, and bringing into the market home productions that
displaced to a certain extent goods from which Spain had hitherto
made large profits. Thus Peru supplied wine, leather, and oil; soap
was manufactured in Guayaquil and Nicaragua; Campeche yielded wax,
Guayaquil, Riobamba, and Puerto Viejo, cordage for ships, and Nicaragua
a good quality of pitch. Quito and other places manufactured cloths,
and New Spain silken and woolen goods. Had Philip adopted a generous
colonial policy he would have fostered and profited by these new
industries, but all fiscal regulations looked to the advancement of
Spanish commerce without regard for the development of trade within the
colonies.
[Sidenote: WINE AND TOBACCO.]
Two commodities were watched and guarded with peculiar jealousy—wine and
tobacco. Peru produced a wine that found favor with many and obtained a
ready sale. In an ordinance of Philip II. dated the 16th of September
1586, no wine but that imported from Spain was allowed to be sold on
the Isthmus; nor was it to be mixed with wine obtained elsewhere. The
penalties attached to infringements of this law were heavy fines and
even perpetual banishment. The reason assigned for these measures was
the injurious effect of Peruvian wine upon the public health, but the
real motive was the prejudicial effect of its sale upon the Spanish wine
trade.[XXII‑13] Tobacco was a monopoly of the crown, and one rigidly
protected, its sale, importation, or cultivation being forbidden under
severe penalties.[XXII‑14]
Panamá imported most of her provisions, and the difficulties in
obtaining a regular and cheap supply were augmented by the monopolies
acquired by wealthy merchants who were enabled to control the market.
New measures to correct this abuse were continually adopted, and as
often evaded or violated.[XXII‑15] The scarcity of provisions sometimes
caused distress approaching to famine, and at certain seasons was liable
to be aggravated by the crowds of travellers and adventurers who crossed
the Isthmus.[XXII‑16] Peru was the great source of supply and the trade
with that country was the subject of frequent cédulas addressed to the
viceroy.[XXII‑17]
[Sidenote: PEARLS AND GOLD.]
Pearls and gold were still among the leading productions of the Isthmus,
and the most valuable fisheries were at the old Pearl Islands of Vasco
Nuñez de Balboa.[XXII‑18] Diving for pearls was performed by negroes
chosen by their masters on account of their dexterity as swimmers,
and their ability to hold their breath under water. From twelve to
twenty under charge of an overseer usually formed a gang. Anchoring
in twelve to fifteen fathoms of water, they would dive in succession,
bringing up as many shells as they could gather or carry. It was a
laborious calling, and attended with great danger because of the sharks
that swarmed around the islands and with which they had many a fierce
struggle, often losing limb or life in the encounter. The divers were
required to collect a certain quantity of pearls, and any surplus they
were at liberty to sell, but only to their own masters and at a price
fixed by them.[XXII‑19]
Ever since their first discovery these fisheries had maintained their
fame, and there was obtained the largest pearl then known in the world;
one that became the property of Philip II., and was described by Sir
Richard Hawkins[XXII‑20] as being "the size of a pommel of a ponyard;"
its weight being two hundred and fifty carats, and its value one hundred
and fifty thousand pesos. It was presented by the king to his daughter
Elizabeth, wife of Albertus, duke of Austria.
The number and variety of pearls were such that this trade became one of
the most prolific sources of wealth to Panamá, Seville alone importing
in 1587 some six hundred pounds weight, many of them rivalling the
choicest specimens found in Ceylon and the East Indies. From this time
there occurred a marked falling-off both in quantity and quality, and
in consequence a series of restrictions was put upon the industry.
Notwithstanding these precautionary measures the pearl-beds became
rapidly exhausted; diving proved a profitless labor,[XXII‑21] and not
until several decades later was this industry revived.
