Second Session of Thirty-seventh Congress.--The Military Situation.
--Disaster at Ball's Bluff.--Death of Colonel E. D. Baker.--The
President's Message.--Capital and Labor.--Their Relation discussed
by the President.--Agitation of the Slavery Question.--The House
refuses to re-affirm the Crittenden Resolution.--Secretary Cameron
resigns.--Sent on Russian Mission.--Succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton.
--His Vigorous War Measures.--Victories in the Field.--Battle of
Mill Spring.--General Order of the President for a Forward Movement.
--Capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.--Prestige and Popularity
of General Grant.--Illinois Troops.--General Burnside's Victory in
North Carolina.--Effect of the Victories upon the Country.--Continued
Success for the Union in the South-West.--Proposed Celebration.--
The Monitor and the Merrimac.--Ericsson.--Worden.--Capture of New
Orleans by Farragut.--The Navy.--Its Sudden and Great Popularity.
--Legislation in its Favor.--Battle of Shiloh.--Anxiety in the
North.--Death of Albert Sidney Johnston.--General Halleck takes
the Field.--Military Situation in the East.--The President and
General McClellan.--The Peninsular Campaign.--Stonewall Jackson's
Raid.--Its Disastrous Effect.--Fear for Safety of Washington.--Anti-
Slavery Legislation.--District of Columbia.--Compensated Emancipation.
--Colonization.--Confiscation.--Punishment of Treason.
The first session of the Thirty-seventh Congress came to an end
amid the deep gloom caused by the disastrous defeat at Bull Run.
The second session opened in December, 1861, under the shadow of
a grave disaster at Ball's Bluff, in which the eloquent senator
from Oregon, Edward D. Baker, lost his life. Despite these reverses
the patriotic spirit of the country had constantly risen, and had
increased the Union forces until the army was six hundred thousand
strong. Winfield Scott had gone upon the retired list at the ripe
age of seventy-five, and George B. McClellan had succeeded him in
command of the army. The military achievements thus far had been
scarcely more then defensive. The National Capital had been
fortified; Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri had been
wrenched from rebel domination; while on our Southern coast two
landings had been effected by the Union troops,--the first at
Hatteras in North Carolina, the second at Port Royal in South
Carolina. There was serious danger of a division of popular
sentiment in the North growing out of the Slavery question; there
was grave apprehension of foreign intervention from the arrest of
Mason and Slidell. The war was in its eighth month; and, strong
and energetic as the Northern people felt, it cannot be denied that
a confidence in ultimate triumph had become dangerously developed
throughout the South.
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, 1861.
The message of Mr. Lincoln dealt with the situation in perfect
candor. He did not attempt to withhold any thing or to color any
thing. He frankly acknowledged that "our intercourse with foreign
nations had been attended with profound solicitude." He recognized
that "a nation which endured factious domestic division is exposed
to disrespect abroad; and one party, if not both, is sure, sooner
or later, to invoke foreign intervention." With his peculiar power
of condensing a severe expression, he said that "the disloyal
citizens of the United States have offered the ruin of our country
in return for the aid and comfort which they have invoked abroad."
This offer was made on the presumption that some commercial or
substantial gain would accrue to other nations from the destruction
of the Republic; but Mr. Lincoln believed with confidence that
"foreign governments would not in the end fail to perceive that
one strong nation promises more durable peace, and a more extensive,
valuable, and reliable commerce, than can the same nation broken
into hostile fragments," and for this reason he believed that the
rebel leaders had received from abroad "less patronage and
encouragement than they probably expected."
The President dwelt with satisfaction upon the condition of the
Border States, concerning whose course he had constantly exhibited
the profoundest solicitude. He now informed Congress that "noble
little Delaware led off right, from the first," and that Maryland,
which had been "made to seem against the Union," had given "seven
regiments to the loyal cause, and none to the enemy, and her people,
at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majority
and a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to any
candidate on any question." Kentucky, concerning which his anxiety
had been deepest, was now decidedly, and, as he thought, "unchangeably,
ranged on the side of the Union." Missouri he announced as
comparatively quiet, and he did not believe she could be again
overrun by the insurrectionists. These Border slave States, none
of which "would promise a single soldier at first, have now an
aggregate of not less than forty thousand in the field for the
Union; while of their citizens certainly not more than a third of
that number, and they of doubtful whereabouts and doubtful existence,
are in arms against it." Beyond these results the President had
some "general accounts of popular movements in behalf of the Union
in North Carolina and Tennessee," and he expressed his belief that
"the cause of the Union is advancing steadily and certainly
Southward."
The one marked change in the popular opinion of the free States,
now reflected in Congress, was in respect to the mode of dealing
with Slavery. Mr. Lincoln was conservative, and always desired to
keep somewhat in the rear rather than too far in advance of the
public judgment. In his message he avoided all direct expression
upon the Slavery question, but with the peculiar shrewdness which
characterized his political discussion he announced a series of
general truths respecting labor and capital which, in effect, were
deadly hostile to the institution. He directed attention to the
fact the "the insurrection is largely if not exclusively a war upon
the first principle of popular government--the rights of the people."
Conclusive evidence of this appeared in "the maturely considered
public documents as well as in the general tone of the insurgents."
He discerned a disposition to abridge the right of suffrage and to
deny to the people the "right to participate in the selection of
public officers except those of the Legislature." He found indeed
that "monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge
from the power of the people." While he did not think it fitting
to make "a general argument in favor of popular institutions," he
felt that he should scarcely be justified were he "to omit raising
a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism." It
was, he said, "the effort to place capital on an equal footing
with, if not above, labor in the structure of government," and it
assumed "that labor is available only in connection with capital;
that nobody labors unless somebody else, owning capital, somehow
by the use of it induces him to labor."
THE PRESIDENT'S ANTI-SLAVERY ARGUMENT.
Mr. Lincoln found that the next step in this line of argument raised
the question, "whether it is best that capital shall hire laborers,
and thus induce them to work by their own consent, or buy them,
and drive them to it without their consent?" thus leading to the
conclusion that "all laborers are either hired laborers or what we
call slaves," and that "whoever is once a hired laborer is fixed
in that condition for life." From all these theories Mr. Lincoln
radically dissented, and maintained that "labor is the superior of
capital, and deserves much the higher consideration." "No men
living," said he, "are more worthy to be trusted than those who
toil up from poverty--none less inclined to take or touch aught
which they have not honestly earned. Let them beware of surrendering
a political power which they already possess, and which, if
surrendered, will surely be used to close the door of advancement,
and to fix new disabilities and burdens upon them till all of
liberty shall be lost." If Mr. Lincoln had directly attempted at
that early stage of the contest to persuade the laboring men of
the North that it was best for them to aid in abolishing Slavery,
he would have seriously abridged the popularity of his administration.
