Elections of 1862.--Mr. Lincoln advances to Aggressive Position on
Slavery.--Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress adjourns.--
Democratic Hostility to Administration.--Democratic State Conventions.
--Platforms in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.--Nomination
of Horatio Seymour for Governor of New York.--The President prepares
for a Serious Political Contest.--The Issue shall be the Union or
Slavery.--Conversation with Mr. Boutwell.--Proclamation of
Emancipation.--Meeting of Governors at Altoona.--Compensated
Emancipation proposed for Border States.--Declined by their Senators
and Representatives.--Anti-slavery Policy apparently Disastrous
for a Time.--October Elections Discouraging.--General James S.
Wadsworth nominated against Mr. Seymour.--Illinois votes against
the President.--Five Leading States against the President.--
Administration saved in Part by Border States.--Last Session of
Thirty-seventh Congress.--President urges Compensated Emancipation
again.--Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863.--Long Controversy
over Question of Compensation for Slaves.--Test Case of Missouri.
--Fourteen Million Dollars offered her.--General Pope's Campaign.
--Army of the Potomac.--Battle of Antietam.--McClellan removed.--
Burnside succeeds him.--Defeat at Fredericksburg.--Hooker succeeds
Burnside.--General Situation.--Arming of Slaves.--Habeas Corpus.--
Conscription Law.--Depressed and Depressing Period.
Popular interest in the summer of 1862 was divided between events
in the field and the election of Representatives to the Thirty-
eighth Congress. A year before, the line of partisan division had
been practically obliterated in the Loyal States--the whole people
uniting in support of the war. The progress of events had to a
large extent changed this auspicious unanimity, and the Administration
was now subjected to a fight for its life while it was fighting
for the life of the Nation.
The conservatism which Mr. Lincoln had maintained on the Slavery
question had undoubtedly been the means of bringing to the support
of the war policy of his Administration many whom a more radical
course at the outset would have driven into hostility. As he
advanced however towards a more aggressive position, political
divisions became at each step more pronounced. The vote on the
question of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia had been
strictly on the line of party, and the same is true of the proposition
for compensated emancipation in the Border States, and of the Act
confiscating the property of Rebels. Not a single Democrat in the
Senate or House sustained one of these measures. They were all
passed by Republican votes alone, the Democratic minority protesting
each time with increasing earnestness and warmth.
The second session of the Thirty-seventh Congress adjourned on the
17th of July, 1862, but long before that date the excitement
prevailing in Congress had extended to the people, and political
divisions were every day growing more earnest, partisan leaders
every day more active, their followers every day more excited.
The Slavery question was the source of the agitation, and by a
common instinct throughout the free States, the Democrats joined
in the cry against an Abolition war. They were as ready, they
declared, as on the day after the firing on Sumter, to uphold all
measures necessary for the defense of the Government and the
maintenance of the Union, and they demanded that the Republicans
should restrict the war to its legitimate ends--as defined by the
supporters of the Administration in July, 1861, by the unanimous
adoption of the Crittenden Resolution. They would not listen to
any change of action based on change of circumstances, and they
prepared to enforce at the ballot-box their opinions touching the
new departure of Congress and the President.
The Democratic State Conventions in Pennsylvania and Ohio, both
held on the 4th of July, reflected the feeling which so largely
pervaded the ranks of the party throughout the North. In Pennsylvania
the Convention unanimously declared that "the party of fanaticism
or crime, whichever it may be called, that seeks to turn loose the
slaves of the Southern States to overrun the North and to enter
into competition with the white laboring masses, thus degrading
their manhood by placing them on an equality with negroes, is
insulting to our race and merits our most emphatic and unqualified
condemnation." They further declared that "this is a government
of white men and was established exclusively for the white race";
that "the negroes are not entitled to and ought not to be admitted
to political and social equality with the white race."
DEMOCRATIC PLATFORMS IN 1862.
The Democratic Convention of Ohio made an equally open appeal to
race prejudice. They avowed their belief that the Emancipation
policy of the Republican party if successful "would throw upon the
Border free States an immense number of negroes to compete with
and under-work the white laborers and to constitute in various ways
an unbearable nuisance"; and that "it would be unjust to our gallant
soldiers to compel them to free the negroes of the South, and
thereby fill Ohio with a degraded population to compete with these
same soldiers upon their return to the peaceful avocations of life."
It was not by mere chance that the Democratic party of these two
great States held their conventions on the National Anniversary.
It had been carefully pre-arranged with the view of creating a
serious impression against the Administration.
The Democrats of Indiana went beyond their brethren of Ohio and
Pennsylvania in the vigor with which they denounced the anti-slavery
policy of the President. Their convention was held a month later,
and unanimously demanded that "the public authorities of Indiana
should see that the constitution and laws of the State are enforced
against the entrance of free negroes and mulattoes," declaring that
"when the people of Indiana adopted the negro exclusion clause in
their constitution by a majority of ninety-four thousand votes they
meant that the honest laboring white man should have no competitor
in the black race; that the soil of Indiana should belong to the
white man, and that he alone was suited to the form of her
institutions." In Illinois the Democratic party adopted substantially
the same platform as that proclaimed in Indiana. They made the
distinct and unmistakable issue that a war for the abolition of
slavery could not have their support; that the Government of the
United States was made for white men, and that negroes could not
be admitted to terms of equality in civil rights.
