The Army Sea Transport work was carried out by the Admiralty through
its Transport department, with the following exceptions. Arrangements
for the Indian contingent, the Remounts, and all else sent from India,
were made by the Director of Indian Marine, for the outward voyage; by
the Admiralty for the return voyage. For the Colonial contingents,
passage was provided partly in freight ships locally engaged by the
Colonial Governments and partly in Admiralty transports sent from the
Cape. The return voyage in all cases was regulated by the Admiralty.
Remounts (horses) from ports abroad were conveyed in freight ships
hired by the Remount department up to February, 1901; after that date
they were conveyed by the Admiralty. Stores from ports abroad were
delivered in South Africa by the contractors, from whom the War Office
obtained them at "C.I.F." rates; that is to say, that the price which
was paid for the stores included delivery. All other sea transport for
men, animals, and stores was organised by the Admiralty. The services
of the Admiralty shipping agents (Messrs. Hogg and Robinson) were
utilised as regards stores, but these agents worked under the
supervision of the Admiralty Transport department.
[Sidenote: "Freight" and "transport" ships.]
As the terms used above, "freight ships" and "transports," will
frequently recur in this chapter, it is necessary to give an
explanation of their meaning and of the distinction between them.
Troops are carried either in a transport or a freight ship. A
transport is a vessel wholly taken up by the Government on a time
charter. A freight ship is one in which the whole or a portion of the
accommodation is engaged at a rate per head, or for a lump sum for a
definite voyage. For a single voyage, freight, when obtainable, is
generally cheaper. But owners will not always divert their ships under
other than a time charter, and it is necessary that the bulk of the
engagements for the conveyance of troops should be on time charter in
order to secure control over the ships. Transports, when continuously
employed and utilised both ways, are cheaper than freight ships. Under
the transport charter the vessel, though engaged for a named period
certain, is at the disposal of the Admiralty so long as the Government
choose to retain her, except when it is expressly stipulated
otherwise.
[Sidenote: Govt. sea transport.]
The method by which the Government carries out the sea transport of
the Army is as follows:
The Board of Admiralty, as agents for, and on the requisition of, the
Secretary of State for War, undertakes all this work, except coastwise
conveyance in the United Kingdom.
[Sidenote: Office method.]
Since 1st April, 1888, Army Sea Transport has been always charged to
Army instead of to Navy Votes; but the control of the Admiralty over
the Transport service remains unimpaired. The Admiralty has always
held that the work can be efficiently and satisfactorily carried out
only by an Admiralty department, in connection with similar work for
the Navy. For convenience sake the Director of Transports is placed in
direct communication with the War Office as to all ordinary matters.
An officer of the Quartermaster-General's department visits the
Transport department frequently in peace time, and in war time he is
placed at the Admiralty to assist the Director of Transports in
military questions. All claims chargeable to Army Votes, after
examination in the Transport department, receive, before they are
passed to the War Office for payment, the concurrence of Army
examiners, who visit the Admiralty daily. The Director of Transports
is responsible for the whole work; administration, claims and
accounts, custody of Army Transport stores, such as troop-bedding,
horse-gear, etc., etc. The system by which one department does the
work, while another provides for the cost, seems somewhat anomalous.
But the experience of the Boer War, in which it was put to a test of
some magnitude, has conclusively proved that it works well. That
experience has, moreover, fully shown the necessity of the Sea
Transport service remaining as it always has been, under the control
of the Admiralty.
[Sidenote: Transport department at work.]
Ever since 1876 the Transport department has been organised in such a
manner as to be ready to ship a considerable force overseas at short
notice. The office establishment, both clerical and professional, was
intended to be a sufficient nucleus to admit of rapid expansion in
time of war. Full particulars of all ships suitable for the conveyance
of men and animals were kept recorded in special books. A stock of
troop-bedding, horse fittings, etc., etc., was kept in the Government
depôts, and standing contracts for putting these fittings in place,
etc., were in existence. Arrangements had been made with the Director
of Victualling and the War Office respectively for the food supply of
the troops to be embarked, and for the forage of the horses. Stocks of
printed forms ready for issue to the transports were also kept in
hand. All calculations were based on the understanding that the
Admiralty would not be called upon to convey much more than an army
corps without due warning. Bedding and horse fittings (of the old
kind) for 55,000 men and 10,000 horses were immediately available.
