CHAPTER XXVI._History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4) Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government

THE ARMY MOVES FORWARD.

[Sidenote: The intended stroke.]

The first stage in the realisation of Lord Roberts' plan of campaign

must necessarily be the transfer to the neighbourhood of Lord

Methuen's camp of the army with which it was his purpose to manoeuvre

Cronje out of Magersfontein, to relieve Kimberley, and strike for

Bloemfontein.

[Sidenote: The problem. How solved.]

The problem was to carry out this transfer without allowing the Boer

General to suspect the design with which it was made, and, till this

first movement was completed, in order to gain time for it, to keep

him as long as possible uncertain whether the real advance would not

be, as he had always hitherto supposed, along the railway which runs

directly from Colesberg by Norval's Pont to Bloemfontein. Both

purposes were accomplished with rare success. It becomes, therefore,

in all ways interesting, as a study of the larger scope of the

campaign, to realise by what means this result was secured. In all

war, and in every campaign, so far as the two opposing commanders are

concerned, it is the play of mind upon mind which is the ruling

factor. To put himself in the place of the man whom he must outwit, if

he is to give his soldiers the best chance of victory, is for each

commander the essential preliminary. To take such steps as will tend

to confirm that man in any false impressions he is known or reasonably

suspected to have received, and to conceal as far as possible those

measures which are preparing the way for the real stroke, are common

characteristics of all triumphant achievement. The means by which the

end is gained--reticence, the movement of troops in such a way as

will suggest that they are placed with one object when, in fact, the

posts chosen will make it easy to use them for another, the allowing

of subordinate, even high, commanders, to misconceive, until it is

necessary for them to know, why orders are given--all these are the

well-tried methods. The fact that rumours spread almost automatically

and quite invariably from camp to hostile camp, so that what is

believed on one side largely affects belief on the other, is one of

the fixed data on which much depends. The issue openly of fictitious

orders, cancelled by cypher messages, is another available means of

throwing a cloud over what is being done. The art lies in applying

these well-known principles to the particular case to be dealt with.

It will be found that in practice Lord Roberts took advantage of every

one of them; but without a clear understanding of the methods which

the long experience of war has taught those whose duty it is to study

it, the underlying motive of much that has now to be described would

not be clear.

[Sidenote: Causes tending to deceive Cronje.]

Many things tended to convince Cronje that it was along the railway

direct on Bloemfontein that the march into the Free State would be

made. The capture at Dundee, in October, 1899, of certain Intelligence

department papers by the Boers had shown them that this had been the

first design. During the weeks which had immediately followed Lord

Roberts' appointment to command, when, though he had not reached Cape

Town, at least the wider scope of manoeuvres might be supposed to be

directed by him, or to be in accordance with his wishes, the only

fierce fighting which had taken place was round Colesberg, and much of

it suggested a wish to secure the passage of the Orange river at

Norval's Pont, an obvious necessity if the great movement was to be

made along the Colesberg--Norval's Pont--Bloemfontein route. Outside

Natal this continued, after Lord Roberts arrived, to be even more the

case, and so far as Cape Colony was concerned, the distribution of

troops showed Norval's Pont as the central point of the front of

attack. Lord Methuen's line of communications, supply and

reinforcements through Orange River station marked the left, Gatacre's

slowly gathering division the right, and French, now close to

Norval's Pont, the centre. Without delaying the progress over Orange

River bridge, it was possible to strengthen the conviction in Cronje's

mind that it was at Norval's Pont that danger threatened.

[Sidenote: and means taken to hoodwink him.]

In the first place, the great number of wagons, horses and stores

which had to be passed up under the protection of Lord Methuen's

division, and of the troops immediately engaged in guarding the line,

needed ample time, and, as it was not easy for the Boers to

distinguish between what was required for Lord Methuen's army and the

accumulations that were being made for a very different purpose, this

necessary preparation for the decisive move was not likely to attract

much notice. If, therefore, a freshly-arrived division were sent to

French's neighbourhood, say from Port Elizabeth to Naauwpoort

junction, since its coming there was sure to be reported to the Boers,

it would not merely meet the need for having a reinforcement for

French available in case of emergency, which, as will be seen further

on, was the reason assigned at the time by Lord Roberts for sending

it, but it would help to confirm the idea that it was towards Norval's

Pont that the whole concentration was trending. The division and the

whole of French's command could be kept in this district to the last

moment, because of the cross railway which from Naauwpoort junction

runs to connect the railway from Port Elizabeth with that from Cape

Town to Kimberley. The troops moving up by this the most westerly line

would draw the less attention as long as the force at and near

Colesberg was formidable and active. When the right time was

come--that is, as it worked out, when French handed over to Clements

those who were to remain round Colesberg--all the rest, including the

new division, could be carried from Naauwpoort junction and so on

towards the Riet, being, during their passage, far in rear of the

fighting line around Colesberg. It will be easily seen from the map

how greatly the trace of the railways facilitated the removal of

strong bodies from the Naauwpoort--Colesberg region to the Kimberley

railway, the whole movement being screened by the fighting forces left

round Colesberg.

[Sidenote: Further causes of success.]

Cronje himself was a Transvaaler, and his principal line of supply

ran northwards through the ground held by the besiegers of Kimberley.

Although, therefore, many of those under him were from the Orange Free

State and likely to be disturbed by a movement against Bloemfontein,

any such danger appeared to be remote as long as the Orange river,

both at Norval's Pont and Bethulie, was in the hands of the Boers. His

retreat northwards was at all events quite secure. The reports of the

arrival of ever increasing numbers south of Lord Methuen's camp seemed

to imply that, whatever might be done elsewhere, his entrenchments

were to be again attacked, and as he wished for nothing better than

this, he very naturally interpreted the information he received in

accordance with his hopes. It was not difficult, therefore, to impose

on him, in this respect also, by demonstrations against the opposite

flank to that which Lord Roberts intended--not to attack but to pass

by on his route northwards--so placing his army ultimately athwart

Cronje's line of retreat. The execution of this scheme, the guiding

principles of which have thus been sketched, will perhaps now be more

easily followed in detail. It only remains to add here that the

fictitious orders, cancelled by cypher telegrams, were actually sent,

and were very useful in their effect of imposing on the Boers.

[Sidenote: A railway scheme. Facilities and difficulties.]

The interest of the whole scheme for modern soldiers lies in the fact

that it was an application of very ancient principles of war to the

times of railways and telegraphs. Everything turned upon the

facilities afforded by the railways on the one hand, upon the

difficulties which the railway authorities had to surmount on the

other, and, above all, upon this: that where accumulation of rolling

stock, vast in proportion to the resources of the country, had to be

collected from every direction upon a single line, it needed much tact

and management to make the preparations required to enable the

transport of troops, when once begun, to continue rapidly without

interruption, and yet not to disclose the secret. Engines were more

essential than anything else, and to obtain them in sufficient number

the Port Elizabeth lines had to be swept almost bare, although the

supply of the troops round Naauwpoort junction and Colesberg largely

depended on that railway. It may, therefore, be imagined how hard it

was to placate the zealous civil officials, who, without understanding

why it was done, found themselves deprived of the very instruments

needed for their work, and had as best they could to make bricks

without straw. All the organisation of this fell upon Colonel

Girouard, who had promised Lord Roberts to have the immense volume of

stores necessary for the campaign, as well as the troops, delivered at

the assigned stations by February 14th, on two conditions: one, that

absolute secrecy as to all that was being done should be strictly

observed, Girouard himself naming the men to whom he must disclose his

plans; the other, that when he had received his instructions as to the

places where delivery was to be made by the railway these should not

be changed. Unfortunately this latter condition could not be kept.

Honey Nest Kloof, which had been at first selected as the place for

the great camp and depôt, was found to be inadequately supplied with

water, so that Graspan and Belmont inevitably replaced it.

[Sidenote: The nature of task.]

The fact that, with the exception of the two Generals, Kelly-Kenny and

French, who knew the scheme after French's visit to Cape Town, none of

the officers in the trains had any idea where they were going or what

was intended, and did not realise what was essential for the success

of the undertaking, occasionally gave trouble to the railway

authorities. For instance, water for the troops bivouacking at Graspan

was some two miles from the station, but the water indispensable for

the service of the railway was close to the spot where the

disembarkation from the carriages had taken place. Colonel Girouard

himself found to his horror that this, without which he could send no

train forward, was being freely expended by men and officers for their

own use. There was some delay before he secured an adequate guard to

protect it. Despite many incidents, equally inconvenient to this, time

was well kept and Lord Roberts' reliance on the silence and efficiency

of the officials was fully justified.

[Sidenote: Secrecy and orders adapted to case.]

Throughout the month of January Lord Roberts so directed the conduct

of operations and disposed of reinforcements arriving from England as

to mislead the Boer General as to his designs. His real intentions

were, in fact, known only to his Chief of the Staff (Lord Kitchener),

his Military Secretary (Major-General Sir W. G. Nicholson), to the

Director of Military Intelligence (Local Colonel G. F. R. Henderson),

and to those who had to make the railway arrangements, Colonel

Girouard, Major D. Murray, Assistant Director of Railways, Mr. T. R.

Price, Chief Traffic Manager, Major H. Hamilton, who acted as

intermediary for Lord Kitchener, and to Colonel C. P. Ridley, in

charge of the western line of communications. To Lord Methuen the

Commander-in-Chief wrote on the 11th January:--

"I have come to the conclusion that I must ask you to act

strictly on the defensive, and as it may be even necessary for me

to withdraw a portion of your force, you should consider how your

line of entrenchments could be sufficiently reduced to enable you

to hold the position with two, instead of three, brigades, and

possibly with one or two batteries and one regiment of cavalry

less than you have at present. Your request for four of the siege

4·7-in. guns will be complied with, and when these reach you, you

will doubtless be able to make your position practically

impregnable. That the relief of Kimberley cannot be immediately

effected I am as sorry for, as I am sure you must be, but I trust

that it will still be possible for you to give the brave garrison

at that place a helping hand before they run short of supplies

and ammunition."

To the central line of operations where, owing to the activity of

French, the strength of the enemy had increased, Lord Roberts

despatched the 6th division and placed a portion of one of its

brigades (the 12th, under Maj.-Gen. R. A. P. Clements) at French's

disposal. It was decided to give Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny a separate

command from Naauwpoort southward, leaving French to continue his

previous campaign against the enemy round Colesberg.[309] To General

French, therefore, the Field-Marshal addressed the following

instructions on the 12th January:--

[Footnote 309: Lt.-General Kelly-Kenny was very much senior

in the army to Lt.-General French, but the latter's local

commission as Lt.-General was of older date.]

"As I see no chance of being able to leave Cape Town just at

present, and cannot therefore offer you my congratulations in

person, I write to let you know the satisfaction it has given me

to hear of the good work you have been doing in the neighbourhood

of Colesberg.

"You will have learnt by telegram that we have sent you three

battalions of the 12th brigade under Clements. Kelly-Kenny, who

commands the 6th division, sails to-morrow for Port Elizabeth,

and the whole of his eight battalions will, I hope, be collected

shortly at Naauwpoort junction, I gather that the Boers are

increasing in strength between Colesberg and the river. It seems

almost certain that their numbers will be still further augmented

if Buller succeeds in relieving Ladysmith, for Joubert's force

will then be free, and he is almost certain to hurry his men to

the south-west in order to try and block our way into the Orange

Free State.