The most important election of the year was that to be held in New
York, not merely because of the prestige and power of the State,
but on account of the peculiar elements that entered into the
contest. The Democratic party proceeded in the selection of
candidates and in the definition of issues with great circumspection.
They avoided the rancorous expressions used in Pennsylvania and
Ohio, declared that they would continue to render the government
their sincere and united support in the use of all legitimate means
to suppress the rebellion, and cited the Crittenden Resolution,
unanimously passed by Congress in July, 1861, as embodying the
principles upon which they appealed for popular support. They
expressed their "willingness to withhold their views upon all
questions not rendered imperative by the imperiled condition of
the country." The had not one word to say on the subject of slavery,
and they avowed their readiness to act in the coming election with
any class of loyal citizens who agreed with them in the principles
embodied in their platform. This last clause related to a third
party, the remnant of those who had supported Mr. Bell in 1860 and
who had just held a convention at Troy. They had comprised their
entire platform in "the Constitution, the Union and the enforcement
of the laws," and had nominated Horatio Seymour for governor.
It was not difficult to see that politically the case was well
managed, and that the most partisan of partisans in the person of
Mr. Seymour, was enabled to appear before the voters of New York
in the attitude of one who could graciously correct the errors of
the Administration, and direct the course of the war in channels
of patriotism that would harmonize the entire people. The nomination
of Mr. Seymour was made with great enthusiasm by the Democracy,
and the policy of the National Administration was thus challenged
in the leading State of the Union. Mr. Lincoln looked upon the
situation as one of exceeding gravity. The loss to the Administration,
of the House of Representatives in the Thirty-eighth Congress,
would place the control of the war in the hands of its opponents,
and, as the President believed, would imperil the fate of the
National struggle. The power of the purse controls the power of
the sword. The armies in the field required a vast and constant
expenditure, and to secure the money a rigorous system of taxation
must be enforced. A House of Representatives controlling the power
to tax and the power to appropriate could, if hostile to the war,
neutralize and destroy all the efforts of the Executive.
The President measured the extent of the danger and prepared to
meet it. He clearly read the signs of the times. He saw that the
anti-slavery policy of Congress had gone far enough to arouse the
bitter hostility of all Democrats who were not thoroughly committed
to the war, and yet not far enough to deal an effective blow against
the institution. He saw that as the Administration was committed
to the partial policy which involved all the danger of a re-action
and a retreat, it would be wise to commit it to the bold, far-
reaching, radical and aggressive policy from which it would be
impossible to turn without deliberately resolving to sacrifice our
nationality. He determined therefore to lay before the people a
choice between the Union and Slavery. He would persuade them that
both could not be saved and that they must choose the one which
they regarded as the more worthy of preservation. Slavery was not
only the inciting cause of the rebellion but was its chief strength
and support in the South and at the same time a weakening element
to the Union cause in the Loyal States. No man had looked at the
question in all its bearings so closely as Mr. Lincoln. He had
studied the consequences of every step and had proceeded with the
utmost caution.
THE PRESIDENT'S MONITORY PROCLAMATION.
The President kept his own counsels so closely, and relied so
confidently upon his own conclusions, that it is not possible to
say when he first seriously entertained the thought of general
emancipation as a war measure. Mr. George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts
who enjoyed Mr. Lincoln's confidence and who at this period of the
contest was appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is authority
for some interesting statements. About the time that the anti-
slavery legislation now under discussion was in progress Mr. Lincoln
received a letter written by a loyal citizen of Louisiana, containing
a strong argument against emancipation. He depicted in vivid colors
the bad results to flow from it and appealed earnestly to the
President not to take so dangerous a step. Without combating in
detail the arguments of his correspondent who personally enjoyed
his confidence, Mr. Lincoln said, "You must not expect me to give
up this government without playing my last card."
During an interview with Mr. Lincoln after the adjournment of
Congress in July, and when military disasters were falling thick
and fast upon us, Mr. Boutwell suggested to the President that we
could not hope to succeed until the slaves were emancipated. To
which Mr. Lincoln answered, "You would not have it done now, would
you? Had we not better wait for something like a victory?" The
statement, widely made in the autumn of 1862, that Mr. Lincoln had
been frightened or driven into the issuing of the proclamation by
the meeting of the governors of the Loyal States at Altoona, had
no foundation in fact. When the President's attention was called
to it, he said, "The truth is, I never thought of the meeting of
the governors at all. When Lee came over the Potomac I made a
resolve that if McClellan drove him back I would send the proclamation
after him. The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday, but I
could not find out until Saturday whether we had won a victory or
lost a battle. It was then too late to issue it that day, and on
Sunday I fixed it up a little, and on Monday I let them have it."
This colloquial style was characteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and the
frankness with which it was spoken disposes utterly of the claims
made in behalf of Mr. Chase and Mr. Sumner that they contributed
to the text of the Monitory Proclamation of 1862.
Two months before issuing the Proclamation Mr. Lincoln had urgently
requested the senators and representatives of the Border States to
give their effective co-operation in aid of compensated emancipation.
In his letter of July 12 he said "Before leaving the Capitol,
consider and discuss this subject among yourselves. You are patriots
and statesmen, and as such I pray you to consider this proposition
and at least commend it to the consideration of your States and
people. As you would perpetuate popular government, I beseech you
that you do in no wise omit this. Our common country is in great
peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a
speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to
the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated,
its happy future assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you
more than to any others the privilege is given to assure that
happiness, to swell that grandeur, to link your own names therewith
forever."
