CAUSES OF THE AFRICANDERS’ SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.—CONTINUED.
After the conspiracy and raid of 1895–1896 the peace of South Africa
and the final paramountcy of Great Britain therein by the mere force of
a superior civilization and of preponderating financial and diplomatic
resources, depended upon a policy which was not followed.
If the British authorities had eliminated Mr. Cecil Rhodes and his
schemes from the situation, and had suffered matters in South Africa to
return to the state which prevailed in 1887, the end would have been
different, and better. At that time the country was being allowed to
move in an unforced way toward a destiny of settled peace between the
two races. A genuine but unaggressive loyalty in the British colonies
was beginning to develop a reciprocal good will on the part of the two
republics, giving promise of a pleasant fellowship of nations in South
Africa.
The result would not have been a confederated South Africa under the
British crown; that was and is impossible, both for geographical and
political reasons. But there might have been brought about
acquaintanceship and mutual esteem between Great Britain, the would-be
Paramount Power, and the Africander race throughout the Transvaal, the
Orange Free State, and the British colonies of Natal and the Cape—which
race is and will long continue to be the dominant factor in South
Africa. Out of that friendly relationship might have come a paramount
power to Great Britain well worth the having, and in every way
consistent with the honor of the British crown and the continued
independence of the Africander republics.
But Mr. Rhodes and his projects were not eliminated from the situation.
By force of almost unequaled genius for acquisition and intrigue, and
of great powers in no least degree controlled by moral considerations,
he continued to dominate—both locally and in England—the British policy
in South Africa. His presence and influence made final peace in the
country impossible on any condition other than the subjugation of the
Africander Republics. Probably two-thirds of the European population of
South Africa believed that he was the chief criminal—though
unpunished—in connection with the conspiracy and raid of 1895–1896. His
influence, therefore, had the effect of intensifying the race enmities,
already the too vigorous growth of a century, and of warning every
Africander in the two republics to stand armed and ready to defend the
independence of his country. And these men, to whom Mr. Rhodes’
presence and activities were a constant irritation and threat, loved
freedom after the fashion of their Netherland forefathers who worsted
Spain in diplomacy and war in the sixteenth century, and after the
fashion of their Huguenot forefathers who counted no sacrifice too
great to make for liberty.
During 1896 there was a temporary lull in the agitation for reforms in
the Transvaal. Investigations had become an international necessity,
for appearance’s sake if for no other reason; but they led to nothing
except the rehabilitation of the principal leaders in the conspiracy
which had miscarried. Of necessity Doctor Jameson, and his immediate
associates in conducting the invasion, were condemned to death by the
Transvaal authorities, for they were taken in the act, and confessed
themselves guilty of a capital crime. After a time the death sentences
were reversed, and the offenders were set free.
By the opening of 1897 a good degree of order had replaced the state of
chaos into which the uprising had thrown the foreign population and
interests in the Transvaal. Then the agitation for reforms was renewed,
and the claims of the foreigners were backed up and pressed
diplomatically by the British government, of which the exponent in the
long controversy was the Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State
for the Colonies.
It is not necessary to trace, step by step, the diplomatic
correspondence on the subject of reforms in the Transvaal during 1897,
1898 and the first two months of 1899. The whole situation—including
every subject in dispute between the two governments—will come into
view in the discussions and negotiations immediately preceding the
outbreak of the Africanders’ Second War of Independence, in October,
1899.
On the 20th of March, 1899, in reply to a question by Sir E. Ashmead
Bartlett as to Great Britain’s right to interfere with the affairs of
the South African Republic, Mr. Chamberlain, from his place in
parliament, said:
“There are certain cases where we can intervene, and rightly intervene,
in Transvaal affairs.
“1. In the first place, we may intervene if there is any breach of the
convention.
“2. There is no doubt we should have the usual right of interference if
* * * the treatment of British subjects in the Transvaal was of such
nature as would give us the right to interfere as to the treatment of
British subjects in France or Germany.
“3. Then there is only one other case—the third case. We can make
friendly recommendations to the Transvaal for the benefit of South
Africa generally and in the interests of peace.”
In concluding Mr. Chamberlain said: “I do not feel at the moment that
any case has arisen which would justify me in taking the strong action
suggested”; the reference being to the sending of an ultimatum.
The next important development was a petition to the Imperial
Government, signed by 21,684 British subjects in the Transvaal, praying
for interference in their behalf. This was forwarded through Mr.
Conyngham Greene, the British agent at Pretoria, to Sir Alfred Milner,
Governor of Cape Colony, who transmitted it to London, where it was
received by Mr. Chamberlain on the 14th of April.
