CHAPTER I.

Produced by David Widger

REASON,

THE ONLY ORACLE OF MAN;

OR A COMPENDIUS

SYSTEM OF NATURAL RELIGION.

By Col. Ethan Allen.

Boston:

J. P. Mendum, Cornhill.

1854.

REASON

INTRODUCTION.

Colonel Ethan Allen, the author of Oracles of Reason, was the son of

Joseph Allen, a native of Coventry, Connecticut, a farmer in moderate

circumstances. He afterwards resided in Litchfield, where Ethan was born

in the year 1739. The family consisted of eight children, of whom our

author was the eldest. But few incidents connected with his early life

are known. We are apprised, however, that notwithstanding his education

was very limited, his ambition to prove himself worthy of that attention

which superior intellect ever commands, induced him diligently to

explore every subject that came under his notice. A stranger to fear,

his opinions were ever given without disguise or hesitation; and an

enemy to oppression, he sought every opportunity to redress the wrongs

of the oppressed.

At the breaking out of the Revolutionary War, he raised in Vermont,

where he had resided, a company of volunteers, consisting of two hundred

and thirty, with which he surprised the fortress of Ticonderoga, May 10,

1775, containing about forty men, and one hundred pieces of cannon. He

was unfortunately taken prisoner in September following, in an attempt

on Montreal, and sufferred a cruel imprisonment for several years. For

an account of which, the reader is referred to his narrative, contained

in a memoir of the author, by Mr. Hugh Moore, Plattsburg, 1834.

Soon after the close of the revolution, Col. Allen composed the

following work; which, on account of the bold and unusual manner,

particularly in this country, that the subject of religion is treated,

he had great difficulty to get published. It lay a long time in the

hands of a printer at Hartford, who had not the moral courage to print

it. It was finally printed by a Mr. Haswell, of Bennington, Vt. in 1784.

Not long after its publication, a part of the edition, comprising the

entire of several signatures, was accidentally consumed by fire. Whether

Mr. H. deemed this fire a judgment upon him for having printed the

work or not, is unknown--but, the fact is, he soon after committed

the remainder of the edition to the flames, and joined the Methodist

Connection; so that but few copies were circulated.

Col. Allen died in the town of Burlington, Vt., on the 12th of February,

1789, of apoplexy.

PREFACE.

An apology appears to me to be impertinent in writers who venture their

works to public inspection, for this obvious reason, that if they need

it, they should have been stifled in the birth, and not permitted

a public existence. I therefore offer my composition to the candid

judgment of the impartial world without it, taking it for granted that

I have as good a natural right to expose myself to public censure,

by endeavouring to subserve mankind, as any of the species who have

published their productions since the creation; and I ask no favor at

the hands of philosophers, divines or critics, but hope and expect they

will severely chastise me for my errors and mistakes, least they

may have a share in perverting the truth, which is very far from my

intention.

In the circle of my acquaintance, (which has not been small,) I have

generally been denominated a Deist, the reality of which I never

disputed, being conscious I am no Christian, except mere infant baptism

make me one; and as to being a Deist, I know not, strictly speaking,

whether I am one or not, for I have never read their writings; mine will

therefore determine the matter; for I have not in the least disguised my

sentiments, but have written freely without any conscious knowledge of

prejudice for, or against any man, sectary or party whatever; but wish

that good sense, truth and virtue may be promoted and flourish in the

world, to the detection of delusion, superstition, and false religion;

and therefore my errors in the succeeding treatise, which may be

rationally pointed out, will be readily rescinded.

By the public's most obedient and humble servant.

ETHAN ALLEN.

ORACLES OF REASON,

CHAPTER I.

SECTON I. THE DUTY OF REFORMING MANKIND FROM SUPERSTITION AND ERROR...

AND THE GOOD CONSEQUENCES OF IT

The desire of knowledge has engaged the attention of the wise and

curious among mankind in all ages which has been productive of extending

the arts and sciences far and wide in the several quarters of the globe,

and excited the contemplative to explore nature's laws in a gradual

series of improvement, until philosophy, astronomy, geography, and

history, with many other branches of science, have arrived to a great

degree of perfection.

