MEN, SHIPS AND GUNS IN 1812.
COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS was a man of the time, a typical naval officer of
the period. He was minutely careful about the food and habits of his
men, and made the _President_ as homelike as a ship could be. He was not
precisely a man of science, as was the case with his son in the monitor
_Weehawken_, for this was the pre-scientific age of naval warfare.
Indeed, it can scarcely be said with truth that he had either patience
with or appreciation of Robert Fulton, the Pennsylvanian whose
inventions were destined to revolutionize the methods of naval warfare.
This mechanical genius who anticipated steam frigates, iron armor,
torpedoes and rams, rather amused than interested Rodgers. To the
commodore, who expected no miracles, he seemed to possess “Continuity
but not ingenuity.” Fulton had not yet perfected his apparatus, though
he had in 1804 blown up a Danish frigate off Copenhagen, and in 1810 had
published in New York his “Torpedo War and Submarine Explosion.” This
book is full of illustrations so clear, that to look at them now
provokes the wonder that his schemes found so little encouragement. Five
thousand dollars were appropriated by Congress March 30, 1810, for
submarine torpedo experiments. Discouragement evidently followed: for
our government in 1811, following the example of France and England
rejected his plans for a submarine torpedo boat.
“The Battle of the Kegs” was too often referred to in connection with
Fulton’s projects. This threw a humorous but not luminous glow over the
whole matter. It gave to a serious scientific subject very much the same
air as that which Irving has succeeded in casting over the early history
of New York.
Having glanced at the typical American commander, let us now see what
kind of sailors handled the ships and guns of 1812. In an old order book
of Commodore Rodgers’, we find one to midshipman M. C. Perry, dated
“President off Sandy Hook 26th May 1813,” directing him to proceed to
New York and enter for the ship six petty officers and fifty seamen and
boys. From this we may guess the quality of the crews of American
men-of-war.
“You are desired to be particular in entering none but American
citizens, and indeed, native-born citizens in preference.” He is
especially directed to ship good healthy men able to perform duty,
active and robust, while only those of good character and appearance are
to be accepted for the warrant and petty officers. As Matthew Perry was
but seventeen years of age, the order shows the confidence his commander
placed in his judgement. In Perry’s diary the simple entry under May 28
is “At 12 P. M. the pilot boat left the ship with Mr. Hunt and Midp. M.
C. Perry as a recruiting officer for the ship.”
It is the favorite idea of Englishmen who have formed their opinions
from James the popular historian of the British navy, that the victories
of American ships over their own in 1812 were owing to the British
deserters among the Yankees. James, with amazing credulity, believes
that there were two hundred Englishmen on the _Constitution_, that
two-thirds of the sailors in the navy of the United States were bred on
the soil and educated in the ships of Great Britain, and to these our
navy owed at least one half of its effectiveness.
It is much nearer the truth to state that nine-tenths of the American
crews were native-born, and but about one-twentieth of British
nationality, the rest being a mixture. Three-fourths of the natives were
from the northern states; half of the remaining quarter from Virginia,
and nearly all of respectable parentage.
Of the officers, the midshipmen were lads of from eleven to fifteen
years of age. There were in commission during the war about 500 naval
officers, 34,960 sailors and petty officers, and 2,725 marines. The
government possessed six navy yards.
In addition to the officer’s knowledge of the scientific principle of
gunnery, and the thorough familiarity of the gun-crews with their
duties, each ship’s company when away from its cannon was a disciplined
battalion. The manual of small arms comprehended every possible stroke
of offence and defence. Pikes, cutlasses and axes were the weapons
relied on, though a few rifles, in the hands of sharp shooters perched
in the crows-nests and in the tops, and a brace of pistols at each man’s
belt had their places. The Yankee cutlass had already crossed with the
Moorish scimiter at Tripoli, in more than one victory, and “our sailors
felt a just confidence in its merits.”[2] The pike was the boarding
weapon, the sailor’s bayonet, with which he charged the enemy on his own
decks, or repelled his attacks, and was not the least of small arms. The
war of 1812, with men speaking the same language, was practically a
civil war in which the sword was again to be taken up against equals in
every respect. Hence the need of constant practice in handling tools.
