[1] Often, but erroneously, written _Podicipidae_. The word
_Podiceps_ being a contracted form of _Podicipes_ (cf. Gloger,
_Journal fur Ornithologie_, 1854, p. 430, note), a combination of
_podex_, _podicis_ and _pes_, _pedis_, its further compounds must be
in accordance with its derivation.
GRECO, EL, the name commonly given to Dominico Theotocopuli (d. 1614),
Cretan painter, architect and sculptor. He was born in Crete, between
1545 and 1550, and announces his Cretan origin by his signature in Greek
letters on his most important pictures, especially on the "St Maurice"
in the Escorial. He appears to have studied art first of all in Venice,
and on arriving in Rome in 1570 is described as having been a pupil of
Titian, in a letter written by the miniaturist, Giulio Clovio, addressed
to Cardinal Alessandro Farnesi, dated the 15th of November 1570.
Although a student under Titian, he was at no time an exponent of his
master's spirit, and his early historical pictures were attributed to
many other artists, but never to Titian. Of his early works, two
pictures of "The Healing of the Blind Man" at Dresden and Palma, and the
four of "Christ driving the money-changers out of the Temple" in the
Yarborough collection, the Cork collection, the National Gallery, and
the Beruete collection at Madrid, are the chief. His first authentic
portrait is that of his fellow-countryman, Giulio Clovio. It was painted
between 1570 and 1578, is signed in Greek characters, and preserved at
Naples, and the last portrait he painted under the influence of the
Italian school appears to be that of a cardinal now in the National
Gallery, of which four replicas painted in Spain are known. He appears
to have come to Spain in 1577, but, on being questioned two years later
in connexion with a judicial suit, as to when he arrived in the country,
and for what purpose he came, declined to give any information. He was
probably attracted by the prospect of participating in the decoration of
the Escorial, and he appears to have settled down in Toledo, where his
first works were the paintings for the high altar of Santo Domingo, and
his famous picture of "The Disrobing of Christ" in the sacristy of the
cathedral. It was in connexion with this last-named work that he proved
refractory, and the records of a law-suit respecting the price to be
paid to him give us the earliest information of the artist's sojourn in
Spain. In 1590, he painted the "History of St Maurice" for Philip II.,
and in 1578, his masterpiece, entitled "The Burial of the Count Orgaz."
This magnificent picture, one of the finest in Spain, is at last being
appreciated, and can only be put a little below the masterpieces of
Velazquez. It is a strangely individual work, representing Spanish
character even more truthfully than did any Spanish artist, and it
gathers up all the fugitive moods, the grace and charm, the devices and
defects of a single race, and gives them complete stability in their
wavering expressions.
Between 1595 and 1600, El Greco executed two groups of paintings in the
church of San Jose at Toledo, and in the hospital of La Caridad, at
Illescas. Besides these, he is known to have painted thirty-two
portraits, several manuscripts, and many paintings for altar-pieces in
Toledo and the neighbourhood. As an architect he was responsible for
more than one of the churches of Toledo, and as a sculptor for carvings
both in wood and in marble, and he can only be properly understood in
all his varied excellences after a visit to the city where most of his
work was executed.
He died on the 7th of April 1614, and the date of his death is one of
the very few certain facts which we have respecting him. The record
informs us that he made no will, that he received the sacraments, and
was buried in the church of Santo Domingo. The popular legend of his
having gone mad towards the latter part of his career has no foundation
in fact, but his painting became more and more eccentric as his life
went on, and his natural perversity and love of strange, cold colouring,
increased towards the end of his life. As has been well said, "Light
with him was only used for emotional appeal, and was focussed or
scattered at will." He was haughtily certain of the value of his own
art, and was determined to paint in cold, ashen colouring, with livid,
startling effect, the gaunt and extraordinary figures that he beheld
with his eccentric genius. His pictures have wonderful visionary
quality, admirable invention, and are full of passionate fervency. They
may be considered extravagant, but are never commonplace, and are
exceedingly attractive in their intense emotion, marvellous sincerity,
and strange, chilly colour.
El Greco's work is typically modern, and from it the portrait-painter,
J. S. Sargent, claims to have learnt more than from that of any other
artist. It immortalizes the character of the people amongst whom he
dwelt, and he may be considered as the initiator of truth and realism in
art, a precursor and inspirer of Velazquez.
In his own time he was exceedingly popular, and held in great repute.
Sonnets were written in his honour, and he is himself said to have
written several treatises, but these have not come down to our time. For
more than a generation his work was hardly known, but it is now gaining
rapidly in importance, and its true position is more and more
recognized. Some examples of the artist's own handwriting have been
discovered in Toledo, and Senor Don Manuel Cossia of Madrid has spent
many years collecting information for a work dealing with the artist.