Moreover, a committee had recently met to provide for an increase of
the stocks in hand in consequence of information from the War Office
that two army corps could be ready to go abroad if required.
[Sidenote: Time needed.]
In August, 1899, the Director of Transports was asked how long it
would take to despatch 49,000 men and 8,000 horses. His reply was that
in the then state of the labour market, four to five weeks would be
required. Tentative enquiries of this kind, and the evidently critical
state of affairs in South Africa, had led the Transport department, as
early as July, to make for eventualities every preparation that was
possible within the department--such as conferring with contractors,
marine shipping superintendents, etc., and having all troop-bedding
and hammocks washed and overhauled, so that on receipt of any definite
instructions work might be commenced within an hour.
[Sidenote: 23rd Sept./99 First grant.]
On the 23rd September, 1899, the Secretary of State for War authorised
the expenditure of £25,000. This included money for a new pattern of
horse fittings which had been approved. On the same date came a
requisition for the conveyance of 7,000 mules from various foreign
ports. On 20th September the Quartermaster-General had sent to the
department a list giving details of the force proposed to be embarked
if it should become necessary. This list showed ports of embarkation,
and on receipt of it the Admiralty, without waiting for formal
requisition, and on their own responsibility, decided to engage two
large vessels of the Union-Castle Steamship Company, and to hold them
in readiness, and this was done.[83] Also on their own initiative the
Admiralty issued that same evening confidential circulars to
thirty-five leading ship owners, asking what ships now ready, or to be
ready shortly, they were prepared to place at Government disposal for
use as troop-transports, etc., for two months certain, asking for a
reply the following day.
[Footnote 83: It is impossible, of course, to engage a ship
beforehand without incurring expenditure.]
[Sidenote: Ships engaged Sept. 30/99.]
On 30th September there was a conference at the War Office, at which
the Admiralty was represented, and verbal authority was then given to
the Director of Transports to engage vessels for the conveyance of the
force. It was there stated by the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Wolseley)
that the troops would not be ready to begin embarking before the 21st
October. That same night, 30th September, twenty vessels were engaged
from those of which particulars were given in the replies already
received; and from that time the work of engaging and preparing the
vessels proceeded continuously. Immediately, additions were made to
the professional and clerical staff, and more office accommodation was
provided at the Admiralty. On the 9th October, 1899, an official
requisition was received for the conveyance of 46,000 men and 8,600
horses, and a notice that 24,000 of the men and 4,000 horses would be
ready to embark between the 21st October and the 25th October. By the
middle of November this whole force was embarked.
[Sidenote: Time for fitting up.]
A certain amount of time (ten to twelve days) and money (£2,000 to
£5,000, according to the kind of ship) is required to fit a vessel for
carrying either troops or animals after she is empty of cargo. The
vessel having been selected (sometimes even while she is still at
sea), has to be surveyed in order to decide details of the work
necessary, and also in order to obtain the Board of Trade's passenger
certificate if she is to carry men. Troops and horses cannot be
carried in ready-fitted accommodation. The space ordinarily devoted to
cargo or cattle is appropriated, and the requisite accommodation built
up. In the best cavalry ships, which are generally cattle ships
adapted, saloon and cabin accommodation has to be increased. This is
done at the owner's expense as part of the bargain. Height between
decks is an important factor. Even more height is required for horses
than for men. Ships otherwise good often have to be rejected for
failure in this respect. Mounted troops always travel men and horses
together. The men are for sanitary reasons placed on a deck below the
horses. In such cases the horses are not, as a rule, carried on
exposed decks. This is both for the sake of the horses and because the
deck space is required for exercising the men. For remount and mule
freight-ships the exposed decks are utilised, unless the nature of the
voyage renders it undesirable.
[Sidenote: Provision for horses.]
