SECTON I. IMPUTATION CANNOT CHANGE, ALIENATE OR TRANSFER...
THE PERSONAL DEMERIT OF SIN; AND PERSONAL MERIT OF VIRTUE TO OTHERS, WHO
WERE NOT ACTIVE THEREIN, ALTHOUGH THIS DOCTRINE SUPPOSES AN ALIENATION
THEREOF
The doctrine of imputation according to the Christian scheme, consists
of two parts; first, of imputation of the apostacy of Adam and Eve to
their posterity, commonly called original sin; and secondly, of the
imputation of the merits or righteousness of Christ, who in scripture is
called the second Adam, to mankind, or to the elect. This is a concise
definition of the doctrine, and which will undoubtedly be admitted to
be a just one by every denomination of men, who are acquainted with
Christianity, whether they adhere to it or not I therefore proceed to
illustrate and explain the doctrine by transcribing a short, but very
pertinent conversation, which in the early years of my manhood, I had
with a Calvinistical divine: but previously remark, that I was educated
in what is commonly called the Armenian principles, and among other
tenets to reject the doctrine of original sin, this was the point at
issue between the clergyman and me. In my turn I opposed the doctrine
of original sin with philosophical reasonings, and as I thought
had confuted the doctrine. The reverend gentleman heard me through
patiently, and with candor replied, "your metaphysical reasonings are
not to the purpose; inasmuch as you are a Christian, and hope and expect
to be saved by the imputed righteousness of Christ to you; for you may
as well be imputedly sinful as imputedly righteous. Nay, said he, if
you hold to the doctrine of satisfaction and atonement by Christ, by so
doing you pre-suppose the doctrine of apostacy or original sin to be in
fact true; for said he, if mankind were not in a ruined and condemned
state by nature, there could have been no need of a redeemer, but each
individual would have been accountable to his creator and judge,
upon the basis of his own moral agency. Further observing, that upon
philosophical principles it was difficult to account for the doctrine
of original sin, or original righteousness, yet as they were plain
fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith, we ought to assent to
the truth of them, and that from the divine authority of revelation.
Notwithstanding, said he, if you will give me a philosophical
explanation of original imputed righteousness, which you profess to
believe, and expect salvation by, then I will return you a philosophical
explanation of the doctrine of original sin; for it is plain, said he,
that your objections lie with equal weight against original imputed
righteousness, as against original imputed sin." Upon which I had
the candor to acknowledge to the worthy ecclesiastic, that upon the
Christian plan, I perceived that the argument had fairly terminated
against me. For at that time I dared not distrust the infallibility
of revelation, much more to dispute it. However, this conversation was
uppermost in my mind for several months after, and after many painful
searches and researches after the truth respecting the doctrine of
imputation, resolved at all events to abide the decision of rational
argument in the premises, and on a full examination of both parts of
the doctrine, rejected the whole; for on a fair scrutiny I found, that
I must concede to it entirely or not at all, or else believe
inconsistently as the clergyman had argued.
Having opened and explained the doctrine, we proceed argumentatively to
consider it. Imputation of sin or righteousness includes an alteration
or transferring of the personal merits or demerits of sin or
righteousness, from those who may be supposed to have been active in the
one or the other, to others, who are premised not to have been active
therein, otherwise it would not answer the Bible notion of imputation.
For if sin or righteousness, vice or virtue, are imputable only to their
respective personal proficients or actors, in this case original sin
must have been imputed to Adam and Eve, to the exclusion of their
posterity, and the righteousness of Christ as exclusively imputed to
himself, precluding all others therefrom; so that both the sin of the
first Adam and the righteousness of the second, would, on this stating
of imputation, have been matters which respect merely the agency, of the
demerits or merits of the two respective Adams themselves, and in which
we could have had no blame, reward or concern, any more than in the
building of Babel.
This then is the question that determines the sequel of the dispute for
or against the doctrine of imputation, viz. whether the personal
merit or demerit of mankind, that is to say, their virtue or vice,
righteousness or wickedness can be alienated, imputed to, or transferred
from one person to another, or not? If any should object against this
stating of the question now in dispute, it would be the same in reality
as disputing against the doctrine of imputation itself, for imputation
must transfer or change the personal merit or demerit of the sin or
righteousness of mankind or not do it; if it does not do it, the whole
notion of original sin or of righteousness, as being imputed from the
first and second Adams to mankind, is without foundation, consequently,
if there is any reality in the doctrine of imputation, it must needs
transfer or change the guilt of original sin, or of the apostacy of Adam
and Eve, to their posterity, or otherwise they could need no atonement
or imputative righteousness, as a remedy therefrom, but every individual
of "mankind would have stood accountable to their creator and judge on
the basis of their own moral agency," which is undoubted the true state
of the case, respecting all rational and accountable beings; so that if
the transferring of the individual merits or demerits of one person
to another, is not contained in the act or doctrine of imputation, it
contains nothing at all, but is a sound without a meaning, and after all
the talk which has been in the world about it, we must finally adopt to
old proverb, viz. "every tub stands upon its own bottom."
SECTON II. THE MORAL RECTITUDE OF THINGS FORECLOSES...