"This may make the seizure of the Norval's Pont bridge out of the

question; as it would, however, be of such supreme importance to

get possession of this crossing of the Orange river, I shall be

greatly obliged if you will inform me whether you think the

operation in any way feasible. We could increase your force still

more, or what would probably be of even greater assistance to

you, we could threaten the enemy from the Orange River station

direction. The greatest secrecy and caution would be required,

and the seizure of the bridge could only be effected by a very

carefully-thought-out and well-planned _coup de main_, for, if

the Boers had the slightest inkling of our intention, they would

assuredly blow it up. There would, moreover, be no object in our

getting possession of the bridge, and thus risking a number of

valuable lives, unless it could be made perfectly secure on its

immediate northern bank, and this, from the nature of the ground,

might be impossible.

"I hope that your men and horses are keeping thoroughly

efficient. Please take every care of them and save the horses as

much as possible, for, until we can get hold of some of the

regiments now in Ladysmith, yours is almost the only cavalry we

have to depend upon."

The seizure of the bridge[310] would have been useful both in

deceiving Cronje and in facilitating later movements, but the

intricate ground on the northern bank of the river at that point would

have rendered further advance costly, and the defence of the bridge

itself difficult, and as yet it was unnecessary. French, therefore,

though he at the time knew nothing of the intended scheme, exactly

carried out what was the purpose of Lord Roberts' instructions when,

as recorded in Chapter XXIV., he, after the demonstration of January

25th, abandoned further efforts against Norval's Pont. It was not till

January 30th, during his brief visit to Cape Town, that he was given

two copies of the complete plan of operations, one for himself and one

for General Kelly-Kenny. It was no doubt due to these careful

precautions that the secret was so admirably kept as it was, and that

the Boers were so completely deceived as they were as to what was

going on.[311]

[Footnote 310: See map No. 9.]

[Footnote 311: President Steyn telegraphed to C. De Wet as

late as the end of January that the British advance would be

made by Colesberg, and suggested the despatch of

reinforcements to that point from Magersfontein. But De Wet,

who was now in command of all Free State troops in the

western theatre, having been transferred from Natal early in

December, refused, on the ground that if Magersfontein were

weakened, the British would make Kimberley their point of

attack. The records of the O.F.S. railway at this period show

how much anxiety was felt as to Colesberg. Between the 27th

December and 13th January 2,700 burghers passed through

Bloemfontein _en route_ to Norval's Pont, and between the

25th January and 8th February (including a Heidelberg

commando over 500 strong between 6th and 8th) another 1,442;

not until the 9th was the stream of reinforcements for the

south stopped at Bloemfontein. By that time Lord Roberts

himself, and nearly all the army, including Kelly-Kenny's and

French's divisions, had reached their destination south of

the Riet.]

Kelly-Kenny, with his division, less Clements' brigade, was to cover

the communications south of Naauwpoort, allay unrest and disaffection,

and open up the railway line as far as possible from Rosmead in the

direction of Stormberg, thus diverting attention from Gatacre. A

proposal made on the 23rd by him that French should be instructed to

seize Bethulie bridge by a forced march was refused by the

Field-Marshal, who, not to disclose his real reasons, told him that

the enterprise was a doubtful one; the country difficult, and strong

opposition would be offered to the move. To Sir W. Gatacre the

Commander-in-Chief issued orders on the 19th January that Dordrecht

should be garrisoned, and that Brabant's newly-formed Colonial

division should use that town as a base, and thence operate towards

Jamestown so as to menace the line of retreat of the Boer force at

Stormberg. Meanwhile Gatacre himself was to act strictly on the

defensive. Brabant was placed under his orders, but was to be given a

"perfectly free hand" and be allowed to report direct to Army

Headquarters.

[Sidenote: Enemy perplexed. Move begun.]

These various orders and instructions successfully effected Lord

Roberts' purpose. The distribution of the British troops perplexed and

confused the enemy, and the Boer leaders remained passive, making no

substantial change in their dispositions save to increase the strength

of the body covering the crossing to the north of Colesberg. By the

end of January Lord Roberts' staff had nearly finished the work of

preparation, and the Commander-in-Chief directed the concentration of

all available troops between the Orange river and the Modder for the

delivery of the stroke he had designed, leaving before Colesberg and

Magersfontein sufficient forces under the respective commands of

Major-General Clements and Lord Methuen to hold the enemy, at each of

these points, in check. It was on January 29th that General French was

summoned to Cape Town.[312] Immediately after his return the actual

transfer northwards of an army corps, made up of a cavalry division,

three infantry divisions, and some corps troops, was carried out. A

few details had started as early as the 28th.

[Footnote 312: It is one of the sequels of any attempt to

preserve in war that secrecy which is the very master-key of

the house of success that the evidence of much that has been

done during the period of reticence is conflicting. The

actual motive which led Lord Roberts to desire General

French's presence at Cape Town was anxiety as to the

expenditure of horses and ammunition, which the brilliant

operations around Colesberg had involved. He did not summon

him in order to discuss with him the plan of campaign, which

was only incidentally disclosed to him during his visit. The

demonstration that in all essentials that plan had been

definitely formed; and that Lord Kitchener and Sir W.

Nicholson had been engaged in making the necessary changes in

the distribution of transport in order to carry it out; and

that they began this work about two or three days after Lord

Roberts arrived, is complete. Moreover, there is not a trace

in the records or in the memory of any of those at Cape Town

of an idea of employing in command of the cavalry division

anyone else but the man who had given so much cause to put

trust in him. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that General

French acquired the impression, from his conversations with

Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, that he only with difficulty

persuaded them on January 29th to send the cavalry division

and himself in command of it. What, other things apart, makes

it certain that this cannot have been so is that the cavalry

division moved at once when General French returned to

Colesberg. To make so sudden a change was a physical

impossibility. The preparations had required weeks of

strenuous work.]

[Sidenote: The cavalry division.]

The commander of the cavalry division was Lieut.-General J. D. P.

French. It consisted of three cavalry brigades and two M.I. brigades;

of these the 1st cavalry brigade (Brig.-Gen. T. C. Porter) was formed

of the 6th Dragoon Guards, 2nd Dragoons, one squadron of the

Inniskilling Dragoons, one squadron of the 14th Hussars, New South

Wales Lancers, and T., Q., and U. batteries R.H.A.; the 2nd cavalry

brigade (Brig.-Gen. R. G. Broadwood) was made up of the composite

regiment of the Household cavalry, 10th Hussars, 12th Lancers, and G.

and P. batteries R.H.A.; the 3rd cavalry brigade (Brig.-Gen. J. R. P.

Gordon), of 9th and 16th Lancers, and O. and R. batteries R.H.A. To

the 1st M.I. brigade (Colonel O. C. Hannay) were assigned the 1st,

3rd, 5th, and 7th regiments M.I., the New South Wales Mounted Rifles,

Roberts' Horse, Kitchener's Horse, and the Grahamstown Volunteers

M.I.; the 2nd M.I. brigade, commanded by Colonel C. P. Ridley, was

made up by the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th M.I. regiments, the City

Imperial Volunteers, Queensland M.I., and Nesbitt's Horse.[313] Each

cavalry brigade had an ammunition column, detachment of A.S.C., field

hospital, and bearer company. The division was given a field troop

R.E. and six transport companies.

[Footnote 313: The New Zealand Mounted Rifles joined the

brigade on 14th February.]

[Sidenote: The infantry divisions.]

The infantry divisions were the 6th (Kelly-Kenny), the 7th

(Tucker[314]), which had landed from England during the fourth week of

January, and a new division, the 9th, to be formed under command of

Lt.-Gen. Sir H. Colvile. Of these divisions the 6th comprised the 76th

and 81st Field batteries, an ammunition column, the 38th company R.E.,

the 13th infantry brigade, under Major-General C. E. Knox (composed of

2nd East Kent, 2nd Gloucester, 1st West Riding, and 1st Oxfordshire

L.I.), and a new brigade, the 18th, made up of the 1st Yorkshire, 1st

Welsh, and 1st Essex, under the command of Brigadier-General T. E.

Stephenson. The 7th division retained its original constitution, viz.:

the 14th brigade, under Major-General Sir H. Chermside (consisting of

2nd Norfolk, 2nd Lincolnshire, 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, and

2nd Hampshire), the 15th brigade under Major-General A. G. Wavell

(including 2nd Cheshire, 2nd South Wales Borderers, 1st East

Lancashire, and 2nd North Staffordshire), and as divisional troops,

the 18th, 62nd, and 75th Field batteries, an ammunition column, and

9th company R.E. The new 9th division, under Lieut.-General Colvile,

had as its nucleus the 3rd, or Highland brigade, now under

Major-General H. A. MacDonald (2nd Black Watch, 1st Highland Light

Infantry, 2nd Seaforth, and 1st Argyll and Sutherland). The other

brigade, to be termed the 19th, was assigned to Colonel H. L.

Smith-Dorrien, and was to be organised from the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's

L.I., 2nd Shropshire L.I., 1st Gordon Highlanders, and the Royal

Canadian regiment. The 65th (howitzer) and 82nd Field batteries, an

ammunition column, and 7th company R.E., formed Colvile's divisional

troops. Each of the infantry brigades included a bearer company, a

field hospital, and a detachment of the Army Service Corps. From each

of these divisions the cavalry was withdrawn and included in the

cavalry division. Two naval guns were attached to each of the 6th and

9th divisions, but the remainder of the naval brigade, under Captain

J. Bearcroft, R.N., was at first ordered to remain with Lord Methuen.

The only corps troops retained by the Commander-in-Chief were the 15th

company Southern division R.G.A., the 1st Telegraph division, and the

balloon section, Royal Engineers. Rimington's Guides were distributed

amongst the various columns. The total effective strength of the

force, including the Guards' and 9th brigades, which remained before

Magersfontein to hold Cronje in check, was a little under 40,000 men

and 108 guns. The battalions at this time much varied in strength,

those of the 13th brigade averaged but 721, those of the Highland

brigade 780, the battalions of the 15th brigade were as high as 900,

and the Guards' battalions reached the figure of 938. The cavalry

regiments had an average of about 473 all ranks. For details of units,

see Appendix 10.

[Footnote 314: Lt.-General C. Tucker.]

[Sidenote: Reinforcements asked for.]

The intelligence of the failure of Sir R. Buller's operations against

Spion Kop forced the Field-Marshal on 28th January to telegraph to the

War Office that the despatch of the 8th division and another cavalry

brigade from England had become advisable, but, in deference to

reluctance felt by the Cabinet to denude further the home garrisons of

regular infantry, Lord Roberts suspended his request for them at

present until the result of later operations in Natal should be

known.[315] The brigade of cavalry was at once promised.

[Footnote 315: The 8th division was again definitely asked

for on 28th February, and then granted.]

[Sidenote: Demonstrations westward. MacDonald seizes Koodoesberg, Feb.

5th, 1900.]