Gold had been found and mined in different parts of the Isthmus, notably
in Darien, the scene of so many of Balboa's brilliant achievements,
where, according to the report of a later governor, the metal had been
so abundant as to be "weighed by the hundredweight."[XXII‑22] More
definite is the information for this period concerning the mines of
Veragua, a province of irregular shape, lying between the two oceans,
and consisting largely of rugged and inaccessible sierras, down the
sides of which fall mountain torrents that brought quantities of the
precious metal within easy reach. The Spaniards were not slow to learn
of this wealth, partly from the trinkets displayed by Indians, and soon
the mines were flooded with laborers. When the strength of the native
proved unequal to the task the Spaniards enlisted in their service,
as we have seen, the more hardy negro, until in the prosperous days of
mining, which culminated about the year 1570, there were two thousand of
them at work at one time. Rumor magnified the yield to the ever ready
ears of navigators, and according to Dampier "they were the richest
gold mines ever yet found." "Because of their inexhaustible riches
in gold," says Ogilby, "the Spaniards there knew not the end of their
wealth."[XXII‑23]
The yield, if rich, did not prove lasting, however, and the number of
mine-owners dwindled, though several causes united to this end, such as
the attack of hostile natives or negroes who frequently swooped down on
the Spaniards from their mountain fastnesses and despoiled their camp.
The roads were difficult; the mining towns were sickly and for the
most part abandoned during the rainy season, their occupants betaking
themselves to Panamá. In 1580 there were but four of them in the
entire province. These were Ciudad de la Concepcion, the capital, forty
leagues west of Nombre de Dios; Villa de Trinidad, six leagues east of
Concepcion by sea, but inaccessible by land; Ciudad de Santa Fé, where
the smelting-works were established; and Ciudad de San Cárlos built
on the South Sea, some forty or more leagues west of Santa Fé. These
communities contained altogether about a hundred and seventy vecinos;
all employed in mining or in matters connected therewith.
* * * * *
Mining towns were not, however, the only ones to retrograde. The
town of Acla, which it will be remembered was founded by Pedrarias in
1515, and rebuilt by Vasco Nuñez two years later,[XXII‑24] had in 1580
dropped out of existence. And so it was with several settlements that
at different times had risen with hopeful prospects. Either the climate
killed or drove off the inhabitants, or rival towns sprang up under the
patronage of some governor, and with real or fancied advantages lured
away the citizens. Nombre de Dios had maintained its position as the
leading town and port on the Atlantic side, in the face of objections
which ere this would have doomed many another place. The climate was
pestilential, so much so that the place was generally deserted at the
close of the business season, and it contained only sixty wooden houses.
It was subject to floods, and yet destitute during the greater part
of the year of fresh water. Its harbor was exceedingly bad, exposed to
severe northerly and easterly gales, by which, despite every precaution,
vessels of large size were frequently driven ashore, and pirates could
readily assail it. These and other disadvantages led many merchants to
advocate the removal of the port of entry to one of the harbors on the
coast of Honduras. Although the distance from Nombre de Dios to Panamá
was only eighteen leagues, while that from Puerto de Caballos to the
gulf of Fonseca was fully fifty, yet the cost of a single trip by mule
over the former route was thirty pesos, and over the latter but nine.
[Sidenote: ROUTES BETWEEN OCEANS.]
Juan García de Hermosillo was commissioned by the king in 1554 to
inquire into the merits of the respective routes, and two years
later made a voluminous but partial report,[XXII‑25] showing the
practicability of changing the course of vessels going to Tierra Firme
so as to proceed direct to the port of Trujillo, and recommending that
ships from New Spain, Vera Cruz, Pánuco, and the Golfo Dulce should
touch at the same port, and thus allow goods to be carried overland to
Realejo or the bay of Fonseca, and thence shipped to Peru and elsewhere.
