CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROLETARIAT

A revolution is an open contest of social forces in their struggle for

political power.

The state is not an end in itself. It is only a working machine in the

hands of the social force in power. As every machine, the state has its

motor, transmission, and its operator. Its motive power is the class

interest; its motor are propaganda, the press, influences of school and

church, political parties, open air meetings, petitions, insurrections;

its transmission is made up of legislative bodies actuated by the

interest of a caste, a dynasty, a guild or a class appearing under the

guise of Divine or national will (absolutism or parliamentarism); its

operator is the administration, with its police, judiciary, jails, and

the army.

The state is not an end in itself. It is, however, the greatest means

for organizing, disorganizing and reorganizing social relations.

According to who is directing the machinery of the State, it can be an

instrument of profoundest transformations, or a means of organized

stagnation.

Each political party worthy of its name strives to get hold of political

power and thus to make the state serve the interests of the class

represented by the party. Social-Democracy, as the party of the

proletariat, naturally strives at political supremacy of the working

class.

The proletariat grows and gains strength with the growth of capitalism.

From this viewpoint, the development of capitalism is the development of

the proletariat for dictatorship. The day and the hour, however, when

political power should pass into the hands of the working class, is

determined not directly by the degree of capitalistic development of

economic forces, but by the relations of class struggle, by the

international situation, by a number of subjective elements, such as

tradition, initiative, readiness to fight....

It is, therefore, not excluded that in a backward country with a lesser

degree of capitalistic development, the proletariat should sooner reach

political supremacy than in a highly developed capitalist state. Thus,

in middle-class Paris, the proletariat consciously took into its hands

the administration of public affairs in 1871. True it is, that the reign

of the proletariat lasted only for two months, it is remarkable,

however, that in far more advanced capitalist centers of England and the

United States, the proletariat never was in power even for the duration

of one day. To imagine that there is an automatic dependence between a

dictatorship of the proletariat and the technical and productive

resources of a country, is to understand economic determinism in a very

primitive way. Such a conception would have nothing to do with Marxism.

It is our opinion that the Russian revolution creates conditions whereby

political power can (and, in case of a victorious revolution, _must_)

pass into the hands of the proletariat before the politicians of the

liberal bourgeoisie would have occasion to give their political genius

full swing.

Summing up the results of the revolution and counter-revolution in 1848

and 1849, Marx wrote in his correspondences to the New York _Tribune_:

"The working class in Germany is, in its social and political

development, as far behind that of England and France as the German

bourgeoisie is behind the bourgeoisie of those countries. Like master,

like man. The evolution of the conditions of existence for a numerous,

strong, concentrated, and intelligent proletariat goes hand in hand

with the development of the conditions of existence for a numerous,

wealthy, concentrated and powerful middle class. The working class

movement itself never is independent, never is of an exclusively

proletarian character until all the different factions of the middle

class, and particularly its most progressive faction, the large

manufacturers, have conquered political power, and remodeled the State

according to their wants. It is then that the inevitable conflict

between employer and the employed becomes imminent, and cannot be

adjourned any longer."[1] This quotation must be familiar to the reader,

as it has lately been very much abused by scholastic Marxists. It has

been used as an iron-clad argument against the idea of a labor

government in Russia. If the Russian capitalistic bourgeoisie is not

strong enough to take governmental power into its hands, how is it

possible to think of an industrial democracy, i.e., a political

supremacy of the proletariat, was the question.

[1] Karl Marx, _Germany in 1848_. (English edition, pp. 22-23.)

Let us give this objection closer consideration.

Marxism is primarily a method of analysis,--not the analysis of texts,

but the analysis of social relations. Applied to Russia, is it true

that the weakness of capitalistic liberalism means the weakness of the

working class? Is it true, not in the abstract, but in relation to

Russia, that an independent proletarian movement is impossible before

the bourgeoisie assume political power? It is enough to formulate these

questions in order to understand what hopeless logical formalism there

is hidden behind the attempt to turn Marx's historically relative remark

into a super-historic maxim.

Our industrial development, though marked in times of prosperity by

leaps and bounds of an "American" character, is in reality miserably

small in comparison with the industry of the United States. Five million

persons, forming 16.6 per cent. of the population engaged in economic

pursuits, are employed in the industries of Russia; six millions and

22.2 per cent. are the corresponding figures for the United States. To

have a clear idea as to the real dimensions of industry in both

countries, we must remember that the population of Russia is twice as

large as the population of the United States, and that the output of

American industries in 1900 amounted to 25 billions of rubles whereas

the output of Russian industries for the same year hardly reached 2.5

billions.

There is no doubt that the number of the proletariat, the degree of its

concentration, its cultural level, and its political importance depend

upon the degree of industrial development in each country.