Lord Roberts did not wait for it, for his advance could no longer be

delayed. As the troops were pushed forward successively, it was

certain that the enemy must become aware of the assembly of so large a

number very close to Magersfontein, even though the concentration was

screened by Lord Methuen's and General Clements' forces. It was

essential, therefore, to distract Cronje's attention from the flank,

eastward of which the Field-Marshal meant to aim his blow. Nor were

there lacking ample excuses for demonstrations to the westward. The

very unsatisfactory condition of the districts south of Orange river

west of the Kimberley railway was known to the Boer leaders. Cronje

had already detached to Douglas 200 men and two guns, under Commandant

Liebenberg, to support a Cape rebel, L. F. Steinkamp, in raising the

standard of revolt in those regions. To counteract this effort,

Prieska had been re-occupied on 27th January by Lieut.-Colonel

Alderson with a battery and 600 M.I., but their immediate return to De

Aar was necessary, as the mounted men were needed for the general

advance. A diversion on a larger scale was now planned. By Lord

Roberts' order Lord Methuen temporarily attached to the Highland

brigade two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the 62nd Field battery, and

the 7th company R.E., and directed Major-General MacDonald to march at

5.30 on the morning of the 4th February to Koodoesberg Drift, where

the road from Kimberley to Douglas crosses the Riet at about twenty

miles below its junction with the Modder, and to begin the

construction of a fort covering this passage of the river. The column

halted at Fraser's Drift, seven miles out, and there bivouacked for

the night. Koodoesberg Drift was reached the following day. The hot

season was at its height. A reconnaissance was pushed to the

north-west. The top of the Koodoesberg, a long, flat-topped kopje,

about 1,200 yards from the river, was seized. It completely commanded

the drift. A mounted patrol of fifteen Boers retired from this hill as

the British cavalry approached. General MacDonald's force passed that

night on the south bank, being covered by two companies of infantry on

the far side of the river. At daylight, on the 6th of February, the

construction of a redoubt suitable for 200 men on a small knoll to

the north of the drift was begun. Almost immediately a patrol of 9th

Lancers reported that about 300 of the enemy[316] were creeping up the

northern slope of the Koodoesberg. The Major-General accordingly

ordered his brigade-major, Lieut.-Colonel Ewart, to advance rapidly

with the working parties on the hill and try to anticipate the

assailants at the summit. Ewart, supported by the Highland Light

Infantry under Lt.-Colonel Kelham, succeeded in doing so. A Boer

detachment which had already reached the top retired hastily. It was

then found that the plateau was some two miles in length, and

therefore too extensive for complete occupation. Kelham was

accordingly ordered to hold its southern edge, and the R.E. began to

build sangars across the narrow Nek which divided the south of the

hill from the main plateau. The Black Watch was moved over the river

to the right bank in support. In the afternoon arrived large

reinforcements, which had been despatched by Cronje from Scholtz Nek

to aid De Wet. These, estimated by the British troops to be about

2,000 strong,[317] enabled the enemy to push on again up the reverse

slopes of the Berg and definitely establish themselves on the northern

and western edges of the plateau. On this the British field-works were

further strengthened. Visser's homestead, a farmhouse lying in the

plain to the south-east of the kopje and to the north of the drift,

was placed in a state of defence, and occupied by two companies of the

Black Watch. The two squadrons of 9th Lancers during this time were

manoeuvred by Major Little near to the farm, with the object of

inducing the Boers to come out into the open and attack, but they

confined themselves all that afternoon to heavy sniping. At dusk the

companies of the H.L.I. on the eastern extremity of the Berg were

relieved by another company of that battalion and four companies of

the Seaforth.

[Footnote 316: The actual strength of this force was 350. Its

leader was C. De Wet.]

[Footnote 317: General De Wet officially reported that he

only received a reinforcement of 200 men. Other Boer accounts

give his total strength during the action as 800.]

[Sidenote: Course of struggle.]

As soon as it was dark the Boers dragged a gun, which, with a further

reinforcement of 200 men, had been received from Cronje, up the

north-western slopes of the hill, and at 9 a.m. (7th February) they

opened with shrapnel on the breastworks at the eastern edge of the

plateau. The troops holding that ground were now reinforced by two

more companies of the H.L.I. and four of the Black Watch,

Lieut.-Colonel Hughes-Hallett being placed in command. A little later

the cavalry patrols reported that a party of Boers was passing across

Painter's Drift, two miles down the river, to attack the left flank.

The defence of the bank of the Riet had been entrusted to Lt.-Colonel

A. Wilson, commanding the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and that

officer despatched two and a half companies of his battalion with two

guns, under Major E. B. Urmston, to meet this movement. The rest of

Major Granet's battery was in action on the left bank of the river

against the enemy's artillery. On the Koodoesberg itself there was a

sharp fight, and a few of the burghers crept within 300 yards of the

British sangars. The heat of the day was intense, and considerable

difficulty was experienced in conveying water and ammunition up the

steep slopes of the kopje to the British fighting line. Unfortunately,

this steepness at the same time rendered it almost impossible to

withdraw the wounded. Meanwhile Major Urmston's detachment frustrated

the attempt of the enemy, a Ladybrand commando under Commandant

Froneman, to work down the bed of the river from Painter's Drift.

[Sidenote: MacDonald receives reinforcements.]

[Sidenote: MacDonald withdrawn.]

General MacDonald had early in the morning telegraphed to the Modder

camp for reinforcements. In response to this request a cavalry

brigade, with two batteries R.H.A. had been sent out under

Major-General Babington,[318] and about 3.15 p.m. could be seen at a

distance of about four or five miles to the north approaching the

river. MacDonald now hoped to assume the offensive, and reinforced

Hughes-Hallett with the remaining half-battalion of the Seaforth,

preparatory to a direct attack upon the Boers on the plateau, but,

owing to some misunderstanding, concerted action with the cavalry

brigade was not arranged until too late, and the general advance was

accordingly postponed until the following morning. The enemy,

meanwhile, fully realised that the arrival of the cavalry brigade

rendered his isolated position on the plateau no longer tenable. The

burghers, therefore, began slipping away from the hill, and by

nightfall had practically evacuated it, leaving their gun for some

time on the kopje unprotected save by a small escort. General

Babington tried to follow them up, but the Household cavalry, which

was in front, was checked by wire fences and came under heavy rifle

fire. Their attempt to cut off the gun was also quite stopped by

musketry from some thick bush and broken ground. The Boers

subsequently succeeded in removing the piece during the night,

although its descent from the kopje was a task of some serious labour

and took two hours. The Commander-in-Chief's object in making this

feint against the enemy's right had been gained. He had arrived that

morning at the Modder camp, and now ordered the two brigades to

return. General MacDonald therefore withdrew on the evening of the 8th

of February, having first ascertained by a reconnaissance that the

enemy had completely evacuated both the Berg and Painter's Drift.

[Footnote 318: O. and R. batteries R.H.A., composite regiment

of Household cavalry, 16th Lancers, one squadron 10th

Hussars, one squadron 12th Lancers, and two troops of the

Scots Greys.]

[Sidenote: Results of demonstration.]

The British losses during this action were two officers and four men

killed, and five officers and forty-two men wounded. The Boers

admitted a loss of five killed and six wounded. Locally the results of

the engagement were hardly satisfactory, but nevertheless its effect

was exactly what had been hoped for, as General Cronje at once began

to reinforce his right and further strengthen his entrenchments on

that side. A simultaneous demonstration, also made to the westward, by

a body of 1,500 men under Brig.-Gen. Broadwood, helped to confirm the

Boer leaders' assumption that the relief of Kimberley would be

attempted by the west route. Broadwood reached Sunnyside on the 7th,

hoping to strike a blow at Liebenberg's commando at Douglas; but it

had already fallen back across the river, and the British, unable to

spare the time to pursue, retired on the 8th to Richmond, a farm

thirteen miles west of Graspan.

[Sidenote: Numbers in South Africa, 4th Feb. 1900.]

The Commander-in-Chief had at first intended to leave Cape Town for

the north on 30th January, but postponed his departure, as he found

that a little more time was required to collect between the Modder and

Orange rivers the troops he designed to employ. On the 4th February,

"to correct any misapprehension which may exist at the War Office as

to the total force at my disposal," the Field-Marshal informed the

Secretary of State by telegram that the effective strength of fighting

men in Cape Colony, exclusive of seven militia battalions and of the

garrisons of Kimberley and Mafeking, was 51,900, and that the entire

fighting strength of the force in Natal was estimated at 34,830, of

whom 9,780 were invested in Ladysmith. Under these circumstances Lord

Roberts recommended that the number of militia battalions in the

country should be increased to thirty, and that, if possible, two more

regular battalions should be sent, one from Malta and the other from

Egypt. Four days later Lord Roberts informed the War Office that he

would be glad if the whole of the 8,000 Imperial Yeomanry originally

asked for by Sir R. Buller could be sent out, and more, if available.

He suggested that additional mounted men should be raised in the

colonies, and added,

"I trust you will make arrangements to supply us with horses from

Australia, India, and America. Our wants will, I fear, be

considerable."

[Sidenote: Details of movement. 25th Jan. to 12th Feb. 1900.]

On 6th February the Field-Marshal, accompanied by his Chief of the

Staff, left Cape Town for Lord Methuen's camp. Meanwhile the

concentration had gone on. The details of the moves by rail had been

worked out by the Director of Railways and the General Traffic

Manager; ten miles of additional sidings had been laid down between

Orange River and the Modder, and at these sidings, between the 28th of

January and the 12th of February, there were detrained some 30,000

troops, with horses, guns, equipment, and transport, besides an

immense amount of supplies. Clements' brigade, with two squadrons

Inniskilling Dragoons, 660 Australian infantry who were in process of

being converted into mounted troops, 450 mounted infantry, two

batteries (J., R.H.A. and 4th R.F.A.) and a section 37th Howitzer

battery, lay round Rensburg to face General Schoeman's commandos. The

rest of Kelly-Kenny's division and French's original force were

brought round by rail to Orange River, the former unit being there

completed by the new brigade--the 18th--formed out of line of

communication battalions, under the command of Brig.-Gen. T. E.

Stephenson. Seven militia battalions, just disembarked from England,

were hurried up country to replace these regular battalions, and

protect the western and the central lines of rail. By the 8th of

February the cavalry division, except detachments of the 6th Dragoon

Guards and 14th Hussars and Hannay's M.I. brigade, had been assembled

at the Modder River camp under Lieut.-General French. Hannay's brigade

was at Orange River station; the 6th division at Modder River camp;

the 7th at Enslin and Graspan. Of the 9th division, the Highland

brigade was on the Riet, while the new 19th brigade was in process of

formation under Smith-Dorrien at Graspan. The distribution of troops

in South Africa on the 11th February, 1900, will be found in Appendix

10.

[Sidenote: Motives of Lord Roberts. Instructions given below.]

To Cronje it appeared that the English were about once more to hurl

themselves against his carefully-prepared entrenchments. Lord Roberts

had at last under his hand a force whose strength and mobility

permitted of the execution of a great turning movement, and warranted

the confident hope that the tide of fortune would turn in favour of

the British flag. It was his desire that the troops, about to engage

in this fresh enterprise, should reap to the full the benefit of the

practical experiences of the earlier actions of the war, both as

regards the special conditions of fighting in South Africa and the

modifications in tactics necessitated by the introduction of smokeless

powder and magazine small-bore rifles. He also recognised that the

tasks he was about to assign to his mounted troops would tax their

horses to the utmost, and was anxious to impress on all concerned the

necessity for the most careful horsemastership. He therefore issued

the following instructions:--

NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE.

INFANTRY.

As it is desirable that full advantage should be taken of the

experience gained during the past three months by our troops in South

Africa, the following notes are issued for the guidance of all who may

find themselves in command of a force (large or small) on service in

the field.

We have to deal with an enemy possessing remarkable mobility,

intimately acquainted with the country, thoroughly understanding how

to take advantage of ground, adept in improvising cover, and most

skilful in the use of their weapons.

Against such an enemy any attempt to take a position by direct attack

will assuredly fail. The only hope of success lies in being able to

turn one or both flanks, or what would, in many instances, be equally

effective, to threaten to cut the enemy's line of communication.

