MR. PRESIDENT,--More than a year has passed since I last had the
honor of addressing my fellow-citizens of Massachusetts. I then dwelt
on what seemed the proper policy towards the States recently in
rebellion,--insisting that it was our duty, while renouncing Indemnity
for the past, to obtain at least Security for the future; and this
security, I maintained, could be found only in exclusion of ex-Rebels
from political power, and in irreversible guaranties especially
applicable to the national creditor and the national freedman.[59]
During intervening months, the country has been agitated by this
question, which was perplexed by unexpected difference between the
President and Congress. The President insists upon installing ex-Rebels
in political power, and sets at nought the claim of guaranties and
the idea of security for the future, while he denies to Congress any
control over the question, taking it all to himself. Congress asserts
control, and endeavors to exclude ex-Rebels from political power and
establish guaranties, to the end that there may be security for the
future. Meanwhile the States recently in rebellion, with the exception
of Tennessee, are without representation. Thus stands the case.
The two parties are the President, on the one side, and the people of
the United States in Congress assembled, on the other side,--the first
representing the Executive, the second representing the Legislative.
It is _The One Man Power_ vs. _Congress_. Of course, each performs
its part in the government; but until now it has always been supposed
that the legislative gave law to the executive, and not that the
executive gave law to the legislative. This irrational assumption
becomes more astonishing, when it is considered that the actual
President, besides being the creature of circumstance, is inferior in
ability and character, while the House of Representatives is eminent
in both respects. A President who has already sunk below any other
President, even James Buchanan, madly undertakes to rule a House of
Representatives which there is reason to believe is the best that
has sat since the formation of the Constitution. Looking at the two
parties, we are tempted to exclaim, Such a President dictating to such
a Congress! It was said of Gustavus Adolphus, that he drilled the Diet
of Sweden to vote or be silent at the word of command; but Andrew
Johnson is not Gustavus Adolphus, and the American Congress is not the
Diet of Sweden.
* * * * *
The question at issue is one of the vastest ever presented for
practical decision, involving the name and weal of the Republic at
home and abroad. It is not a military question; it is a question of
statesmanship. We are to secure by counsel what was won by war. Failure
now will make the war itself a failure; surrender now will undo all
our victories. Let the President prevail, and straightway the plighted
faith of the Republic will be broken,--the national creditor and the
national freedman will be sacrificed,--the Rebellion itself will flaunt
its insulting power,--the whole country, in length and breadth, will
be disturbed,--and the Rebel region will be handed over to misrule
and anarchy. Let Congress prevail, and all this will be reversed: the
plighted faith of the Republic will be preserved; the national creditor
and the national freedman will be protected; the Rebellion itself will
be trampled out forever; the whole country, in length and breadth, will
be at peace; and the Rebel region, no longer harassed by controversy
and degraded by injustice, will enjoy the richest fruits of security
and reconciliation. To labor for this cause may well tempt the young
and rejoice the old.
And now, to-day, I again protest against any present admission of
ex-Rebels to the great partnership of this Republic, and I renew
the claim of irreversible guaranties, especially applicable to the
national creditor and the national freedman,--insisting now, as I did
a year ago, that it is our duty, while renouncing Indemnity for the
past, to obtain at least Security for the future. At the close of a
terrible war, wasting our treasure, murdering our fellow-citizens,
filling the land with funerals, maiming and wounding multitudes whom
Death had spared, and breaking up the very foundations of peace, our
first duty is to provide safeguards for the future. This can be only
by provisions, sure, fundamental, and irrepealable, fixing forever
the results of the war, the obligations of the Government, and the
equal rights of all. Such is the suggestion of common prudence and of
self-defence, as well as of common honesty. To this end we must make
haste slowly. States which precipitated themselves out of Congress must
not be permitted to precipitate themselves back. They must not enter
the Halls they treasonably deserted, until we have every reasonable
assurance of future good conduct. We must not admit them, and then
repent our folly. The verses in which the satirist renders the quaint
conceit of the old Parliamentary orator, verses revived by Mr. Webster,
and on another occasion used by myself, furnish the key to our duty:--
“I hear a lion in the lobby roar:
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door,
And keep him there? or shall we let him in,
To try if we can turn him out again?”[60]
I am against letting the monster in, until he is no longer terrible in
mouth or paw.
* * * * *
But, while holding this ground of prudence, I desire to disclaim every
sentiment of vengeance or punishment, and also every thought of delay
or procrastination. Here I do not yield to the President, or to any
other person. Nobody more anxious than I to see this chasm closed
forever.
There is a long way and a short way. There is a long time and a
short time. If there be any whose policy is for the longest way or
for the longest time, I am not of the number. I am for the shortest
way, and also for the shortest time. And I object to the interference
of the President, because, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
he interposes delay and keeps the chasm open. More than all others,
the President, by officious assumptions, has lengthened the way and
lengthened the time. Of this there can be no doubt.
From all quarters we learn that after the surrender of Lee the Rebels
were ready for any terms, if they could escape with life. They were
vanquished, and they knew it. The Rebellion was crushed, and they
knew it. They hardly expected to save a small fraction of property.
They did not expect to save political power. They were too sensible
not to see that participants in rebellion could not pass at once
into the copartnership of government. They made up their minds to
exclusion. They were submissive. There was nothing they would not do,
_even to the extent of enfranchising the freedmen and providing for
them homesteads_. Had the National Government taken advantage of this
plastic condition, it might have stamped Equal Rights upon the whole
people, as upon molten wax, while it fixed the immutable conditions of
permanent peace. The question of Reconstruction would have been settled
before it arose. It is sad to think that this was not done. Perhaps in
all history there is no instance of such an opportunity lost. Truly
should our country say in penitential supplication, “We have left
undone those things which we ought to have done, and we have done those
things which we ought not to have done.”
Do not take this on my authority. Listen to those on the spot, who
have seen with their own eyes. A brave officer of our army writes from
Alabama:--
“I believe the mass of the people could have been easily
controlled, if none of the excepted classes had received
pardon. These classes did not expect anything more than life,
and even feared for that. Let me condense the whole subject. At
the surrender, the South could have been moulded at will; but
it is now as stiff-necked and rebellious as ever.”