CHAPTER VI

PROLETARIAN RULE

The proletariat can get into power only at a moment of national

upheaval, of sweeping national enthusiasm. The proletariat assumes power

as a revolutionary representative of the people, as a recognized leader

in the fight against absolutism and barbaric feudalism. Having assumed

power, however, the proletariat will open a new era, an era of positive

legislation, of revolutionary politics, and this is the point where its

political supremacy as an avowed spokesman of the nation may become

endangered.

The first measures of the proletariat--the cleansing of the Augean

stables of the old regime and the driving away of their

inhabitants--will find active support of the entire nation whatever the

liberal castraters may tell us of the power of some prejudices among the

masses. The work of political cleansing will be accompanied by

democratic reorganization of all social and political relations. The

labor government, impelled by immediate needs and requirements, will

have to look into all kinds of relations and activities among the

people. It will have to throw out of the army and the administration all

those who had stained their hands with the blood of the people; it will

have to disband all the regiments that had polluted themselves with

crimes against the people. This work will have to be done immediately,

long before the establishment of an elective responsible administration

and before the organization of a popular militia. This, however, will be

only a beginning. Labor democracy will soon be confronted by the

problems of a normal workday, the agrarian relations and unemployment.

The legislative solution of those problems will show the _class

character_ of the labor government. It will tend to weaken the

revolutionary bond between the proletariat and the nation; it will give

the economic differentiation among the peasants a political expression.

Antagonism between the component parts of the nation will grow step by

step as the policies of the labor government become more outspoken, lose

their general democratic character and become _class policies_.

The lack of individualistic bourgeois traditions and anti-proletarian

prejudices among the peasants and the intelligentzia will help the

proletariat assume power. It must not be forgotten, however, that this

lack of prejudices is based not on political understanding, but on

political barbarism, on social shapelessness, primitiveness, and lack of

character. These are all qualities which can hardly guarantee support

for an active, consistent proletarian rule.

The abolition of the remnants of feudalism in agrarian relations will be

supported by all the peasants who are now oppressed by the landlords. A

progressive income tax will be supported by an overwhelming majority of

the peasants. Yet, legislative measures in defense of the rural

proletariat (farm hands) will find no active support among the majority,

and will meet with active opposition on the part of a minority of the

peasants.

The proletariat will be compelled to introduce class struggle into the

village and thus to destroy that slight community of interests which

undoubtedly unites the peasants as a whole. In its next steps, the

proletariat will have to seek for support by helping the poor villagers

against the rich, the rural proletariat against the agrarian

bourgeoisie. This will alienate the majority of the peasants from labor

democracy. Relations between village and city will become strained. The

peasantry as a whole will become politically indifferent. The peasant

minority will actively oppose proletarian rule. This will influence part

of the intellectuals and the lower middle class of the cities.

Two features of proletarian politics are bound particularly to meet with

the opposition of labor's allies: _Collectivism_ and _Internationalism_.

The strong adherence of the peasants to private ownership, the

primitiveness of their political conceptions, the limitations of the

village horizon, its distance from world-wide political connections and

interdependences, are terrific obstacles in the way of revolutionary

proletarian rule.

To imagine that Social-Democracy participates in the provisional

government, playing a leading role in the period of revolutionary

democratic reconstruction, insisting on the most radical reforms

and all the time enjoying the aid and support of the organized

proletariat,--only to step aside when the democratic program is put into

operation, to leave the completed building at the disposal of the

bourgeois parties and thus to open an era of parliamentary politics

where Social-Democracy forms only a party of opposition,--to imagine

this would mean to compromise the very idea of a labor government. It is

impossible to imagine anything of the kind, not because it is "against

principles"--such abstract reasoning is devoid of any substance--but

because it is _not real_, it is the worst kind of Utopianism, it is the

revolutionary Utopianism of Philistines.

Our distinction between a minimum and maximum program has a great and

profound meaning only under bourgeois rule. The very fact of bourgeois

rule eliminates from our minimum program all demands incompatible with

private ownership of the means of production. Those demands form the

substance of a Socialist revolution, and they presuppose a dictatorship

of the proletariat. The moment, however, a revolutionary government is

dominated by a Socialist majority, the distinction between minimum and

maximum programs loses its meaning both as a question of principle and

as a practical policy. _Under no condition will a proletarian government

be able to keep within the limits of this distinction._

Let us take the case of an eight hour workday. It is a well established

fact that an eight hour workday does not contradict the capitalist

order; it is, therefore, well within the limits of the Social-Democratic

minimum program. Imagine, however, its realization in a revolutionary

period, when all social passions are at the boiling point. An eight hour

workday law would necessarily meet with stubborn and organized

opposition on the part of the capitalists--let us say in the form of a

lock-out and closing down of factories and plants. Hundreds of thousands

of workingmen would be thrown into the streets. What ought the

revolutionary government to do? A bourgeois government, however radical,

would never allow matters to go as far as that. It would be powerless

against the closing of factories and plants. It would be compelled to

make concessions. The eight hour workday would not be put into

operation; the revolts of the workingmen would be put down by force of

arms....