Before any plan of attack can be decided upon, the position must be

carefully examined by reconnoitring parties, and every endeavour must

be made to obtain all possible information about it from the people of

the country. It must, however, be remembered that the position

ostensibly occupied is not always the one the Boers intend to defend;

it is often merely a decoy, a stronger position in the vicinity having

previously been prepared upon which they move rapidly, and from which

they can frequently bring a destructive fire to bear upon the

attacking line. Their marvellous mobility enables them to do this

without much risk to themselves, and also to be in strength at any

point of the position that may be seriously threatened. It follows,

therefore, that our object should be to cripple the mobility of the

Boers, and to effect this, next to inflicting heavy losses on the men

themselves, the surest means would be the capture or destruction of

their horses.

When the extreme rifle range from the position is reached (1,500 to

1,800 yards) by the advance troops, or before, if they find themselves

under artillery fire, all column formations must be given up, and,

when advancing to the attack of the position, infantry must be freely

extended, even on occasions, if necessary, to six or eight paces, the

front and both flanks being well covered with scouts. This extended

formation will throw increased responsibility on battalion and company

commanders. The objective aimed at, therefore, should be carefully

explained to them. They should be allowed to make use of any

opportunity that may offer to further the scheme, on the distinct

understanding that no isolated acts are attempted, such as might

endanger the general plan. During the attack commanding officers must

be careful not to lose touch with the troops on their right and left,

and they should, as far as possible, ensure their co-operation. Every

advantage should be taken of cover, and battalion and company

commanders should look out for and occupy positions from which they

would be able to bring an enfilading fire to bear upon the enemy. The

capacity of these officers will be judged by the initiative displayed

in seizing rapidly every opportunity to further the general scheme of

attack.

An essential point, and one which must never be lost sight of, is the

power of endurance of the infantry soldier. If infantry soldiers

(carrying as they do a considerable weight on their backs) are called

upon to march a longer distance than can reasonably be expected from

men in a normal state of health, or if they are injudiciously pressed

as regards the pace, they will necessarily commence to feel the strain

before they reach a point where their best energies are required to

surmount the difficulties which lie before them. If at such a period a

man feels exhausted, moral deterioration and the consequences to our

arms which such deterioration entails, must readily supervene.

ARTILLERY.

As a general rule the artillery appear to have adapted themselves to

the situation, and to the special conditions which present themselves

in a campaign in South Africa.

The following points, however, require to be noticed:--

1. At the commencement of an action artillery should not be ordered

to take up a position until it has been ascertained by scouts to be

clear of the enemy and out of range of infantry fire.

2. When it is intended to take a position with infantry the

preparation by artillery should be thorough and not spasmodic. Unless

a strong force of infantry is pushed within 900 yards of the position,

the enemy will not occupy his trenches and the guns will have no

target. It is a mere waste of ammunition also to bombard an

entrenchment when the infantry attack is likely to be delayed, even

for a short time. To be of real value the fire of the guns should be

continuous until the assault is about to be delivered.

3. The expenditure of ammunition is a matter which can only be

regulated by the circumstances of the moment, officers commanding

should, however, always bear in mind that the supply of artillery

ammunition in the field is necessarily limited.

4. It is of great importance that artillery horses should be kept fit

for any special effort. They are not easily replaced, and it is the

duty of artillery officers to represent to the commander of the column

whenever they consider that their horses are being unduly worked, as

regards either pace or distance.

CAVALRY AND MOUNTED TROOPS.

Similarly with cavalry horses. Every endeavour should be made to save

them as much as possible, for unless this is done they cannot be

expected to last through a lengthened campaign.

The men should dismount on every available opportunity, if for a few

minutes only at a time, and, on the line of march, it will be

advantageous for them to occasionally lead instead of riding their

horses.

Horses should be fed at short intervals, and not allowed to be kept

too long without water. A sufficiency of grain is necessary to enable

horses to withstand hard work, but they will never keep in condition

unless they have an ample supply of hay or some bulky equivalent.

On the line of march scouting must be carried out by the mounted

troops in the most searching manner, in front and on both flanks. All

high ground should be visited and, whenever practicable, horsemen

should ride along ridges and hills. As soon as parties of the enemy

are observed the mounted troops (after sending back word to the

commander) should make a considerable detour round the position

occupied by the Boers, endeavour to estimate their numbers, and to

ascertain where their horses have been left. They should also see

whether, by threatening the Boers' line of communication, they would

not be forced to fight on ground unprepared for defence.

ROBERTS, Field-Marshal,

Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

Chief of Staff (Circular Memorandum).

Cape Town, 5th February, 1900.

The following notes by Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief are

communicated for the guidance of all concerned.

By Order,

KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM,

Chief of Staff.

NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE.

CAVALRY.

1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged beyond one

day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be lightened as much as

possible, nothing being taken that can possibly be dispensed with.

2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too slowly

when on reconnaissance duty, and that unnecessarily long halts are

made, the result being that the enemy, although starting after the

cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I could understand this if the

country were close and difficult, but between the Modder and the

Orange rivers its general features are such as to admit of small

parties of cavalry accompanied by field guns being employed with

impunity.

ARTILLERY.

3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage of ours

in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility, and we should

make use of this by not remaining in positions, the precise distance

of which from the enemy's batteries has evidently been fixed

beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved that the Boers' fire is far

less accurate at unknown distances. In taking up positions compact

battery formations should be avoided. The guns should be opened out,

or it may be desirable to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly,

retirements should be carried out at considerably increased intervals,

by alternate batteries or sections if necessary, and care should be

taken to travel quickly through the danger zone of hostile artillery

fire.

The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has succeeded in

deceiving our artillery on several occasions:--

Suppose A to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless powder;

simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at A a powder flask of

black powder will be exploded at B, a hill in the rear, leading us to

direct our projectile on B. Careful calculation with a watch, however,

will defeat this plan.

INFANTRY.

4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers to

exercise command over their men, except such as may be in their

immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be a system of

whistle calls by which a company lying in extended order could obey

orders as readily as if in quarter column. I invite suggestions for

such a system of whistle calls as would be useful.

5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at present, and

it seems desirable they should wear a distinguishing mark of some

kind, either on the collar at the back of the neck, or on the back of

the coat.

6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage of the

sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for themselves. If such

soil is scraped even with a canteen lid, a certain amount of cover

from rifle fire can be obtained in a short time.

7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of the

most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution, which has

been suggested to me, is for a portion of the supports gradually to

creep forward until a regular chain of men is established from the

supports (where the ammunition carts should be) right up to the firing

line. The ammunition could then be gradually worked up by hand till it

reached the firing line, where it could be passed along as required.

This would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition, but

it appears to be an improvement on the present method, which is almost

impossible to carry out under fire.

8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to hold

entrenchments _on the plain_ with the same tenacity and courage as

they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated that this applies

especially to night time, if they know that British infantry are

within easy striking distance from them. How far this is true time

only can show.

ROBERTS, Field-Marshal,

Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.

END OF VOL. I.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.

REINFORCEMENTS SANCTIONED ON THE 8th SEPTEMBER, 1899.

+--------------------+

| STRENGTH |

Officers

|----

| Other Ranks

| |------

| | Horses

| | |-----

| | | Guns

| | | |----

| | | | Ship in which embarked.

| | | | |-----------

| | | | | |----------

| | | | | | |--------

| | | | | | | |-------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | | | | | | | |

(_a_) FROM INDIA.

| | | | | | | | |

General | 3| 2| 7| --|_City of |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Cavalry | 9| 15| 23| --|_Pundua_ |Bombay | 22.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

5th Dragoon | 21| 474| 523| 1|_Lindula_ |Bombay | 26.9.99|Durban |11.10.99

Guards | | | | |_Patiala_ | | 8.10.99| |22.10.99

| | | | |_Virawa_ | | 8.10.99| |25.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

9th Lancers | 15| 476| 515| 1|_Wardha_[1]|Bombay | 24.9.99|Cape |18.10.99

| | | | |_Nowshera_ | | 24.9.99| Town |15.10.99

| | | | |_Nairung_ | | 25.9.99| |14.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

19th Hussars| 23| 474| 533| 1|_Vadala_ |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 7.10.99

| | | | |_Pundua_ | | 22.9.99| | 5.10.99

| | | | |_Warora_ | | 23.9.99| | 9.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Brigade Div.| 3| 1| 7| --|_Lalpoora_ |Bombay | 18.9.99|Durban | 2.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

21st battery| 5| 176| 152| 6|_Lalpoora_ |Bombay | 18.9.99|Durban | 2.10.99

R.F.A | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

42nd battery| 5| 169| 153| 6|_Secundra_ |Bombay | 17.9.99|Durban | 4.10.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

53rd battery| 5| 173| 153| 6|_Booldana_ |Bombay | 19.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99

R.F.A | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition | 3| 90| 149| --|_Nevassa_ |Bombay | 27.9.99|Durban |12.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Infantry | 9| 20| 14| --|_City of |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st battn. | 22| 843| 7| 1|_Sutlej_ |Bombay | 21.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st battn. | 29| 846| 5| 1|_Nurani_ |Calcutta | 20.9.99|Durban | 9.10.99

Gloucester-| | | | |_India_ | | 24.9.99| |13.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 25| 844| 5| 1|_Purnea_ |Calcutta | 18.9.99|Durban | 5.10.99

King's | | | | |_Nurani_ | | 20.9.99| | 9.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 29| 843| 6| 1|_Palitana_ |Bombay | 23.9.99|Durban | 9.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

_(b)_ | 206| 5,446|2,252|25[2] | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

(_b_) FROM HOME AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

| | | | | | | | |

18th | | | | | | | | |

R.F.A. | 9| 182| 166| 6|_Zibenghla_|Birkenhead| 26.9.99|Cape |30.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

62nd | | | | | | | | |

R.F.A. | 4| 169| 151| 6|_Zayathla_ |Birkenhead| 26.9.99|Cape |25.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

75th | | | | | | | | |

R.F.A. | 4| 166| 151| 6|_Zayathla_ |Birkenhead| 26.9.99|Cape |25.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

column | 8| 202| 120| --|_Gaika_ |Southampton 30.9.99|Durban |29.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

R.E. | 3| 55| --| --|_Jelunga_ |Southampton 20.9.99|Durban |26.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

R.E. | 2| 33| --| --|_Kinfauns |Southampton 30.9.99|Durban |26.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Fusiliers | 27| 784| 5| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton 16.9.99|Cape | 7.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

regt.[3] | 26| 961| 6| --|_Sumatra_ |Malta | 27.9.99|Cape |21.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Fusiliers | 26| 848| 5| --|_Avoca_ |Egypt | 24.9.99|Durban |12.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Brigade | 26| 835| 5| --|_Jelunga_ |Crete | 2.10.99|Durban |26.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Infantry | 12| 438| 3| --|_H.M.S. |Mauritius | 6.10.99|Cape |14.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Corps | 9| 130| --| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton 16.9.99|Cape | 7.10.99

| | | | |_Kinfauns | | 30.9.99| |18.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

Corps | 1| 50| --| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton 16.9.99|Cape | 7.10.99

------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------

TOTAL. | 363|10,299|2,864| 43

| | | [2]|[4]

-----------------------------------

[Tablenote 1: _Wardha_ returned to Durban damaged and the squadron was

transferred to _Nevassa_.]

[Tablenote 2: Includes seven machine.]

[Tablenote 3: Subsequently went to Natal.]

[Tablenote 4: Includes seven machines.]