THE ACT OF IMPUTATION.
Imputation confounds virtue and vice, and saps the very foundation of
moral government, both divine and human. Abstract the idea of personal
merit and demerit, from the individuals of mankind, justice would be
totally blind, and truth would be nullified, or at least excluded from
any share in the administration of government. Admitting that moral good
and evil has taken place in the system of rational agents, yet, on the
position of imputation, it would be impossible, that a retribution of
justice should be made to them by God or by man, except it be according
to their respective personal merits and demerits; which would fix upon
the basis of our own moral agency and accountability, and preclude the
imputation of righteousnes.
Truth respects the reality of things, as they are in their various
complicated and distinct natures, and necessarily conforms to all facts
and realities. It exists in, by and with every thing that does exist,
and that which does not and cannot exist, is fictitious and void of
truth, as is the doctrine of imputation. It is a truth that some of the
individuals of mankind are virtuous, and that others are vicious, and
it is a truth, that the former merit peace of conscience and praise, and
the latter horror of conscience and blame; for God has so constituted
the nature of things, that moral goodness, naturally and necessarily
tends to happiness in a moral sense, and moral evil as necessarily tends
to the contrary; and as truth respects every thing, as being what it
is, it respects nature, as God has constituted it, with its tendencies,
dispositions, aptitudes and laws; and as the tendency of virtue is to
mental happiness, and vice the contrary, they fall under the cognizance
of truth, as all other facts necessarily do; which tendencies will
for ever preclude imputation, by making us morally happy or miserable
according to our works.
Truth respects the eternal rules of unalterable rectitude and fitness,
which comprehends all virtue, goodness and true happiness; and as sin
and wickedness is no other but a deviation from the rules of eternal
unerring order and reason, so truth respects it as unreasonable, unfit,
unrighteous and unhappy deviation from moral rectitude, naturally
tending to misery. This order of nature, comprehended under the terms of
truth, must have been of all others the wisest and best; in fine it
must have been absolutely perfect; for this order and harmony of things,
could not have resulted from anything short of infinite wisdom, goodness
and power, by which it is also upheld; and all just ideas of equity, or
of natural and moral fitness must be learned from nature, and predicated
on it; and nature predicated on the immutable perfection of a God; and
to suppose that imputation, in any one instance has taken place, is the
same as to suppose, that the eternal order, truth, justice, equity and
fitness of things has been changed, and if so, the God of nature must
needs have been a changeable being, and liable to alter his justice or
order of nature, which is the same thing; for without the alteration
of nature, and the tendency of it, there could be no such thing as
imputation, but every of the individuals of mankind would be ultimately
happy or miserable, according as their respective proficiencies may be
supposed to be either good or evil, agreeable to the order and tendency
of nature before alluded to. For all rational and accountable agents
must stand or fall upon the principles of the law of nature, except
imputation alters the nature and tendency of things; of which the
immutability of a God cannot admit. From what has been already argued
on this subject, we infer, that as certain as the individuals of mankind
are the proprietors of their own virtues or vices, so certain, the
doctrine of imputation cannot be true. Furthermore, the supposed act
or agency of imputing or transferring the personal merit or demerit
of moral good or evil, _alias_, the sin of the first Adam, or the
righteousness of the second Adam, to others of mankind, cannot be the
act or exertion of either the first or second Adam, from whom original
sin and righteousness is said to have been imputed. Nor can it be
the act or doings of those individuals, to whom the supposed merit or
demerit of original sin or righteous is premised to be imputed; so that
both Adam and each individual of mankind are wholly excluded from acting
any part in the premised act of imputation; and are supposed to be
altogether passive in the matter, and consequently it necessarily
follows, that if there ever was such an act as that of imputation, it
must have been the immediate and sovereign act of God, to the preclusion
of the praise or blame of man But to suppose, that God can impute the
virtue or vice of the person of A, to be the virtue or vice of the
person of B, is the same as to suppose that God can impute or change
truth into falsehood, or falsehood into truth, or that he can reverse
the nature of moral rectitude itself, which is inadmissable. But
admitting, that imputation was in the power and at the option of man,
it is altogether probable that they would have been very sparing in
imputing merit and happiness, but might nevertheless have been vastly
liberal in imputing demerit and misery, from one to another, which is
too farcical.
SECTON III. CONTAINING REMARKS ON THE ATONEMENT...
AND SATISFACTION FOR ORIGINAL SIN
The doctrine of imputation is in every point of view incompatible with
the moral perfections of God. We will premise, that the race of Adam in
their respective generations was guilty of the apostacy, and obnoxious
to the vindictive justice and punishment of God, and accordingly doomed
to either an eternal or temporary punishment therefore, which is the
Bible representation of the matter. What possibility could there have
been of reversing the divine decree? It must be supposed to have
been just, or it could not have had the divine sanction, and if so,
a reversal of it would be unjust. But it would be still a greater
injustice to lay the blame and vindictive punishment of a guilty race
of condemned sinners upon an innocent and inoffensive being, for in this
case the guilty would be exempted from their just punishment, and the
innocent unjustly suffer for it, which holds up to view two manifest
injustices; the first consists in not doing justice to the guilty, and
the second in actually punishing the innocent, which instead of atoning
for sin, would add sin to sin, or injustice to injustice; and after all,
if it was ever just, that the race of Adam should have been punished for
the imputed sin of their premised original ancestor, be that punishment
what it will, it is so still, notwithstanding the atonement, for the
eternal justice and reason of things can never, be altered. This justice
always defeats the possibility of satisfaction for sin by way of a
mediator.
