Remember the day before the Compitalia. I will order the bath to be
heated, and Terentia is going to invite Pomponia. We will add your
mother to the party. Please bring me Theophrastus _de Ambitione_ from my
brother's library.
[Footnote 172: "The Conqueror," _i.e._, Pompey. Aulus's son is L.
Afranius.]
[Footnote 173: _I.e._, his military get-up.]
[Footnote 174: Cyrus was Cicero's architect; his argument or theory he
calls Cyropædeia, after Xenophon's book.]
[Footnote 175: He supposes himself to be making a mathematical figure in
optics:
[Illustration]]
[Footnote 176: The theory of sight held by Democritus, denounced as
unphilosophical by Plutarch (_Timoleon_, Introd.).]
[Footnote 177: Apparently a villa in the _Solonius ager_, near
Lanuvium.]
[Footnote 178: The Cornelius Balbus of Gades, whose citizenship Cicero
defended B.C. 56 (consul B.C. 40). He was Cæsar's close friend and
agent.]
[Footnote 179: Cicero was apparently not behind the scenes. The
coalition with Pompey certainly, and with Crassus probably, had been
already made and the terms agreed upon soon after the elections. If
Cicero afterwards discovered this it must have shewn him how little he
could trust Pompey's show of friendship and Cæsar's candour. Cæsar
desired Cicero's private friendship and public acquiescence, but was
prepared to do without them.]
[Footnote 180: From Cicero's Latin poem on his consulship.]
[Footnote 181: εἶς οἰωνός ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης (Hom. _Il._ xii.
243).]
XXIX (Q FR I, 1)
Quintus Cicero was prætor in B.C. 62. In B.C. 61 (March) he went
out to "Asia" as proprætor; his first year of office would be up in
March, B.C. 60, but his governorship was, as was very common,
extended till March, B.C. 59. Towards the end of B.C. 60 the senate
seems to have arranged not to appoint his successor, that is, he
would be left in office till about March, B.C. 58. It is in view of
this third year of office that Cicero writes this essay-letter to
him on the duties of a provincial governor. Apparently Quintus had
faults of temper which had caused some scandals to reach Rome. We
have seen how he was one of the few who managed to quarrel with
Atticus; and in B.C. 48 we shall find how fiercely he resented the
exercise of his brother's influence which had led him to take the
losing side, which from his attachment to Cæsar he may have been
half inclined to think the wrong side. His constant squabbles with
his wife (though the fault was evidently in great part hers) also
go towards forming our conclusion about him that, with some ability
and honesty, he was _un peu difficile_.
TO HIS BROTHER QUINTUS (IN ASIA)
ROME (DECEMBER)
[Sidenote: B.C. 60, ÆT. 46]
I. Though I have no doubt that many messengers, and even common rumour,
with its usual speed, will anticipate this letter, and that you will
already have heard from others that a third year has been added to my
loss and your labour, yet I thought you ought to receive from me also
the news of this tiresome circumstance. For not in one, but in several
of my previous letters, in spite of others having given up the idea in
despair, I gave you hope of being able at an early date to quit your
province, not only that I might as long as possible cheer you with a
pleasurable belief, but also because I and the prætors took such pains
in the matter, that I felt no misgiving as to the possibility of its
being arranged. As it is, since matters have so turned out that neither
the prætors by the weight of their influence, nor I by my earnest
efforts, have been able to prevail, it is certainly difficult not to be
annoyed, yet our minds, practised as they are in conducting and
supporting business of the utmost gravity, ought not to be crushed or
weakened by vexation. And since men ought to feel most vexed at what has
been brought upon them by their own fault, it is I who ought in this
matter to be more vexed than you. For it is the result of a fault on my
part, against which you had protested both in conversation at the moment
of your departure, and in letters since, that your successor was not
named last year. In this, while consulting for the interests of our
allies, and resisting the shameless conduct of some merchants, and while
seeking the increase of our reputation by your virtues, I acted
unwisely, especially as I made it possible for that second year to
entail a third. And as I confess the mistake to have been mine, it lies
with your wisdom and kindness to remedy it, and to see that my
imprudence is turned to advantage by your careful performance of your
duties. And truly, if you exert yourself in every direction to earn
men's good word, not with a view to rival others, but henceforth to
surpass yourself, if you rouse your whole mind and your every thought
and care to the ambition of gaining a superior reputation in all
respects, believe me, one year added to your labour will bring us, nay,
our posterity also, a joy of many years' duration. Wherefore I begin by
entreating you not to let your soul shrink and be cast down, nor to
allow yourself to be overpowered by the magnitude of the business as
though by a wave; but, on the contrary, to stand upright and keep your
footing, or even advance to meet the flood of affairs. For you are not
administering a department of the state, in which fortune reigns
supreme, but one in which a well-considered policy and an attention to
business are the most important things. But if I had seen you receiving
the prolongation of a command in a great and dangerous war, I should
have trembled in spirit, because I should have known that the dominion
of fortune over us had been at the same time prolonged. As it is,
however, a department of the state has been intrusted to you in which
fortune occupies no part, or, at any rate, an insignificant one, and
which appears to me to depend entirely on your virtue and self-control.