APPENDIX 2.

The distribution of British forces under arms in Cape Colony on 11th

October, 1899.

{ Detachments 14th and 23rd cos., R.G.A.

CAPE PENINSULA { Headquarters 8th coy., R.E.

{ Two cos., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers.

{ 9th coy., Army Service Corps.

STELLENBOSCH { Two cos., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers.

{ 15th coy., Army Service Corps.

{ One section, 7th coy., R.E.

{ One section, 29th coy., R.E.

DE AAR { 1st battn. Northumberland Fusiliers.

{ Four cos., 2nd battn. King's Own Yorkshire

Light Infantry.

{ M.I. coy., 1st battn. Northumberland Fusiliers.

{ One section, R.G.A.

{ One section, 7th coy., R.E.

{ Four cos., 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire

{ regt.

ORANGE RIVER STATION { Four cos., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers.

{ M.I. coy., 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire

regt., less detachment at Kimberley.

{ M.I. coy., 1st battn. Royal Munster Fusiliers.

{ One section, 7th coy., R.E.

{ 23rd coy., R.G.A.

{ Diamond Fields artillery (six guns).

{ Diamond Fields Horse.

KIMBERLEY { Four cos., 1st battn. Loyal North Lancashire

{ regt.

{ Kimberley regt.

{ Town Guard.

{ Detachment M.I. coy., 1st battn. Loyal North

Lancashire regt.

FOURTEEN STREAMS Detachment Cape Police.

TAUNGS Detachment Cape Police.

VRYBURG { Detachment Cape Police.

{ Vryburg Mounted Rifles (one coy.)

{ Bechuanaland Rifles.

{ Protectorate regiment.

MAFEKING { Detachment Cape Police.

{ Detachment British South African Police.

{ Town Guard.

TULI { Rhodesian regiment (_en route_ from Buluwayo).

{ Detachment British South African Police.

{ One section, (two guns) R.G.A.

{ One section, 29th coy., R.E.

NAAUWPOORT { Four cos., 2nd battn. Royal Berkshire regt.

{ M.I. coy., 2nd battn. King's Own Yorkshire

Light Infantry.

{ One section, (two guns) R.G.A.

STORMBERG { One section, 29th coy., R.E.

{ Four cos., 2nd battn. Royal Berkshire regt.

{ M.I. coy., 2nd battn. Royal Berkshire regt.

APPENDIX 3.

The distribution of British forces under arms in Natal on 11th

October, 1899.

{ 18th Hussars.

{ One sqdn., Natal Carbineers.

{ M.I. coy., 1st battn. Leicestershire regiment.

{ M.I. coy., 1st battn. King's Royal Rifle Corps.

DUNDEE[5] { M.I. coy., 2nd battn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

{ Detachment Natal Police.

{ 13th, 67th, and 69th batteries, R.F.A.

{ 1st battn. Leicestershire regt.

{ 1st battn. King's Royal Rifle Corps.

{ 2nd battn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

{ 5th Lancers.

{ 19th Hussars.

{ 21st, 42nd, and 53rd batteries, R.F.A.

{ 10th mountain battery, R.G.A.

{ 23rd coy., R.E.

{ 1st battn. Liverpool regt. and M.I. coy.

{ 1st battn. Devonshire regt.

LADYSMITH { 1st battn. Manchester regt.

{ 2nd battn. Gordon Highlanders.

{ Natal Mounted Rifles.

{ Natal Carbineers.

{ Border Mounted Rifles.

{ Natal Field artillery.

{ Detachment Natal Police.

{ Natal Naval Volunteers.

{ Natal Corps of Guides.

{ Durban Light Infantry.

COLENSO { Detachment Natal Naval Volunteers.

{ One sqdn., Natal Carbineers.

ESTCOURT { Natal Royal Rifles.

PIETERMARITZBURG { 2nd battn. King's Royal Rifle Corps.

{ Imperial Light Horse.

HELPMAKAAR { Umvoti Mounted Rifles.

ESHOWE { One mounted coy., 1st battn. King's Royal Rifle

{ Corps.

DURBAN { One sqdn., 5th Dragoon Guards.

[Tablenote 5: The 1st battn. Royal Irish Fusiliers, and one section,

23rd coy., R.E., arrived at Dundee during 15th and 16th October.]

APPENDIX 4.

STRENGTH OF BURGHER ARMY OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

-----------------------+---------------+---------------------

District. | Present on | Subsequent Increase.

| Mobilisation. |

-----------------------+---------------+---------------------

Bethel | 700 | }

Bloemhof | 800 | }

Carolina | 506 | }

Ermelo | 800 | }

Fordsburg | 900 | }

Germiston and Boksburg | 1,050 | }

Heidelberg | 1,685 | }

Jeppestown | 400 | }

Johannesburg[6] | 1,000 | }

Krugersdorp | 800 | }

Lichtenburg | 850 | }

Lydenburg | 1,230 | }

Marico | 1,050 | }

Middelburg | 1,317 | } 14,779[8]

Piet Retief | 230 | }

Potchefstroom | 3,000 | }

Pretoria | 2,540 | }

Rustenburg | 1,500 | }

Springs | 60 | }

Standerton | 1,100 | }

Swaziland[6] | 290 | }

Utrecht | 900 | }

Vryheid | 944 | }

Waterberg | 732 | }

Wakkerstroom | 800 | }

Wolmaranstad | 400 | }

Zoutpansberg | 1,287 | }

-----------------------+---------------+---------------------

26,871[7] 14,779

\-------------------------/

Total Transvaal Burghers in the field 41,650

[Tablenote 6: Exclusive of police.]

[Tablenote 7: Boer evidence.]

[Tablenote 8: Intelligence statistics on conclusion of peace.]

STRENGTH OF BURGHER ARMY OF ORANGE FREE STATE.

-------------------------------------------------------------

District. | Present on | Subsequent Increase.

| Mobilisation. |

-------------------------------------------------------------

Bethlehem | 1,605 | }

Bethulie | 385 | }

Bloemfontein | 2,824 | }

Boshof | 1,030 | }

Ficksburg | 633 | }

Fauresmith | 1,560 | }

Heilbron | 1,671 | }

Harrismith | 915 | }

Hoopstad | 799 | } 6,264[10]

Jacobsdal | 250 | }

Kroonstad | 2,561 | }

Ladybrand | 1,113 | }

Philippolis | 402 | }

Rouxville | 1,109 | }

Smithfield | 797 | }

Vrede | 1,006 | }

Winburg | 2,114 | }

Wepener | 571 | }

-------------------------------------------------------------

21,345[9] 6,264

\------------------------/

Total O.F.S. Burghers in the field 27,609

REGULAR FORCES OF BOTH REPUBLICS.

State Artillery S.A.R 800

State Artillery O.F.S 375

South African Republic Police (whites only) 1,209

Swaziland Police (whites only) 302

-----

2,686

=====

FOREIGN CORPS.

Hollanders 320

Italian 75

Scandinavian 100

Irish 500

German 200

French 50

Russian 25

American 50

Foreigners serving with Commandos 800

-----

2,120

=====

[Tablenote 9: Boer evidence.]

[Tablenote 10: Intelligence statistics on conclusion of peace.]

ADDITIONS.

Rebels 13,000

Small bands[11] 300

------

13,300

======

GRAND TOTAL.

Burghers of S.A.R. 41,650

Burghers of O.F.S. 27,609

Regular Forces 2,686

Foreign Corps 2,120

Rebels, etc. 13,300

------

87,365

======

[Tablenote 11: _E.g._, those under S. Eloff, W. Mears, J. Hindon, etc.]

APPENDIX 5.

List of H.M. ships and vessels serving on the Cape station October

11th, 1899, to June 1st, 1902, showing the approximate dates when they

were so engaged.

Those that were present on the station at the beginning of the war are

shown with an asterisk.

Name of Dates between Commanded by Remarks.

vessel. which so serving.

from to

BARRACOUTA* 10/99 6/02 Comder. R.H. Peirse

Comder. H. Cotesworth

Comder. S. H. B. Ash

BARROSA* 10/99 3/01 Comder. W. F. Tunnard

BEAGLE 7/01 6/02 Comder. H. V. W. Elliott

BLANCHE 1/01 6/02 Comder. M. T. Parks

DORIS* 10/99 4/01 Capt. R. C. Prothero, C.B. Flagship of

Rear Admrl.

Sir R. H.

Harris,

K.C.B.

K.C.M.G.

DWARF* 11/99 6/02 Lieut. H. F. Shakespear

Lieut. W. N. England

FEARLESS 12/99 8/00 Comder. H. R. P. Floyd Detached from

Mediterranean

station.

FORTE* 10/99 6/02 Capt. E. P. Jones C.B.

Comder. C. H. Dundas

Capt. R. C. Sparkes, C.M.G.

Capt. P. Hoskyns, C.M.G.,

M.V.O.

GIBRALTAR 4/01 6/02 Capt. A. H. Limpus Flagship of

Rear Admiral

Arthur W.

Moore, C.B.,

C.M.G.

MAGICIENNE* 10/99 11/00 Capt. W. B. Fisher, C.B.

MAGPIE 11/00 5/02 Lieut. J. K. Laird

MONARCH* 10/99 6/02 Capt. R. D. B. Bruce

Capt. C. H. Bayly

Capt. W. L. Grant

NAIAD 4/01 11/01 Capt. the Hon. A. E. Detached from

Bethell Mediterranean

station.

NIOBE 11/99 8/00 Capt. A. L. Winsloe Detached from

Channel

Squdrn.

PARTRIDGE* 10/99 6/02 Lieut. A. T. Hunt

Lieut. E. La T. Leatham

PEARL 4/02 6/02 Capt. E. P. Ashe

PELORUS 12/99 6/00 Capt. H. C. B. Hulbert Detached from

Channel

Squdrn.

PHILOMEL* 10/99 1/02 Capt. J. E. Bearcroft, C.B.

POWERFUL 10/99 3/00 Capt. the Hon. Hedworth On way home

Lambton, C.B. from China.

RACOON 1/00 7/00 Comder. G. H. Hewett Detached from

Comder. A. E. A. Grant East Indies

stn.

RAMBLER 11/99 6/00 Comder. H. E. P. Cust Surveying

Service.

RATTLER 9/01 6/02 Lieut. C. Tibbits

REDBREAST 2/01 4/01 Lieut. M. R. Hill Detached from

East Indies.

SAPPHO 2/01 7/01 Capt. C. Burney Dtchd. from

S.E. Coast

America.

SYBILLE 1/01 2/01 Capt. H. P. Williams Wrecked near

Lambert's

Bay.

TARTAR* 10/99 7/01 Comder. F. R. W. Morgan

Comder. R. H. Travers

TERRIBLE 10/99 3/00 Capt. P. M. Scott, C.B. On her way out

to China

station.

TERPSICHORE 3/01 3/02 Capt. C. H. Coke Replaced the

Sybille.

THETIS 11/99 4/01 Capt. W. Stokes Rees, C.B. Detached from

Mediterranean

station.

THRUSH* 10/99 6/02 Lieut. W. H. D'Oyly

WIDGEON* 10/99 6/01 Lieut. A. F. Gurney

Lieut. W. Forbes

APPENDIX 6.

SHOWING APPROXIMATE STRENGTH, CASUALTIES, &C., IN THE PRINCIPAL

ENGAGEMENTS DESCRIBED IN VOLUME I.

TALANA HILL, OCTOBER 20th, 1899.

CHAPTER VII.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED.