He pursued the wiser course of showing that the spirit of the
Southern insurrection was hostile to all free labor, and that in
its triumph not merely the independence of the laborer but his
right of self-defense, as conferred by suffrage, would be imperiled
if not destroyed. Until the discussion reached the higher plane
on which Mr. Lincoln placed it, the free laborer in the North was
disposed to regard a general emancipation of the slaves as tending
to reduce his own wages, and as subjecting him to the disadvantage
of an odious contest for precedence of race. The masses in the
North had united with the Republican party in excluding Slavery
from the Territories because the larger the area in which free
labor was demanded the better and more certain was the remuneration.
But against a general emancipation Mr. Lincoln was quick to see
that white laborers might be readily prejudiced by superficial
reasoning, and hence he adduced the broader argument which appealed
at once to their humanity, to their sense of manly independence,
and to their instinct of self-preservation against the mastery and
the oppression of capital.
The agitation of the Slavery question, while unavoidable, was
nevertheless attended with serious embarrassments to the Union
cause. The great outburst of patriotism which followed the fall
of Sumter contemplated a rally of the entire North for the defense
of the Flag and the preservation of the Union. Neither political
party was to take advantage of the situation, but all alike were
to share in the responsibility and in the credit of maintaining
the government inviolate. Every month however had demonstrated
more and more that to preserve the government without interfering
with Slavery would be impossible; and as this fact became clearly
evident to the Republican vision, a large section of the Democratic
party obdurately refused to acknowledge it or to consent to the
measures which it suggested. It was apparent therefore within the
first six months of the struggle that a division would come in the
North, which would be of incalculable advantage to the insurrectionists,
and that if the division should go far enough it would insure
victory to the Confederate cause. If the Democratic party as a
whole had in the autumn of the year 1861 taken the ground which a
considerable section of it assumed, it would have been impossible
to conduct the war for the Union successfully. Great credit
therefore was due and was cordially given to the large element in
that party which was ready to brave all the opprobrium of their
fellow-partisans and to accept the full responsibility of co-
operating with the Republicans in war measures.
Congress had hardly come together when the change of opinion and
action upon the Slavery question became apparent. Mr. Holman of
Indiana, reciting the Crittenden resolution which had been passed
the preceding session with only two adverse votes, offered a
resolution that its principles "be solemnly re-affirmed by this
House." Objection was made by several members. Mr. Thaddeus
Stevens moved to lay the resolution on the table, and the motion
prevailed on a yea and nay vote by 71 to 65. The majority were
all Republicans. The minority was principally made up of Democrats,
but Republicans as conspicuous as Mr. Dawes of Massachusetts and
Mr. Shellabarger of Ohio voted in the negative. The wide divergence
between this action on the part of the Republicans on the third
day of December, 1861, and that which they had taken on the preceding
22d of July, was recognized and appreciated by the country, and
thus began the open division on the Slavery question which continually
widened, which consolidated the Republican party in support of the
most radical measures, and which steadily tended to weaken the
Democratic party in the loyal States.
SECRETARY CAMERON RESIGNS.
At the height of the excitement in Congress over the engagement at
Ball's Bluff there was a change in the head of the War Department.
The disasters in the field and the general impatience for more
decisive movements on the part of our armies led to the resignation
of Secretary Cameron. He was in his sixty-third year, and though
of unusual vigor for his age, was not adapted by education or habit
to the persistent and patient toil, to the wearisome detail of
organization, to the oppressive increase of responsibility,
necessarily incident to military operations of such vast proportions
as were entailed by the progress of the war. He was nominated as
Minister to Russia, and on the eleventh day of January, 1862, was
succeeded in the War Department by Edwin M. Stanton.
Mr. Stanton signalized his entrance upon duty by extraordinary
vigor in war measures, and had the good fortune to gain credit for
many successes which were the result of arrangements in progress
and nearly perfected under his predecessor. A week after he was
sworn in, an important victory was won at Mill Springs, Kentucky,
by General George H. Thomas. The Confederate commander, General
Zollicoffer, was killed, and a very decisive check was put to a
new development of Secession sympathy which was foreshadowed in
Kentucky. A few days later, on the 27th of January, under the
inspiration of Mr. Stanton, the President issued a somewhat remarkable
order commanding "a general movement of the land and naval forces
of the United States against the insurgent forces on the 22d of
February." He especially directed that the army at and about
Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western
Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and
flotilla at Cairo, and the naval force in the Gulf of Mexico be
ready for a movement on that day. The order did not mean what was
stated on its face. It was evidently intended to mislead somebody.
The Illinois colonel who had taken possession of Paducah in the
preceding September was now known as Brigadier-General Grant. He
had been made prominent by a daring fight at Belmont, Missouri, on
the 7th of November (1861) against a largely superior force under
the command of the Confederate General Pillow. For the numbers
engaged it was one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war.
The quarter-master of the expedition intimated to General Grant
that in case of a reverse he had but two small steamers for transportation
to the Illinois shore. The General's only reply was that in the
event of his defeat "the steamers would hold all that would be
left." He was now in command at Cairo, and co-operating with him
was a flotilla of hastily constructed gunboats under the command
of Flag-officer A. H. Foote of the navy. General Grant evidently
interpreted Mr. Lincoln's order to mean that he need not wait until
the 22d, and he began his movement of the first day of February.
