SECTON I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITY OF EVIL AND OF SIN CONSIDERED
That God is infinitely good in the eternal displays of his providence,
has been argued in the third section of the second chapter, from which
we infer that there cannot be an infinite evil in the universe, inasmuch
as it would be incompatible with infinite good; yet there are many who
imbibe the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, and the maxim on which
they predicate their arguments in its support, are, that the greatness
of sin, or adequateness of its punishment, is not to be measured, or
its viciousness ascertained by the capacity and circumstances of the
offender, but by the capacity and dignity of the being against whom
the offence is committed; and as every transgression is against the
authority and law of God, it is therefore against God; and as God is
infinite, therefore, sin is an infinite evil, and from hence infer the
infinite and vindictive wrath of God against sinners, and of his justice
in dooming them, as some say to infinite, and others say to eternal
misery; the one without degree or measure, and the other without end or
duration.
Admitting this maxim for truth, that the transgressions or sins of
mankind are to be estimated by their heinousness, by the dignity and
infinity of the divine nature, then it will follow that all sins
would be equal, which would confound all our notions of the degrees
or aggravations of sin; so that the sin would be the same to kill my
neighbor as it would be to kill his horse. For the divine nature, by
this maxim, being the rule by which man's sin is to be estimated, and
always the same, there could therefore be no degrees in sin or guilt,
any more than there are degrees of perfection in God, whom we all admit
to be infinite, and who for that reason only cannot admit of any degrees
or enlargement. Therefore as certain as there are degrees in sin, the
infinity of the divine nature cannot be the standard whereby it is to be
ascertained, which single consideration is a sufficient confutation of
the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, as predicated on that maxim,
inasmuch as none are so stupid as not to discern that there are degrees
and aggravations in sin.
I recollect a discourse of a learned Ecclesiastic, who was laboring
in support of this doctrine. His first proposition was, "That moral
rectitude was infinitely pleasing to God;" from which he deduced this
inference, viz., "That a contrariety to moral rectitude was consequently
infinitely displeasing to God and infinitely evil." That the absolute
moral rectitude of the divine nature is infinitely well pleasing to God,
will not be disputed; for this is none other but perfect and infinite
rectitude; but there cannot in nature be an infinite contrariety
thereto, or any being infinitely evil, or infinite in any respect
whatever, except we admit a self-existent and infinite diabolical
nature, which is too absurd to deserve argumentative confutation.
Therefore, as all possible moral evil must result from the agency of
finite beings, consisting in their sinful deviations from the rules
of eternal unerring order and reason, which is moral rectitude in the
abstract, we infer that, provided _all finite beings in the universe_
had not done anything else but sin and rebel against God, reason and
moral rectitude in general; all possible moral evil would fall as much
short of being infinite, as all finite capacities, complexly considered,
would fail of being infinite, which will bear no proportion at all. For
though _finite minds_, as has been before argued, bear a _resemblance to
God_, yet they bear _no proportion to his infinity_; and therefore there
is not and cannot be any being, beings or agency of being or beings,
complexly considered or otherwise, which are infinite in capacity, or
which are infinitely evil and detestable in the sight of God, in that
unlimited sense; for the actions or agency of limited beings, are also
limited, which is the same as finite: so that both the virtues and
vices of man are finite; they are not virtuous or vicious but in degree;
therefore moral evil is finite and bounded.
Though there is one, and but one infinite good, which is God, and there
can be no dispute, but that God judges, and approves or disapproves of
all things and beings, and agencies of beings, as in truth they are, or
in other words judges of every thing as being what it is; but to judge
a finite evil to be infinite, would be infinitely erroneous and
disproportionate; for so certain as there is a distinction between,
infinity and infinitude, so certain finite sinful agency cannot be
infinitely evil; or in other words finite offences cannot be infinite.
Nor is it possible that the greatest of sinners should in justice
deserve infinite punishment, or their nature sustain it; finite beings
may as well be supposed to be capable of infinite happiness as of
infinite misery, but the rank which they hold in the universe exempts
them from either; it nevertheless admits them to a state of agency,
probation or trial, consequently to interchangeable progressions in
moral good and evil, and of course to alternate happiness or misery.
We will dismiss the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin with this
observation, that as no mere creature can suffer an infinitude of misery
or of punishment, it is therefore incompatible with the wisdom of God,
so far to capacitate creatures to sin, as in his constitution of things
to foreclose himself from adequately punishing them for it.
SECTON II. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD AS INCOMPATIBLE...