Warrant Horses Guns

Arms. Officers N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). Field. Machine.

Cavalry (includes

detachment Natal

Carbineers.) 21 497 485 -- 1

Royal Artillery 17 454 428 18 --

Infantry and details

(includes mounted

infantry companies) 89 3,285 655 -- 4

Total 127 4,236 1,568 18 5

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total

(Prisoners). Casualties.

Officers 11 23 9 43

N.C.O.s and men 40 180 237 457

500

APPROXIMATE BOER LOSSES:--Killed, 30; wounded, 100; prisoners, 12 = 142.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Description of Weapons.

15-pr. Field Guns. ·303 L.M. rifles.

Number of rounds 1,237 82,000

RIETFONTEIN, OCTOBER 24th, 1899.

CHAPTER VIII.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED.

Warrant Horses Guns

Arms. Officers N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). Field. Machine.

Cavalry (includes Natal 110 1,842 2,024 -- 6

Mounted Volunteers.)

Royal Artillery 16 479 553 18 --

Infantry 92 2,782 400 -- 4

Total 218 5,103 2,977 18 10

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total

(Prisoners). Casualties.

Officers 1 6 -- 7

N.C.O.s and men 13 92 2 107

----

114

APPROXIMATE BOER LOSSES:--Killed, 13; wounded, 31--44.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Description of Weapons.

15-pr. 2·5-in. ·303 L.M.

Field Guns. Mountain Guns. rifles.

Number of rounds 680 125 52,951

ELANDSLAAGTE, OCTOBER 21st, 1899.

CHAPTER IX.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED.

Warrant Horses Guns

Arms. Officers N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). Field. Machine.

Cavalry (includes Imperial

Light Horse and 17 1,297 1,319 -- 3

Natal Carbineers)

Royal Artillery (includes

Natal Field Artillery) 20 532 481 18 --

Infantry 47 1,583 322 -- 3

Total 84 3,412 2,122 18 6

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total

(Prisoners). Casualties.

Officers 4 31 -- 35

N.C.O.s and men 46 182 -- 228

Total 263

APPROXIMATE BOER LOSSES:--Killed, 67; wounded, 108; prisoners, 188 = 363.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Description of Weapons

15-pr. Field 2·5-in. Natal ·303 L.M. Pistol.

Guns. F.A. rifles.

Number of rounds 423 74 61,212 241

LOMBARDS KOP, 30th OCTOBER, 1899.

CHAPTER X.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS.

Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns

N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). 4·7-in. 12-pr. 15-pr. Machine.

Naval. 2·5-in.

Cavalry (includes

Imperial Light Horse 160 2,946 3,121 -- -- -- -- 7

and Natal Mounted

Volunteers)

Royal Artillery

(includes Naval 74 1,677 1,230 2 4 50 6 6

Brigade and Natal

Volunteer Artillery)

Royal Engineers 10 224 95 -- -- -- -- --

Infantry 212 7,150 1,397 -- -- -- -- 10

Total 456 11,997 5,843 2 4 50 6 23

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing Total

(Prisoners). Casualties.

Officers 6 10 37 53

N.C.O.s and men 63 239 917 1,219

Total 1,272

AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Description of Weapons.

15-pr. Field 2·5-in. Naval ·303

Guns. 12-pr. 12-cwt. L.M. rifles.

Number of Rounds 2,359 330 25 433,247

BELMONT, 23rd NOVEMBER, 1899.

CHAPTER XIII.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED.

Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns

N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). Naval Field Machine.

12-pr. 15-pr.

Cavalry (includes

Imperial Light Horse) 160 2,946 3,121 -- -- --

The Naval Brigade 18 384 10 4 -- --

1st Division Staff 12 55 46 -- -- --

Mounted troops 48 920 999 -- -- 3

Royal Artillery 19 546 514 -- 12 --

Royal Engineers 13 333 71 -- -- --

Infantry(2 brigades) 216 7,010 347 -- -- 7

Army Service Corps

and Royal Army 20 418 312 -- -- --

Medical Corps

Total 346 9,666 2,299 4 12 10

BELMONT.

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

Officers 3 23 -- 26

Other ranks 51 220 -- 271

297

Note.--The force engaged at Graspan was the same as at Belmont, less

casualties, &c., of the 23rd November.

GRASPAN, 25th NOVEMBER, 1899.

CHAPTER XIV.

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

Officers 3 6 -- 9

Other ranks 15 137 7 159

168

MODDER RIVER, 28th NOVEMBER, 1899.

CHAPTER XV.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED.

Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns

N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). Naval Field Machine.

12-pr. 15-pr.

The Naval Brigade 16 238 10 4 -- --

1st Division Staff 12 55 46 -- -- --

Mounted troops 47 866 895 -- -- 3

Royal Artillery 23 656 704 -- 16 --

Royal Engineers 13 333 71 -- -- --

Infantry 211 7,500 379 -- -- 8

Armed Service Corps

and Royal Army 20 418 312 -- -- --

Medical Corps

Total 342 10,066 2,417 4 16 11

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES, 28th NOVEMBER, 1899.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

Officers 4 19 -- 23

Other ranks 67 370 18 455

478

STORMBERG, 10th DECEMBER, 1899.

CHAPTER XVIII.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF TROOPS ENGAGED.

Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns

N.C.O.s (Riding and

and men. Draught). Field Machine.

Divisional Staff 7 14 7 -- --

Mounted Troops

(includes detachment

Cape Police) 17 436 453 -- 2

Royal Artillery 19 466 514 12 --

Royal Engineers 7 200 63 -- --

Infantry 50 1,710 84 -- 2

Armed Service Corps,

Royal Army Medical 8 101 88 -- --

Corps, &c.

Total 108 2,927 1,209 12 4

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total

Casualties.

Officers -- 8 13 21

N.C.O.s and men 25 102 548 675

696

SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Description of Guns, &c.

15-pr. Machine. Lee-Metford

·303.

Number of rounds 569[12] 1,146 137,382[13]

[Tablenote 12: Includes 67 rounds captured by the enemy.]

[Tablenote 13: Includes 37,400 rounds lost in ammunition carts, and

86,560 rounds in the pouches of the killed and prisoners.]

MAGERSFONTEIN, 11th DECEMBER, 1899.

CHAPTER XX.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF THE TROOPS ENGAGED.

Arms. Officers. Warrant, Horses Guns

N.C.O.s (Riding and Naval. Field. Machine.

and men. Draught). 4·7-in. 12-pr. Howitzer. 15-pr. 12-pr.

The Naval Brigade 18 294 10 1 4 -- -- -- --

1st Division Staff 10 53 44 -- -- -- -- -- --

1st Cavalry Brigade 77 1,627 1,686 -- -- -- -- 6 4

Royal Artillery 29 918 931 -- -- 4 18 -- --

Royal Engineers 12 325 70 -- -- -- -- -- --

Infantry (3 brigades) 297 10,672 551 -- -- -- -- -- 12

Armed Service Corps

and Royal Army 32 600 431 -- -- -- -- -- --

Medical Corps

Total 475 14,489 3,723 1 4 4 18 6 16

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

Officers 22 46 1 69

Other ranks 188 629 62 879

948

SUMMARY OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Description of Guns, &c.

Howitzers. Field Guns. Machine. Lee-Metford

·303.

Rounds 402 4,189 18,487 321,782

COLENSO, 15th DECEMBER, 1899.

CHAPTER XXII.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF THE TROOPS ENGAGED.

Guns.

Arms. Officers. Other Horses Naval. Field Machine.

Ranks. (Riding 15-pr.

and 4·7in. 12-pr.

Draught).

The Naval Brigade 31 279 6 2 12 -- --

Natal Army Staff 34 137 123 -- -- -- --

Mounted troops 126 2,561 2,700 -- -- -- 2

Royal Artillery 39 1,074 869 -- -- 30 --

Royal Engineers 14 419 255 -- -- -- --

Infantry

(4 brigades) 416 13,521 716 -- -- -- 16

Army Service Corps 16 217 550 -- -- -- --

Royal Army Medical

Corps 30 464 336 -- -- -- --

Total 706 18,672 5,555 2 12 30 18

SUMMARY OF BRITISH CASUALTIES.

Ranks. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

Officers 7 47 20 74

Other ranks 136 709 220 1,065

1,139

NAVAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

Rounds.

4·7-inch 160

12-pr. 12-cwt. 900

APPENDIX 7.

THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AS ORIGINALLY ORGANISED AND SENT TO SOUTH AFRICA.

+--------------------+

| STRENGTH |

Officers

|----

| Other Ranks

| |------

| | Horses

| | |-----

| | | Guns

| | | |----

| | | | Ship in which embarked.

| | | | |-----------

| | | | | |--------

| | | | | | |--------

| | | | | | | |---------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Army Corps | 36| 119| 29| --{_Dunottar |14.10.99|31.10.99|Cape |31.10.99

Staff | | | | { Castle_ | | | Town |

| | | | {_Caspian_ |17.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | {_Carisbrook|28.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99

| | | | { Castle_ | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

13th Hussars| 25| 558| 499| 1{_Montfort_ |13.11.99| 8.12.99|Durban |13.12.99

| | | | {_Templemore_10.11.99| 2.12.99|Durban | 5.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Artillery | 4| 15| 16| --|_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |25.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

G. battery, | 5| 178| 196| 6|_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |25.11.99

R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

P. battery, | 5| 179| 196| 6|_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |25.11.99

R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Division | 4| 13| 14| --|_Algeria_ | 7.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

4th battery,| 5| 170| 137| 6|_Sicilian_ |15.11.99|10.12.99|Cape |10.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

38th battery, 5| 173| 137| 6|_Algeria_ | 7.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

78th battery, 5| 171| 137| 6|_Sicilian_ |15.11.99|10.12.99|East |12.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London |

| | | | | | | |[14] |

| | | | | | | | |

Division | 4| 14| 10| --|_Antillian_|17.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape |10.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

37th battery, 5| 194| 161| 6|_Antillian_|17.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape |10.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

R.F.A. | | | | {_British |16.11.99| 6.12.99|East |11.12.99

61st battery, | | | { Princess_ | | | London |

R.F.A. | 5| 194| 152| 6{ | | |[14] |

| | | | {_Montfort_ |13.11.99| 8.12.99|East |11.12.99

| | | | { | | | London |

| | | | { | | |[14] |

| | | | | | | | |

65th battery, 5| 194| 162| 6|_Canning_ |12.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 4.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | {_British |16.11.99| 6.12.99|Cape | 6.12.99

| | | | { Princess_ | | | Town |

Ammunition | | | | { | | | |

Park | 17| 269| 260| --{_Canning_ |12.11.99| 4.12.99|Cape | 4.12.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | {_Sicilian_ |15.11.99|10.12.99|Cape |10.12.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 10| 245| --| --|_Kildonan | 4.11.99|22.11.99{Durban |27.11.99

Engineers | | | | | Castle_ | | {Cape |22.11.99

| | | | | | | { Town |

| | | | | | | | |

the Royal | 27| 1,014| 2| 1|_Dictator_ | 6.11.99| 1.12.99|East | 4.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Army Service| | | | {_Braemar | 6.10.99|27.10.99|Cape |27.10.99