Summarized, the complaints of the petitioners were as follows:
1. The great majority of the uitlander population consists of British
subjects who have no share in the government.
2. Petitions of the uitlanders to the Transvaal government have either
failed or have been scornfully rejected.
3. Instead of redressing uitlander grievances, the Transvaal
government, after the Jameson raid, passed laws making their position
more irksome—i.e., the immigration of aliens act, the press law, the
aliens expulsion law. The immigration act was suspended at the
insistence of the British government, but the others remain in force.
4. The Transvaal government exercises the power of suppressing
publications devoted to the interests of British uitlanders.
5. British subjects are expelled from the Transvaal without the right
of appeal to the high court.
6. The promise of municipal government for the city of Johannesburg has
been kept in appearance only. There are 1,039 burghers resident of
Johannesburg, and 23,503 uitlanders, but the law giving each ward of
the city two members of the council also requires that one of them must
be a burgher, and the Burgomaster, who is appointed by the government,
has the casting vote.
7. The city of Johannesburg is menaced by forts occupied by strong Boer
garrisons.
8. The uitlanders of Johannesburg are denied the right to police their
own city.
9. Trial by jury is a farce, as uitlanders can be tried by burghers
only.
10. The uitlanders are deprived of political representation; are taxed
beyond the requirements of the Transvaal government.
11. The education of uitlander children is made subject to impossible
conditions.
12. The Boer police give no protection to lives and property in the
city of Johannesburg.
It will be noted that this petition, dealing with political and other
grievances, makes no mention of the dynamite monopoly, extortionate
railway charges, burdensome tariffs on imported foodstuffs, and other
industrial and commercial grievances of which complaints had been made
at an earlier date. And in judging of this list of complaints it should
be considered that, with the exception of the eleventh, concerning the
education of children—which is fatally indefinite in expression—most of
the conditions complained of are exactly such as would be imposed on a
city lately in insurrection, and yet inhabited by the same persons who
had conspired to overthrow the government.
The dangerous tension already existing was greatly heightened by a long
telegraphic communication from Sir Alfred Milner, Governor of Cape
Colony, to Mr. Chamberlain, on the 5th of May. After reviewing the
situation, and reiterating the grievances which British subjects were
said to be suffering, and declaring that the spectacle presented “does
steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain,” Sir
Alfred revealed the true inwardness of the struggle already begun
between the Africanders and the British by saying:
“A certain section of the press, not in the Transvaal only, preaches
openly and constantly the doctrine of a republic embracing all South
Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the
Transvaal, its alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active
sympathy which in case of war it would receive from a section of her
Majesty’s subjects.
“I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda
but some striking proof of the intention of her Majesty’s government
not to be ousted from its position in South Africa.”
Sir Alfred’s reference in the last two paragraphs is to the “Africander
Bund,” a society whose ramifications were to be found throughout Natal,
Cape Colony, and, indeed, wherever members of the Africander race were
to be found.
He that runneth may read and understand these luminous words in Sir
Alfred Milner’s dispatch. The coming struggle was not to be about some
foreigners in the Transvaal, but to defeat, in time, the republican
aspirations of the whole Africander race, including those in the two
republics already established and “a section of her Majesty’s subjects”
in the British territories of Natal and Cape Colony; and the issue was
understood to be either “a republic embracing all South
Africa”—involving the expulsion of the British government “from its
position in South Africa”—or the defeat of those aspirations in the
establishing of a confederated South Africa under the British crown.
In the light of Sir Alfred’s dispatch one ceases to wonder that all
negotiations about the uitlander grievances, and that the repeated
concessions as to the franchise offered by the Transvaal, were without
effect. It is evident that both parties saw inevitable war approaching
on quite another and a much larger question.
The response of the British government to the uitlanders’ petition, and
to Sir Alfred Milner’s appeal for intervention, was a suggestion that
President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner should meet at Pretoria and
confer concerning the chief matters in dispute between the two
governments. Afterward, upon the invitation of Mr. Steyn, president of
the Orange Free State, it was decided to hold the conference at
Bloemfontein, the capital of the Free State Republic. In accepting the
invitation to this conference in a telegram dated the 17th of May, Mr.
Kruger said:
“I remain disposed to come to Bloemfontein and will gladly discuss
every proposal in a friendly way that can conduce to a good
understanding between the South African Republic and England, and to
the maintenance of peace in South Africa, provided that the
independence of this republic is not impugned.”
The date selected for the first meeting between Mr. Kruger and Sir
Alfred was the 31st of May. On the 22d Sir Alfred telegraphed Mr.