A cédula was thereupon addressed, in October 1556, to the audiencias
of Española and the Confines, the governor of Tierra Firme, and the
officers of the India House at Seville, directing that the opinions of
experts should be taken, and information obtained from all familiar with
the coast and its harbors. Testimony concerning the facts and views
advanced in Hermosillo's report was taken in 1558, and among those
who pronounced in favor of the transfer as recommended were Oviedo
the chronicler, Luis Gutierrez the cosmographer, and Juan de Barbosa,
then governor of Tierra Firme. The cabildo of Santiago also bestirred
themselves in behalf of the change, as one apt to improve communication
with Peru, and, as they temptingly added, likely to increase largely
the royal revenue.[XXII‑26]
Communications between the home government and its transatlantic
subjects involved vexatious delays; such negotiations were always slow,
and at this time there was some temporary disorganization of the council
of the Indies to complicate matters. The subject would seem to have been
ignored until quickened anew by an address of Felipe de Aniñon, who had
lived many years in the Indies, "on the utility and advantages which
would result from changing the route of transit between the seas from
Nombre de Dios and Panamá to Puerto de Caballos and Fonseca."[XXII‑27]
The memorial, without presenting any new arguments, recapitulates with
considerable force those which had been previously advanced, urging that
immunity would thus be secured from the raids of corsairs, and that
even though Panamá and Nombre de Dios were abandoned, a dozen cities
would spring up to take their place in a region whose mines were so
rich and whose soil was so fertile. At Nombre de Dios even Indian women,
elsewhere so prolific, became barren; fruits refused to grow, children
could not be reared, and men lived not out the usual span of life. Their
gold and silver were as nothing to the treasures that could be extracted
from the mines of Honduras, for when these latter should be worked by
imported negroes with the aid of quicksilver, his Majesty would have
there a kingdom thrice as rich as Spain. The memorialist concludes by
stating that even though eight hundred thousand pesos were expended
in opening roads the outlay was justifiable, for it would be offset by
the yield of an additional million to the annual revenue of the king.
The question of establishing elsewhere the port of entry was finally
decided by the report of Jean Baptiste Antonelli, the royal surveyor,
which showed that while a removal was necessary a desirable site existed
close by.
[Sidenote: PORTOBELLO.]
Five leagues to the west of Nombre de Dios was the village of
Portobello, containing, in 1585, not more than ten houses but possessing
a commodious harbor, with good anchorage, easy of access, and one where
laborers could unload vessels without the necessity of wading up to the
arm-pits, as was the case at Nombre de Dios. Timber and pasture were
abundant, the soil was fertile, and fresh water could be had throughout
the year. Moreover it could easily be fortified against attack from
corsairs and privateersmen, who, under Drake and others, had already
committed depredations on the Isthmus as will be hereafter related. "If
it might please your Majesty," reports the surveyor, "it were good that
the city of Nombre de Dios be brought and builded in this harbor." On
the 20th of March 1597 the change was made under charge of the factor
Francisco de Valverde y Mercado and a settlement was founded which soon
became one of the most important cities in Central America.[XXII‑28]
In 1529 Panamá is described by Herrera as "a town of six hundred
householders." In 1581 it was styled by Philip "muy noble y muy leal."
Nevertheless its progress was greatly retarded by sickness, caused by
the heat of the atmosphere, the humidity of the soil, and the spread of
infectious diseases. Small-pox, quinsy, dysentery, intermittent fevers,
and other ailments were prevalent among the community, and at times the
city was almost depopulated.[XXII‑29]
* * * * *
In 1564 the seat of the audiencia of the Confines was removed, as we
have seen, to Panamá[XXII‑30] under the presidency of Doctor Barros de
Millan. Great though short-lived were the rejoicings throughout Tierra
Firme at this victory. The people of Guatemala would not consent to
become a mere dependency of the audiencia of Mexico; and as already
stated a decree was issued in 1568 ordering that the audiencia should
again be removed to Guatemala, the change being made two years later,
though, as we shall find, an audiencia was before long once more
established in Panamá.