The majority of the senators and representatives from the Border
States did not concur with Mr. Lincoln's views and did not respond
favorably to his earnest appeal. The Maryland delegation in
Congress, the Kentucky delegation with one exception, and the
Missouri delegation with one exception, entered into a long argument
dissenting from the conclusions of the President. The West Virginia
men (with the exception of Mr. Carlile), Mr. Casey of Kentucky,
Mr. John W. Noell of Missouri, Mr. George P. Fisher of Delaware,
together with Mr. Horace Maynard and Mr. A. J. Clements from
Tennessee (not a Border State), expressed their readiness to co-
operate with Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Maynard wrote a separate letter
distinguished by breadth of view and strength of expression. It
is impossible to comprehend the determination of the Border State
men at that crisis. Having resisted in vain the aggressive
legislation of Congress already accomplished, they could hardly
fail to see that the institution of slavery was threatened with
utter destruction. It seems absolutely incredible that, standing
on the edge of the crater, they made no effort to escape from the
upheaval of the volcano, already visible to those who stood afar
off.
THE PRESIDENT'S ANTI-SLAVERY POLICY.
The Monitory Proclamation of Emancipation was issued on the 22d of
September. It gave public notice that on the first day of January,
1863--just one hundred days distant--"all persons held as slaves
within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof
shall be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then
thenceforward and forever free." It was a final tribute to those
engaged in rebellion that every agency, every instrumentality would
be employed by the government in its struggle for self-preservation.
It brought--as Mr. Lincoln intended it should bring--the seriousness
of the contest to the hearts and consciences of the people in the
Loyal States. He plainly warned them that every thing was at stake
and that if they were unwilling to meet the trial with the courage
and the sacrifice demanded, they were foredoomed to disaster, to
defeat, to dishonor. He knew that the policy would at first
encounter the disapproval of many who had supported him for the
Presidency, and that it would be violently opposed by the great
mass of the Democratic party. But his faith was strong. He believed
that the destruction of slavery was essential to the safety of the
Union, and he trusted with composure to the discerning judgment
and ultimate decision of the people. If the Administration was to
be defeated, he was determined that defeat should come upon an
issue which involved the whole controversy. If the purse of the
Nation was to be handed over to the control of those who were not
ready to use the last dollar in the war for the preservation of
the Union, the President was resolved that every voter in the Loyal
States should be made to comprehend the deadly significance of such
a decision.
The effect of the policy was for a time apparently disastrous to
the Administration. The most sagacious among political leaders
trembled for the result. Only the radical anti-slavery men of the
type of Sumner and Stevens and Lovejoy were strong and unyielding
in faith. They could not doubt, they would not doubt the result.
For many weeks the elections in the North promised nothing but
adversity. Maine voted a few days before the Proclamation was
issued. Ever since the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the
majorities against the Democrats in that State had varied from ten
to nineteen thousand. Under the pressure of military reverses and
the cry of an abolition war, the majority for Abner Coburn, the
Republican candidate for governor, was a little over four thousand;
and for the first time in ten years one of the districts returned
a Democratic representative to Congress in the person of L. D. M.
Sweat. Vermont, contrary to the tide of opinion elsewhere, increased
her majority for the Administration--an event due in large part to
the loyal position taken by Paul Dillingham who had been the leader
of the Democratic party in the State.
The October elections were utterly discouraging. In Ohio the
Democrats prevailed in fourteen of the Congressional districts,
leaving the Republicans but five,--registering at the same time a
popular majority of some seven thousand against the Administration.
The extent of this reverse may be measured by the fact that in the
preceding Congressional election Republican representatives had
been chosen in thirteen districts. In Indiana the result was
overwhelming against the President. The Republicans had held their
convention early in the summer and had re-affirmed the Crittenden
Resolution as embodying their platform of principles. They were
not in position therefore to withstand the furious onslaught made
by the Democrats on the Slavery question. Of the eleven Congressional
districts the Republicans secured but three, and the Democrats had
a large majority on the popular vote.--In Pennsylvania whose election
was usually accepted as the index to the average public opinion of
the country, the Democrats secured a majority of four thousand,
and elected one-half the delegation to Congress. In November,
1860, Mr. Lincoln had received a majority of sixty thousand in
Pennsylvania, and this change marked the ebb of popular favor
created by the anti-slavery policy of the Administration.
Against the candidacy of Mr. Seymour for the governorship of New
York, the Republicans nominated James S. Wadsworth, formerly a
partisan of Mr. Van Buren and Silas Wright. He was a gentleman of
the highest character, of large landed estate which he had inherited,
and of wide personal popularity. He had volunteered for the war and
was then in the service, with the rank of Brigadier-General. The
convention which nominated him assembled after Mr. Lincoln's decisive
action. They hailed "with the profoundest satisfaction the recent
proclamation of the President declaring his intention to emancipate
the slaves of all rebels who did not return to their allegiance by
the 1st of January, 1863," and they urged upon the National Government
"to use all the means that the God of battles had placed in its
power against a revolt so malignant and so pernicious." Lyman
Tremaine, a distinguished citizen who had been theretofore connected
with the Democratic party, was nominated for Lieutenant-Governor.