Horses must be carried either on wooden or wood-sheathed decks, or on
cemented decks, or on platforms over metal decks with the gangways
cemented. For men, in all cases, the decks must be wood or
wood-sheathed. As modern vessels, other than passenger ships, usually
have steel decks, this becomes a considerable item in the time and
cost of fitting. It is also frequently necessary to cut such extra
side-lights as are essential for carrying men or horses. Extra
lighting, ventilation and distilling apparatus, mess tables, stools,
and provision for men's hammocks must all be obtained. Latrines have
to be built, as well as a prison, a hospital, and the numerous
store-rooms and issue-rooms that are required. Horse stalls have to be
fitted, and sometimes even an extra deck has to be laid. A
considerable number of horse stalls are kept at the Government depôts,
and the contractors who work for the Government are bound to be ready
to fit up a certain number of transports at short notice. For this war
the stock of horse fittings in hand was only utilised to a small
extent, as it had been decided, a short time before the war broke out,
to adopt a longer stall (eight feet) without horse hammocks, instead
of the existing six feet six inches stall with hammock. There is no
doubt that the new fitting was a great improvement.
[Sidenote: "Transports." Mode of fitting up.]
[Sidenote: "Freight" ships. Different method.]
Transports are always fitted at the expense of Government. The work is
done either by (a) contractors who hold a standing contract, (b)
special supplementary contractors, or (c) the owners on behalf of the
Government. Freight ships, on the contrary, are fitted by the
shipowners, the cost being covered by the rate per head, whether they
take troops or animals. Horses in freight ships were provided with the
long stall under a modified specification. The fittings on these ships
were often required for one voyage only, whereas in the transports
they were used again and again. Mules were in all cases placed in
pens. These held, as a rule, five mules, and no detailed
specifications were necessary. Trade fittings were accepted if
satisfactory to the shipping officer. In all ships carrying animals,
whether transports or freight ships, spare stalls to the extent of
five per cent, were allowed to provide for sick animals and for
shifting the animals for cleaning purposes.
_Hospital Ships._--Eight transports in all were fitted up as hospital
ships. Two, the _Spartan_ and _Trojan_, each of about 3,500 tons
gross, were prepared in England for local service at the Cape. The
other six, ranging from 4,000 to 6,000 tons gross, were infantry
transports converted at Durban, as they were required, for bringing
sick and wounded from the Cape to England. All were equipped in
concert with the Army Medical Officers, in accordance with plans which
had been found suitable on previous expeditions. All ordinary fittings
were cleared out, and the ship was arranged in "wards," with special
cots; operating rooms, laundries, ice room, special cooking
appliances, radiators for warming, punkahs and electric fans, cot
lifts, and everything else that medical science suggested, were added.
[Sidenote: Special gifts to nation.]
These ships were not officially declared under the Geneva Convention
and did not fly the Red Cross flag, as they were occasionally employed
during the return voyage for the conveyance of combatants. Besides
these eight vessels there were available the _Maine_, lent by the
Atlantic Transport Company, and most generously and at great cost
fitted out and maintained by the American Ladies' Committee, who
spared no time, trouble, or expense in making her most efficient and
comfortable. Their kindly action will not soon be forgotten by the
officers and men who benefited by her, by their immediate friends, or
by the British nation. There was also the _Princess of Wales_,
similarly sent out by the Central Red Cross Society, to whom much
gratitude was naturally felt. H.M. Queen Alexandra, then H.R.H. the
Princess of Wales, took special interest in the equipment of this
vessel.
[Sidenote: Not a ship available at once.]
It will be seen, therefore, that no ships exist which can be utilised
for sea transport without extensive adaptation and alteration. It is
perhaps hardly realised generally how much work has to be done both by
Government and the shipowner before a transport can be ready for sea.
In addition to all that has been described the ship must be docked and
her bottom coated with anti-fouling composition, and she must be
ballasted as needed. Boats, awnings and crews, efficient services of
fresh and salt water, and provision against fire, have to be secured,
and before any of the work can be started the ship herself must be
definitely engaged.