Corps | 19| 326| --| --{ Castle_ | | | Town |

| | | | {_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|Cape | 9.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | {_Pindari_ |30.10.99|25.11.99|Cape |26.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | {_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99

| | | | { | | | London |

Royal Army | | | | {_Dictator_ | 6.11.99| 1.12.99|East | 4.12.99

Medical | 4| 35| --| --{ | | | London |

Corps | | | | {_Ranee_ | 5.11.99| 5.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | {_Arawa_ | 7.11.99| 1.12.99|Cape | 2.12.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Army Service| 21| 482| --| --|_Braemar | 6.10.99|27.10.99|Cape |27.10.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Division| 4| 16| 17| --|_City of |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

troop, | 4| 116| 88| --|_Rapidan_ |13.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape | 9.12.99

R.E. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

cavalry| 3| 13| 4| --|_City of |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

6th | 25| 563| 499| 1{_Chicago_ | 8.11.99| 1.12.99|Cape | 2.12.99

Dragoon| | | | { | | | Town |

Guards | | | | {_Wakool_ | 4.11.99|27.11.99|Cape |28.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

10th | 26| 565| 502| 1{_Ismore_ | 4.11.99|Wrecked.|Columbine 3.12.99

Hussars| | | | { | | |Pnt.[15]|

| | | | {_Columbian_| 6.11.99| 2.12.99|Cape | 3.12.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

12th | 26| 559| 500| 1{_Mohawk_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

Lancers| | | | {_City of |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99

| | | | { Vienna_ | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Southern, 25| 575| --| 4{_Malta_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99

Aldershot, | | | { | | | Town |

South-Eastern| | | {_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99

and | | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

R. battery, 6| 180| 198| 6|_America_ |24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |19.11.99

R.H.A.| | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition 3| 83| 75| --|_America_ |24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |19.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 11 | 4| 57| --| --|_Ismore_ | 4.11.99|Wrecked.|Columbine 3.12.99

Bearer| | | | | | | |Pnt.[15]|

| | | | | | | | |

No. 11 | 5| 35| --| --|_Mohawk_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|Cape |16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

cavalry| 3| 13| 4| --|_Carisbrook|28.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

Royal | 27| 562| 520| 1|_Manchester|30.10.99|22.11.99|Durban |27.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | {_Antillian_|17.11.99| 9.12.99|Cape |10.12.99

2nd | | | | { | | | Town |

Dragoons 25| 548| 498| 1{_British |16.11.99| 6.12.99|Cape | 7.12.99

| | | | { Princess_ | | | Town |

| | | | {_Ranee_ | 9.11.99| 5.12.99|Cape | 5.12.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | {_Jamaican_ |23.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

6th | | | | {[16]_Persia_28.10.99|11.12.99|Cape |11.12.99

Dragoons 25| 557| 498| 1{ | | | Town |

| | | | {_Siberian_ |24.10.99|19.11.99|Cape |20.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

O. battery, 6| 180| 198| 6|_Glengyle_ |27.10.99|20.11.99|Cape |21.11.99

R.H.A. | | | | | | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition 3| 86| 61| --|_Glengyle_ |27.10.99|20.11.99|Cape |21.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Western, 24| 581| --| 4{_Orient_ |22.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |13.11.99

Eastern| | | | { | | | Town |

and | | | | {_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99

Dublin | | | | { | | | Town |

M.I. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

cavalry| 2| 55| --| --|_Idaho_ | 3.11.99|26.11.99|Cape |26.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 6 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

Division | 10| 4| --| --|_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|Cape | 9.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

"A." | | | | | | | | |

squadron, 8| 186| 191| --|_Maplemore_|29.11.99|25.12.99|Cape |25.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Division 9| 183| 152| 6|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

7th | | | | | | | | |

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

14th | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 172| 137| 6|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

66th | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 170| 136| 6|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition 5| 129| 94| --|_Armenian_ |24.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 8| 208| --| --|_Goorkha_ |21.10.99|15.11.99{Durban |21.11.99

Engineers | | | | | | {Cape |15.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 7 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Gascon_ |21.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |12.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

brigade| 2| 16| 3| --|_Goorkha_ |21.10.99|15.11.99|[17]Cape|15.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Grenadier 32| 1,083| 6| 1|_Goorkha_ |21.10.99|15.11.99|[17]Cape|15.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st battn. 31| 1,090| 5| 1|_Malta_ |22.10.99|16.11.99|[17]Cape|16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. 31| 1,082| 3| 1|_Gascon_ |21.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |12.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st battn. 30| 1,089| 3| 1|_Nubia_ |21.10.99|13.11.99|Cape |14.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 1 | 3| 58| --| --|_Gascon_ |21.10.99|12.11.99|Cape |12.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 1 | 4| 35| --| --|_Nubia_ |21.10.99|13.11.99|Cape |13.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | 3| 18| 3| --|_Roslin |20.10.99| 8.11.99|Durban |12.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 26| 1,064| 3| 1|_Yorkshire_|20.10.99|11.11.99|Durban |14.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

battn. | 24| 1,041| 3| 1|_Manila_ |20.10.99|15.11.99|Durban |19.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

West | 27| 936| 3| 1|_Roslin |20.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |12.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

battn. | 26| 1,082| 3| 1{_Harlech |20.10.99|15.11.99|Durban |20.11.99

East | | | | { Castle_ | | | |

Surrey | | | | {_Lismore |20.10.99|11.11.99|Durban |14.11.99

regiment | | | { Castle_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

No. 4 | | | | | | | | |

bearer | 3| 58| --| --|_Roslin |20.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |15.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 3 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 4| 35| --| --|_Roslin |20.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |15.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

infantry 11| 8| 4| --|_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|Durban |14.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

"B." | | | | | | | | |

squadron, 9| 191| 199| --{_Maplemore_|29.11.99|24.12.99|Cape |25.12.99

Royal | | | | { | | | Town |

Horse | | | | {_Pinemore_ | 4.12.99|29.12.99|Cape |29.12.99

Guards | | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

5th | | | | | | | | |

brigade| 4| 12| 16| --|_Urmston | 1.11.99|27.11.99|Durban | 2.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

63rd | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Ismore_ | 4.11.99|Wrecked |Durban |27.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | |[18] | |

| | | | | | | | |

64th | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Urmston | 1.11.99|27.11.99|Durban | 2.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | Grange_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

73rd | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 170| 139| 6|_Idaho_ | 3.11.99|26.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition 5| 123| 93| --|_Idaho_ | 3.11.99|26.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 9| 208| --| --|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

3rd | | | | | | | | |

infantry 2| 18| 1| --|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 29| 1,014| 3| 1|_Orient_ |24.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Highland 26| 1,087| --| 1|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Seaforth 27| 927| 3| 1|_Mongolian_|21.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Argyll | 30| 1,081| 3| 1{_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Cape |24.11.99

and | | | | { | | | Town |

Sutherland | | | {_Orcana_ |27.10.99|17.11.99|Cape |17.11.99

Highlanders | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

No. 3 | | | | | | | | |

Bearer | 3| 58| --| --|_Aurania_ |23.10.99|11.11.99|Cape |11.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 10 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Mongolian_|21.10.99|18.11.99|Cape |18.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

brigade| 3| 22| 3| --|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Scottish 26| 939| 3| 1|_City of |23.10.99|16.11.99|Durban |22.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

King's | 29| 1,074| 3| 1|_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Durban |28.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Durham | 28| 921| 3| 1|_Cephalonia_24.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Rifle | 29| 1,082| 3| 1|_German_ |28.10.99|21.11.99|Durban |25.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 9 | | | | | | | | |

Bearer | 2| 54| --| --|_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Durban |29.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 9 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 6| 38| --| --|_Servia_ | 4.11.99|24.11.99|Durban |29.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

division 11| 8| 4| --|_Moor_ |21.10.99| 9.11.99|East |16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd Life 9| 186| 193| --|_Pinemore_ | 4.12.99|29.12.99|Cape |29.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

6th | | | | | | | | |

brigade| 4| 13| 5| --|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

74th | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 170| 138| 6|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London |

| | | | | | | | |

77th | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London |

| | | | | | | | |

79th | | | | | | | | |

battery, 5| 173| 141| 6|_Montfort_ |13.11.99| 8.12.99|East |11.12.99

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | London |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition 5| 128| 94| --|_Englishman_ 6.11.99|30.11.99|East | 4.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 9| 220| --| --|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Cape |28.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 16 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 4| 35| --| --|_Cheshire_ | 9.11.99|29.11.99|East | 5.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

brigade| 3| 21| 3| --|_Catalonia_| 5.11.99|30.11.99|Durban | 5.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 29| 969| 3| 1|_Catalonia_| 5.11.99|30.11.99|Durban | 5.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 25| 875| 3| 1|_Britannic_|26.10.99|14.11.99|East |16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Connaught 28| 855| 3| 1|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 28| 923| --| 1|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 8 | | | | | | | | |

Bearer | 3| 57| --| --|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 15 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Bavarian_ |10.11.99|28.11.99|Durban | 1.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

brigade| 3| 21| 3| --|_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 25| 769| 3| 1|_Pavonia_ |22.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 29| 870| 2| 1{_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

Scots | | | | {_Pavonia_ |22.10.99|18.11.99|Durban |23.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 27| 1,074| 3| 1|_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 29| 946| 3| 1|_Hawarden |23.10.99|12.11.99|Durban |16.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 12 | | | | | | | | |

Bearer | 3| 58| --| --|_Catalonia_| 5.11.99|30.11.99|Durban | 5.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 17 | | | | | | | | |

Field | 5| 35| --| --|_Oriental_ |23.10.99|13.11.99|Durban |17.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | 29| 977| 3| 1|_Kildonan | 4.11.99|22.11.99|East |26.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | | | | | | | | |

Somerset | 29| 875| 3| 1|_Briton_ | 4.11.99|20.11.99|Durban |24.11.99

Light | | | | | | | | |[19]

| | | | | | | | |

Cornwall's 29| 920| 3| 1|_Formosa_ | 5.11.99|29.11.99|Cape |29.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

Welsh | 28| 823| 3| 1|_Kildonan | 4.11.99|22.11.99|Port |26.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

2nd | 28| 990| 3| 1{_Harlech |20.10.99|14.11.99|Cape |14.11.99

Northamptonshire | | { Castle_ | | | Town |

regiment | | | | {_Nubia_ |21.10.99|13.11.99|Cape |13.11.99

| | | | { | | | Town |

| | | | | | | | |

Light | 29| 905| 3| 1|_Arawa_ | 8.11.99| 1.12.99|Cape | 1.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

Gordon | 29| 855| 4| 1|_Cheshire_ | 9.11.99|29.11.99|Cape |29.11.99

[Tablenote 14: Battery subsequently went to Natal.]

[Tablenote 15: Arrived Cape Town, 6.12.99.]

[Tablenote 16: _Persia_ broke down at St. Vincent.]

[Tablenote 17: Started from Gibraltar.]

[Tablenote 18: Guns lost.]

[Tablenote 19: The battalion transhipped to S.S. _Orcana_, which

arrived at Durban 24.11.99.]

APPENDIX 8.

The composition and distribution of British troops in southern Natal,

23rd November, 1899, the morning of the fight at Willow Grange.

ESTCOURT. { 2nd brigade Staff.

{ Naval detachment with two 12-pr. 12-cwt. guns.

{ 7th battery, R.F.A.

{ Natal Field artillery.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. T. { 2nd battn. The Queen's (Royal West Surrey

HILDYARD { regiment), five companies.

{ 2nd battn. West Yorkshire regiment.

{ 2nd " East Surrey regiment.

{ 1st " The Border regiment.

{ 2nd " Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

{ Mounted infantry company of 2nd battn. King's

{ Royal Rifle Corps.