By the 16th he had captured Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. The
flotilla had been more active than the troops, against Fort Henry,
which was speedily evacuated, but Fort Donelson did not surrender
until after a hard-fought land battle in which the characteristic
tenacity, skill, and bravery of General Grant were for the first
time fully shown to the country. "The victory achieved," he
announced in his congratulatory order to the troops, "is not only
great in the effect it will have in breaking down the rebellion,
but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken
in a single battle on this continent." The number of prisoners
exceeded ten thousand; forty pieces of cannon and extensive magazines
of ordnance with military stores of all kinds were captured. The
Confederate commander was General S. B. Buckner, who had joined
the rebellion under circumstances which gained him much ill will
in the Loyal States. Under a flag of truce he asked General Grant
on the morning of the 16th for an armistice to "settle the terms
of capitulation." General Grant's answer was, "No terms except
unconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to move
immediately on your works." General Buckner felt himself "compelled
to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms" which General
Grant proposed. It is due to General Buckner to say that he had
been left in a humiliating position. The two generals who ranked
him, Gideon J. Pillow and John B. Floyd, seeing the inevitable,
had escaped from the fort the preceding night with five thousand
men, leaving to Buckner the mortification of surrender. In view
of this fact the use of the term "unchivalrous" by the Confederate
commander can be justly appreciated.
VICTORY AT FORT DONELSON.
The effect of the victory upon the country was electric. The public
joy was unbounded. General Grant had become in a day the hero of
the war. His fame was on every tongue. The initials of his name
were seized upon by the people for rallying-cries of patriotism,
and were woven into songs for the street and for the camp. He was
"Unconditional Surrender," he was "United States," he was "Uncle
Sam." Not himself only but his State was glorified. It was an
Illinois victory. No less than thirty regiments from that State
were in General Grant's command, and they had all won great credit.
This fact was especially pleasing to Mr. Lincoln. Indiana, Iowa,
Missouri, and Kentucky were all gallantly represented on the field,
but the prestige of the day belonged to Illinois. Many of her
public men, prominent in political life before and since the war,
were in command of regiments. The moral force of the victory was
increased by the fact that so large a proportion of these prominent
officers had been, like General Grant, connected with the Democratic
party,--thus adding demonstration to assurance that it was an
uprising of a people in defense of their government, and not merely
the work of a political party seeking to extirpate slavery. John
A. Logan, Richard J. Oglesby, William R. Morrison, and William Pitt
Kellogg were among the Illinois officers who shared in the renown
of the victory. General Lewis Wallace commanded a division made
up of Indiana and Kentucky troops, and was honorably prominent.
The total force under General Grant was nearly fifty regiments,
furnishing about twenty-eight thousand men for duty. They had
captured the strongest Confederate intrenchment in the West, manned
by nearly seventeen thousand men. The defeat was a great mortification
to Jefferson Davis. He communicated intelligence of the disaster
to the Confederate Congress in a curt message in which he described
the official reports of the battle as "incomplete and unsatisfactory,"
and stated that he had relieved Generals Floyd and Pillow from
command.
Two important results followed the victory. The strong fortifications
erected at Columbus, Kentucky, to control the passage of the
Mississippi, were abandoned by the Confederates; and Nashville,
the capital of Tennessee, was surrendered to the Union army without
resistance. The Confederate force at the latter point was under
command of General Albert Sidney Johnston, who, unable to offer
battle, sullenly retreated southward. If the Confederate troops
had been withdrawn from Fort Donelson in season to effect a junction
with Johnston at Nashville, that able general might have delivered
battle there on terms possibly advantageous to his side. It was
this feature of the case which rendered the loss of Donelson so
serious and so exasperating to the Confederate Government, as shown
in the message of Jefferson Davis.
Another victory for the Union was gained on the coast of North
Carolina under the joint efforts of the army and the navy. General
Burnside was in command of the former and Commodore Gouldsborough
of the latter. The battle of Roanoke Island was fought the day
after the capture of Fort Henry, and the Union victory led to a
lodgment of the national forces on the soil of North Carolina,
which was held firmly to the end. Events beyond the Mississippi
were also favorable to the National Government. General Sterling
Price had been the cause of much trouble in Missouri, where he was
personally popular. He had led many young men into rebellion, and
his efforts to carry the State into the Confederacy were energetic
and unremitting. He had been dominating a large section of Missouri
and creating grave apprehensions for its safety. On the 18th of
February General Halleck, who had succeeded General Fremont in the
command of the Western Department, telegraphed the Secretary of
War: "General Curtis has driven Price from Missouri, and is several
miles across the Arkansas line, cutting up Price's army and hourly
capturing prisoners and stores. The Army of the South-West is
doing its duty nobly. The flag of the Union is floating in
Arkansas."
These victories coming almost simultaneously produced a profound
impression throughout the Loyal States. Men rushed to the conclusion
that the war would be closed and the Union restored before the end
of the year. The most sedate communities become mercurial and
impressible in time of deep excitement. The rejoicing was universal.
Congress ordered the illumination of the Capitol and other public
buildings in Washington on the 22d of February "in honor of the
recent victories of our army and navy;" and "as a mark of respect
to the memory of those who had been killed and in sympathy with
those who have been wounded" the House of Representatives on the
19th of February, on the motion of Mr. Washburne of Illinois,
adjourned without transacting business. The flags taken in the
recent victories were to be publicly exhibited, and a day of general
congratulation was to be associated with the memory of Washington
and "the triumph of the government which his valor and wisdom had
done so much to establish." In the midst of the arrangements for
this celebration, the members of the Cabinet jointly communicated
to Congress on the 21st of February the intelligence that "the
President of the United States is plunged into affliction by the
death of a beloved child." Congress immediately ordered that the
illumination of the public buildings be omitted, and "entertaining
the deepest sentiments of sympathy and condolence with the President
and his family," adjourned. The reading of Washington's Farewell
Address on the 22d, before the two Houses, was the only part
accomplished of the brilliant celebration that had been designed.
THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC.
A fortnight later, on the 8th of March (1862), came the remarkable
engagement in Hampton Roads between the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_.
The former vessel arrived at Fortress Monroe after the _Merrimac_
had destroyed the United-States sloop-of-war _Cumberland_ and the
frigate _Congress_, and had driven the steam-frigate _Minnesota_
aground just as darkness put an end to the fight. On Sunday morning,
March 9, the _Merrimac_ renewed her attack upon the _Minnesota_,
and was completely surprised by the appearance of a small vessel
which, in the expressive description of the day, resembled a cheese-
box on a raft. She had arrived from New York at the close of the
first day's fight. From her turret began a furious cannonade which
not only diverted the attack from the _Minnesota_ but after a
ferocious contest of many hours practically destroyed the _Merrimac_,
which was compelled to seek the shelter of Confederate batteries
at Sewell's Point, and never re-appeared in service. The relief
to the North by this victory was incalculable. Not only had the
_Merrimac_ been stopped in her expected bombardment of Northern
cities, but the success of the _Monitor_ assured to the government
a class of armor-plated vessels that could be of great value in
the coast service to which our naval operations were principally
confined. Against land batteries they would prove especially
formidable. Ericsson who constructed the _Monitor_ and Lieutenant
Worden who commanded her, divided the honors, and were everywhere
regarded as having rendered an invaluable service to the country.