WITH ETERNAL PUNISHMENT
We may for certain conclude, that such a punishment will never have the
divine approbation, or be inflicted on any intelligent being or beings
in the infinitude of the government of God. For an endless punishment
defeats the very end of its institution, which in all wise and good
governments is as well to reclaim offenders, as to be examples to
others; but a government which does not admit of reformation and
repentance, must unavoidably involve its subjects in misery; for the
weakness of creatures will always be a source of error and inconstancy,
and a wise Governor, as we must admit God to be, would suit his
government to the capacity and all other circumstances of the governed;
and instead of inflicting eternal damnation on his offending children,
would rather interchangeably extend his beneficence with his vindictive
punishments, so as to alienate them from sin and wickedness, and incline
them to morality; convincing them from experimental suffering, that
sin and vanity are their greatest enemies, and that in God and
moral rectitude their dependence and true happiness consists, and by
reclaiming them from wickedness and error, to the truth, and to the love
and practice of virtue, give them occasion to glorify God for the wisdom
and goodness of his government, and to be ultimately happy under it.
But we are told that the eternal damnation of a part of mankind greatly
augments the happiness of the elect, who are represented as being vastly
the less numerous, (a diabolical temper of mind in the elect:) besides,
how narrow and contractive must such notions of infinite justice and
goodness be? Who would imagine that the Deity conducts his providence
similar to the detestable despots of this world? Oh horrible? most
horrible impeachment of Divine Goodness! Rather let us exaltedly suppose
that God eternally had the ultimate best good of beings generally
and individually in his view, with the reward of the virtuous and the
punishment of the vicious, and that no other punishment will ever be
inflicted, merely by the divine administration, but that will finally
terminate in the best good of the punished, and thereby subserve the
great and important ends of the divine government, and be productive of
the restoration and felicity of all finite rational nature.
The most weighty arguments deducible from the divine nature have
been already offered, _to wit_, ultimate end of God, in creation and
providence, to do the greatest possible good and benignity to beings in
general, and consequently, that the great end and design of punishment,
in the divine government, must be to reclaim, restore, and bring
revolters from original rectitude back to embrace it and to be ultimately
happy; as also, that an eternal punishment, would defeat the very end
and design of punishment itself; and that no good consequences to the
punished could arise out of a never ending destruction; but that a
total, everlasting, and irreparable evil would take place on such
part of the moral creation, as may be thus sentenced to eternal and
remediless perdition; which would argue imperfection either in the
creation, or moral government of God, or in both.
SECTON III. HUMAN LIBERTY, AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CANNOT...
BE ATTENDED WITH ETERNAL CONSEQUENCES, EITHER GOOD OR EVIL
From what has been argued in the foregoing section, it appears that
mankind in this life are not agents of trial for eternity, but that
they will eternally remain agents of trial! To suppose that our eternal
circumstances will be unalterably fixed in happiness or misery, in
consequence of the agency or transactions of this temporary life, is
inconsistent with the moral government of God, and the progressive and
retrospective knowledge of the human mind. God has not put it into our
power to plunge ourselves into eternal woe and perdition; human liberty
is not so extensive, for the term of human life bears no proportion to
eternity succeeding it; so that there could be no proportion between a
momentary agency, (which is liberty of action,) or probation, and any
supposed eternal consequences of happiness or misery resulting from it.
Our liberty consists in our power of agency, and cannot fall short of,
or exceed it, for liberty is agency itself, or is that by which agency
or action is exerted; it may be that the curious would define it, that
agency is the effect of liberty, and that liberty is the cause which
produces it; making a distinction between action and the power of
action; be it so, yet agency cannot surpass its liberty; to suppose
otherwise, would be the same as to suppose agency without the power of
agency, or an effect without a cause; therefore, as our agency does not
extend to consequences of eternal happiness or misery, the power of that
agency, which is liberty, does not. Sufficient it is for virtuous minds,
while in this life, that they keep "Consciences void of offence towards
God and towards man." And that in their commencement in the succeeding
state, they have a retrospective knowledge of their agency in this, and
retain a consciousness of a well spent life. Beings thus possessed of
a habit of virtue, would enjoy a rational felicity beyond the reach
of physical evils which terminate with life; and in all rational
probability would be advanced in the order of nature, to a more exalted
and sublime manner of being, knowledge and action, than at present we
can conceive of, where no joys or pains can approach, but of the mental
kind; in which elevated state virtuous minds will be able, in a clearer
and more copious manner in this life, to contemplate the superlative
beauties of moral fitness; and with ecstatic satisfaction enjoy it,
notwithstanding imperfection and consequently agency, proficiency and
trial, of some kind or other, must everlastingly continue with finite
minds.