_Animals._--The units to be employed in the war were not carried by
sea complete with their transport animals. The cavalry and artillery
were accompanied by their horses, but nearly all the transport animals
were taken direct to South Africa from ports abroad. Remounts and
mules from abroad were conveyed by freight ships at rates per animal,
which included forage, attendance, horse-gear and fittings, and all
expenses.
_Stores._--It was decided from the first not to utilise the spare
space in the transports for conveying stores, because on arrival it
might well be that the stores were urgently required at the first
port, while the troops were wanted elsewhere with equal urgency. This
would have led to delay and confusion. Moreover, if the cargo could
not be at once received, the transport would be hampered in her
movements and inconvenience and expense would follow. Stores from
England were therefore carried in freight ships, either in full cargo
ships engaged at a lump sum, with special terms for varying ports and
demurrage, or in the regular liners at rates per ton.
[Sidenote: Infantry and mounted troops.]
For infantry, passenger ships or large fast cargo boats are selected.
The latter are preferred as the former require more extensive
alterations. Mounted troops are usually carried in ships specially
designed for the conveyance of live stock; remounts and mules in
similar vessels, or in specially roomy cargo ships. The vessels
employed for infantry and mounted troops were, in fact, running ships
belonging to good lines, and they had to possess, or take out, a Board
of Trade passenger certificate. The owners naturally do not keep such
ships waiting on the off-chance of Government employment. They are in
full work and have to sacrifice their own lucrative business to accept
an Admiralty contract.
_Coaling Arrangements._--Whenever possible, space was appropriated in
the holds of the transports for additional coal bunkers, so that the
quantity of coal taken from England might be as great as possible. The
contractors at St. Vincent, Las Palmas and Teneriffe were also given
special instructions, and a constant stream of colliers was kept going
to the Cape. The transports were made to call at the three first-named
places in such rotation as should ensure there being no block at any
of them. A man-of-war was stationed at St. Vincent, one at Las Palmas,
and one at Teneriffe to supervise the arrangements and to make such
preparation and give such help as should preclude delay in dealing
with each of the ships as they arrived. This system proved to be a
good one. There was plenty of coal and no delay, but it was found that
the high-speed vessels, owing to their enormous coal consumption, were
not so suitable as others of more moderate speed. Eminently suited as
they were for the short run across the Atlantic, it was really hardly
worth while using them for the long voyage to the Cape.
_Victualling._--The first batch of troops sent out was victualled from
the Navy Yards, and this practice was partially continued till early
in 1900. But, owing to considerations of the reserve of stores, and to
the fact that the Navy salt meat ration was new to the troops and not
liked by them, this was then changed. The owners contracted to victual
the men at a rate per head per day, and this, though more expensive,
worked well. Moreover, it gave greater satisfaction to the men, as it
was more like what they were accustomed to on shore; and it was an
important point to land them in the best possible condition.
Volunteers and yeomanry when carried separate from the regulars were
fed on a slightly better scale than the latter. If carried in the same
ship all were fed alike on the better scale.
_Forage_ in transports was in all cases supplied from the Government
stores. In freight ships it was supplied by the owners, and was
included in the rate per animal.
_Troop-bedding and horse-gear_ are supplied by Government in all
transports. Though a large stock is always kept on hand, special
purchases of both had also to be made from time to time as the war
went on to meet unexpectedly great demands.
_Staff of the Transport Department._--To meet the requirements of this
sudden expansion of work, Naval staffs were sent out to Cape Town,
Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London, under Captain Sir Edward
Chichester, R.N., and at home--to assist the normal peace
establishment (which consisted of the Director of Transports,
Rear-Admiral Bouverie F. Clark, Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N., the Naval
Assistant, and Mr. Stephen J. Graff, the Civil Assistant, with their
respective staffs)--the clerical establishment was enlarged and two
captains, four lieutenants, engineers, and paymasters, and the
requisite staff were appointed--some to each of the three districts,
the Thames, Liverpool, and Southampton. These three places are, by
reason of local considerations such as dock and repair accommodation,
railway service and tidal conditions, the most suitable for such work,
and with few exceptions the embarking was done in those districts.