The modesty and heroism of Worden secured him an unbounded share
of popular admiration and respect.
In the ensuing month of April the navy performed another great
service by the capture of New Orleans. The fleet was in command
of Captain Farragut, and successfully passed the fortifications
which had been erected by the National Government to prevent a
foreign foe from entering the Mississippi. New Orleans made no
resistance to the approach of the fleet, and General B. F. Butler,
in command of the Department of the Gulf, established his headquarters
in the city. The importance of this conquest to the Union cause
could hardly be estimated. It enabled the government to embarrass
the trans-Mississippi States in their support of the rebel army,
and thus inflicted a heavy blow upon the fortunes of the Confederacy.
New Orleans in the control of the National Government was easy to
defend, and it afforded a base of offensive operations in so many
directions that no amount of vigilance could anticipate the attacks
that might be made by the Union forces.
Viewed in connection with the effective work of Flag-officer Foote
in supporting General Grant in the Henry and Donelson campaign,
and of Gouldsborough in supporting Burnside on the coast of North
Carolina, these later and greater achievements of the navy served
to raise that branch of the service in popular esteem. Besides
the intrinsic merit which attached to the victories, they had all
the advantage of a genuine surprise to the public. Little had been
expected from the navy in a contest where the field of operation
seemed so restricted. But now the people saw that the most important
post thus far wrenched from the Confederacy had been taken by the
navy, and that it was effectively sustaining and strengthening the
army at all points. It was no longer regarded as a mere blockading
force, but was menacing the coast of the Confederate States,
penetrating their rivers, and neutralizing the strength of thousands
of Rebel soldiers who were withdrawn from armies in the field to
man the fortifications rendered necessary by this unexpected form
of attack. These facts made a deep impression of Congress. Since
the close of the second war with Great Britain the navy had enjoyed
no opportunity for distinction. The war with Mexico was wholly a
contest on land, and for a period of forty-five years the navy of
the United States had not measured its strength with any foe.
Meanwhile however it had made great advance in the education and
training of its officers and in the general tone of the service.
Under the secretaryship of George Bancroft, the eminent historian,
(in the cabinet of Mr. Polk,) an academy had been established at
Annapolis for the scientific training of naval officers. By this
enlightened policy, inaugurated if not originally conceived by Mr.
Bancroft, naval officers had for the first time been placed on an
equal footing with the officers of the army who had long enjoyed
the advantages of the well-organized and efficient school at West
Point. The academy had borne fruit, and at the outbreak of the
war, the navy was filled with young officers carefully trained in
the duties of their profession, intelligent in affairs, and with
an _esprit de corps_ not surpassed in the service of any other
country. Their efficiency was supplemented by that of volunteer
officers in large numbers who came from the American merchant
marine, and who in all the duties of seamanship, in courage,
capacity, and patriotism, were the peers of any men who ever trod
a deck.
Congress now realized that a re-organization of the naval service
was necessary, that the stimulus of promotion should be more
liberally used, the pride of rank more generously indulged. An
Act was therefore passed on the 16th of July greatly enlarging the
scope of the naval organization and advancing the rank of its
officers. Farragut had won his magnificent triumph at New Orleans
while holding the rank of captain,--the highest then known to our
service,--and Worden had achieved his great fame at Hampton Roads
with the commission of a lieutenant. David D. Porter, with no
higher rank, had been exercising commands which in any European
government would have been assigned to an admiral. Perhaps no navy
in the world had at that time abler officers than ours, while the
rank and emolument, except for the lowest grades, was shamefully
inadequate. The old navy had only the ranks of passed-midshipman,
lieutenant, commander, and captain. The new law gave nine grades,
--midshipman, ensign, master, lieutenant, lieutenant-commander,
commander, captain, commodore, and rear-admiral. The effect of
the increased rank was undoubtedly stimulating to the service and
valuable to the government. Two higher grades of vice-admiral and
admiral were subsequently added, and were filled by Farragut and
Porter to whom in the judgment of the Department special and emphatic
honor was due. The navy had conquered its own place in the public
regard, and had performed an inestimable service in the contest
against the rebellion.
THE DESPERATE BATTLE OF SHILOH.
The brilliant success in the early spring, both of the army and
navy, was unfortunately not continued in the subsequent months.
General Grant, after the fall of Nashville, marched southward to
confront the army of General A. S. Johnston, and on the 6th and
7th of April a terrible battle was fought at Pittsburg Landing on
the Tennessee River. The battle was originally called by that name
in the annals of the Union, but the title of "Shiloh" given to it
by the Confederate authorities, is the one more generally recognized
in history. In the first day's engagement the Union army narrowly
escaped a crushing defeat; but before the renewal of the contest
on the following morning General Buell effected a junction with
the forces of General Grant, and the two, united, recovered all
the lost ground of the day before and gained a substantial victory
for the Union, though at great cost of life. The Union army lost
some eighteen hundred men killed and nearly eight thousand wounded.
The Confederate loss was not less. There is no doubt that General
Grant was largely outnumbered on the first day, but after the
junction of Buell he probably outnumbered the Confederates. Sixty
thousand was perhaps the maximum of the Union forces on the second
day, while the Confederate army, as nearly as can be ascertained,
numbered fifty thousand. One great event of the battle was the
death of Albert Sidney Johnston, a soldier of marked skill, a man
of the highest personal character. Jefferson Davis made his death
the occasion of a special message to the Confederate Congress, in
which he said that "without doing injustice to the living, our loss
is irreparable." The personal affliction of Mr. Davis was sore.
The two had been at West Point together, and had been close friends
through life. William Preston Johnston, son of the fallen General,
a young man of singular excellence of character and of most attractive
personal traits, was at the time private secretary to Mr. Davis.
He has since been widely known in the South in connection with its
educational progress.
Deep anxiety had preceded the battle throughout the North, and the
relief which followed was grateful. It was made the occasion by
the President for a proclamation in which the people were asked
"to assemble in their places of public worship and especially
acknowledge and render thanks to our Heavenly Father for the successes
which have attended the Army of the Union." But after the first
flush of victory, the battle became the subject of controversy in
the newspapers. Criticism of officers was unsparing, the slaughter
of our soldiers was exaggerated, crimination and recrimination were
indulged in respecting the conduct of troops from certain States.