We have no reason to fear, as far as I know, any designs of our enemies,
any actual fighting in the field, any revolts of allies, any default in
the tribute or in the supply of corn, any mutiny in the army: things
which have very often befallen the wisest of men in such a way, that
they have been no more able to get the better of the assault of fortune,
than the best of pilots a violent tempest. You have been granted
profound peace, a dead calm: yet if the pilot falls asleep, it may even
so overwhelm him, though if he keeps awake it may give him positive
pleasure. For your province consists, in the first place, of allies of a
race which, of all the world, is the most civilized; and, in the second
place, of citizens, who, either as being _publicani_, are very closely
connected with me, or, as being traders who have made money, think that
they owe the security of their property to my consulship.
II. But it may be said that among even such men as these there occur
serious disputes, many wrongful acts are committed, and hotly contested
litigation is the result. As though I ever thought that you had no
trouble to contend with! I know that the trouble is exceedingly great,
and such as demands the very greatest prudence; but remember that it is
prudence much more than fortune on which, in my opinion, the result of
your trouble depends. For what trouble is it to govern those over whom
you are set, if you do but govern yourself? That may be a great and
difficult task to others, and indeed it is most difficult: to you it has
always been the easiest thing in the world, and indeed ought to be so,
for your natural disposition is such that, even without discipline, it
appears capable of self-control; whereas a discipline has, in fact, been
applied that might educate the most faulty of characters. But while you
resist, as you do, money, pleasure, and every kind of desire yourself,
there will, I am to be told, be a risk of your not being able to
suppress some fraudulent banker or some rather over-extortionate
tax-collector! For as to the Greeks, they will think, as they behold the
innocence of your life, that one of the heroes of their history, or a
demigod from heaven, has come down into the province. And this I say,
not to induce you to act thus, but to make you glad that you are acting
or have acted so. It is a splendid thing to have been three years in
supreme power in Asia without allowing statue, picture, plate, napery,
slave, anyone's good looks, or any offer of money--all of which are
plentiful in your province--to cause you to swerve from the most
absolute honesty and purity of life. What can be imagined so striking or
so desirable as that a virtue, a command over the passions, a
self-control such as yours, are not remaining in darkness and obscurity,
but have been set in the broad daylight of Asia, before the eyes of a
famous province, and in the hearing of all nations and peoples? That the
inhabitants are not being ruined by your progresses, drained by your
charges, agitated by your approach? That there is the liveliest joy,
public and private, wheresoever you come, the city regarding you as a
protector and not a tyrant, the private house as a guest and not a
plunderer?
III. But in these matters I am sure that mere experience has by this
time taught you that it is by no means sufficient to have these virtues
yourself, but that you must keep your eyes open and vigilant, in order
that in the guardianship of your province you may be considered to vouch
to the allies, the citizens, and the state, not for yourself alone, but
for all the subordinates of your government. However, you have in the
persons of your _legati_ men likely to have a regard for their own
reputation. Of these in rank, position, and age Tubero is first; who, I
think, particularly as he is a writer of history, could select from his
own Annals many whom he would like and would be able to imitate.
Allienus, again, is ours, as well in heart and affection, as in his
conformity to our principles. I need not speak of Gratidius: I am sure
that, while taking pains to preserve his own reputation, his fraternal
affection for us makes him take pains for ours also.[183] Your quæstor
is not of your own selection, but the one assigned you by lot. He is
bound both to act with propriety of his own accord, and to conform to
the policy and principles which you lay down. But should any one of
these adopt a lower standard of conduct, you should tolerate such
behaviour, if it goes no farther than a breach, in his private capacity,
of the rules by which he was bound, but not if it goes to the extent of
employing for gain the authority which you granted him as a promotion.
For I am far from thinking, especially since the moral sentiments of the
day are so much inclined to excessive laxity and self-seeking, that you
should investigate every case of petty misconduct, and thoroughly
examine every one of these persons; but that you should regulate your
confidence by the trustworthiness of its recipient. And among such
persons you will have to vouch for those whom the Republic has itself
given you as companions and assistants in public affairs, at least
within the limits which I have before laid down.