(G. C. W.)
GRECO-TURKISH WAR, 1897. This war between Greece and Turkey (see GREECE:
_Modern History_) involved two practically distinct campaigns, in
Thessaly and in Epirus. Upon the Thessalian frontier the Turks, early in
March, had concentrated six divisions (about 58,000 men), 1500 sabres
and 156 guns, under Edhem Pasha. A seventh division was rendered
available a little later. The Greeks numbered about 45,000 infantry, 800
cavalry and 96 guns, under the crown prince. On both sides there was a
considerable dispersion of forces along the frontier. The Turkish navy,
an important factor in the war of 1877-78, had become paralytic ten
years later, and the Greek squadron held complete command of the sea.
Expeditionary forces directed against the Turkish line of communications
might have influenced the course of the campaign; but for such work the
Greeks were quite unprepared, and beyond bombarding one or two
insignificant ports on the coast-line, and aiding the transport of
troops from Athens to Volo, the navy practically accomplished nothing.
On the 9th and 10th April Greek irregulars crossed the frontier, either
with a view to provoke hostilities or in the hope of fomenting a rising
in Macedonia. On the 16th and 17th some fighting occurred, in which
Greek regulars took part; and on the 18th Edhem Pasha, whose
headquarters had for some time been established at Elassona, ordered a
general advance. The Turkish plan was to turn the Greek left and to
bring on a decisive action, but this was not carried out. In the centre
the Turks occupied the Meluna Pass on the 19th, and the way was
practically open to Larissa. The Turkish right wing, however, moving on
Damani and the Reveni Pass, encountered resistance, and the left wing
was temporarily checked by the Greeks among the mountains near Nezeros.
At Mati, covering the road to Tyrnavo, the Greeks entrenched themselves.
Here sharp fighting occurred on the 21st and 22nd, during which the
Greeks sought to turn the right flank of the superior Turkish central
column. On the 23rd fighting was renewed, and the advance guard of the
Turkish left column, which had been reinforced, and had pressed back the
Greeks, reached Deliler. The Turkish forces had now drawn together, and
the Greeks were threatened on both flanks. In the evening a general
retreat was ordered, and the loose discipline of the Greek army was at
once manifested. Rumours of disaster spread among the ranks, and wild
panic supervened. There was nothing to prevent an orderly retirement
upon Larissa, which had been fortified and provisioned, and which
offered a good defensive position. The general _debacle_ could not,
however, be arrested, and in great disorder the mass of the Greek army
fled southwards to Pharsala. There was no pursuit, and the Turkish
commander-in-chief did not reach Larissa till the 27th. Thus ended the
first phase of the war, in which the Greeks showed tenacity in defence,
which proved fruitless by reason of initially bad strategic dispositions
entailing far too great dispersion, and also because there was no plan
of action beyond a general desire to avoid risking a defeat which might
prevent the expected risings in Macedonia and elsewhere. The handling of
the Turkish army showed little skill or enterprise; but on both sides
political considerations tended to prevent the application of sound
military principles.
Larissa being abandoned by the Greeks, Velestino, the junction of the
Thessalian railways, where there was a strong position covering Volo,
seemed to be the natural rallying point for the Greek army. Here the
support of the fleet would have been secured, and a Turkish advance
across the Othrys range upon Athens could not have taken place until the
flanking position had been captured. Whether by direction or by natural
impulse, however, the mass of the Greek troops made for Pharsala, where
some order was re-established, and preparations were made to resist
attack. The importance of Velestino was recognized by sending a brigade
thither by railway from Pharsala, and the inferior Greek army was thus
split into two portions, separated by nearly 40 m. On 27th April a
Turkish reconnaissance on Velestino was repulsed, and further fighting
occurred on the 29th and 30th, in which the Greeks under Colonel
Smolenski held their own. Meanwhile the Turks made preparations to
attack Pharsala, and on 5th May the Greeks were driven from their
positions in front of the town by three divisions. Further fighting
followed on the 6th, and in the evening the Greek army retired in fair
order upon Domokos. It was intended to turn the Greek left with the
first division under Hairi Pasha, but the flanking force did not arrive
in time to bring about a decisive result. The abandonment of Pharsala
involved that of Velestino, where the Turks had obtained no advantage,
and on the evening of the 5th Colonel Smolenski began a retirement upon
Halmyros. Again delaying, Edhem Pasha did not attack Domokos till the
17th, giving the Greeks time to entrench their positions. The attack was
delivered in three columns, of which the right was checked and the
centre failed to take the Greek trenches and suffered much loss. The
left column, however, menaced the line of retreat, and the Greek army
abandoned the whole position during the night. No effective stand was
made at the Furka Pass, which was evacuated on the following night.