[Sidenote: EMBEZZLEMENT AND GAMBLING.]
By a cédula dated February 26, 1571, Tierra Firme was made subject to
the viceroy of Peru in all matters relating to government, war, and
exchequer, but not in civil matters.[XXII‑31] Little direct information
of the working of the new regime in the latter part of the sixteenth
century can now be obtained. The cédulas issued in later years, however,
show it to have been a source of chronic discontent to the royal council
in all its departments. Among them was one dated January 7, 1588,
forbidding the president and oidores residing at Panamá to visit any
private citizen or resident for any purpose whatever, and another dated
December 31, 1590, forbidding officials in the treasury department to
assume the duties of alcaldes ordinarios at any time. Some of the latter
were fined and suspended for illegal speculation with government funds,
which became so common that in 1594 the defalcations in the treasury
from this cause alone amounted to about one hundred and fifty thousand
pesos.[XXII‑32] In 1579 the corregidor of Panamá, when at the point of
death, confessed that he alone had embezzled the sum of six thousand
two hundred and thirty-six pesos, which he had collected and unlawfully
withheld from the treasury.[XXII‑33] The granting of passports was a
means by which members of the audiencia contrived to cheat the king of
his revenues, his Majesty declaring that in a single year two thousand
persons passed through Tierra Firme without procuring the royal license
at the prescribed cost.[XXII‑34] Gambling was also prevalent, dice being
the favorite game, and many merchants, bringing their goods from Spain,
were fleeced by professional gamesters.[XXII‑35]
While the condition of affairs at the Isthmus was thus in an
unsatisfactory condition, the authorities were constantly in dread
of invasion from foreign powers. Early in the year 1561 two caravels
arrived with intelligence that a large fleet had sailed from England for
America, and with orders that preparations be made for a stout defence.
The treasure on board the ships lying in harbor was quickly removed
and secreted on shore, and no vessels were allowed to leave port until
the arrival of the convoy fleet from Spain under the adelantado Pedro
Menendez. It is not recorded that on this occasion the English made any
attempt to land on the shores of Tierra Firme, but four years later, the
monarchs of England and Spain being then on friendly terms, one Captain
Parker touched at the coast of Darien ostensibly for the purpose of
trading with the natives. An armed flotilla was despatched against him,
but the captain refused to depart, and when attacked not only repulsed
his assailants, but captured one of the enemy's squadron.[XXII‑36]
[Sidenote: FEAR OF PIRATES.]
Although, as will be told in the next chapter, the Isthmus was several
times invaded by English adventurers between 1572 and 1596, it was not
until near the end of the century that any really effectual measures
were completed for its protection. On the 2d of May 1574 the king wrote
to the audiencia of Panamá, that he had information of many privateering
expeditions then being fitted out with the intention of proceeding to
the Indies. In 1580 three ships of war were stationed on the coast to
guard against corsairs and it was ordered that criminals be delivered
over to serve as oarsmen on board these vessels. In 1591 a more powerful
fleet was sent to the West Indies and fortifications ordered to be
erected at the town of Cruces and other points on the Isthmus. At
this date Panamá alone could put into the field eight hundred Spanish
infantry and fifty horse. Four years later a site was selected for a
fort at the mouth of the Chagre river. Finally in 1597, when the news
of Drake's last expedition had thoroughly roused the king to a sense of
the danger, mechanics were sent out from Spain to hasten the completion
of the defences, and it was ordered that the cost be defrayed from the
royal treasury.[XXII‑37]
Panamá was assailable from three different points: from Nombre de Dios,
whence it could only be reached through the mountain passes of Capira,
where a small band of resolute men could hold an army in check; from
Acla, fourteen leagues east of Nombre de Dios, where men of war had
formerly anchored; and by way of the Rio Chagre, which was navigable
for large boats as far as Cruces, the road thence to Panamá presenting
no serious obstacle to an invading force.[XXII‑38]