I have been overwhelmed with public criticism and private advice and
even anonymous letters telling me exactly what I should do. Some are
impatient that I do not advise immediate and extensive non-co-operation;
others tell me what harm I am doing the country by throwing it knowingly
in a tempest of violence on either side. It is difficult for me to deal
with the whole of the criticism, but I would summarize some of the
objections and endeavour to answer them to the best of my ability. These
are in addition to those I have already answered:--
(1) Turkish claim is immoral or unjust and how can I, a lover of truth
and justice, support it? (2) Even if the claim be just in theory, the
Turk is hopelessly incapable, weak and cruel. He does not deserve any
assistance.
(3) Even if Turkey deserves all that is claimed for her, why should I
land India in an international struggle?
(4) It is no part of the Indian Mahomedans' business to meddle in this
affair. If they cherish any political ambition, they have tried, they
have failed and they should now sit still. If it is a religious matter
with them, it cannot appeal to the Hindu reason in the manner it is put
and in any case Hindus ought not to identify themselves with Mahomedans
in their religious quarrel with Christendom.
(5) In no case should I advocate non-co-operation which in its extreme
sense is nothing but a rebellion, no matter how peaceful it may be.
(6) Moreover, my experience of last year must show me that it is beyond
the capacity of any single human being to control the forces of violence
that are lying dormant in the land.
(7) Non-co-operation is futile because people will never respond in
right earnest, and reaction that might afterwards set in will be worse
than the state of hopefulness we are now in.
(8) Non-co-operation will bring about cessation of all other activities,
even working of the Reforms, thus set back the clock of progress. (9)
However pure my motives may be, those of the Mussalmans are obviously
revengeful.
I shall now answer the objections in the order in which they are
stated--
(1) In my opinion the Turkish claim is not only not immoral and unjust,
but it is highly equitable, if only because Turkey wants to retain what
is her own. And the Mahomedan manifesto has definitely declared that
whatever guarantees may be necessary to be taken for the protection of
non-Muslim and non-Turkish races, should be taken so as to give the
Christians theirs and the Arabs their self-government under the Turkish
suzerainty.
(2) I do not believe the Turk to be weak, incapable or cruel. He is
certainly disorganised and probably without good generalship. He has
been obliged to fight against heavy odds. The argument of weakness,
incapacity and cruelty one often hears quoted in connection with those
from whom power is sought to be taken away. About the alleged massacres
a proper commission has been asked for, but never granted. And in any
case security can be taken against oppression.
(3) I have already stated that if I were not interested in the Indian
Mahomedans, I would not interest myself in the welfare of the Turks any
more than I am in that of the Austrians or the Poles. But I am bound as
an Indian to share the sufferings and trial of fellow-Indians. If I deem
the Mahomedan to be my brother. It is my duty to help him in his hour
of peril to the best of my ability, if his cause commends itself to
me as just.
(4) The fourth refers to the extent Hindus should join hands with the
Mahomedans. It is therefore a matter of feeling and opinion. It is
expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to the utmost in a just
cause and I should therefore travel with him along the whole road so
long as the means employed by him are as honourable as his end. I cannot
regulate the Mahomedan feeling. I must accept his statement that the
Khilafat is with him a religious question in the sense that it binds him
to reach the goal even at the cost of his own life.
(5) I do not consider non-co-operation to be a rebellion, because it is
free from violence. In a larger sense all opposition to a Government
measure is a rebellion. In that sense, rebellion in a just cause is a
duty, the extent of opposition being determined by the measure of the
injustice done and felt.