{ 16th company, Army Service Corps.

{ Natal Royal Rifles.

{ Durban Light Infantry.

{ Natal Carbineers (one squadron).

{ Imperial Light Horse (one squadron).

{ Bethune's mounted infantry.

{ Natal Police.

MOOI RIVER. { 6th brigade Staff.

{ 14th battery, R.F.A.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. { 2nd battn. The Queen's (Royal West Surrey

BARTON. { regiment), three companies.

{ 2nd battn. Devonshire regiment.

{ 2nd " Royal Scots Fusiliers (one company).

{ 1st " Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

{ 2nd " Royal Irish Fusiliers.

{ 24th company, Army Service Corps.

{ Thorneycroft's mounted infantry.

NOTTINGHAM ROAD. { 66th battery, R.F.A. (two guns).

{ 2nd battn. Scottish Rifles.

PIETERMARITZBURG. { Divisional Staff of 2nd division.

{ Headquarters line of communication.

{ Naval contingent with four 12-pr. 12-cwt. Naval

{ guns.[20]

{ 66th battery, R.F.A. (four guns).

LT.-GENERAL SIR C. F. { Divisional ammunition column.

CLERY. { General depôt.

{ Natal Naval Volunteers.

{ Imperial Light Infantry.

{ Pietermaritzburg Rifle association.

{ Home Guard.

{ Reserve Rifle association.

{ Railway Rifle association.

GREYTOWN. {

MAJOR G. LEUCHARS. { Umvoti Mounted Rifles.

DURBAN. { Naval contingent, two 6-in. guns, two 4·7-in.

{ guns, 12 Naval 12-pr. 12-cwt. and two Naval

{ 12-pr. 8-cwt. guns.

CAPT. PERCY SCOTT, R.N. { [21]2nd battn. Royal Fusiliers.

{ [21]2nd " Royal Scots Fusiliers (seven

{ companies).

{ [21]1st " Durham Light Infantry.

[Tablenote 20: Two of these guns were _en route_ to Mooi River.]

[Tablenote 21: _En route_ to Pietermaritzburg.]

APPENDIX 9.

REINFORCEMENTS LANDED IN SOUTH AFRICA UP TO THE 13th OF FEBRUARY,

1900, OTHER THAN THOSE GIVEN IN APPENDICES 1. AND 7.

+--------------------+

| STRENGTH |

Officers

|----

| Other Ranks

| |------

| | Horses

| | |-----

| | | Guns

| | | |----

| | | | Ship in which embarked.

| | | | |-----------

| | | | | |-------------

| | | | | | |--------

| | | | | | | |----------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(A) REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO SOUTH AFRICA AFTER "LOMBARDS KOP."

| | | | | | | | |

No. 4. | | | | | | | | |

Mountain | 6 | 276| 18| 6|_Narrung_ |Royal |16.11.99|Durban |12.12.99

R.G.A. | | | | | | Dock | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Suffolk | 22| 1,081| 3| 1|_Scott_ |Southampton|11.11.99|Cape Town |28.11.99

| | | | | | | | |

Essex | 23| 912| 3| 1 |_Greek_ |Southampton|11.11.99|Cape Town | 3.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Derbyshire | 29| 1,091| 5| 1 |_Dunera_ |Malta |21.11.99|East |15.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

(B) FIFTH INFANTRY DIVISION.

| | | | | | | | |

Staff | 11| 29| 7| --|_Norham |Southampton|25.11.99|Cape Town |13.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

14th | | | | | | | | |

Hussars | 25| 599| 497| 1 {_Victorian_|Southampton|13.12.99|Durban | 6.1.00

| | | | {_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

division | 4| 13| 13| --|_Atlantian_|Queenstown | 5.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

19th | | | | | | | | |

battery, | 5| 170| 133| 6|_Atlantian_|Liverpool | 3.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

20th | | | | | | | | |

battery, | 5| 170| 137| 6|_Victorian_|Southampton|13.12.99|Cape Town | 1.1.00

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

28th | | | | | | | | |

battery, | 5| 170| 137| 6|_Atlantian_|Queenstown | 5.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition | 5| 128| 93| --|_Atlantian_|Queenstown | 5.12.99|Durban | 1.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

37th | | | | | | | | |

Field | 7| 207| --| |_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99

R.E. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

10th | | | | | | | | |

Infantry [22]1| 17| 2| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |16.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 25| 1,078| 3| 1|_Gaul_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |16.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

1st | | | | | | | | |

battn. | 22| 956| 4| 1|_Doune |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |15.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Dorset | 22| 944| 3| 1|_Simla_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Durban |21.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Middlesex | 25| 1,023| 4| 1|_Avondale |Southampton| 2.12.99|Cape |26.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

brigade | 3| 12| 3| --|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 25| 1,049| 3| 1|_Dilwara_ |Southampton| 2.12.99|Durban |30.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Lancashire | 21| 1,082| 3| 1|_Norman_ |Southampton| 2.12.99|Cape |19.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

South | 22| 1,049| 3| 1|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

York and | 24| 838| 4| 1|_Majestic_ |Liverpool |13.12.99|Durban | 2.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

No. 27 coy.| 2| 47| --| --|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 32 coy.| 2| 60| --| --|_Gaul_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Cape Town |16.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

No. 25 coy.| 2| 60| 1| --|_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

Royal Army | 15| 153| --| --{_Canada_ |Liverpool |30.11.99|Durban |23.12.99

Medical | | | | {_Simla_ |Southampton|24.11.99|Durban |21.12.99

Corps | | | | {_Dilwara_ |Southampton| 2.12.99|Durban |30.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

division | 4| 16| 18| --|_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00

R.H.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Q. battery, | 4| 174| 194| 6{_Manchester_Southampton|19.12.99|Cape Town { 25.1.00

R.H.A. | | | | {_Corporation_ | | { [25]

| | | | | | | | |

T. battery, | 5 | 170| 196| 6{_Manchester_Southampton|19.12.99|Cape Town | 25.1.00

R.H.A. | | | | {_Corporation_ | | |

| | | | | | | | |

U. battery, | 3 | 178| 196| 6|_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00

R.H.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

column | 5| 107| 93| --|_Cestrian_ |Southampton|21.12.99|Cape Town | 10.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

Army Ordnance 2| 80| --| --|_Guelph_ |Southampton|18.11.99|Cape Town |10.12.99

| | | | | | | | |

(D) SIXTH INFANTRY DIVISION.

| | | | | | | | |

Divisional | 10 | 40| 8| --|_Dunottar |Southampton|23.12.99|Port | 15.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

division | 4| 13| 16| --|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

76th battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

81st battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

82nd battery, 5| 170| 138| 6|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00

R.F.A. | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition | 4| 123| 96| --|_America_ |Royal | 5.1.00|Cape Town | 31.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 10| 208| 10| --|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

brigade | 3| 21| --| --|_Gascon_ |Southampton|16.12.99|Port | 12.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 22| 903| 2| 1|_Sumatra_ |Royal |16.12.99|Port | 13.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

Royal Irish| 18| 843| 18 | 1|_Gascon_ |Southampton|16.12.99|Port | 12.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 27| 1,055| 117| 1|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape | 8.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 8| 823| 3| 1|_Gascon_ |Southampton|16.12.99|Port | 12.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

brigade | 3| 21| 3| --|_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

East Kent | 21| 934| 120| 1|_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00

regt. | | [28]| | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 26| 930| 119| 1|_Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00

Gloucestershire | [29]| | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

1st battn. | 27| 981| 109| 1|_Orient_ |Southampton|29.12.99|Cape Town | 19.1.00

West Riding| | [30]| | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

1st battn. | 26| 768| 87| 1|_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00

Oxfordshire| | [31]| | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Army Service| 2| 60| --| --|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

Army Service| 2| 60| --| --|_Sumatra_ |Royal |16.12.99|Port | 13.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

Army Service| 3| 46| --| --|_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

Medical Corps 20| 221| -- | --{_Tintagel |Southampton|17.12.99|Cape Town | 8.1.00

| | | | { Castle_ | | | |

| | | | {_Gaika_ |Southampton|22.12.99|Cape Town | 14.1.00

| | | | {_America_ |Royal | 5.1.00|Cape Town | 31.1.00

| | | | { | Albert | | |

| | | | { | Dock | | |

| | | | { _Cymric_ |Liverpool | 1.1.00|Cape Town | 21.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

(E) SEVENTH DIVISION.

| | | | | | | | |

Divisional | 18| 48| 31| --{_Kildonan |Southampton| 3.1.00|Cape Town | 20.1.00

Staff | | | | { Castle_ | | | |

| | | | {_Dwarka_ |Bombay | 4.1.00|Cape Town | 18.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

division | 4| 12| 14| --|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00

| | | | | | | | |

83rd battery, 5| 170| 134| 6|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00

R.F.A. | | | | | Port_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

84th battery, 5| 170| 135| 6|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00

R.F.A. | | | | | Port_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

85th battery, 5| 170| 137| 6|_Manchester|Tilbury | 18.1.00|Cape Town | 11.2.00

R.F.A. | | | | | Port_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Ammunition | 3| 126| 93| --|_Glengyle_ |S.W. India | 10.1.00|Cape Town | 4.2.00

| | | | | | | | |

Royal | 7| 213| --| --|_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

brigade | 2| 20| 3| --|_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 26| 984| 5| 1|_Assaye_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 23.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 25| 971| 5| 1|_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

King's Own | 28| 1,067| 3| 1|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 22| 838| 3| 1|_Assaye_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 23.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

15th infantry 3| 21| 1| --|_Briton_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 29.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 27| 963| 3| 1|_Britannic_|Southampton| 7.1.00|Cape Town | 27.1.00

| | | | | | | | |

East | 27| 948| 3| 1|_Bavarian_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00

| | | | | | | | |

2nd battn. | 29| 1,064| 3| 1|_Bavarian_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00

| | | | | | | | |

North | 27| 998| 3| 1|_Aurania_ |Southampton| 15.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00

| | | | | | | | |

Corps, | 2| 41| --| --|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00

No. 12 | | | | | Castle_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Corps, | 2| 37| --| --|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00

No. 17 | | | | | Castle_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Corps, | 2| 42| --| --|_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 26.1.00

No. 34 | | | | | Castle_ | | | |

| | | | | | | | |

Medical | 16| 164| --| --{_Braemar |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 27.1.00

Corps | | | | { Castle_ | | | |

| | | | {_Britannic_|Southampton| 7.1.00|Cape Town | 27.1.00

| | | | {_Goorkha_ |Southampton| 4.1.00|Cape Town | 25.1.00

| | | | {_Bavarian_ |Southampton| 13.1.00|Cape Town | 3.2.00

[Tablenote 22: Maj.-Gen. Talbot Coke embarked at Mauritius, 1.12.99.]

[Tablenote 23: The battalion was transhipped to _Mongolian_, which

arrived at Durban on 1.1.00.]

[Tablenote 24: The battalion was transhipped to _Roslin Castle_, which

arrived at Durban on 23.12.99.]

[Tablenote 25: Accident to propeller twice during voyage.]

[Tablenote 26: Strength includes mounted infantry company in

_America_.]

[Tablenote 27: Strength includes mounted infantry company in _British

Prince_.]

[Tablenote 28: Strength includes mounted infantry company in _British

Prince_.]

[Tablenote 29: Strength includes mounted infantry company in _British

Prince_.]

[Tablenote 30: Strength includes mounted infantry company in

_Pindari_.]

History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4) Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government · 第 24 / 25 章