_General Remarks and Statistics._--Tables are given on pages 108-9,
showing the number of vessels employed and of the troops, etc.,
carried. The total number of voyages out and home with troops, animals
or stores was about 1,500, representing over 9,000,000 miles steaming,
exclusive of coast movements at the Cape, and in addition to about
1,000,000 miles of cross voyages by the transports to India,
Australia, Bermuda, etc. The ships selected for the conveyance of
troops were chosen as the best adapted for the special work they had
to perform, viz.: to deliver them at their destination with the least
risk and in healthy condition, fit to take the field at once. That the
choice was not unsuccessful is evidenced by the fact that throughout
these vast operations not a single life was lost at sea from causes
due to the ship, and the only serious casualties were the loss of one
cavalry transport, the _Ismore_, with guns and 315 horses; one mule
freight ship, the _Carinthea_, with 400 mules; and two store freight
ships, the _Denton Grange_ and the _Madura_, the latter by fire.
Looking to the mileage run, this is a wonderful record, and one which
reflects the highest credit on the mercantile marine in general, and
on the management of the shipping lines concerned in particular.
[Sidenote: The voyage to and fro.]
There was no delay in getting the troops off. From 20th October, 1899,
when the first units of the army corps were ready to embark, to the
30th November, 1899, no less than 58,000 men and 9,000 horses left
England, and a steady stream continued month after month, the largest
shipment in one month being February, 1900, when 33,500 men and 5,500
horses left this country. The removal from South Africa was even more
speedy. From 1st June, 1902, to 31st July, 53,800 men embarked. By the
end of August the number was 94,000 men, and by the end of September,
133,000 men had left South Africa. The homeward move was simplified by
there being no horses, and by the Government being able to utilise to
their full extent the resources of the Union-Castle Company, whose
large fleet of vessels, specially suitable for carrying troops, had an
important share in the work.
[Sidenote: Patriotism of shipowners.]
The shipowners, as a body, showed every desire throughout the war to
meet the wishes of the Admiralty, often (in the early days) placing
their ships at the disposal of the Government at great inconvenience
to their own trade, and making great personal exertions to expedite
the despatch of the troops and to ensure their comfort. In no case was
any vessel engaged, either for troops, animals, or stores, which was
not a registered British ship, and as far as possible the crews were
British subjects; practically the crews of all troop transports were
then exclusively so.
[Sidenote: Numbers conveyed.]
The following figures will convey an idea of the extent of the Sea
Transport work in connection with the war, from its commencement up to
the 31st December, 1902.
The numbers conveyed were:
To South Africa. Personnel. Horses. Mules.
_From Home and Mediterranean:_
Troops, &c. 338,547 84,213 249
South African Constabulary 8,482 -- --
British South Africa Police 353 -- --
Imperial Military Railways 320 -- --
Colonial Office Details 59 -- --
Various 89 -- --
_From India:_
Troops, &c. 19,438 8,611 1,117
Natives 10,528 -- --
_From Ceylon, Mauritius, &c.:_
Troops, &c. 690 -- --
Natives 26 -- --
Various 8 -- --
_From Colonies:_
Contingents 29,793 27,465 19
South African Constabulary 1,249 -- --
Remounts -- 36,660 --
_From other countries:_
Remounts, &c. -- 195,915 102,627
Prisoners of War and Escorts 22,790 -- --
Totals 432,372 352,864 104,012
_From South Africa:_
To United Kingdom, Colonies,
India, &c., including
Boer prisoners 372,320 2,460 --
Grand Total 804,692 persons. 459,336 animals.
The tonnage of stores carried to South Africa was as follows,
exclusive of wagons, guns, baggage, and equipment accompanying the
troops, and of the vast quantities of supplies delivered by
contractors from abroad at rates inclusive of freight:
In the Transports 4,990 tons.
Otherwise 1,369,080 tons.
Total 1,374,070 tons.
[Sidenote: Numbers of ships.]