The contest was extremely animated, enlisting the interest of the
entire country. The result was a victory for Mr. Seymour. His
majority over General Wadsworth was nearly ten thousand. His vote
almost equaled the total of all the Democratic factions in the
Presidential election of 1860, while Mr. Wadsworth fell nearly
seventy thousand behind the vote given to Mr. Lincoln. The
discrepancy could be well accounted for by the greater number of
Republicans who had gone to the war, and for whose voting outside
the State no provision had been made. No result could have been
more distasteful to the Administration than the triumph of Mr.
Seymour, and the experience of after years did not diminish the
regret with which they had seen him elevated to a position of power
at a time when the utmost harmony was needed between the National
and State Governments.
REPUBLICAN DEFEAT IN ILLINOIS.
To the President the most mortifying event of the year was the
overwhelming defeat in Illinois. Great efforts were made by the
Republican party to save the State. Personal pride entered into
the contest almost as much as political principle, but against all
that could be done the Democrats secured a popular majority of
seventeen thousand, and out of the fourteen representatives in
Congress they left but three to the Republicans. They chose a
Democratic Legislature, which returned William A. Richardson to
the Senate for the unexpired term of Mr. Douglas,--filled since
his death by O. H. Browning who had been appointed by the Governor.
The crushing defeat of Mr. Lincoln in his own State had a depressing
effect upon the party elsewhere, and but for the assurance in which
the Administration found comfort and cheer, that the Democrats were
at home to vote while the Republicans were in the field to fight,
the result would have proved seriously discouraging to the country
and utterly destructive of the policy of emancipation as proclaimed
by the President.
In the five leading free States, the Administration had thus met
with a decisive defeat. The Democratic representatives chosen to
Congress numbered in the aggregate fifty-nine, while those favorable
to the Administration were only forty. In some other States the
results were nearly as depressing. New Jersey, which had given
half its electoral vote to Mr. Lincoln two years before, now elected
a Democratic governor by nearly fifteen thousand majority, and of
her five representatives in Congress only one was friendly to the
policy of the Administration. Michigan, which had been Republican
by twenty thousand in 1860, now gave the Administration but six
thousand majority, though Senator Chandler made almost superhuman
efforts to bring out the full vote of the party. Wisconsin, which
had given Mr. Lincoln a large popular majority, now gave a majority
of two thousand for the Democrats, dividing the Congressional
delegation equally between the two parties.
If this ratio had been maintained in all the States, the defeat of
the war party and of the anti-slavery policy would have been
complete. But relief came and the Administration was saved. The
New-England States which voted in November stood firmly by their
principles, though with diminished majorities. The contest in
Massachusetts resulted in the decisive victory of Governor Andrew
over General Charles Devens, who ran as a Coalition candidate of
the Democrats and Independents against the emancipation policy of
the Administration. New Hampshire which voted the ensuing spring
had the benefit of a Loyal re-action and sustained the Administration.
In the West, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota cheered the Administration
with unanimous Republican delegations to Congress, and on the
Pacific coast California and Oregon stood firmly by the President.
The result in the Border slave States amply vindicated the sagacity
and wisdom of the President in so constantly and carefully nurturing
their loyalty and defending them against the inroads of the
Confederates. They responded nobly, and in great part repaired
the injury inflicted by States which were presumptively more loyal
to the Administration, and which had a far larger stake in the
struggle for the Union. Delaware's one representative was Republican,
Missouri elected a decisive majority of friends to the Administration,
and in the ensuing year Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland
materially increased the strength of the government. The Administration
was finally assured that it would be able to command a majority of
about twenty in the House. But for the aid of the Border slave
States the anti-slavery position of Mr. Lincoln might have been
overthrown by a hostile House of Representatives. It is true
therefore in a very striking sense that the five slave States which
Mr. Lincoln's policy had held to their loyalty, were most effectively
used by him in overpowering the eleven slave States which had
revolted against the Union.
COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION URGED.
The third and last session of the Thirty-seventh Congress assembled
four weeks after the close of the exciting contest for the control
of the next House of Representatives. The message of Mr. Lincoln
made no reference whatever to the political contest in the country,
and unlike his previous communications to Congress gave no special
summary of the achievements by our forces either upon the land or
the sea. He contended himself with stating that he transmitted
the reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and referred
Congress to them for full information. He dwelt a length upon the
total inadequacy of Disunion as a remedy for the differences between
the people of the two sections, and quoted with evident satisfaction
the declarations he had made in his Inaugural address upon that
point. In his judgment "there is no line, straight or crooked,
suitable for a National boundary upon which to divide. Trace it
through from east to west upon the line between the free and the
slave country, and we shall find a little more than one-third of
its length are rivers easy to be crossed; and populated, or soon
to be populated, thickly on both sides, while nearly all its
remaining length are merely surveyor's lines over which people may
walk back and forth without any consciousness of their presence.
No part of this line can be made any more difficult to pass by
writing it down on paper or parchment as a National boundary." In
the President's view "a nation may be said to consist of its
territory, its people, and its laws. The territory is the only
part which is of certain durability. That portion of the earth's
surface which is inhabited by the people of the United States is
well adapted for the home of one National family, but it is not
well adapted for two or more."
Mr. Lincoln was still anxious that the Loyal slave States should
secure the advantage of compensated emancipation which he had
already urged, and he recommended an amendment to the Constitution
whereby a certain amount should be paid by the United States to
each State that would abolish slavery before the first day of
January, A. D. 1900. The amount was to be paid in bonds of the
United States on which interest was to begin from the time of actual
delivery to the States. The amendment was further to declare, that
"all slaves who enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war at
any time before the end of the rebellion shall be forever free,"
but the individual owners, if loyal, shall be compensated at the
same rate that may be paid to those in States abolishing slavery.