General Grant was accused of having been surprised and of having
thereby incurred a danger which narrowly escaped being a defeat.
The subject was brought into Congress and warmly debated. Senator
Sherman of Ohio introduced a resolution calling for all the reports
from the officers in command, and made a speech defending the
conduct of the Ohio troops, upon which some reflections had been
inconsiderately and most unjustly cast. Mr. Elihu Washburne made
an elaborate speech in the House on the 2d of May, in which he gave
a full account of the battle, and defended General Grant with much
warmth against all possible charges which, either through ignorance
or malice, had been preferred against him for his conduct of the
battle. This speech, which was of great value to General Grant,
both with the Administration and the country, laid the foundation
of that intimate friendship which so long subsisted between him
and Mr. Washburne. Mr. Richardson of Illinois followed his colleague,
and expressed his disgust with even the introduction of the subject
in Congress. He felt that our armies would gain more renown and
secure greater victories if the "Riot Act" could be read, and both
Houses of Congress dispersed to their homes at the very earliest
moment.
General Halleck, who had command of the Western Department, became
anxious for reputation on the field, and was thought by many to be
jealous of the daily increasing fame of General Grant. After the
battle of Shiloh, he took command in person of the army which Grant
had already rendered illustrious, leaving Grant to command its
right wing. Uniting the Western forces into one large army General
Halleck marched southward in pursuit of the Confederate column now
under the command of Beauregard, and strongly intrenched at Corinth.
As the army approached, Corinth was evacuated, and the campaign of
General Halleck, leading to no important engagement, did not add
to his military fame. Meanwhile there had been increasing
dissatisfaction in Congress and among the people with the supersedure
of General Grant, and to relieve the situation General Halleck was
called to Washington in the early part of July to take command of
the army which had been relinquished by McClellan in March, when
he set forth upon the Peninsular campaign. In the intervening
months there had been no General-in-Chief of the army, the duties
being performed by the Secretary of War.
GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.
The Western victories, important as they were, did not remove the
pressure in the East. The popular interest was more largely
concentrated in the success of the Army of the Potomac, which would
secure the safety of the National Capital, and possibly the possession
of the capital of the Confederacy. High hopes had been staked upon
the issue. Elaborate preparations had been made and the utmost
care had been taken in the organization and discipline of the army.
General George B. McClellan was intrusted with the command. He
was a native of Pennsylvania, a distinguished graduate of West
Point, a man of high personal character. His military skill was
vouched for by older officers whose opinions would have weight with
the President. But he had been six months in command of the Army
of the Potomac and had done nothing in the field. The autumn had
passed in inaction, the winter had worn away, and the spring had
come without finding him ready to move. Whatever might be the
justification for delay, it was his misfortune to become the subject
of controversy. There was a McClellan party and an anti-McClellan
party, in the press, among the people, in Congress, and in the
army. How far this may have impaired the efficiency of his command
cannot be known, but it no doubt seriously undermined him in the
confidence of the War Department. Before he had fired a gun in
the Peninsular campaign he was in a disputation with both the
President and Secretary Stanton. On the 9th of April (1862) Mr.
Lincoln wrote him, "Your dispatches complaining that you are not
properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very
much." General McClellan had complained that the President had
detained McDowell's corps, and thus weakened the strength of his
army, and the President was defending the policy as one necessary
to the safety of Washington. McClellan protested that he had but
eighty-five thousand men at Yorktown. The President insisted that
he had a hundred and eight thousand. "And once more," said the
President, "in conclusion, let me tell you it is indispensable to
you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will
do me the justice to remember that I always insisted that going
down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near
Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting the difficulty;
that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments
at either place. The country will not fail to note (is now noting)
that the present hesitation to move upon the intrenched enemy is
but the story of Manassas repeated. I beg to assure you that I
have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of
feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose of sustaining you so
far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can."
This condition of affairs with the indication of increasing discord
between the Commander-in-Chief and General McClellan boded no good
to the Union cause, and the entire Peninsular campaign was but a
succession of "hopes deferred" that made the heart sick; of
disappointment, of great sacrifice of life and treasure, and in
the end of positive disaster and humiliating retreat.
As General McClellan neared Richmond and needed re-enforcements
for a decisive battle with General Lee's army, the Confederates
used the most admirable tactics for the purpose of alarming the
authorities at Washington and compelling them to withhold help from
the Army of the Potomac. Stonewall Jackson came thundering down
the Shenandoah Valley with a force which the exaggeration of the
day placed far beyond his real numbers. He brushed aside the army
of General Banks at Winchester by what might well be termed a
military cyclone, and created such consternation that our troops
in the Potomac Valley were at once thrown upon the defensive.
McDowell with his corps was at Fredericksburg, hurrying to Hanover
Court-House for the purpose of aiding McClellan. With our forces
thus remote from Washington, and the fortifications around the city
imperfectly manned, something akin to panic seized upon the
Government. General McDowell, by direct order of the President,
was turned from his march on Richmond, to follow or intercept
Jackson. On the 25th of May the Secretary of War telegraphed to
the governors of the Loyal States: "Intelligence from various
quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are marching
on Washington. You will please organize and forward immediately
all the militia and volunteer forces in your State." The governors
in turn issued alarming proclamations, some of which were eminently
calculated to spread the contagion of fear prevailing at Washington.
Governor Andrew, with evident apprehension of the worst, informed
the people of Massachusetts that "The wily and barbarous horde of
traitors to the people, to the Government, to our country, and to
liberty, menace again the National Capital: they have attacked and
routed Major-General Banks, are advancing on Harper's Ferry, and
are marching on Washington. The President calls on Massachusetts
to rise at once for its rescue and defense." Throughout the entire
North there was for several days a genuine belief that the National
Capital might soon be in possession of the Confederate army, and
the senators and representatives in Congress be seized as prisoners
of war.
STONEWALL JACKSON'S STRATEGY.
Meanwhile Stonewall Jackson having marched to the very banks of
the Potomac and shelled Harper's Ferry, and having succeeded beyond
his most sanguine expectation in the object which he had in view,
deliberately began his retreat. He was followed up the Shenandoah
Valley by the commands of four Major-Generals and one Brigadier-
General of the Union army. He drew these united forces after him
precisely as he desired, for the benefit of Lee's army at Richmond.