It is nevertheless to be regretted, that the bulk of mankind, even in

those nations which are most celebrated for learning and wisdom, are

still carried down the torrent of superstition, and entertain very

unworthy apprehensions of the being, perfections, creation, and

providence of God, and their duty to him, which lays an indispensable

obligation on the philosophic friends of human nature, unanimously to

exert themselves in every lawful, wise, and prudent method, to

endeavor to reclaim mankind from their ignorance and delusion, by

enlightening their minds in those great and sublime truths concerning

God and his providence, and their obligations to moral rectitude which

in this world, and that which is to come, cannot fail greatly to affect

their happiness and well being.

Though "none by searching can find out God, or the Almighty to

perfection," yet I am persuaded, that if mankind would dare to exercise

their reason as freely on those divine topics as they do in the common

concerns of life, they would, in a great measure, rid themselves of

their blindness and superstition, gain more exalted ideas of God

and their obligations to him and one another, and be proportionally

delighted and blessed with the views of his moral government, make

better members of society, and acquire many powerful incentives to the

practice of morality, which is the last and greatest perfection that

human nature is capable of.

SECTON II. OF THE BEING OF A GOD

The laws of nature having subjected mankind to a state of absolute

dependence on something out of it, and manifestly beyond themselves,

or the compound exertion of their natural powers, gave them the first

conception of a superior principle existing; otherwise they could have

had no possible conception of a superintending power. But this sense of

dependency, which results from experience and reasoning on the facts,

which every day cannot fail to produce, has uniformly established the

knowledge of our dependence to every individual of the species who are

rational, which necessarily involves, or contains in it, the idea of a

ruling power, or that there is a God, which ideas are synonymous.

The globe with its productions, the planets in their motions, and the

starry heavens in their magnitudes, surprise our senses and confound our

reason, in their munificent lessons of instruction concerning God, by

means whereof, we are apt to be more or less lost in our ideas of the

object of divine adoration, though at the same time every one is truly

sensible that their being and preservation is from God. We are too apt

to confound our ideas of God with his works, and take the latter for

the former. Thus barbarous and unlearned nations have imagined, that

inasmuch as the sun in its influence is beneficial to them in bringing

forward the spring of the year, causing the production of vegetation,

and food for their subsistence, that therefore it is their God: while

others have located other parts of creation, and ascribe to them

prerogatives of God; and mere creatures and images have been substituted

for Gods by the wickedness or weakness of man, or both together. It

seems that mankind in most ages and parts of the world have been fond of

corporeal Deities with whom their outward senses might be gratified, or

as fantastically diverted from the just apprehension of the true God,

by a supposed supernatural intercourse with invisible and mere spiritual

beings, to whom they ascribe divinity, so that through one means or

other, the character of the true God has been much neglected, to the

great detriment of truth, justice, and morality in the world; nor is

it possible that mankind can be uniform in their religious opinions, or

worship God according to knowledge, except they can form a consistent

arrangement of ideas of the Divine character.