Chamberlain asking for final instructions to guide him in the
approaching conference, and outlining his own views of the situation
thus:
“It is my own inclination to put in the foreground the question of the
uitlanders’ grievances, treating it as broadly as possible, and
insisting that it is necessary, in order to relieve the situation, that
uitlanders should obtain some substantial degree of representation by
legislation to be passed this session. Following would be the general
line:
“Franchise after six years, retroactive, and at least seven members for
the Rand” (the mining district). “Present number of Volksraad of South
Africa being twenty-eight, this would make one-fifth of it uitlander
members.
“If President Kruger will not agree to anything like this, I should try
municipal government for the whole Rand as an alternative, with wide
powers, including control of police.
“If he rejects this, too, I do not see much use in discussing the
various outstanding questions between the two governments in detail,
such as dynamite, violations of Zululand boundary, ‘Critic’ case, Cape
boys and Indians, though it would be desirable to allude to them in
course of discussion, and point out the gravity of having so many
subjects of dispute unsettled.”
In a telegram, dated the 24th of May, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir
Alfred Milner, in part, as follows:
“I think personally you should lay all stress on the question of
franchise in first instance. Other reforms are less pressing and will
come in time if this can be arranged satisfactorily and form of oath
modified. Redistribution is reasonable, and you might accept a moderate
concession.
“If fair terms of franchise are refused by President Kruger it is
hardly worth while to bring forward other matters, such as aliens,
colored people, education, dynamite, etc., at the conference, and the
whole situation must be reconsidered.”
On the 31st of May, 1899, Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger met in
conference at Bloemfontein. Their negotiations form one of the most
interesting features of the controversy between the two governments.
The results of the conference, in brief, were as follows. For the
uitlanders, Sir Alfred demanded that:
“Every foreigner who can prove satisfactorily that he has been a
resident in the country for five years; that he desires to make it his
permanent place of residence; that he is prepared to take the oath to
obey the laws, to undertake all obligations of citizenship, and to
defend the independence of the country; should be allowed to become a
citizen on taking that oath.”
Sir Alfred Milner modified these proposals by suggesting that the
franchise be restricted to persons possessing a specific amount of
property or of yearly wages, and who have good characters. He asked,
further, that “in order to make that proposal of any real use for the
new citizens, who mostly live in one district, * * * there should be a
certain number of new constituencies created,” and that “the number of
these districts should not be so small as to leave the representatives
of the new population in a contemptible minority.”
President Kruger did not accept Sir Alfred’s proposals, and submitted
counter proposals as follows:
“1. Every person who fixes his residence in the South African Republic
has to get himself registered on the Field Cornet’s books within
fourteen days after his arrival, according to the existing law. He will
be able after complying with the conditions under ‘A’ and after the
lapse of two years to get himself naturalized, and will, five years
after naturalization, on complying with the conditions under ‘B,’
obtain the full franchise.
“A.
“1. Six months’ notice of intention to apply for naturalization. 2.
Two years’ continuous residence. 3. Residence in the South African
Republic during that time. 4. No dishonoring sentence. 5. Proof of
obedience to laws; no act against the government or independence.
6. Proof of full state citizenship and franchise or title thereto
in former country. 7. Possession of unmortgaged property to the
value of £150; or occupation of house to the rental of £50 per
annum; or yearly income of at least £200. Nothing, however, shall
prevent the government from granting naturalization to persons who
have not satisfied this condition. 8. Taking of an oath similar to
that of the Orange Free State.
“B.
“1. Continuous registration for five years after naturalization. 2.
Continuous residence during that period. 3. No dishonoring
sentence. 4. Proof of obedience to laws. 5. Proof that applicant
still complies with the condition of A 7.”
In a memorandum which is a part of the records of the conference Sir
Alfred Milner admitted that President Kruger’s proposals were “a
considerable advance upon the existing provisions as to franchise.” But
he intimated that they stopped far short of the solution he had
suggested, and which, he said, “alone appeared to be adequate to the
needs of the case.” He also declared it a waste of time to discuss
further details; and so the conference ended in failure.
Notwithstanding the failure of the conference, the Volksraad of the
South African Republic passed a seven years’ retroactive franchise law
on the 19th of July, 1899. This law was somewhat modified from the
proposals submitted by President Kruger at the conference. It also gave
the uitlanders additional representation in both raads, which President
Kruger announced on the 27th of July as follows:
“By virtue of the powers conferred upon them the Executive Council
yesterday decided to give three new members in each Volksraad for the
Witwatersrand gold fields. That is to say, there are at present two
members for both raads; the number will be increased to eight, four to
sit in the first and four in the second raad. With the De Kaap
representative, there will now be five members to represent the mining
industry in a proposed enlarged legislature of thirty-one members.”