He did not fly from them as if dreading a battle, for that would
have been to dismiss the large Union force to the aid of General
McClellan. Occasionally detailing a fraction of his command to
engage in a skirmish with his pursuers, who far outnumbered his
whole force, he managed to keep his main body at a safe distance,
and to reserve it for a more important work ahead. After thus
drawing our troops so far up the valley that it was impossible for
them to retrace their steps in season for concentration on Richmond,
he rapidly transported the main body of his own troops by rail from
Staunton, and rejoined General Lee in time to take part in the
final and memorable series of engagements which, by the close of
June, had compelled General McClellan to take refuge on the banks
of the James, where he could have the co-operation of the gunboats
which lay at Harrison's Landing.
General Halleck took command as General-in-Chief of the army directly
after the Army of the Potomac had closed its campaign against
Richmond. He visited Harrison's Landing on the 24th of July to
make personal inquiry into the situation, and the result was an
order for the transfer of the army to Acquia Creek. General
McClellan protested earnestly, and, in the judgment of many of the
most skilled in military science, wisely, against this movement.
The Army of the Potomac, he said, was "within twenty-five miles of
Richmond, and with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army
by water during its advance to within twelve miles of Richmond.
At Acquia Creek we would be seventy miles from Richmond, with land
transportation all the way." He thought the government had ample
troops to protect Washington and guard the line of the Potomac,
and he could not see the wisdom of transporting the Army of the
Potomac two hundred miles at enormous cost, only to place it three
times as far from Richmond as it then was. General Halleck's
position was sustained by the President, and the Secretary of War,
and the argument of General McClellan, convincing and conclusive
as it seems, was overruled by the peremptory mandate of his military
superiors.
The failure of the Peninsular campaign will always be a subject of
controversy. At the time it was one of prolonged and angry dispute.
Where military critics so widely differ, civilians gain the right
to a personal judgment. The weakness of that great military movement
was the lack of cordiality and confidence between the commander
and the Administration at Washington. The seeds of distrust had
been sown and a bountiful crop of disaster was the natural growth.
The withdrawal of McDowell's corps was a fatal blow to McClellan.
Before a military court which was inquiring into the transaction,
General McClellan stated under oath that he had "no doubt that the
Army of the Potomac would have taken Richmond had not the corps of
General McDowell been separated from it; and that, had the command
of General McDowell in the month of May joined the Army of the
Potomac by way of Hanover Court-House, we would have had Richmond
a week after the junction." He added, with evident reference to
Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, "I do not hold General McDowell
responsible for a failure to join me on that occasion."
STONEWALL JACKSON'S SUCCESSFUL RAID.
When General McDowell was turned back from Fredericksburg to take
part in the fruitless chase after Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah
Valley, he was doing precisely what the President of the Confederate
States would have ordered, had he been able to issue the orders of
the President of the United States. McDowell saw the blunder, but
his directions were peremptory and nothing was left but to obey.
He telegraphed the Secretary of War, "The President's order is a
crushing blow to us." Mr. Lincoln personally and immediately
replied to General McDowell, "The change is as painful to me as it
can possibly be to you or to any one." McDowell then ventured to
argue the case with the President. He distinctly told Mr. Lincoln
that he could effect nothing in trying to cut off Stonewall Jackson
in the Shenandoah Valley. "I shall," he continued, "gain nothing
for you there, and I shall lose much for you here. It is therefore
not only on personal ground that I have a heavy heart in this
matter, but I feel that it throws us all back, and from Richmond
north we shall have all our large mass paralyzed, and shall have
to repeat what we have just accomplished." Mr. Lincoln's order
and the whole of this correspondence were by telegraph on the twenty-
fourth day of May. Conclusive as the reasoning of General McDowell
seems, it did not move Mr. Lincoln from his purpose; and the heavy
re-enforcement which was then within three days of the point where
it could most effectively aid McClellan, was diverted to a hopeless
and useless pursuit. Had McDowell been allowed to proceed as he
desired and as General McClellan confidently expected, he would
have re-enforced the Army of the Potomac for an attack on Lee,
while Stonewall Jackson's corps was in the Shenandoah Valley. By
the unfortunate diversion ordered by Mr. Lincoln, precisely the
reverse occurred. Stonewall Jackson's corps arrived before Richmond
in season to aid in defeating McClellan, while McDowell with his
splendid contingent was aimlessly loitering in a distant part of
Virginia.
The President was led into this course by the urgent advice of the
Secretary of War. When McClellan went to the field, Mr. Stanton
undertook personally to perform the duties of General-in-Chief in
Washington. This was evidently an egregious blunder. Neither by
education, temper, temperament, nor by any other trait of his
character, was Mr. Stanton fitted for this duty. He was very
positively and in a high degree unfitted for it. With three Major-
Generals--McDowell, Banks, and Fremont--exercising independent
commands in the Potomac Valley, with their movements exerting a
direct and important influence upon the fortunes of the main army
under McClellan, there was especial need of a cool-headed, experienced,
able general at the Capital. Had one of the three great soldiers
who have been at the head of the army since the close of the war,
then been in chief command at Washington, there is little hazard
in saying that the brilliant and dashing tactics of Stonewall
Jackson would not have been successful, and that if General McClellan
had failed before Richmond, it would not have been for lack of
timely and adequate re-enforcement.
Before these military disasters occurred, Congress had made progress
in its legislation against the institution of Slavery. At the
beginning of the war there had been an ill-defined policy, or rather
an absence of all policy, in relation to the most important of
pending questions. The winter preceding the outbreak of the
rebellion had been so assiduously devoted by Congress to efforts
of compromise and conciliation, that it was difficult to turn the
public mind promptly to the other side, and to induce the people
to accept the logical consequences of the war. There was no uniform
policy among our generals. Each commander was treating the question
very much according to his own personal predilection, and that was
generally found to be in accordance with his previous political
relations. The most conspicuous exception to this rule was General
Benjamin F. Butler, who had been identified with the extreme pro-
slavery wing of the Democratic party. He was in command in May,
1861, at Fortress Monroe, and he found that when fugitive slaves
sought the protection of his camp they were pursued under flags of
truce, and their return was requested as a right under the Constitution
of the United States by men who were in arms against the Constitution.