Under the political domination of the proletariat, the introduction of

an eight hour workday must have totally different consequences. The

closing down of factories and plants cannot be the reason for increasing

labor hours by a government which represents not capital, but labor, and

which refuses to act as an "impartial" mediator, the way bourgeois

democracy does. A labor government would have only one way out--to

expropriate the closed factories and plants and to organize their work

on a public basis.

Or let us take another example. A proletarian government must

necessarily take decisive steps to solve the problem of unemployment.

Representatives of labor in a revolutionary government can by no means

meet the demands of the unemployed by saying that this is a bourgeois

revolution. Once, however, the state ventures to eliminate

unemployment--no matter how--a tremendous gain in the economic power of

the proletariat is accomplished. The capitalists whose pressure on the

working class was based on the existence of a reserve army of labor,

will soon realize that they are powerless _economically_. It will be the

task of the government to doom them also to _political_ oblivion.

Measures against unemployment mean also measures to secure means of

subsistence for strikers. The government will have to undertake them, if

it is anxious not to undermine the very foundation of its existence.

Nothing will remain for the capitalists but to declare a lock-out, to

close down factories and plants. Since capitalists can wait longer than

labor in case of interrupted production, nothing will remain for a labor

government but to meet a general lock-out by expropriating the factories

and plants and by introducing in the biggest of them state or communal

production.

In agriculture, similar problems will present themselves through the

very fact of land-expropriation. We cannot imagine a proletarian

government expropriating large private estates with agricultural

production on a large scale, cutting them into pieces and selling them

to small owners. For it the only open way is to organize in such estates

cooeperative production under communal or state management. This,

however, _is the way of Socialism_.

Social-Democracy can never assume power under a double obligation: to

put the _entire_ minimum program into operation for the sake of the

proletariat, and to keep strictly _within the limits_ of this program,

for the sake of the bourgeoisie. Such a double obligation could never be

fulfilled. Participating in the government, not as powerless hostages,

but as a leading force, the representatives of labor _eo ipso_ break the

line between the minimum and maximum program. _Collectivism becomes the

order of the day._ At which point the proletariat will be stopped on

its march in this direction, depends upon the constellation of forces,

not upon the original purpose of the proletarian Party.

It is, therefore, absurd to speak of a _specific_ character of

proletarian dictatorship (or a dictatorship of the proletariat _and_ the

peasantry) within a bourgeois revolution, viz., a _purely democratic_

dictatorship. The working class can never secure the democratic

character of its dictatorship without overstepping the limits of its

democratic program. Illusions to the contrary may become a handicap.

They would compromise Social-Democracy from the start.

Once the proletariat assumes power, it will fight for it to the end. One

of the means to secure and solidify its power will be propaganda and

organization, particularly in the village; another means will be a

_policy of Collectivism_. Collectivism is not only dictated by the very

position of the Social-Democratic Party as the party in power, but it

becomes imperative as a means to secure this position through the active

support of the working class.

* * * * *

When our Socialist press first formulated the idea of a _Permanent

Revolution_ which should lead from the liquidation of absolutism and

civic bondage to a Socialist order through a series of ever growing

social conflicts, uprisings of ever new masses, unremitting attacks of

the proletariat on the political and economic privileges of the

governing classes, our "progressive" press started a unanimous indignant

uproar. Oh, they had suffered enough, those gentlemen of the

"progressive" press; this nuisance, however, was too much. Revolution,

they said, is not a thing that can be made "legal!" Extraordinary

measures are allowable only on extraordinary occasions. The aim of the

revolutionary movement, they asserted, was not to make the revolution go

on forever, but to bring it as soon as possible into the channels of

_law_, etc., etc. The more radical representatives of the same

democratic bourgeoisie do not attempt to oppose the revolution from the

standpoint of completed constitutional "achievements": tame as they are,

they understand how hopeless it is to fight the proletariat revolution

with the weapon of parliamentary cretinism _in advance_ of the

establishment of parliamentarism itself. They, therefore, choose another

way. They forsake the standpoint of law, but take the standpoint of what

they deem to be facts,--the standpoint of historic "possibilities," the

standpoint of political "realism,"--even ... even the standpoint of

"Marxism." It was Antonio, the pious Venetian bourgeois, who made the

striking observation:

Mark you this, Bassanio,

The devil can cite scriptures for his purpose.

Those gentlemen not only consider the idea of labor government in Russia

fantastic, but they repudiate the very probability of a Social

revolution in Europe in the near historic epoch. The necessary

"prerequisites" are not yet in existence, is their assertion.

Is it so? It is, of course, not our purpose to set a time for a Social

revolution. What we attempt here is to put the Social revolution into a

proper historic perspective.

Our Revolution: Essays on Working-Class and International Revolution, 1904-1917 · 第 4 / 7 章