Although we extend our ideas retrospectively ever so far upon the

succession, yet no one cause in the extended order of succession, which

depends upon another prior to itself, can be the independent cause of

all things: nor is it possible to trace the order of the succession of

causes back to that self-existent cause, inasmuch as it is eternal

and infinite, and cannot therefore be traced out by succession, which

operates according to the order of time, consequently can bear no more

proportion to the eternity of God, than time itself may be supposed

to do, which has no proportion at all; as the succeeding arguments

respecting the eternity and infinity of God will evince. But

notwithstanding the series of the succession of causes cannot be

followed in a retrospective succession up to the self-existent or

eternal cause, it is nevertheless a perpetual and conclusive evidence

of a God.--For a succession of causes considered collectively, can

be nothing more than effects of the independent cause, and as much

dependent on it as those dependent causes are upon one another; so that

we may with certainty conclude that the system of nature, which we call

by the name of natural causes, is as much dependent on a self-existent

cause, as an individual of the species in the order of generation is

dependent on its progenitors for existence. Such part of the series of

nature's operations, which we understand, has a regular and necessary

connection with, and dependence on its parts, which we denominate by the

names of cause and effect. From hence we are authorised from reason to

conclude, that the vast system of causes and effects are thus

necessarily connected, (speaking of the natural world only,) and the

whole regularly and necessarily dependent on a self-existent cause: so

that we are obliged to admit an independent cause, and ascribe

self-existence to it, otherwise it could not be independent, and

consequently not a God. But the eternity or manner of the existence of a

self-existent and independent being is to all finite capacities utterly

incomprehensible; yet this is so far from an objection against the

reality of such a being, that it is essentially necessary to support the

evidence of it; for if we could comprehend that being whom we call God,

he would not be God, but must have been finite and that in the same

degree as those may be supposed to be who could comprehend him;

therefore so certain that God is, we cannot comprehend his essence,

eternity, or manner of existence. This should always be premised, when

we assay to reason on the being, perfection, eternity, and infinity of

God, or of his creation and providence. As far as we understand nature,

we are become acquainted with the character of God, for the knowledge of

nature is the revelation of God. If we form in our imagination a

compendious idea of the harmony of the universe, it is the same as

calling God by the name of harmony, for there could be no harmony

without regulation, and no regulation without a regulator, which is

expressive of the idea of a God. Nor could it be possible, that there

could be order or disorder, except we admit of such a thing as creation,

and creation contains in it the idea of a creator, which is another

appellation for the Divine Being, distinguishing God from his creation.

Furthermore, there could be no proportion, figure, or motion, without

wisdom and power; wisdom to plan, and power to execute, and these are

perfections, when applied to the works of nature, which signify the

agency or superintendency of God. If we consider nature to be matter,

figure, and motion, we include the idea of God in that of motion; for

motion implies a mover as much as creation does a creator. If from the

composition, texture, and tendency of the universe in general, we form a

complex idea of general good resulting therefrom to mankind, we

implicitly admit a God by the name of good, including the idea of his

providence to man. And from hence arises our obligations to love and

adore God, because he provides for, and is beneficent to us. Abstract

the idea of goodness from the character of God, and it would cancel all

our obligations to him, and excite us to hate and detest him as a

tyrant: hence it is, that ignorant people are superstitiously misled

into a conceit that they hate God, when at the same time it is only the

idol of their own imagination, which they truly ought to hate and be

ashamed of; but were such persons to connect the ideas of power, wisdom,

goodness, and all possible perfection in the character of God, their

hatred towards him would be turned into love and adoration.

By extending our ideas in a larger circle, we shall perceive our

dependence on the earth and waters of the globe which we inhabit, and

from which we are bountifully fed and gorgeously arrayed; and next

extend our ideas to the sun, whose fiery mass darts its brilliant rays

of light to our terraqueous ball with amazing velocity, and whose

region of inexhaustible fire supplies it with fervent heat, which causes

vegetation, and gilds the various seasons of the year with ten thousand

charms: this is not the achievement of man, but the workmanship and

providence of God. But how the sun is supplied with materials, thus to

perpetuate its kind influences, we know not. But will any one deny the

reality of those beneficial influences, because we do not understand the

manner of the perpetuality of that fiery world, or how it became such

a body of fire? or will any one deny the reality of nutrition by food,

because we do not understand the secret operation of the digesting

powers of animal nature, or the minute particulars of its cherishing

influence? None will be so stupid as to do it. Equally absurd would it

be for us to deny the providence of God, by "whom we live, move, and

have our being," because we cannot comprehend it.