The uninterrupted drill bore its fruit in due season.
One potent secret of American excellence of naval service, which raised
our standard of war ships and guns even higher than the highest in
Europe, was the rule of promotion for merit. This nerved every sailor
and petty officer to do nothing less than his best at all times. In this
respect, the navy of the western world contrasted effectively with that
of Great Britain, where commissions were bought and sold in open market.
The Yankee captain taught his men to take pride in their guns as if they
were human. Of many an American sailor in 1812 it could be said:
“His conscience and his gun, he thought
His duty lay between.”
The American men-of-war went to sea with sights on their guns that
enabled a cannonneer to fire with nearly the accuracy of a rifle. In
their occasional use of sheet-lead cartridges, which required less
sponging and worming after firing than those of flannel and of paper,
they anticipated the copper shells of recent American invention.
The broadsides of that day may seem to us ridiculous in weight, as
compared to those of our time. A projectile from an iron-clad now
exceeds the entire mass of metal thrown by the largest of the old
line-of-battle ships. The heaviest broadside in the United States in
1812—that thrown by the _United States_ carrying fifty-four guns—was
but 846 pounds. Nevertheless the American ships had usually heavier and
better guns and of longer range than the British. The power of a
line-of-battle ship had been condensed into the space of a frigate. This
was the American idea, to increase the weight of metal thrown in
broadside without altering the ship’s rating.
With their guns every man and boy on board was constantly familiar by
daily practice, and the name and purpose of each rope, crook, pulley,
and cleet on the carriages were fully known to all. It must be
remembered that horizontal shell-firing was unknown sixty years ago.
Bombs could be thrown only from mortars as in a land siege, but never
from cannon in naval duels, though short howitzers were occasionally
employed in Europe to fire bombs. “Bomb-guns, firing hollow shot,” on
ships, were not invented until 1824. The seeming advantage to the old
time sailor, in his exemption from exploding shells, was in reality and
from a humane point of view, a disadvantage; since in navals annals
short sharp engagements were less common. A vast waste of ammunition
causing “prolonged mutilation and slaughter” was rather the rule. It was
the coolness of the American cannonneer, his economy in firing his gun
only when he was reasonably sure of hitting, his ability to hold the
linstock from the touch-hole till the word was given to fire, that made
the duels of 1812 short and decisive.
As a feeble substitute for bomb-shells, the Americans were driven to the
use of all sorts of hardware and blacksmith’s scraps as projectiles.
This kind of shot was called “langrel” or “langrage,” and the metal
magazine of a cruiser in 1812 would be sure to cause merriment if looked
into in our decade. In old and in recent times, each combatant aimed to
destroy the propelling power of the other. As the main design now is to
strike the boiler and disable the machinery, so then the first object
was to cut up the sails and rigging, so as to reduce the ship to a hulk.
For the purpose, our blacksmiths and inventors were called on to furnish
all sorts of ripping and tearing missiles and every species of
dismantling shot. Their anvils turned off “star shot,” “chain shot,”
“sausages,” “double headers,” “porcupines” and “hedge-hogs.” The “star
shot” made of four wrought iron bolts hammered to a ring folded like a
frame of umbrella rods. On firing, this camp stool arrangement expanded
its rays to the detriment of the enemy’s cordage and canvas. The
“sausage” consisted of four or six links, each twelve inches long and
when rammed home resemble a disjointed fishing pole or artist’s
sketching chair packed up. When belched forth it was converted into a
swinging line of iron six feet long which made havoc among the ropes.
The “double header” resemble a dumb bell. The “chain shot,” “porcupine”
and “hedge-hog” explain themselves by their names. Such projectiles,
with a small blacksmith’s shop of bolts and spikes, were to the weight
of half a ton, taken out of the side of the _Shannon_ after her fight
with the _Chesapeake_ and sold at auction in Halifax where most of them
were converted into horse-shoes and other innocent articles. In
preparing for the battle of Lake Erie, all the scraps of iron saved at
the forges were sewn in leather bags. This flying cutlery helped largely
to disable the enemy and bring about the victory. In battle, the
carronades charged with this “langrage” were tilted high and pointed at
the rigging, while the solid shot of the regular broadsides hulled the
enemy with decisive effect. This kind of projectile, though it had been
in use in Europe since 1720, was denounced by the British as inhuman and
uncivilized. As the history of war again and again proves, what is first
denounced as barbarous is finally adopted as fair against an enemy.