The anomaly of this situation was seen by General Butler, and he
met it promptly by refusing to permit the slaves to be returned,
declaring them to be contraband of war. As they were useful to
the enemy in military operations, they were to be classed with arms
and ammunition. This opinion was at first received joyously by
the country, and the word "contraband" became the synonym of fugitive
slave. But General Butler's judgment is justified by the rules of
modern warfare, and its application solved a question of policy
which otherwise might have been fraught with serious difficulty.
In the presence of arms the Fugitive-slave Law became null and
void, and the Dred Scott decision was trampled under the iron hoof
of war.
SLAVERY ABOLISHED IN THE DISTRICT.
The first exercise of legislative power hostile to the institution
of slavery, already detailed, was promptly followed by one still
more decisive. Congress provided for the abolition of the institution
in the District of Columbia. A bill for this purpose was introduced
in the Senate on the 16th of December, 1861, and two months later
Mr. Morrill of Maine, from the Committee on the District, reported
it to the Senate with a favorable recommendation. Garrett Davis
of Kentucky spoke in support of an amendment requiring the
colonization, beyond the limits of the United States, of all persons
who might be liberated by the Act. He was firmly persuaded that
the liberation of slaves with their continued residence among the
whites would result in a war of races. Mr. Hale of New Hampshire
combated his opinion by arguments and facts drawn from the history
of emancipation in Jamaica. Mr. Wilson of Massachusetts gave an
interesting history of the circumstances which led to the selection
of the site for the National Capital upon slave territory.
Mr. Sumner dealt with the subject at great length, enforcing his
views by numerous authorities drawn from history, from the decisions
of courts, and from the opinions of publicists and statesmen of
modern times. The opponents of the measure did not conceal their
apprehension that the abolition of slavery in the District of
Columbia portended its overthrow in the States. Mr. Sumner and
his associates hailed the movement as the inauguration of a policy
destined to produce that result. "The future," said the Massachusetts
senator, "cannot be doubtful. At the National Capital slavery will
give way to freedom. But the good work will not stop here: it must
proceed. What God and Nature decree, Rebellion cannot arrest."
Mr. Sherman of Ohio maintained that it was not a measure for the
preservation of the government, but a municipal regulation, and
that the time had come when it was evidently wise to exercise the
powers granted by the Constitution. Mr. Willey of Virginia deprecated
the existence of slavery in the capital of the country, but he
opposed the emancipation bill as the first of a series of measures
that would end in the abolition of slavery in all the States by
act of Congress. The bill passed the Senate the third day of April
by a vote of 29 to 14.
When the measure reached the House and was read for information it
was at once challenged by Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio; and upon the
parliamentary question "Shall the bill be rejected?" the yeas were
45 and the nays were 93. The debate which immediately followed
was in good temper, with a notable absence of the exasperation
which it was feared the subject would call forth. Mr. Crittenden
of Kentucky stated the objections of the minority, and especially
of the Border slave States, fairly and temperately. The time seemed
to him unpropitious inasmuch as the moving cause of the secession
of the States was the apprehension on their part that Congress was
likely to take measures for the abolition of slavery. The passage
of the bill necessarily rendered futile every attempt at reconciliation.
Secondly, there was an implied agreement with Virginia and Maryland
at the time of the cession of the District that "the system of
slavery shall not be disturbed." And finally, the bill, although
it provided for compensation to lawful owners, was in effect a
measure of confiscation. It passed the House by a vote of 92 to
38. The President accompanied his approval with a special message
in which, while not doubting the constitutionality of the measure,
he intimated that there were "matters within and about the Act
which might have taken a course or shape more satisfactory to his
judgment." He especially commended the provision made for compensation
to the owners of slaves, and referred with satisfaction to the
appropriation made to aid any colored person of the District who
might desire to emigrate "to Liberia, Hayti, or any country beyond
the limits of the United States which the President may determine."
The sum of one hundred thousand dollars was appropriated for this
purpose by the Act--one hundred dollars being allowed to each
emigrant. The experiment came to nothing. The colored persons
who had resided in the United States as slaves were obviously
desirous of trying their fortunes as freemen among the people whom
they knew, and in the homes to which they were attached.
THE PRESIDENT'S CONSERVATIVE COURSE.
Mr. Lincoln had always been a firm believer in the scheme of African
colonization; and in his message of December, 1861, he recommended
a provision for colonizing the slaves set free by the influence of
war. From the slave States which had remained loyal to the Union
he was willing to accept slaves in lieu of the direct tax, according
to some mode of valuation that might be agreed upon, and he was
anxious that adequate provision should be made for their settlement
in some place or places with a climate congenial to them. But the
experiment with the manumitted negroes of the District, which was
made in compliance with this recommendation of the President and
in deference to his personal wishes, frequently and earnestly
expressed, demonstrated the impracticability of the plan. Colonization
could be effected only by the forcible removal of the colored
people, and this would have been a more cruel violation of their
natural rights than a continuance of the slavery in which they were
born. If free choice between the two conditions had been offered,
nine-tenths, perhaps even a larger proportion of the slaves, would
have preferred to remain in their old homes. In an economic point
of view the scheme was indefensible. We were at the time the only
country with undeveloped agricultural resources in warm latitudes,
that was not engaged in seeking labor from all quarters of the
world. The Colonization scheme deliberately proposed to strip the
United States of patient, faithful laborers, acclimated to the
cotton and sugar fields of the South, and capable of adding great
wealth to the nation. Colonization would deprive us of this much
needed labor, would entail vast expense in the deportation of the
negroes, and would devolve upon this country, by a moral responsibility
which it could not avoid, the protection and maintenance of the
feeble government which would be planted on the shores of Africa.
The Liberian experiment, honorable as it was to the colored race,
and successful as it had proved in establishing civilization in
Africa, had not attained such material prosperity as would justify
the United States in the removal of millions of its population to
a remote country where there was no demand for labor.
Mr. Lincoln's course on the Slavery question at that period of his
Administration was steadily and studiously conservative. He had
checked the Secretary of War (Mr. Cameron) in the issuing of an
anti-slavery order which was considered premature and unwise; he
had countermanded and annulled the proclamations of General Hunter
and General Fremont declaring the slaves to be free within the
districts of their respective commands. He now recommended a
measure in the line of his conservative policy, to which he attached
great weight, and from which he anticipated important consequences.