IV. In the case, however, of those of your personal staff or official
attendants whom you have yourself selected to be about you--who are
usually spoken of as a kind of prætor's cohort--we must vouch, not only
for their acts, but even for their words. But those you have with you
are the sort of men of whom you may easily be fond when they are acting
rightly, and whom you may very easily check when they shew insufficient
regard for your reputation. By these, when you were raw to the work,
your frank disposition might possibly have been deceived--for the better
a man is the less easily does he suspect others of being bad--now,
however, let this third year witness an integrity as perfect as the two
former, but still more wary and vigilant. Listen to that only which you
are supposed to listen to; don't let your ears be open to whispered
falsehoods and interested suggestions. Don't let your signet ring be a
mere implement, but, as it were, your second self: not the minister of
another's will, but a witness of your own. Let your marshal hold the
rank which our ancestors wished him to hold, who, looking upon this
place as not one of profit, but of labour and duty, scarcely ever
conferred it upon any but their freedmen, whom they indeed controlled
almost as absolutely as their slaves. Let the lictor be the dispenser of
your clemency, not his own; and let the fasces and axes which they carry
before you constitute ensigns rather of rank than of power. Let it, in
fact, be known to the whole province that the life, children, fame, and
fortunes of all over whom you preside are exceedingly dear to you.
Finally, let it be believed that you will, if you detect it, be hostile
not only to those who have accepted a bribe, but to those also who have
given it. And, indeed, no one will give anything, if it is made quite
clear that nothing is usually obtained from you through those who
pretend to be very influential with you. Not, however, that the object
of this discourse is to make you over-harsh or suspicious towards your
staff. For if any of them in the course of the last two years has never
fallen under suspicion of rapacity, as I am told about Cæsius and
Chærippus and Labeo--and think it true, because I know them--there is no
authority, I think, which may not be intrusted to them, and no
confidence which may not be placed in them with the utmost propriety,
and in anyone else like them. But if there is anyone of whom you have
already had reason to doubt, or concerning whom you have made some
discovery, in such a man place no confidence, intrust him with no
particle of your reputation.
V. If, however, you have found in the province itself anyone, hitherto
unknown to us, who has made his way into intimacy with you, take care
how much confidence you repose in him; not that there may not be many
good provincials, but, though we may hope so, it is risky to be
positive. For everyone's real character is covered by many wrappings of
pretence and is concealed by a kind of veil: face, eyes, expression very
often lie, speech most often of all. Wherefore, how can you expect to
find in that class[184] any who, while foregoing for the sake of money
all from which we can scarcely tear ourselves away,[185] will yet love
you sincerely and not merely pretend to do so from interested motives? I
think, indeed, it is a hard task to find such men, especially if we
notice that the same persons care nothing for almost any man out of
office, yet always with one consent shew affection for the prætors. But
of this class, if by chance you have discovered any one to be fonder of
you--for it may so happen--than of your office, such a man indeed gladly
admit upon your list of friends: but if you fail to perceive that,
there is no class of people you must be more on your guard against
admitting to intimacy, just because they are acquainted with all the
ways of making money, do everything for the sake of it, and have no
consideration for the reputation of a man with whom they are not
destined to pass their lives. And even among the Greeks themselves you
must be on your guard against admitting close intimacies, except in the
case of the very few, if such are to be found, who are worthy of ancient
Greece. As things now stand, indeed, too many of them are untrustworthy,
false, and schooled by long servitude in the arts of extravagant
adulation. My advice is that these men should all be entertained with
courtesy, but that close ties of hospitality or friendship should only
be formed with the best of them: excessive intimacies with them are not
very trustworthy--for they do not venture to oppose our wishes--and they
are not only jealous of our countrymen, but of their own as well.
VI. And now, considering the caution and care that I would shew in
matters of this kind--in which I fear I may be somewhat
over-severe--what do you suppose my sentiments are in regard to slaves?
Upon these we ought to keep a hold in all places, but especially in the
provinces. On this head many rules may be laid down, but this is at once
the shortest and most easily maintained--that they should behave during
your progresses in Asia as though you were travelling on the Appian way,
and not suppose that it makes any difference whether they have arrived
at Tralles or Formiæ. But if, again, any one of your slaves is
conspicuously trustworthy, employ him in your domestic and private
affairs; but in affairs pertaining to your office as governor, or in any
department of the state, do not let him lay a finger. For many things
which may, with perfect propriety, be intrusted to slaves, must yet not
be so intrusted, for the sake of avoiding talk and hostile remark. But
my discourse, I know not how, has slipped into the didactic vein, though
that is not what I proposed to myself originally. For what right have I
to be laying down rules for one who, I am fully aware, in this subject
especially, is not my inferior in wisdom, while in experience he is even
my superior? Yet, after all, if your actions had the additional weight
of my approval, I thought that they would seem more satisfactory to
yourself. Wherefore, let these be the foundations on which your public
character rests: first and foremost your own honesty and self-control,
then the scrupulous conduct of all your staff, the exceedingly cautious
and careful selection in regard to intimacies with provincials and
Greeks, the strict and unbending government of your slaves. These are
creditable even in the conduct of our private and everyday business: in
such an important government, where morals are so debased and the
province has such a corrupting influence, they must needs seem divine.
