“_And be it further enacted_, That in each of these
States all judgments and decrees of court which have not
been voluntarily executed, and which have been rendered
subsequently to the date of the Ordinance of Secession in
each State respectively, shall be subject to appeal to the
highest court in the State, organized after the State shall
be admitted again by Congress into the Union; but no such
appeal shall be allowed, unless the motion for the same
shall have been lodged in the court, or clerk’s office of
the court, in which the decree was rendered, within sixty
days after the governor appointed under this Act shall have
entered upon the discharge of the duties of his office,
and for all judgments rendered subsequently to such date,
within sixty days after the same have been rendered.”
Mr. Trumbull objected to it as out of order under the rule. Mr.
Sumner said:--
My attention has often been called to the necessity of such a
provision, by gentlemen from the South, and especially by lawyers
there. They tell me that without some such provision the grossest
injustice will be done. Throughout the whole Rebellion the local
tribunals were sitting to administer justice; yet it was not justice,
but injustice, that they administered. Under their decrees private
rights were overthrown; and I doubt not that my friend from Illinois
has recently read the account of an extensive injustice in Texas, where
private property to an almost incalculable amount was taken away by
these unjust decrees.
Should there not be a remedy? I think all will say that there should
be. This is, if I may so express myself, the last time of asking. If
those States are once organized as States and received into the Union,
I know not if we have the power of applying a remedy. That we have now
I am sure. I cannot doubt our constitutional power at this moment to
set aside all those decrees, so far as they have not been voluntarily
submitted to, or subject them, according to the provision of my
amendment, to appeal in a higher tribunal after the reorganization of
justice in these States. Is not the provision reasonable? Is it not
to serve the ends of justice? If you do not accept it now, can you
accept it at any time hereafter? And if you do not accept it now or
hereafter, will not these parties go without remedy? On that question I
do not pronounce dogmatically. I do not mean to say that they will be
absolutely without remedy; but I do not easily see their remedy. I see
difficulties in the way, while at this moment I see no difficulties in
the way.
Then I encounter the objection that this is not in order. Why not? Is
it not to carry out your Reconstruction Bill, to smooth difficulties,
to remove wrong, to establish justice? It may not have been specially
foreshadowed in the original bill or the supplemental bill; but I
submit that it is entirely germane to both those bills. Besides, it is
commended by an intrinsic justice, which should make it acceptable at
any time.
The amendment was decided to be out of order.