The British neglected artillery practice and knew little of nice
gunnery. Their carronades and long deck guns were less securely
fastened, and were often over charged. By their recoil they were often
kicked over and rendered useless during a fight. A terrible picture in
words is given by Victor Hugo in his “93” of a carronade let loose in a
storm on the deck of a French ship. British discipline too, had fallen
behind the standard of Nelson’s day. A nearly uninterrupted series of
victories had so spoiled with conceit the average English naval man that
he felt it unnecessary if not impossible to learn from an enemy. In the
autobiography of Henry Taylor, the author of “Philip Van Artevelde,” who
in his youth was midshipman on a British frigate in 1812, he tells us
that during a whole year he was not once in the rigging. Very little
attention was paid to scientific gunnery, and target practice was rare.
In some ships, not a ball was shot from a gun in three years. Dependence
was placed on the number of cannon rather than on their quality,
equipment or service. They counted rather than weighed their shot. Most
of the British frigates were over-gunned.
The carronade, invented in 1779, had become immediately popular, and by
1781 four hundred and twenty-nine British war vessels were equipped with
from six to ten carronades. These were above their regular complement
and not included in the rate or enumeration. Hence a “thirty-eight,” a
“forty-two,” or a “seventy-four” gun-ship might have many more muzzles
than her professed complement. The fearful effect of short range upon
the timber of ships enabled the British to convert their enemy’s walls
into missiles, and make splinters their ally in the work of death and
mutilation. Farragut’s “splinter nettings” were then unknown nor dreamed
of. Hence the terrific proverbial force of the British broadsides in the
Nile and at Trafalgar. After such demonstration of power, such manifest
superiority over foemen worthy of their steel, it seemed absurd in
British eyes to make special preparation, or abandon old routine in
order to meet the Yankees in their “pine board” and “fir built”
frigates. What they had done with the French they expected to with the
Americans, and more easily. They did not know the virtues of the
American long guns nor the rapidity, coolness, and unerring accuracy of
the American artillerists. They were now to learn new lessons in the art
of war. They were to fight with sailors who took aim.
At the outbreak of hostilities our naval force in ships consisted of one
hundred and seventy gun-boats afloat, three second class frigates under
repair, three old brigs rotten and worthless, with five brigs and
sloops, three first-class and two second-class frigates which were
seaworthy. After the embargo of April 14th most of the fast sailers in
the American merchant service were converted into privateers.
The British naval force all told consisted of over a thousand sail and
her sailors were flushed with the remembrances of Aboukir and Trafalgar.
Before hostilities and at the date of the declaration of war, there were
off our coast the _Africa_, one sixty-four gun-ship; the _Shannon_,
_Guerriere_, _Belvidera_, and _Eolus_, second class frigates; besides
several smaller vessels.
The war with Great Britain, our “second war for independence” was
declared when the treasury was empty and the cabinet divided. Some
pamphleteers stigmatized it as “Mr. Madison’s war.” So great was the
cowardly fear of British invincibility on the seas, and so shameful and
unjust were the suspicions against our navy that many counsellors at
Washington urged that the national vessels should keep within tide-water
and act only as harbor batteries. To the earnest personal remonstrance
of Captains Bainbridge and Stewart we owe it that our vessels got to sea
to win a glory imperishable.
Borrowing a point from the English who, in older days, usually chose
their time to declare war when the richly-laden Dutch galleons were on
their homeward voyage from the Indies, President Madison and Congress,
hoping to fill the depleted treasury, passed the act declarative of war
about the time the Jamaica plate fleet of eighty-five vessels was to
arrive off our coast. This sailed from Negril Bay on the 20th of May and
war against Great Britain was declared on the 12th of June, at least one
week too late.
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[2] Roosevelt’s “Naval History of the War of 1812.”