The amendment also proposed to give to "Congress the right to
appropriate money for the colonization of the emancipated slaves,
with their own consent, at any place outside of the United States."
Congress had scarcely time to consider this grave proposition when
the President issued on the first day of the new year (1863) his
formal Proclamation abolishing slavery in all the States in rebellion
against the Government, with the exception of Tennessee, and of
certain parishes in Louisiana and certain counties in Virginia
whose population was considered loyal to the Government. Tennessee
was excepted from the operation of the Proclamation at the urgent
request of Andrew Johnson who, after the fall of Nashville in the
preceding spring, had resigned from the Senate to accept the
appointment of military governor of his State. His service in the
Senate, with his State in flagrant rebellion, was felt to be somewhat
anomalous and he was glad to accept a position in which he could
be more directly helpful to the loyal cause. He possessed the
unbounded confidence of Mr. Lincoln who yielded to his views
respecting the best mode of restoring Tennessee to the Union, and
her inhabitants to their duty to the National Government. There
is good reason for believing that both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Johnson
afterwards regarded the omission of Tennessee from the Proclamation
of Emancipation as a mistake, honestly made in the first place by
Governor Johnson and too readily acceded to by the President.
The recommendation of Mr. Lincoln for a system of compensated
emancipation was taken up promptly and cordially by the Republican
members of both branches of Congress. The House appointed a special
committee on the subject. With but little delay a bill was passed
appropriating to Missouri, the first State considered, ten millions
of dollars with the restriction that the money should be paid only
to the loyal slave-holders. The Senate increased the amount to
fifteen millions of dollars and returned it to the House for
concurrence in the amendment. The measure had been thus passed in
both branches but with stubborn opposition on the part of some
prominent Democratic leaders from Missouri. John B. Henderson in
the Senate and John W. Noell in the House labored earnestly to
secure the compensation for their State, but the bill was finally
defeated in the House. By factious resistance, by dilatory motions
and hostile points of order, the Democratic members from Missouri
were able to force the bill from its position of parliamentary
advantage, and to prevent its consideration within the period in
which a majority of the House could control its fate. The just
responsibility for depriving Missouri of the fifteen millions of
dollars must be charged in an especial degree to Thomas L. Price,
Elijah H. Norton, and William A. Hall, representatives from that
State, who on the 25th of February, 1863, by the use of objectionable
tactics deprived the House of the opportunity even to consider a
bill of such value and consequence to their constituents. A large
majority stood ready to pass it, but the determined hostility of
the Democratic members from Missouri defeated the kindly and generous
intentions of Congress towards their own State. At a later period
in the session the attempt was made to pass the bill by a suspension
of the Rules, but this motion though it received the support of a
majority was defeated for the lack of two-thirds of the votes as
required. The Democratic members of Missouri were again active in
resisting the boon which was offered to their State and so earnestly
pressed by the Republicans of the House.
MISTAKE OF BORDER STATE MEN.
The course of the Missouri representatives was sustained by the
solid vote of the Democratic members from the free States, and
received the co-operation of a majority of representatives from
the Border slave States. If the bill for Missouri had passed, a
similar relief would have been offered to Kentucky, West Virginia,
Maryland and Delaware. Mr. Crittenden whose influence with the
representatives from these States was deservedly great could not
be persuaded to adopt the President's policy. The consideration
which influenced him and other Border State men to the course which
subsequent events proved to be unwise, was their distrust of the
success of the Union arms. The prospect had grown steadily
discouraging ever since the adjournment of Congress in the preceding
July, and with the exception of General McClellan's success at
Antietam there had been nothing to lighten the gloom which deeply
beclouded the military situation. The daily expenditures of the
nation were enormous, and the Secretary of the Treasury had at the
opening of the season estimated that the National debt at the close
of the current fiscal year would exceed seventeen hundred millions
of dollars. The Border State men chose therefore to maintain
possession of their four hundred thousand slaves, even with the
title somewhat shaken by war, rather than to part with them for
the bonds of a Government whose ability to pay they considered
extremely doubtful.
They could readily have secured, indeed they were urged to accept,
fifty millions of dollars, the equivalent of gold coin, in securities
which became in a few years the favorite investment of the wisest
capitalists in the world. Such opportunities are never repeated.
The magnanimous policy of the President and the wise liberality of
the Republican party were precisely adapted, if the Border State
men could have seen it, to the critical situation of the hour.
Subsequent events prevented the repetition of the offer, and the
slave-holders were left to thank themselves and their representatives
for the loss of the munificent compensation proffered by the
Government. They could not believe Mr. Lincoln when at the pressing
moment he pleaded with them so earnestly to accept the terms, and
flavored his appeal with the humorous remark to Mr. Crittenden:
"You Southern men will soon reach the point where bonds will be a
more valuable possession than bondsmen. Nothing is more uncertain
now than two-legged property."
After the unfortunate issue of the Peninsular campaign and in the
fear that Lee might turn directly upon Washington, a new army was
organized on the 27th of June, 1862, and placed under the command
of Major-General John Pope. It included the forces which had been
serving under Fremont, Banks and McDowell, and was divided into
three corps with these officers respectively in command. General
Fremont considering the designation below his rank asked to be
relieved from the service, and his corps was assigned to General
Rufus King, and soon after to General Sigel. General Pope took
the field on the 14th of July with a formidable force. General
McClellan was still within twenty-five miles of Richmond, and with
Pope in front of Washington, the Confederate authorities were at
a standstill and could not tell which way to advance with hope of
success or even with safety.