In London it was believed that the action of the Volksraad was a long
stride toward a peaceful solution of the difficulties. In the House of
Commons Mr. Chamberlain, after reading a telegram from Sir Alfred
Milner announcing the action of the Volksraad, said:
“I have no official information as to the redistribution, but it has
been stated that the government of the South African Republic proposes
to give seven new seats to the district chiefly inhabited by aliens.
“If this report is confirmed this important change in the proposals of
President Kruger, coupled with previous amendments, leads the
government to hope that the new law may prove a basis of a settlement
on the lines laid down by Sir Alfred Milner at the Bloemfontein
conference.”
But somewhere in the counsels by which the British authorities acted at
this time there was an element of suspicion and of yet unsatisfied
aggression, which did not make for a peaceful settlement. After the
Volksraad of the South African Republic had passed the seven years’
franchise law, together with enlarged representation of the uitlanders
in both raads, and after Mr. Chamberlain had made his hopeful
announcement in the House of Commons, the whole subject was reopened by
a new request. The Transvaal government was asked to agree that a joint
commission of inquiry, made up of expert delegates representing the
Transvaal and the British government, should be appointed to
investigate the exact effect of the new franchise law.
It is not surprising that this request fell as a shock upon a
government which had received from the power making this and other
extraordinary demands a guaranty, in the convention of 1884, that it
should be in every sense independent in the management of its internal
affairs. On the 21st of August President Kruger formally declined to
accede to the request for a joint committee to investigate the effect
of the new franchise law, and submitted an alternative proposition: The
South African Republic would give a five years’ retroactive franchise,
eight new seats in the Volksraad and a vote for President and
Commandant-General, conditioned upon Great Britain consenting:
“1. In the future not to interfere in the internal affairs of the
Transvaal Republic. 2. Not to insist further on its assertion of the
existence of suzerainty. 3. To agree to arbitration.”
In a dispatch dated the 2d of September, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain, having
rejected President Kruger’s alternative proposals, suggested another
conference, to be held at Cape Town, and ended with the significant
statement:
“Her Majesty’s government also desires to remind the government of the
South African Republic that there are other matters of difference
between the two governments which will not be settled by the grant of
political representation to the uitlanders, and which are not proper
subjects for reference to arbitration.”
In dispatches printed on the 7th of September President Kruger
signified a willingness to attend the Cape Town conference, and, while
holding that no good could come of a joint inquiry into the effect of
the new franchise law, he would agree that British representatives
should make an independent inquiry, after which any suggestions they
might make would be submitted to the raad. Concerning suzerainty he
announced the unalterable purpose of his people to adhere absolutely to
the convention of 1884.
On the 8th of September the British cabinet formulated a note to the
South African Republic very much in the nature of an ultimatum,
refusing point blank to entertain the proposal that Great Britain
should relinquish suzerainty over the Transvaal and pointedly
intimating that the offer of a joint inquiry into the effect of the
seven years’ franchise law would not remain open indefinitely.
The Transvaal’s rejoinder, printed unofficially on the 16th of
September, announced that the South African Republic withdrew the
proposal to give a five years’ franchise, that it would adhere to the
original seven years’ law already passed by the Volksraad, and that it
would, if necessary, adopt any suggestions Great Britain might make
with reference to the practical workings of the law.
On the 25th of September, after three days’ consideration, the British
cabinet gave out the text of another note to the South African
Republic, which read as follows:
“The object Her Majesty’s government had in view in the recent
negotiations has been stated in a manner which cannot admit of
misunderstanding—viz.: To obtain such substantial and immediate
representation for the outlanders as will enable them to secure for
themselves that fair and just treatment which was formally promised
them in 1881, and which Her Majesty intended to secure for them when
she granted privileges of self-government to the Transvaal.
“No conditions less comprehensive than those contained in the telegram
of September 8 can be relied on to effect this object.
“The refusal of the South African government to entertain the offer
thus made—coming, as it does, after four months of protracted
negotiations, themselves the climax of five years of extended
agitation—makes it useless to further pursue the discussion on the
lines hitherto followed, and the imperial government is now compelled
to consider the situation afresh and formulate its own proposals for a
final settlement of the issues which have been created in South Africa
by the policy constantly followed by the government of South Africa.
“They will communicate the result of their deliberations in a later
dispatch.”