That physical evils may and have been propagated by natural generation,
none can dispute, for that the facts themselves are obvious. But that
moral evil can be thus propagated, is altogether chimerical, for we are
not born criminals.
SECTON IV. REMARKS ON REDEMPTION, WROUGHT OUT BY INFLICTING...
THE DEMERITS OF SIN UPON THE INNOCENT, WOULD BE UNJUST, AND THAT IT
COULD CONTAIN NO MERCY OR GOODNESS TO THE UNIVERSALITY OF BEING
The practice of imputing one person's crime to another, in capital
offences among men, so that the innocent should suffer for the guilty,
has never yet been introduced into any court of judicature in the world,
or so much as practised in any civilized country; and the manifest
reason in this, as in all other cases of imputation, is the same, viz.
it confounds personal merit and demerit.
The murderer ought to suffer for the demerit of his crime, but if the
court exclude the idea of personal demerit (guilt being always the
inherent property of the guilty and of them only) they might as well
sentence one person to death for the murder as another: for justice
would be wholly blind was it not predicated on the idea of the fact of a
personal demerit, on the identical person who was guilty of the murder:
nor is it possible to reward merit abstractly considered from its
personal agents. These are facts that universally hold good in human
government. The same reasons cannot fail to hold good in the divine mind
as in that of the human, for the rules of justice are essentially the
same whether applied to the one or to the other, having their uniformity
in the eternal truth and reason of things.
But it is frequently objected, that inasmuch as one person can pay,
satisfy and discharge a cash debt for another, redeem him from prison
and set him at liberty, therefore Jesus Christ might become responsible
for the sins of mankind, or of the elect, and by suffering their
punishments atone for them and free them from their condemnation. But it
should be considered, that comparisons darken or reflect light upon an
argument according as they are either pertinent or impertinent thereto;
we will therefore examine the comparison, and see if it will with
propriety apply to the atonement.
Upon the Christian scheme, Christ the Son was God, and equal with God
the Father, or with God the Holy Ghost, and therefore original sin must
be considered to be an offence equally against each of the persons
of the premised Trinity, and being of a criminal nature could not be
discharged or satisfied by cash or produce, as debts of a civil contract
are, but by suffering; and it has already been proved to be inconsistent
with the divine or human government, to inflict the punishment of the
guilty upon the innocent, though one man may discharge another's debt in
cases where lands, chattels or cash are adequate to it; but what capital
offender was ever discharged by such commodities?
Still there remains a difficulty on the part of Christianity, in
accounting for one of the persons in the premised Trinity satisfying a
debt due to the impartial justice of the unity of the three persons. For
God the Son to suffer the condemnation of guilt in behalf of man, would
not only be unjust in itself, but incompatible with his divinity, and
the retribution of the justice of the premised Trinity of persons in
the god-head (of whom God the Son must be admitted to be one) toward
mankind; for this would be the same as to suppose God to be judge,
criminal and executioner, which is inadmissible.
But should we admit for argument's sake, that God suffered for original
sin, yet taking into one complex idea the whole mental system of beings,
universally, both finite and infinite, there could have been no display
of grace, mercy, or goodness to being in general, in such a supposed
redemption of mankind; inasmuch as the same quantity or degree of evil
is supposed to have taken place upon being, universally considered, as
would have taken place, had finite individuals, or the race of Adam,
suffered according to their respective demerits.
Should we admit that there is a Trinity of persons in the divine
essence, yet the one could not suffer without the other, for essence
cannot be divided in suffering, any more than in enjoyment. The essence
of God is that which includes the divine nature, and the same identical
nature must necessarily partake of the same glory, honor, power, wisdom,
goodness and absolute uncreated and unlimited perfection, and is equally
exempted from weakness and suffering. Therefore, as certain as Christ
suffered he was not God, but whether he is supposed to be God or man, or
both, he could not in justice have suffered for original sin, which must
have been the demerit of its perpetrators as before argued.
Supposing Christ to have been both God and man, he must have existed in
two distinct essences, viz. the essence of God and the essence of man.
And if he existed in two distinct and separate essences, there could be
no union between the divine and human natures. But if there is any such
thing as an hypostatical union between the divine and human natures,
it must unite both in one essence, which is impossible: for the divine
nature being infinite, could admit of no addition or enlargement and
consequently cannot allow of a union with any nature whatever. Was such
an union possible in itself, yet, for a superior nature to unite with an
inferior one in the same essence, would be degrading to the former,
as it would put both natures on a level by constituting an identity of
nature: the consequences whereof would either deify man, or divest God
of his divinity, and reduce him to the rank and condition of a creature;
inasmuch as the united essence must be denominated either divine or
human.