The number of specially engaged ships employed on the work was as
follows:
No.
Transports engaged by the Admiralty 117
Transports engaged in India 41
---- 158
Troop freight ships:
Outwards. {Engaged by Admiralty 115
{Engaged by Colonial Governments 13
Homewards. {Engaged by Admiralty 104
{Engaged by P.T.O., South Africa 21
---- 253
Remount freight ships:
Engaged by Remount Department 107
Engaged by Admiralty 201
---- 308
Mule Freight Ships engaged by Admiralty 98
Full Cargo Freight Ships engaged by Admiralty 210
----
1,027
Nearly all the transports made several voyages, and some of them were
in continuous employment for over three years, and went to the Cape
and back as many as ten times besides coastal and colonial voyages.
[Sidenote: Tonnage, transports and owners.]
[Sidenote: Report of Royal Commission.]
The 210 full cargo ships carried 974,000 tons of the stores, besides
3,745 oxen. The remainder was conveyed in running ships at current
rates. The transports engaged by the Admiralty were the property of
thirty-six owners, mostly Liverpool or London firms; their average
size was 6,400 tons gross, ranging from 12,600 to 3,500 tons, the
range of speed from nineteen to eleven knots. The proportion of
tonnage per man and per horse turns out, over the whole, four tons per
man, twelve and a half tons per horse. This estimate is made by
calculating the tonnage per man on the infantry ships alone, and
allowing for the men at that rate by casting out the tonnage per horse
over the transports which conveyed both men and horses. The following
is an extract from the report of His Majesty's Commissioners appointed
to enquire into matters in connection with the war in South Africa,
dated 9th July, 1903, pp. 125, 126.
"TRANSPORT BY SEA.
"The transport by sea to South Africa from the United Kingdom and the
Colonies of a force much larger than any which had ever crossed the
seas before in the service of this or any other country affords a
remarkable illustration not only of the greatness of British maritime
resources, but also of what can be done when careful forethought and
preparation is applied to the object of utilising rapidly in war
instruments which are in peace solely engaged in the purposes of civil
life. If the same forethought had been applied throughout, there would
have been little criticism to make with regard to the South African
War. A full account of the Sea Transport organisation will be found in
the evidence of Mr. Stephen Graff, Assistant Director of Transports at
the Admiralty, and of Captain F. J. Pitt, R.N., Naval Assistant
Director of Transports.
* * * * *
"It had been represented by the Admiralty in a letter of the 4th
April, 1898 (in continuation of earlier representations), that the
stock of horse fittings and water tanks was inadequate even for one
Army Corps, inasmuch as one Army Corps, with a Cavalry Brigade and
Line of Communication troops, requires over 15,000 horses, and it was
represented that an expenditure of £25,000 to provide complete
fittings would be necessary. In April, 1899, there was a conference
between the Admiralty and War Office officials, who came to the
conclusion that 'the present stock of fittings, horse-gear, etc., is
dangerously insufficient and inadequate to ensure the rapid despatch
of even one Army Corps, one Cavalry Brigade and Line of Communication
troops.' At this time it had been intimated by the War Office that
transport for two Army Corps might be needed. On the 19th July, 1899,
the Committee recommended the purchase of 6,000 new pattern stalls,
and on the 23rd September the Secretary of State for War authorised
the expenditure of £25,000. The engagement and preparation of ships
began on the 30th September. It does not appear that the absence of a
sufficient stock of horse fittings caused any appreciable delay. To a
large extent the difficulty was met by fitting up with lighter
fittings the Liverpool cattle ships, which are in many ways so
constructed as to be admirable conveyances for horses. The plan of
using these ships, and the kind of fittings to be used on them, had
been worked out some time before the war by Captain Pitt, R.N.
* * * * *
"The adjustment of ships to transport purposes involves much labour,
but the ships appear to have been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as
the troops were ready to start. The arrangements between the War
Office and the Admiralty for the embarkation of troops worked with
great success. Sir Charles M. Clarke, then Quartermaster-General,
stated that the demands of the War Office were 'most admirably met.'
