CHAPTER VIII

A LABOR GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA AND SOCIALISM

The objective prerequisites of a Social revolution, as we have shown

above, have been already created by the economic progress of advanced

capitalist countries. But how about Russia? Is it possible to think that

the seizure of power by the Russian proletariat would be the beginning

of a Socialist reconstruction of our national economy?

A year ago we thus answered this question in an article which was

mercilessly bombarded by the organs of both our factions. We wrote:

"The workingmen of Paris, says Marx, had not expected miracles from the

Commune. We cannot expect miracles from a proletarian dictatorship now.

Governmental power is not almighty. It is folly to think that once the

proletariat has seized power, it would abolish capitalism and introduce

socialism by a number of decrees. The economic system is not a product

of state activity. What the proletariat will be able to do is to

shorten economic evolution towards Collectivism through a series of

energetic state measures.

"The starting point will be the reforms enumerated in our so-called

minimum program. The very situation of the proletariat, however, will

compel it to move along the way of collectivist practice.

"It will be comparatively easy to introduce the eight hour workday and

progressive taxation, though even here the center of gravity is not the

issuance of a 'decree,' but the organization of its practical

application. It will be difficult, however,--and here we pass to

Collectivism--to organize production under state management in such

factories and plants as would be closed down by their owners in protest

against the new law.

"It will be comparatively simple to issue a law abolishing the right of

inheritance, and to put it into operation. Inheritances in the form of

money capital will not embarrass the proletariat and not interfere with

its economy. To be, however, the inheritor of capital invested in land

and industry, would mean for a labor government to organize economic

life on a public basis.

"The same phenomenon, on a vastly larger scale, is represented by the

question of expropriation (of land), with or without compensation.

Expropriation with compensation has political advantages, but it is

financially difficult; expropriation without compensation has financial

advantages, but it is difficult politically. Greater than all the other

difficulties, however, will be those of an economic nature, the

difficulties of organization.

"To repeat: a labor government does not mean a government of miracles.

"Public management will begin in those branches where the difficulties

are smallest. Publicly managed enterprises will originally represent

kind of oases linked with private enterprises by the laws of exchange of

commodities. The wider the field of publicly managed economy will grow,

the more flagrant its advantages will become, the firmer will become the

position of the new political regime, and the more determined will be

the further economic measures of the proletariat. Its measures it will

base not only on the national productive forces, but also on

international technique, in the same way as it bases its revolutionary

policies not only on the experience of national class relations but also

on the entire historic experience of the international proletariat."

_Political supremacy of the proletariat is incompatible with its

economic slavery._ Whatever may be the banner under which the

proletariat will find itself in possession of power, it will be

compelled to enter the road of Socialism. It is the greatest Utopia to

think that the proletariat, brought to the top by the mechanics of a

bourgeois revolution, would be able, even if it wanted, to limit its

mission by creating a republican democratic environment for the social

supremacy of the bourgeoisie. Political dominance of the proletariat,

even if it were temporary, would extremely weaken the resistance of

capital which is always in need of state aid, and would give momentous

opportunities to the economic struggle of the proletariat.

A proletarian regime will immediately take up the agrarian question with

which the fate of vast millions of the Russian people is connected. In

solving this, as many another question, the proletariat will have in

mind the main tendency of its economic policy: to get hold of a widest

possible field for the organization of a Socialist economy. The forms

and the tempo of this policy in the agrarian question will be

determined both by the material resources that the proletariat will

be able to get hold of, and by the necessity to cooerdinate its

actions so as not to drive possible allies into the ranks of the

counter-revolution.

It is evident that the _agrarian_ question, i.e., the question of rural

economy and its social relations, is not covered by the _land_ question

which is the question of the forms of land ownership. It is perfectly

clear, however, that the solution of the land question, even if it does

not determine the future of the agrarian evolution, would undoubtedly

determine the future agrarian policy of the proletariat. In other words,

the use the proletariat will make of the land must be in accord with its

general attitude towards the course and requirements of the agrarian

evolution. The land question will, therefore, be one of the first to

interest the labor government.

One of the solutions, made popular by the Socialist-Revolutionists, is

the _socialization of the land_. Freed from its European make-up, it

means simply "equal distribution" of land. This program demands an

expropriation of all the land, whether it is in possession of landlords,

of peasants on the basis of private property, or it is owned by village

communities. It is evident that such expropriation, being one of the

first measures of the new government and being started at a time when

capitalist exchange is still in full swing, would lead the peasants to

believe that they are "victims of the reform." One must not forget that

the peasants have for decades made redemption payments in order to turn

their land into private property; many prosperous peasants have made

great sacrifices to secure a large portion of land as their private

possession. Should all this land become state property, the most bitter

resistance would be offered by the members of the communities and by

private owners. Starting out with a reform of this kind, the government

would make itself most unpopular among the peasants.

And why should one confiscate the land of the communities and the land

of small private owners? According to the Socialist-Revolutionary

program, the only use to be made of the land by the state is to turn it

over to all the peasants and agricultural laborers on the basis of equal

distribution. This would mean that the confiscated land of the

communities and small owners would anyway return to individuals for

private cultivation. Consequently, there would be _no economic gain_ in

such a confiscation and redistribution. _Politically_, it would be a

great blunder on the part of the labor government as it would make the

masses of peasants hostile to the proletarian leadership of the

revolution.

Closely connected with this program is the question of hired

agricultural labor. Equal distribution presupposes the prohibition of

using hired labor on farms. This, however, can be only a _consequence_

of economic reforms, it cannot be decreed by a law. It is not enough to

forbid an agricultural capitalist to hire laborers; one must first

secure agricultural laborers a fair existence; furthermore, this

existence must be profitable from the viewpoint of social economy. To

declare equal distribution of land and to forbid hired labor, would mean

to compel agricultural proletarians to settle on small lots, and to put

the state under obligation to provide them with implements for their

socially unprofitable production.

It is clear that the intervention of the proletariat in the organization

of agriculture ought to express itself not in settling individual

laborers on individual lots, but in organizing _state or communal

management of large estates_. Later, when socialized production will

have established itself firmly, a further step will be made towards

socialization by forbidding hired labor. This will eliminate small

capitalistic enterprises in agriculture; it will, however, leave

unmolested those private owners who work their land wholly or to a great

extent by the labor of their families. To expropriate such owners can by

no means be a desire of the Socialistic proletariat.

The proletariat can never indorse a program of "equal distribution"

which on one hand demands a useless, purely formal expropriation of

small owners, and on the other hand it demands a very real parceling of

large estates into small lots. This would be a wasteful undertaking, a

pursuance of a reactionary and Utopian plan, and a political harm for

the revolutionary party.

* * * * *

How far, however, can the Socialist policy of the working class advance

in the economic environment of Russia? One thing we can say with perfect

assurance: it will meet political obstacles long before it will be

checked by the technical backwardness of the country. _Without direct

political aid from the European proletariat the working class of Russia

will not be able to retain its power and to turn its temporary supremacy

into a permanent Socialist dictatorship._ We cannot doubt this for a

moment. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a _Socialist

revolution in the West would allow us to turn the temporary supremacy of

the working class directly into a Socialist dictatorship_.

Our Revolution: Essays on Working-Class and International Revolution, 1904-1917 · 第 6 / 7 章