And as to the vicious, who have violated the laws of reason and
morality, lived a life of sin and wickedness, and are at as great
a remove from a rational happiness as from moral rectitude; such
incorrigible sinners, at their commencing existence in the world of
spirits, will undoubtedly have opened to them a tremendous scene of
horror, self-condemnation and guilt, with an anguish of mind; the more
so, as no sensual delights can there, (as in this world,) divert the
mind from its conscious guilt; the clear sense of which will be the
more pungent, as the mind in that state will be greatly enlarged,
and consequently more capaciously susceptible of sorrow, grief, and
conscious woe, from a retrospective reflection of a wicked life.
SECTON IV. OF PHYSICAL EVILS.
Physical evils are in nature inseparable from animal life, they
commenced existence with it, and are its concomitants through life; so
that the same nature which gives being to the one, gives birth to the
other also; the one is not before or after the other, but they are
coexistent together, and cotemporaries; and as they began existence in a
necessary dependence on each other, so they terminate together in death
and dissolution. This is the original order to which animal nature is
subjected, as applied to every species of it. The beasts of the field,
the fowls of the air, the fishes of the sea, with reptiles, and all
manner of beings, which are possessed with animal life; nor is pain,
sickness, or mortality any part of God's punishment for sin. On the
other hand sensual happiness is no part of the reward of virtue: to
reward moral actions with a glass of wine or a shoulder of mutton, would
be as inadequate, as to measure a triangle with sound, for virtue and
vice pertain to the mind, and their merits or demerits have their
just effects on the conscience, as has been before evinced: but animal
gratifications are common to the human race indiscriminately, and also,
to the beasts of the field: and physical evils as promiscuously and
universally extend to the whole, so "_That there is no knowing good or
evil by all that is before us, for all is vanity_." It was not among the
number of possibles, that animal life should be exempted from mortality:
omnipotence itself could not have made it capable of eternalization and
indissolubility; for the self same nature which constitutes animal life,
subjects it to decay and dissolution; so that the one cannot be without
the other, any more than there could be a compact number of mountains
without vallies, or that I could exist and not exist at the same
time, or that God should effect any other contradiction in nature;
all contradictions being equally impossible, inasmuch as they imply an
absolute incompatibility with nature and truth; for nature is predicated
on truth, and the same truth which constitutes mountains, made the
vallies at the same time; nor is it possible that they could have a
separate existence. And the same truth which affirms my existence,
denies its negative; so also the same law of nature, which in truth
produceth an animal life and supports it for a season, wears it out,
and in its natural course reduces it to its original elements again. The
vegetable world also presents us with a constant aspect of productions
and dissolutions; and the bustle of elements is beyond all conception;
but the dissolution of forms is not the dissolution of matter, or the
annihilation of it, nor of the creation, which exists in all possible
forms and fluxilities; and it is from such physical alterations of
the particles of matter, that animal or vegetable life is produced
and destroyed. Elements afford them nutrition, and time brings them to
maturity, decay and dissolution; and in all the prolific production
of animal life, or the productions of those of a vegetative nature,
throughout all their growth, decay and dissolution, make no addition or
diminution of creation; but eternal nature continues its never ceasing
operations, (which in most respects are mysterious to us) under the
unerring guidance of the providence of God.
Animal nature consists of a regular constitution of a variety of organic
parts, which have a particular and necessary dependance on each other,
by the mutual assistance whereof the whole are animated. Blood seems
to be the source of life, and it is requisite that it have a proper
circulation from the heart to the extreme parts of the body, and from
thence to the heart again, that it may repeat its temporary rounds
through certain arteries and veins, which replenish every minutia
part with blood and vital heat; but the brain is evidently the seat of
sensation, which through the nervous system conveys the animal spirits
to every part of the body, imparting to it sensation and motion,
constituting it a living machine-, which could never have been produced,
or exercised its respective functions in any other sort of world but
this; which is in a constant series of fluxilities, and which causeth
it to produce food for its inhabitants. An unchangeable world could not
admit of production or dissolution, but would be identically the same,
which would preclude the existence and nutriment of such sensitive
creatures as we are. The nutrition extracted from food by the secret
aptitudes of the digesting powers (by which mysterious operation it
becomes incorporated with the circulating juices, supplying the animal
functions with vital heat, strength and vigor) demands a constant
flux and reflux of the particles of matter, which is perpetually
incorporating with the body, and supplying the place of the superfluous
particles that are constantly discharging themselves by insensible
perspiration; supporting, and at the same time, in its ultimate
tendency, destroying animal life. Thus it manifestly appears, that the
laws of the world in which we live, and the constitution of the animal
nature of man, are all but one uniform arrangement of cause and effect;
and as by the course of those laws, animal life is propagated and
sustained for a season, so by the operation of the same laws, decay and
mortality are the necessary consequences.