(6) My experience of last year shows me that in spite of aberrations in
some parts of India, the country was entirely under control that the
influence of Satyagraha was profoundly for its good and that where
violence did break out there were local causes that directly contributed
to it. At the same time I admit that even the violence that did take
place on the part of the people and the spirit of lawlessness that was
undoubtedly shown in some parts should have remained under check. I have
made ample acknowledgment of the miscalculation I then made. But all the
painful experience that I then gained did not any way shake my belief in
Satyagraha or in the possibility of that matchless force being utilised
in India. Ample provision is being made this time to avoid the mistakes
of the past. But I must refuse to be deterred from a clear course;
because it may be attended by violence totally unintended and in spite
of extraordinary efforts that are being made to prevent it. At the same
time I must make my position clear. Nothing can possibly prevent a
Satyagrahi from doing his duty because of the frown of the authorities.
I would risk, if necessary, a million lives so long as they are
voluntary sufferers and are innocent, spotless victims. It is the
mistakes of the people that matter in a Satyagraha campaign. Mistakes,
even insanity must be expected from the strong and the powerful, and the
moment of victory has come when there is no retort to the mad fury of
the powerful, but a voluntary, dignified and quiet submission but not
submission to the will of the authority that has put itself in the
wrong. The secret of success lies therefore in holding every English
life and the life of every officer serving the Government as sacred as
those of our own dear ones. All the wonderful experience I have gained
now during nearly 40 years of conscious existence, has convinced me that
there is no gift so precious as that of life. I make bold to say that
the moment the Englishmen feel that although they are in India in a
hopeless minority, their lives are protected against harm not because of
the matchless weapons of destruction which are at their disposal, but
because Indians refuse to take the lives even of those whom they may
consider to be utterly in the wrong that moment will see a
transformation in the English nature in its relation to India and that
moment will also be the moment when all the destructive cutlery that is
to be had in India will begin to rust. I know that this is a far-off
vision. That cannot matter to me. It is enough for me to see the light
and to act up to it, and it is more than enough when I gain companions
in the onward march. I have claimed in private conversations with
English friends that it is because of my incessant preaching of the
gospel of non-violence and my having successfully demonstrated its
practical utility that so far the forces of violence, which are
undoubtedly in existence in connection with the Khilafat movement, have
remained under complete control.
(7) From a religious standpoint the seventh objection is hardly worth
considering. If people do not respond to the movement of
non-co-operation, it would be a pity, but that can be no reason for a
reformer not to try. It would be to me a demonstration that the present
position of hopefulness is not dependent on any inward strength or
knowledge, but it is hope born of ignorance and superstition.
(8) If non-co-operation is taken up in earnest, it must bring about a
cessation of all other activities including the Reforms, but I decline
to draw therefore the corollary that it will set back the clock of
progress. On the contrary, I consider non-co-operation to be such a
powerful and pure instrument, that if it is enforced in an earnest
spirit, it will be like seeking first the Kingdom of God and everything
else following as a matter of course. People will have then realised
their true power. They would have learnt the value of discipline,
self-control, joint action, non-violence, organisation and everything
else that goes to make a nation great and good, and not merely great.
(9) I do not know that I have a right to arrogate greater purity for
myself than for our Mussalman brethren. But I do admit that they do not
believe in my doctrine of non-violence to the full extent. For them it
is a weapon of the weak, an expedient. They consider non-co-operation
without violence to be the only thing open to them in the war of direct
action. I know that if some of them could offer successful violence,
they would do to-day. But they are convinced that humanly speaking it is
an impossibility. For them, therefore, non-co-operation is a matter not
merely of duty but also of revenge. Whereas I take up non-co-operation
against the Government as I have actually taken it up in practice
against members of my own family. I entertain very high regard for the
British constitution, I have not only no enmity against Englishmen but I
regard much in English character as worthy of my emulation. I count many
as my friends. It is against my religion to regard any one as an enemy.
I entertain similar sentiments with respect to Mahomedans. I find their
cause to be just and pure. Although therefore their viewpoint is
different from mine I do not hesitate to associate with them and invite
them to give my method a trial, for, I believe that the use of a pure
weapon even from a mistaken motive does not fail to produce some good,
even as the telling of truth if only because for the time being it is
the best policy, is at least so much to the good.