If the army of Lee should move towards Washington he might be
compelled to fight General Pope protected by the extensive
fortifications on the south side of the Potomac, leaving Richmond
at the same time uncovered, with the possibility that McClellan,
re-enforced by Burnside's corps which lay at Fortress Monroe, would
renew his attack with an army of ninety thousand men. But as soon
as the Confederates ascertained that McClellan was ordered back to
the Potomac, they saw their opportunity and made haste to attack
Pope. Fault was found with the slowness of McClellan's movements.
His judgment as a military man was decidedly against the transfer
of his army from the point it occupied near Richmond, and it cannot
be said that he obeyed the distasteful order with the alacrity with
which he would have responded to one that agreed with his own
judgment.
AGGRESSIVE COURSE OF THE CONFEDERATES.
No reason can be assigned why if the Army of the Potomac was to be
brought back in front of Washington it should not have been
transferred in season to re-enforce General Pope and give a crushing
blow to Lee. General McClellan was directed on the third day of
August to withdraw his whole army to Acquia Creek, and as General
Halleck declares, "in order to make the movement as rapidly as
possible General McClellan was authorized to assume control of all
the vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay, of which there
was then a vast fleet." General McClellan did not begin the
evacuation of Harrison's Landing until the 14th of August--eleven
days after it was ordered. General Burnside's corps was ordered
on the 1st of August to move from Newport News to Acquia Creek,
and an estimate of the transportation facilities at command of
General McClellan, may be formed from the fact that Burnside's
whole corps reached their destination in forty-eight hours. General
Lee knew at once by this movement that it was not the design to
attack Richmond, and he made haste to throw his army on Pope before
the slow moving army from Harrison's Landing could re-enforce him.
General McClellan did not himself reach Acquia Creek until the 24th
of August. The disasters sustained by General Pope in the month
of August could not have occurred if the forces of the Union,
readily at command, had been brought seasonably to his aid. It
was at this crisis that the unfortunate movements were made, the
full responsibility for which, perhaps the exact character of which,
may never be determined, but the sorrowful result of which was that
the Union forces, much larger in the aggregate than Lee's, were
divided and continually outnumbered on the field of battle.
Flushed with success the Confederate authorities pushed their
fortunes with great boldness. General Bragg invaded Kentucky with
a large army and General Lee prepared to invade Pennsylvania. The
cruel defeat of General Pope disabled him for the time as a commander,
and the Administration, fearing for the safety of Washington, and
yielding somewhat to the obvious wishes of the soldiers, ordered
General McClellan on September 2 to assume command of all troops
for the defense of the Capital. General Lee avoiding the fortifications
of Washington, passed over to Maryland, and prepared to invade
Pennsylvania with a force formidable in numbers and with the added
strength of a supreme confidence in its invincibility. General
McClellan moved promptly westward to cut off Lee's progress northward.
After preliminary engagements the main battle of Antietam was fought
on the 17th of September, resulting in a Union victory. Lee was
severely repulsed and retreated across the Potomac.
General McClellan fought the battle of Antietam under extraordinary
embarrassment caused by the surrender of Harper's Ferry to the
Confederates on the 13th, with a loss to the Union army of more
than twelve thousand men. Could he have had the advantage of this
force on the battle-field, under a competent commander, at the
critical moment, his victory over Lee might have been still more
decisive. His success however was of overwhelming importance to
the National Government and put a stop to an invasion of Pennsylvania
which might have been disastrous in the extreme. He was blamed
severely, perhaps unjustly, for not following Lee on his retreat
and reaping the fruits of his victory. He had the misfortune to
fall into a controversy once more with the authorities at Washington.
After a correspondence with the War Department he was peremptorily
ordered by the General-in-Chief Halleck on the 6th of October in
these words: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac
and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must
move now while the roads are good. . . . I am directed to add that
the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with
the President in these instructions." The order was not promptly
obeyed. The Army of the Potomac--as those who spoke for General
McClellan maintained--had been for six months engaged in a laborious
campaign in which they had fought many battles and experienced much
hardship. They needed rest, recruitment, clothes, shoes, and a
general supply of war material before setting out on what would
prove a winter march. The authorities at Washington asserted, and
apparently proved on the testimony of Quartermaster-General Meigs,
a most accomplished, able, and honorable officer, that the Army of
the Potomac, when it received its first orders to move in October,
was thoroughly and completely equipped. General McClellan thought
however that if intrusted with the command of the army he should
be allowed to direct its movements. He crossed the Potomac near
Harper's Ferry in the last week of October, and began an advance
through Virginia which effectually covered Washington. He had
reached Warrenton, and, before the plan of his campaign was developed,
received at midnight, on the 7th of November, a direct order from
President Lincoln to "surrender the command of the army to General
Burnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capital
of New Jersey."
GENERAL McCLELLAN'S MILITARY CAREER.