We know that earth, water, fire and air, in their various compositions

subserve us, and we also know that these elements are devoid of

reflection, reason, or design; from whence we may easily infer, that a

wise, understanding, and designing being has ordained them to be thus

subservient. Could blind chance constitute order and decorum, and

consequently a providence? That wisdom, order, and design should be the

production of nonentity, or of chaos, confusion, and old night, is too

absurd to deserve a serious confutation, for it supposeth that there may

be effects without a cause, viz.: produced by nonentity, or that chaos

and confusion could produce the effects of power, wisdom, and goodness.

Such absurdities as these we must assent to, or subscribe to the

doctrine of a self-existent and providential being.

SECTON III. THE MANNER OF DISCOVERING THE MORAL PERFECTIONS...

AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

Having in a concise manner offered a variety of indisputable reasons

to evince the certainty of the being and providence of God, and of

his goodness to man through the intervention of the series of nature's

operations, which are commonly described by the name of natural

causes, we come now more particularly to the consideration of his moral

perfections; and though all finite beings fall as much short of an

adequate knowledge thereof as they do of perfection itself, nevertheless

through the intelligence of our own souls we may have something of a

prospective idea of the divine perfections. For though the human

mind bears no proportion to the divine, yet there is undoubtedly a

resemblance between them. For instance, God knows all things, and

we know some things, and in the things which we do understand, our

knowledge agrees with that of the divine, and cannot fail necessarily

corresponding with it. To more than know a thing, speaking of that thing

only, is impossible even to omniscience itself; for knowledge is but the

same in both the infinite and finite minds. To know a thing is the same

as to have right ideas of it, or ideas according to truth, and truth is

uniform in all rational minds, the divine mind not excepted. It will

not be disputed but that mankind in plain and common matters understand

justice from injustice, truth from falsehood, right from wrong, virtue

from vice, and praise-worthiness from blame-worthiness, for other wise

they could not be accountable creatures. This being admitted, we are

capable of forming a complex idea of a moral character, which when done

in the most deliberate, the wisest, and most rational manner in our

power, we are certain bears a resemblance to the divine perfections. For

as we learn from the worlds of nature an idea of the power and wisdom

of God, so from our own rational nature we learn an idea of his moral

perfections.

From what has been observed on the moral perfections of God, we infer

that all rational beings, who have an idea of justice, goodness, and

truth, have at the same time either a greater or less idea of the moral

perfections of God. It is by reason that we are able to compound an idea

of a moral character, whether applied to God or man; it is that which

gives us the supremacy over the irrational part of the creation.