The accommodation on the ships appears to have been well calculated.
The timing of the departures and arrivals, so as to regulate the
pressure on intermediate coaling stations and terminal ports, also
seems to have been satisfactory. The delays in disembarkation of men
and stores were slight, and, when they occurred, were due to
insufficient berthing accommodation at Cape Town. The accidents on
voyage were few, and only one ship, the _Ismore_, was entirely lost,
together with a battery of artillery."
NOTE BY THE OFFICIAL HISTORIAN.
[Sidenote: Effect on Army.]
[Sidenote: Questions of above record.]
The record above given of the splendid triumph of the Admiralty
administration of Sea Transport during the war has been compiled by
Capt. A. H. Limpus, R.N., with the cordial assistance of the Transport
department of the Admiralty. The conclusion that the work of carrying
the Army by sea could not have been in more competent hands is one
which admits of no doubt in the mind of any reader who studies it.
There are, nevertheless, certain deductions to be made in regard to
the passengers carried--the greatest army ever delivered by any
country over 6,000 miles of sea-way--which closely concern the
efficiency of the instrument with which the blow of Britain has to be
struck, at points so distant from her shores. It is essential that the
management of railways shall be in the hands of the officials of the
particular company which conveys an excursion; but in order that the
undertaking may be a great success many things are needed besides the
perfect management of the trains. No one who has seen the amount of
labour and the kind of organisation required by those who yearly send
to the country the holiday-children, for instance, will fail to know
that the passengers also need to be prepared beforehand for their part
in the day. Moreover, some knowledge on the part of the most admirable
railway officials of the special needs of those they carry is
required; and, further, if any sudden change is made in the carriages
themselves, in the sequence of trains, or in other matters strictly
belonging to the functions of the company, this, if not communicated
to the managers of the excursion, may introduce dire confusion.
[Sidenote: A new experience needs special training.]
An army has over the holiday travellers the advantage of its
long-established unity, its discipline, and its training, but
embarkation and disembarkation are entirely outside its ordinary
experience. It needs, therefore, being much accustomed to work by
habit, to be prepared both for getting on board ship, and, still more,
for getting off it, in the manner that will best enable it to fulfil
its duties, and, as time is very precious, to do this with the least
possible delay, both in order to play completely into the hands of the
officers in charge of the ships and in order to be itself at its best
when it lands. This is the more easily accomplished because a ship in
dock is virtually a part of the mainland. Everything that has to be
done by troops in embarking can be imitated perfectly on shore, if the
ordinary fittings of a ship are placed in a hut or other building
outside which such a gangway is erected as that over which men and
horses have to be passed in entering a ship. Now, by the willing
assistance of the Admiralty in furnishing the exact fittings used in
transports, this practice had been carried out by all arms--cavalry,
horse and field artillery, army service corps and infantry--at least
in some instances. Practical adaptations in the training of each
corps had been made by the experiments conducted on shore by each.
Printed regulations embodying these had been framed.
[Sidenote: Necessity for mutual understanding shown by incident.]
Unfortunately, the sudden improvement in the ship fittings mentioned
above, coming as it did at the very moment of war, completely, for the
Army, upset the conditions on which the drill had been framed. It had
been devised to make the passage of horses on board as rapid as it
could be when the horses had to be placed in slings. Men, specially
trained in slinging, were in each corps detailed to do the work. To
find, when the embarkation began, that there were no slings, naturally
involved at the last moment a change in method. Moreover, horses
always obey more kindly, especially in strange circumstances, the men
to whom they are accustomed, those by whom they are groomed and fed.
It was, nevertheless, not surprising that the shipping authorities,
unaware that the soldiers were dealing with conditions already
familiar to them, should have detailed men of the ship to place the
horses in their stalls. The horses did not like the unfamiliar hands;
the soldiers were puzzled by their horses being taken from them. In
some cases much delay and confusion occurred, and, indeed, it needed
all the tact and good-fellowship of the navy and army officers to
adjust things satisfactorily. Relatively to other matters the incident
was a small one, but it illustrates the importance of a thorough
understanding between the two services such as can only be gained by
continued practice during peace-time for war.