Such principles and conduct on your part are sufficient to justify the
strictness which you have displayed in some acts of administration,
owing to which I have encountered certain personal disputes with great
satisfaction, unless, indeed, you suppose me to be annoyed by the
complaints of a fellow like Paconius--who is not even a Greek, but in
reality a Mysian or Phrygian--or by the words of Tuscenius, a madman and
a knave, from whose abominable jaws you snatched the fruits of a most
infamous piece of extortion with the most complete justice.
VII. These and similar instances of your strict administration in your
province we shall find difficulty in justifying, unless they are
accompanied by the most perfect integrity: wherefore let there be the
greatest strictness in your administration of justice, provided only
that it is never varied from favour, but is kept up with impartiality.
But it is of little avail that justice is administered by yourself with
impartiality and care, unless the same is done by those to whom you have
intrusted any portion of this duty. And, indeed, in my view there is no
very great variety of business in the government of Asia: the entire
province mainly depends on the administration of justice. In it we have
the whole theory of government, especially of provincial government,
clearly displayed: all that a governor has to do is to shew consistency
and firmness enough, not only to resist favouritism, but even the
suspicion of it. To this also must be added courtesy in listening to
pleaders, consideration in pronouncing a decision, and painstaking
efforts to convince suitors of its justice, and to answer their
arguments. It is by such habits that C. Octavius has recently made
himself very popular;[186] in whose court, for the first time,[187] the
lictor did not interfere, and the marshal kept silence, while every
suitor spoke as often and as long as he chose. In which conduct he would
perhaps have been thought over-lax, had it not been that this laxity
enabled him to maintain the following instance of severity. The
partisans of Sulla were forced to restore what they had taken by
violence and terrorism. Those who had made inequitable decrees, while in
office, were now as private citizens forced to submit to the principles
they had established. This strictness on his part would have been
thought harsh, had it not been rendered palatable by many sweetening
influences of courtesy. But if this gentleness was sufficient to make
him popular at Rome, where there is such haughtiness of spirit, such
unrestrained liberty, such unlimited licence of individuals, and, in
fine, so many magistrates, so many means of obtaining protection, such
vast power in the hands of the popular assembly, and such influence
exercised by the senate, how welcome must a prætor's courtesy be in
Asia, in which there is such a numerous body of citizens and allies, so
many cities, so many communities, all hanging on one man's nod, and in
which there are no means of protection, no one to whom to make a
complaint, no senate, no popular assembly! Wherefore it requires an
exalted character, a man who is not only equitable from natural impulse,
but who has also been trained by study and the refinements of a liberal
education, so to conduct himself while in the possession of such immense
power, that those over whom he rules should not feel the want of any
other power.
VIII. Take the case of the famous Cyrus, portrayed by Xenophon, not as
an historical character, but as a model of righteous government, the
serious dignity of whose character is represented by that philosopher as
combined with a peculiar courtesy. And, indeed, it is not without reason
that our hero Africanus used perpetually to have those books in his
hands, for there is no duty pertaining to a careful and equitable
governor which is not to be found in them. Well, if _he_ cultivated
those qualities, though never destined to be in a private station, how
carefully ought those to maintain them to whom power is given with the
understanding that it must be surrendered, and given by laws under whose
authority they must once more come? In my opinion all who govern others
are bound to regard as the object of all their actions the greatest
happiness of the governed. That this is your highest object, and has
been so since you first landed in Asia, has been published abroad by
consistent rumour and the conversation of all. It is, let me add, not
only the duty of one who governs allies and citizens, but even of one
who governs slaves and dumb animals, to serve the interests and
advantage of those under him. In this point I notice that everyone
agrees that you take the greatest pains: no new debt is being contracted
by the states, while many have been relieved by you from a heavy and
long-standing one. Several cities that had become dilapidated and almost
deserted--of which one was the most famous state in Ionia, the other in
Caria, Samus and Halicarnassus--have been given a new life by you: there
is no party fighting, no civil strife in the towns: you take care that
the government of the states is administered by the best class of
citizens: brigandage is abolished in Mysia; murder suppressed in many
districts; peace is established throughout the province; and not only
the robberies usual on highways and in country places, but those more
numerous and more serious ones in towns and temples, have been
completely stopped: the fame, fortunes, and repose of the rich have been
relieved of that most oppressive instrument of prætorial
rapacity--vexatious prosecution; the expenses and tribute of the states
are made to fall with equal weight on all who live in the territories of
those states: access to you is as easy as possible: your ears are open
to the complaints of all: no man's want of means or want of friends
excludes him, I don't say from access to you in public and on the
tribunal, but even from your house and chamber: in a word, throughout
your government there is no harshness or cruelty--everywhere clemency,
mildness, and kindness reign supreme.