The reasons for this sudden and peremptory order were not given,
and if expressed would probably have been only an assertion of the
utter impossibility that the War Department and General McClellan
should harmoniously co-operate in the great military movements
which devolved upon the Army of the Potomac. But the time of
removal was not opportunely selected by the Administration. After
General McClellan's failure on the Peninsula, a large proportion
of the Northern people clamored for his deposition from command,
and it would have been quietly acquiesced in by all. At the end
of those disastrous days when he was falling back on the line of
the James River, General McClellan had telegraphed the Secretary
of War "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no
thanks to you or to any persons in Washington. You have done your
best to sacrifice this army." Perhaps no such dispatch was ever
before sent by a military officer to the Commander-in-Chief of the
army--to the ruler of the nation. In any other country it would
have been followed with instant cashiering. Mr. Lincoln, with his
great magnanimity, had however condoned the offense, and after the
defeat of Pope the Administration had enlarged the command of
McClellan and trusted the fortunes of the country to his generalship.
The trust had not been in vain. He had rolled back the tide of
invasion by a great battle in which for the first time the army of
Lee had been beaten. He was now marching forward with his army
strengthened for another conflict, and without explanation to the
country or to himself was deprived of his command. A large part
of the people and of the public press and an overwhelming majority
in the army were dissatisfied with the act, and believed that it
would entail evil consequences.
This ended the military career of General McClellan which throughout
its whole period had been a subject of constant discussion--a
discussion which has not yet closed. The opinion of a majority of
intelligent observers, both civil and military, is that he was a
man of high professional training, admirably skilled in the science
of war, capable of commanding a large army with success, but at
the same time not original in plan, not fertile in resource, and
lacking the energy, the alertness, the daring, the readiness to
take great risks for great ends, which distinguish the military
leaders of the world. For a commander of armies, in an offensive
campaign, his caution was too largely developed. He possessed in
too great a degree what the French term the _defensive instinct of
the engineer_, and was apparently incapable of doing from his own
volition what he did so well on the bloody field of Antietam, when
under the pressure of an overwhelming necessity.
General Burnside assumed the command with diffidence. After a
consultation with General Halleck he moved down the Rappahannock
opposite Fredericksburg where he confronted General Lee's army on
the 13th of December, and made an attack upon it under great
disadvantages and with the legitimate result of a great defeat.
The total loss of killed and wounded of the Union army exceeded
ten thousand men. The public mind was deeply affected throughout
the North by this untoward event. All the prestige which Lee had
lost at Antietam had been regained, all the advantage we had secured
on that field was sacrificed by the disaster on the still bloodier
field of Fredericksburg. It added immeasurably to the gloom of a
gloomy winter, and in the rank and file of the army it caused a
dissatisfaction somewhat akin to mutiny. So pronounced did this
feeling become and so plainly was it manifested that the subject
attracted the attention of Congress and led to some results which,
despite the seriousness of the situation, were irresistibly amusing.
On the 23d of January Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts offered a somewhat
extraordinary resolution,--instructing the Committee on the Conduct
of the War to "inquire whether Major-General Burnside has since
the battle of Fredericksburg formed any plans for the movement of
the Army of the Potomac or any portion of the same, and if so
whether any subordinate generals of said army have written to or
visited Washington, to oppose or interfere with the execution of
such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been
arrested or interfered with, and if so by what authority." The
consideration of the resolution was postponed under the rule, and
three days later it was called up by Mr. Anthony of Rhode Island
and its adoption urged "with the view of finding out whether officers
were coming up here from the Army of the Potomac to interfere with
the plans of General Burnside." There was indeed no doubt that
some of the general officers connected with the army had been in
Washington, and confidentially informed the President of the
dispirited and depressed condition of the whole force.
GENERAL BURNSIDE AND GENERAL HOOKER.
General Burnside's character was one of great frankness, truth,
and fidelity. He was full of courage and of manliness, and he
conceived from circumstances within his knowledge, that certain
officers in his command were gradually undermining and destroying
him in the confidence of the army and of the public. He had not
desired the position to which the President called him as the
successor of General McClellan. He did not feel himself indeed
quite competent to the task of commanding an army of one hundred
thousand men. But there as in every other position in life he
would try to do his best. He failed and failed decisively. It
would probably have been wise for him to resign his command
immediately after the defeat at Fredericksburg. On January 23,
the Friday before the Senate resolution was adopted, General
Burnside, highly incensed by the injury which he thought had been
done him, wrote an order peremptorily "dismissing, subject to the
approval of the President, Major-General Joseph E. Hooker from the
Army of the United States, for having been guilty of unjust and
unnecessary criticism of his superior officers, and for having by
the general tone of his conversation endeavored to create distrust
in the minds of officers who have associated with him, and for
having habitually spoken in disparaging terms of other officers."
The order declared that General Hooker was dismissed "as a man
unfit to hold an important commission during a crisis like the
present when so much patience, charity, confidence, consideration,
and patriotism is due from every person in the field." The same
order dismissed Brigadier-General John Newton and Brigadier-General
John Cochrane for going to the President with criticisms on the
plans of the commanding officer, and relieved Major-General William
B. Franklin, Major-General W. F. Smith, Brigadier-General Sturgis
and several others from further service in the Army of the Potomac.
The outcome of this extraordinary proceeding was very singular.
General Burnside took the order, before its publication, to the
President who instead of approving it, very good-naturedly found
a command for the General in the West, and on the very day that
the Senate passed the resolution of inquiry, two orders were read
at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac,--one from General
Burnside announcing that Major-General Joseph E. Hooker was assigned
to the command of the Army of the Potomac and asking the army to
"give to the brave and skillful General, who is now to command you,
your full and cordial support and co-operation;" the other from
General Hooker assuming command of the Army of the Potomac by
direction of the President and conveying to the late commander,
General Burnside, "the most cordial good wishes of the whole army."
