Eloquence is the faculty of awakening in others our view of a thing, or
our opinion about it, of kindling in them our feeling concerning it, and
thus putting them in sympathy with us. And all this by conducting the
stream of our thought into their minds, through the medium of words, with
such force as to carry their thought from the direction it has already
taken, and sweep it along with ours in its course. The more their previous
course of thought differs from ours, the greater is this achievement. From
this it is easily understood how personal conviction and passion make a
man eloquent; and in general, eloquence is more the gift of nature than
the work of art; yet here, also, art will support nature.
In order to convince another of a truth which conflicts with an error he
firmly holds, the first rule to be observed, is an easy and natural one:
_let the premisses come first, and the conclusion follow_. Yet this rule
is seldom observed, but reversed; for zeal, eagerness, and dogmatic
positiveness urge us to proclaim the conclusion loudly and noisily against
him who adheres to the opposed error. This easily makes him shy, and now
he opposes his will to all reasons and premisses, knowing already to what
conclusion they lead. Therefore we ought rather to keep the conclusion
completely concealed, and only advance the premisses distinctly, fully,
and in different lights. Indeed, if possible, we ought not to express the
conclusion at all. It will come necessarily and regularly of its own
accord into the reason of the hearers, and the conviction thus born in
themselves will be all the more genuine, and will also be accompanied by
self-esteem instead of shame. In difficult cases we may even assume the
air of desiring to arrive at a quite opposite conclusion from that which
we really have in view. An example of this is the famous speech of Antony
in Shakspeare’s “Julius Cæsar.”
In defending a thing many persons err by confidently advancing everything
imaginable that can be said for it, mixing up together what is true, half
true, and merely plausible. But the false is soon recognised, or at any
rate felt, and throws suspicion also upon the cogent and true arguments
which were brought forward along with it. Give then the true and weighty
pure and alone, and beware of defending a truth with inadequate, and
therefore, since they are set up as adequate, sophistical reasons; for the
opponent upsets these, and thereby gains the appearance of having upset
the truth itself which was supported by them, that is, he makes _argumenta
ad hominem_ hold good as _argumenta ad rem_. The Chinese go, perhaps, too
far the other way, for they have the saying: “He who is eloquent and has a
sharp tongue may always leave half of a sentence unspoken; and he who has
right on his side may confidently yield three-tenths of his assertion.”