Colonel Smolenski, who arrived on the 18th from Halmyros, was directed
to hold the pass of Thermopylae. The Greek forces being much
demoralized, the intervention of the tsar was invoked by telegraph; and
the latter sent a personal appeal to the Sultan, who directed a
suspension of hostilities. On the 20th an armistice was arranged.
In Epirus at the outbreak of war about 15,000 Greeks, including a
cavalry regiment and five batteries, the whole under Colonel Manos,
occupied a line of defence from Arta to Peta. The Turks, about 28,000
strong, with forty-eight guns, under Achmet Hifsi Pasha, were
distributed mainly at Iannina, Pentepagadia, and in front of Arta. On
18th April the Turks commenced a three days' bombardment of Arta; but
successive attempts to take the bridge were repulsed, and during the
night of the 21st they retired on Philippiada, 26 m. distant, which was
attacked and occupied by Colonel Manos on the 23rd. The Greeks then
advanced to Pentepagadia, meeting with little resistance. Their
difficulties now began. After some skirmishing on the 27th, the position
held by their advanced force near Homopulos was attacked on the 28th.
The attack was renewed on the 29th, and no Greek reinforcements were
forthcoming when needed. The Euzones made a good defence, but were
driven back by superior force, and a retreat was ordered, which quickly
degenerated into panic-stricken flight to and across the Arta.
Reinforcements, including 2500 Epirote volunteers, were sent to Arta
from Athens, and on 12th May another incursion into Turkish territory
began, the apparent object being to occupy a portion of the country in
view of the breakdown in Thessaly and the probability that hostilities
would shortly end. The advance was made in three columns, while the
Epirote volunteers were landed near the mouth of the Luro river with the
idea of cutting off the Turkish garrison of Prevesa. The centre column,
consisting of a brigade, three squadrons and two batteries, which were
intended to take up and hold a defensive position, attacked the Turks
near Strevina on the 13th. The Greeks fought well, and being reinforced
by a battalion from the left column, resumed the offensive on the
following day, and fairly held their own. On the night of the 15th a
retreat was ordered and well carried out. The volunteers landed at the
mouth of the Luro, were attacked and routed with heavy loss.
The campaign in Epirus thus failed as completely as that in Thessaly.
Under the terms of the treaty of peace, signed on 20th September, and
arranged by the European powers, Turkey obtained an indemnity of
LT4,000,000, and a rectification of the Thessalian frontier, carrying
with it some strategic advantage. History records few more unjustifiable
wars than that which Greece gratuitously provoked. The Greek troops on
several occasions showed tenacity and endurance, but discipline and
cohesion were manifestly wanting. Many of the officers were incapable;
the campaign was gravely mismanaged; and politics, which led to the war,
impeded its operations. On the other hand, the fruits of the German
tuition, which began in 1880, and received a powerful stimulus by the
appointment of General von der Goltz in 1883, were shown in the Turkish
army. The mobilization was on the whole smoothly carried out, and the
newly completed railways greatly facilitated the concentration on the
frontier. The young school of officers trained by General von der Goltz
displayed ability, and the artillery at Pharsala and Domokos was well
handled. The superior leading was, however, not conspicuously
successful; and while the rank and file again showed excellent military
qualities, political conditions and the Oriental predilection for
half-measures and for denying full responsibility and full powers to
commanders in the field enfeebled the conduct of the campaign. On
account of the total want of careful and systematic peace training on
both sides, a war which presented several interesting strategic problems
provided warnings in place of military lessons. (G. S. C.)
GREECE,[1] an ancient geographical area, and a modern kingdom more or
less corresponding thereto, situated at the south-eastern extremity of
Europe and forming the most southerly portion of the Balkan Peninsula.
The modern kingdom is bounded on the N. by European Turkey and on the
E., S. and W. by the Aegean, Mediterranean and Ionian seas. The name
_Graecia_, which was more or less vaguely given to the ancient country
by the Romans, seems not to have been employed by any native writer
before Aristotle; it was apparently derived by the Romans from the
Illyrians, who applied the name of an Epirote tribe ([Greek: Graikoi],
Graeci) to all their southern neighbours. The names Hellas, Hellenes
([Greek: Hellas, Hellenes]), by which the ancient Greeks called their
country and their race, and which are still employed by the modern
Greeks, originally designated a small district in Phthiotis in Thessaly
and its inhabitants, who gradually spread over the lands south of the
Cambunian mountains. The name Hellenes was not universally applied to
the Greek race until the post-Homeric epoch (Thucyd. i. 3).
[Illustration: Map of Greece.]