In the South-West where General Grant, General Sherman, and General
Rosecrans were stubbornly contesting the ground, no decisive results
were attained. The army went into winter quarters, with a general
feeling of discouragement pervading the country. A substantial
advantage was gained by General Buell's army in driving Bragg out
of Kentucky, and a very signal and helpful encouragement came to
the Government from the fact that the public manifestations in
Kentucky were decisively adverse to the Confederates, and that
Lee's army in Maryland met no welcome from any portion of the
population. General McClellan's army was cheered everywhere in
Maryland as it marched to the field of Antietam; and as Bragg
retreated through the mountain sections of Kentucky his stragglers
were fired upon by the people, and the women along the route
upbraided the officers with bitter maledictions. Perhaps the
feature of the two invasions most discouraging to the Confederates
was the condition of the popular mind which they found in the Border
States. They had expected to arouse fresh revolt, but they met a
people tired of conflict and longing for repose under the flag of
the Nation.
Congress felt that the situation was one of uncertainty if not of
positive adversity. They did not however abate one jot or tittle
of earnest effort in providing for a renewal of the contest in the
ensuing spring. They appropriated some seven hundred and forty
millions of dollars for the army and some seventy-five millions
for the navy, and they took the very decisive step of authorizing
"the President to enroll, arm, equip, and receive into the land
and naval service of the United States such number of volunteers
of African descent as he may deem useful to suppress the present
Rebellion for such term of service as he may prescribe, not exceeding
five years." The enactment of this bill was angrily resisted by
the Democratic party and by the Union men of the Border States.
But the Republicans were able to consolidate their ranks in support
of it. In the popular opinion it was a radical measure, and therein
lay its chief merit. Aside from the substantial strength which
the accession of these colored men to the ranks would give to the
Union army, was the moral effect which would be produced on the
minds of Southern men by the open demonstration that the President
did not regard the Proclamation of Emancipation as _brutum fulmen_,
but intended to enforce it by turning the strong arm of the slave
against the person of the master. It was a policy that required
great moral courage, and it was abundantly rewarded by successful
results. It signalized to the whole world the depth of the
earnestness with which the Administration was defending the Union,
and the desperate extent to which the contest would be carried
before American nationality should be surrendered. The measure
had long been demanded by the aggressive sentiment of the North,
and its enactment was hailed by the mass of people in the Loyal
States as a great step forward.
SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS.
A subject of striking interest at this session of Congress was the
passage of the "Act relating to _habeas corpus_, and regulating
judicial proceedings in certain cases." The President had ordered
for the public safety, and as an act necessary to the successful
prosecution of the war, the arrest and confinement of certain
persons charged with disloyal practices. No punishment was attempted
or designed except that of confinement in a military fortress of
the United States. It became a matter of argument not only in
Congress but throughout the country, whether the President was
authorized by the Constitution to suspend the writ of _habeas
corpus_. In order to set the question at rest it was now proposed
to pass an Act of indemnity for past acts to all officers engaged
in making arrests, and also to confirm to the President by law the
right which he had of his own power been exercising. The bill
declared that "during the present Rebellion the President of the
United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may
require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of
_habeas corpus_ in any case throughout the United States or any
part thereof; and wherever the said writ shall be suspended no
military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ
of _habeas corpus_, to return the body of any person or persons
detained by him by authority of the President."
The bill was stubbornly resisted by the Democratic party, and after
its passage by the House thirty-six Democratic representatives
asked leave to enter upon the Journal a solemn protest against its
enactment. They recited at length their grounds of objection, the
principal of which was "the giving to the President the right to
suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_ throughout the limits of the
United States, whereas by the Constitution the power to suspend
the privilege of that writ is confided to the discretion of Congress
alone and is limited to the place threatened by the dangers of
invasion or insurrection," and also because "the bill purports to
confirm and make valid by act of Congress arrests and imprisonments
which were not only not warranted by the Constitution of the United
States but were in palpable violation of its express prohibitions."
Mr. Thaddeus Stevens peremptorily moved to lay the request on the
table, and on a call of the ayes and noes the motion prevailed by
a vote of 75 to 41. The division in the House by this time amounted
to a strict line, on one side of which was the war party and on
the other side the anti-war party.
The crowning achievement of the session in aid of the Union was
the passage of an "Act for enrolling and calling out the National
forces and for other purposes." By its terms all able-bodied
citizens of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty-
five years, with a few exemptions which were explicitly stated,
were declared to "constitute the National forces and shall be
employed to perform military duty in the service of the United
States when called on by the President for that purpose." Volunteering
was not to be relied upon as the sole means of recruiting the army,
but the entire population within the arms-bearing age was now to
be devoted to the contest. Taken in connection with other legislation
already adverted to--the enormous appropriations for the forthcoming
campaign, the organization of African regiments, the suspension of
the writ of _habeas corpus_ at the President's discretion--this
last measure was the conclusive proof of the serious determination
with which Congress and the people would continue the contest.
The spirit with which the President and Congress proceeded in that
depressing and depressed period proved invaluable to the country.
The situation had so many elements of a discouraging character that
the slightest hesitation or faltering among those controlling the
administration of the Government would have been followed by distrust
and dismay among the people.