This dependence, however, is not a direct one. Between the productive

forces of a country on one side and the political strength of its social

classes on the other, there is at any given moment a current and cross

current of various socio-political factors of a national and

international character which modify and sometimes completely reverse

the political expression of economic relations. The industry of the

United States is far more advanced than the industry of Russia, while

the political role of the Russian workingmen, their influence on the

political life of their country, the possibilities of their influence on

world politics in the near future, are incomparably greater than those

of the American proletariat.

In his recent work on the American workingman, Kautsky arrives at the

conclusion that there is no immediate and direct dependence between the

political strength of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of a country

on one hand and its industrial development on the other. "Here are two

countries," he writes, "diametrically opposed to each other: in one of

them, one of the elements of modern industry is developed out of

proportion, i.e., out of keeping with the stage of capitalistic

development; in the other, another; in America it is the class of

capitalists; in Russia, the class of labor. In America there is more

ground than elsewhere to speak of the dictatorship of capital, while

nowhere has labor gained as much influence as in Russia, and this

influence is bound to grow, as Russia has only recently entered the

period of modern class struggle." Kautsky then proceeds to state that

Germany can, to a certain degree, study her future from the present

conditions in Russia, then he continues: "It is strange to think that it

is the Russian proletariat which shows us our future as far as, not the

organization of capital, but the protest of the working class is

concerned. Russia is the most backward of all the great states of the

capitalist world. This may seem to be in contradiction with the economic

interpretation of history which considers economic strength the basis of

political development. This is, however, not true. It contradicts only

that kind of economic interpretation of history which is being painted

by our opponents and critics who see in it not a _method of analysis_,

but a _ready pattern_."[2] These lines ought to be recommended to those

of our native Marxians who substitute for an independent analysis of

social relations a deduction from texts selected for all emergencies of

life. No one can compromise Marxism as shamefully as these bureaucrats

of Marxism do.

[2] K. Kautsky, _The American and the Russian Workingman_.

In Kautsky's estimation, Russia is characterized, economically, by a

comparatively low level of capitalistic development; politically, by a

weakness of the capitalistic bourgeoisie and by a great strength of the

working class. This results in the fact, that "the struggle for the

interests of Russia as a whole has become the task of _the only powerful

class in Russia_, industrial labor. This is the reason why labor has

gained such a tremendous political importance. This is the reason why

the struggle of Russia against the polyp of absolutism which is

strangling the country, turned out to be a single combat of absolutism

against industrial labor, a combat where the peasantry can lend

considerable assistance without, however, being able to play a leading

role.[3]

[3] D. Mendeleyer, _Russian Realities_, 1906, p. 10.

Are we not warranted in our conclusion that the "man" will sooner gain

political supremacy in Russia than his "master"?

* * * * *

There are two sorts of political optimism. One overestimates the

advantages and the strength of the revolution and strives towards ends

unattainable under given conditions. The other consciously limits the

task of the revolution, drawing a line which the very logic of the

situation will compel him to overstep.

You can draw limits to all the problems of the revolution by asserting

that this is a bourgeois revolution in its objective aims and inevitable

results, and you can close your eyes to the fact that the main figure in

this revolution is the working class which is being moved towards

political supremacy by the very course of events.

You can reassure yourself by saying that in the course of a bourgeois

revolution the political supremacy of the working class can be only a

passing episode, and you can forget that, once in power, the working

class will offer desperate resistance, refusing to yield unless

compelled to do so by armed force.

You can reassure yourself by saying that social conditions in Russia are

not yet ripe for a Socialist order, and you can overlook the fact that,

once master of the situation, the working class would be compelled by

the very logic of its situation to organize national economy under the

management of the state.

The term _bourgeois revolution_, a general sociological definition,

gives no solution to the numerous political and tactical problems,

contradictions and difficulties which are being created by the mechanism

of a _given_ bourgeois revolution.

Within the limits of a bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth

century, whose objective was the political supremacy of capital, the

dictatorship of the _Sans-Culottes_ turned out to be a fact. This

dictatorship was not a passing episode, it gave its stamp to a whole

century that followed the revolution, though it was soon crushed by the

limitations of the revolution.

Within the limits of a revolution at the beginning of the twentieth

century, which is also a bourgeois revolution in its immediate objective

aims, there looms up a prospect of an inevitable, or at least possible,

supremacy of the working class in the near future. That this supremacy

should not turn out to be a passing episode, as many a realistic

Philistine may hope, is a task which the working class will have at

heart. It is, then, legitimate to ask: is it inevitable that the

dictatorship of the proletariat should clash against the limitations of

a bourgeois revolution and collapse, or is it not possible that under

given _international conditions_ it may open a way for an ultimate

victory by crushing those very limitations? Hence a tactical problem:

should we consciously strive toward a labor government as the

development of the revolution will bring us nearer to that stage, or

should we look upon political power as upon a calamity which the

bourgeois revolution is ready to inflict upon the workingmen, and which

it is best to avoid?

Our Revolution: Essays on Working-Class and International Revolution, 1904-1917 · 第 2 / 7 章