[Sidenote: Importance of the right stores being on top.]
In the matter of stores a difficulty, which had been very strongly
commented upon in the case of the Egyptian expedition of 1882, again
presented itself. In 1882, in the disembarkation at Ismailia in the
Suez Canal, where the facilities were much less than they were in the
several harbours of South Africa, it became a very serious point that
the stores required by the Army at once on landing were at the bottom
of the holds. The ample landing capacities of Cape Town, of Durban,
and almost, relatively to Ismailia, of East London and Port Elizabeth,
made this in the present war less serious; but even in this case it
drew a strongly-worded telegram of remonstrance. It would be
impossible to reckon upon our having always at our disposal
conveniences so great as these for disembarking an army. It becomes,
therefore, for future expeditions, important to note that the trouble
which became so grave in 1882 was not removed at the ports of
embarkation when this war began. To say the least, it was not the
universally established practice to give to the naval officer in
charge or to any one else a list showing the order in which the
material embarked would be required on landing; and to ask that those
things which would be first needed should be put in last, so that they
might be on the top.
[Sidenote: Co-operation in forcing a landing.]
The army in South Africa had not to land against an opposing enemy. It
is obviously important that in conjoint practice of the two services
the possibility of an opposed landing should be taken into account. It
was unfortunate, therefore, that as a consequence of the limited time
at disposal, the other duties of the fleet, and the cost of demurrage,
it became necessary for the Admiralty, when it was wisely decided to
have combined manoeuvres of navy and army in the autumn of 1904, in
order to practise embarkation and disembarkation, to direct that the
landing should be carried out under peace conditions. As a consequence
of this the first party landed on a shore, supposed to be hostile, was
one of unarmed sailors; and orders, at least in one instance, filled
the foremost boats with the clerks and clerkly paraphernalia of a
divisional Headquarters. That may have been the routine rightly
followed in many cases at Cape Town, but the true application of the
lessons of history does not consist in blind imitation of precedent
from the past in those respects in which the conditions have changed.
Joint action in manoeuvre will be valueless unless it is used to
familiarise each service with the work of the other as it will be in
the actual fighting of the time. During the great war at the end of
the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century failure
followed failure because the services had not practised together. At
last they did so and the result was a brilliant success. The Japanese
have undoubtedly owed many of their triumphs to their having profited
by _our_ historical records. Their disembarkations have been models of
combined action.
[Sidenote: Causes of delay, real and imaginary.]
[Sidenote: Limit of striking force.]
On one other point the Naval triumph is of great importance to the
Army. The passage quoted above (page 111) from the report of the
Commission on the War marks well the facts. "The ships appear to have
been ready as soon, or almost as soon, as the troops were ready to
start." It follows that the shipping was just ready and no more for
the Army, after mobilisation, when the reserves had been called in and
incorporated. Moreover, it is to be noticed (page 100) that this
result was only secured by a splendid audacity in expenditure by the
Naval authorities, supplementing an admirable organisation. Now, as in
every war we carry out abroad, the earliest time at which any armed
force can move towards its object is the hour when the ships are ready
to convey it, it follows that no delay whatever was caused by the
necessity for summoning to the colours trained men retained for
service by a small fee. On the other hand very great delay was caused
by the impossibility of preparing for the particular campaign without
threatening those whom we desired to conciliate. It, therefore,
further follows that if there were ready at all times a force which
did not need to be ostentatiously prepared, we should avoid the crux
of not being able to make war without preparing for it and of not
being able to prepare lest we should provoke war. On the other hand,
this instance admirably illustrates the invariable law that the
strength that can be so used is strictly limited by the number of
properly fitted ships that the Admiralty can have ready at any given
moment. An examination of Captain Limpus' careful statement will show
how very small this inevitably is, and how much time is needed to fit
those that are not available. Moreover, there is, on the Army side, as
has been shown in Chapter V., this further restriction, that the
equipment and transport, without which a campaign cannot be carried
on, must be of the kind suited to the particular case.