SECTON IV. THE CAUSE OF IDOLATRY, AND THE REMEDY OF IT

Inasmuch as God is not corporeal, and consequently does not and cannot

come within the notice of our bodily sensations, we are therefore

obliged to deduce inferences from his providence, and particularly from

our own rational nature, in order to form our conceptions of the divine

character, which through inattention, want of learning, or through the

natural imbecility of mankind, or through the artifice of designing men,

or all together, they have been greatly divided and subdivided in their

notions of a God. Many have so groped in the dark as wholly to mistake

the proper object of divine worship, and not distinguishing the creator

from his creation, have paid adoration to "four footed beasts and

creeping things." And some have ascribed divine honors to the sun, moon,

or stars; while others have been infatuated to worship dumb, senseless,

and unintelligent idols, which derived their existence as Gods, partly

from mechanics, who gave them their figure, proportion, and beauty, and

partly from their priests, who gave them their attributes; whose

believers, it appears, were so wrought upon, that they cried out in the

ecstasy of their deluded zeal, "Great is Diana." Whatever delusions have

taken place in the world relative to the object of divine worship, or

respecting the indecencies or immoralities of the respective

superstitions themselves, or by what means soever introduced or

perpetuated, whether by designing men whose interest it has always been

to impose on the weakness of the great mass of the vulgar; or as it is

probable, that part of those delusions took place in consequence of the

weakness of uncultivated reason, in deducing a visible instead of an

invisible God from the works of nature. Be that as it will, mankind are

generally possessed of an idea that there is a God, however they may

have been mistaken or misled as to the object. This notion of a God, as

has been before observed, must have originated from a universal sense of

dependence, which mankind have on something that is more wise, powerful,

and beneficent than themselves, or they could have had no apprehensions

of any superintending principle in the universe, and consequently would

never have sought after a God, or have had any conception of his

existence, nor could designing men have imposed on their credulity by

obtruding false Gods upon them; but taking advantage of the common

belief that there is a God, they artfully deceive their adherents with

regard to the object to be adored. There are other sorts of idols which

have no existence but in the mere imagination of the human mind; and

these are vastly the most numerous, and universally (either in the

greater or less degree) dispersed over the world; the wisest of mankind

are not and cannot be wholly exempt from them, inasmuch as every wrong

conception of God is (as far as the error takes place in the mind)

idolatrous. To give a sample, an idea of a jealous God is of this sort.

Jealousy is the offspring of finite minds, proceeding from the want of

knowledge; which in dubious matters makes us suspicious and distrustful;

but in matters which we clearly understand, there can be no jealousy,

for knowledge excludes it, so that to ascribe it to God is a manifest

infringement on his omniscience.*

* "The Lord thy God is a jealous God."

The idea of a revengeful God is likewise one of that sort, but this

idea of divinity being borrowed from a savage nature, needs no further

confutation. The representation of a God, who (as we are told by certain

divines) from all eternity elected an inconsiderable part of mankind to

eternal life, and reprobated the rest to eternal damnation, merely from

his own sovereignty, adds another to the number;--this representation

of the Deity undoubtedly took its rise from that which we discovered

in great, powerful, and wicked tyrants among men, however tradition may

since have contributed to its support, though I am apprehensive that

a belief in those who adhere to that doctrine, that they themselves

constitute that blessed elect number, has been a greater inducement to

them to close with it, than all other motives added together. It is

a selfish and inferior notion of a God void of justice, goodness, and

truth, and has a natural tendency to impede the cause of true religion

and morality in the world, and diametrically repugnant to the truth of

the divine character, and which, if admitted to be true, overturns

all religion, wholly precluding the agency of mankind in either their

salvation or damnation, resolving the whole into the sovereign disposal

of a tyrannical and unjust being, which is offensive to reason and

common sense, and subversive of moral rectitude in general. But as

it was not my design so much to confute the multiplicity of false

representations of a God, as to represent just and consistent ideas of

the true God, I shall therefore omit any further observation on them in

this place, with this remark, that all unjust representations, or ideas

of God, are so many detractions from his character among mankind. To

remedy these idolatrous notions of a God, it is requisite to form right

and consistent ideas in their stead.

The discovery of truth necessarily excludes error from the mind, which

nothing else can possibly do; for some sort of God or other will crowd

itself into the conceptions of dependent creatures, and if they are

not so happy as to form just ones, they will substitute erroneous and

delusive ones in their stead; so that it serves no valuable purpose to

mankind, to confute their idolatrous opinions concerning God, without

communicating to them just notions concerning the true one, for if this

is not effected, nothing is done to the purpose. For, as has been before

observed, mankind will form to themselves, or receive from others, an

idea of Divinity either right or wrong: this is the universal voice of

intelligent nature, from whence a weighty and conclusive argument may

be drawn of the reality of a God, however inconsistent most, of their

conceptions of him may be. The fact is, mankind readily perceives that

there is a God, by feeling their dependence on him, and as they explore

his works, and observe his providence, which is too sublime for finite

capacities to understand but in part, they have been more or less

confounded in their discoveries of a just idea of a God and of his moral

government. Therefore we should exercise great applications and care

whenever we assay to speculate upon the Divine character, accompanied

with a sincere desire after truth, and not ascribe anything to his

perfections of government which is inconsistent with reason or the best

information which we are able to apprehend of moral rectitude, and be

at least wise enough not to charge God with injustice and contradictions

which we should scorn to be charged with ourselves. No king, governor,

or parent would like to be accused of partiality in their respective

governments, "Is it fit to say unto Princes, ye are ungodly, how much

less to him that regardeth not the persons of princes, or the rich more

than the poor, for they are all the work of his hands."

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