On the 6th of March, 1862, the President sent a message to Congress
recommending the adoption of a joint resolution declaring that "the
United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt
gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to each State pecuniary aid
to be used in its discretion to compensate for the inconveniences,
public and private, produced by such change of system." Mr. Lincoln
believed that if the leaders of the existing Rebellion could conquer
their independence, the Border slave States would necessarily join
them from sympathy with their institutions. By the initiation of
emancipation all possible desire or tendency in that direction
would be removed, and thus a severe blow be given to the Rebellion.
He believed in compensation to the slave-holder, and expressed his
opinion that "gradual and not sudden emancipation is better for
all." He asked Congress to consider "how very soon the current
expenses of the war would purchase at a fair valuation all the
slaves in any named State."
When the message reached the House it was referred to the Committee
of the Whole on the State of the Union. Four days later Mr. Roscoe
Conkling moved to suspend the rules in order to bring the resolution
before the House "in the exact form in which the President had
recommended it." The motion prevailed by 86 to 35. Francis P.
Blair of Missouri and the representatives from West Virginia were
the only Border State men who voted to suspend the rules. Mr.
Conkling thought an immediate vote might be taken because he presumed
"every member had made up his mind on the question involved." But
the Kentucky delegation desired time for consultation. They
concluded to oppose the resolution. Mr. Crittenden, speaking the
sentiments of all, asked, "Why do you exact of Kentucky more than
she has already done to show her loyalty? Has she not parted with
all her former allies, with all her natural kindred in other States?
Why should it be asked that she should now surrender up her domestic
institutions?" Against the protest of Kentucky the resolution was
passed, such radical abolitionists as Owen Lovejoy warmly supporting
the proposition to pay for slaves out of the Treasury of the United
States. Mr. Henderson of Missouri and Mr. Willey of West Virginia
were the only Border State senators who saw the vast advantage to
be secured to their own constituents by the passage of the measure.
They supported it ably and heartily. It was earnestly opposed by
the senators from Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware. Mr. Carlile
of West Virginia was the only senator in nominal sympathy with the
Administration who voted against it. The hostility to the President's
policy by senators from the Border slave States was so fixed as to
prevent even a free discussion of the measure, and it was therefore
remanded to a future day for consideration.
CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY.
A still more aggressive movement against slavery was made by Congress
before the close of this eventful session. On the day that Congress
convened, in the preceding December, Mr. Trumbull gave notice of
his intention to introduce a bill "for the confiscation of the
property of rebels, and giving freedom to the persons they hold in
slavery." Three days later he formally introduced the bill, and
made a lucid explanation of its provisions and its objects. He
"disdained to press it upon the ground of a mere military power
superior to the civil in time of war." "Necessity," said he, "is
the plea of tyrants; and if our Constitution ceases to operate,
the moment a person charged with its observance thinks there is a
necessity to violate it, is of little value." So far from admitting
that the superiority of the military over the civil power in time
of war, Mr. Trumbull held that "under the Constitution the military
is as much the subject of control by the civil power in war as in
peace." He was for suppressing the rebellion "according to law,
and in no other way;" and he warned his countrymen who stood "ready
to tolerate almost any act done in good faith for the suppression
of the rebellion, not to sanction usurpations of power which may
hereafter become precedents for the destruction of constitutional
liberty." Though the bill was introduced on the second day of
December, 1861, it did not become a law until the 17th of July in
the next year.
In the months intervening, it was elaborately debated, almost every
senator taking part in the discussion. Garrett Davis of Kentucky,
who had succeeded Mr. Breckinridge in the Senate, made a long speech
against the bill, contending that Congress had no power to free
any slaves. He wanted a bill of great severity against the rebel
leaders: "to those that would repent" he would give "immunity,
peace, and protection; to the impenitent and incorrigible he would
give the gallows, or exile and the forfeiture of their whole estate."
Such a law as that, he said, his "own State of Kentucky desired.
As Hamilcar brought his infant son Hannibal to the family altar,
and made him swear eternal enmity to the Roman power, so I have
sworn and will ever maintain eternal enmity to the principle of
secession and all its adherents." It was seen throughout the debate
that the bill under consideration was in large part provoked by
the confiscation measures of the Confederate Congress, and Mr.
Davis declared that "the debts due to the North, estimated at
$200,000,000, seized, confiscated, and appropriated by the rebel
government, shall be remunerated fully."
Mr. John B. Henderson of Missouri who, as a Union man of prominence
and ability, had succeeded Trusten Polk in the Senate, opposed the
bill because it would "cement the Southern mind against us and
drive new armies of excited and deluded men from the Border States
to espouse the cause of rebellion." He urged that "the Union
sentiment of the South should be cultivated, and radical measures
tending to destroy that sentiment should be dropped." Mr. Fessenden
was conservative on this as on other questions, and insisted upon
the reference of Mr. Trumbull's bill to a committee; which was the
occasion of some little passage between himself and Mr. Trumbull,
not without temper. Mr. Trumbull suggested that "the senator from
Maine would not be likely to get any light from the deliberations
of five men unless he were himself one of them." Retorting in the
same spirit, but, as he said, good-naturedly, Mr. Fessenden said
he should not "hope that _any_ deliberation of anybody would
enlighten the senator from Illinois."
Sustaining the extreme power of confiscation, Mr. Sumner desired
"the Act to be especially leveled at the institution of Slavery."
He recalled the saying of Charles XII. of Sweden, that the cannoneers
were perfectly right in directing their shots at him, for the war
would be at an instant end if they could kill him; whereas they
would reap little from killing his principal officers. "There is,"
said the senator, "no shot in this war so effective as one against
Slavery, which is king above all officers; nor is there better
augury of complete success than the willingness at last to fire
upon this wicked king." By this means, Mr. Sumner believed that
we should "take from the rebellion its mainspring of activity and
strength, stop its chief stores of provisions and supplies, remove
a motive and temptation to prolonged resistance, and destroy forever
the disturbing influence which, so long as it exists, will keep
this land a volcano, ever ready to break forth anew." Mr. Sumner,
Mr. Wade, and Mr. Chandler, the senators who were regarded as most
radical, desired more stringent provisions than they could secure.
The really able lawyers of the Senate, Mr. Fessenden and Judge
Collamer, repressed the extreme measures which but for their
interposition would have been enacted. As the bill was finally
perfected, Mr. Chandler and his colleague Mr. Howard voted against
it, as did also Mr. Browning of Illinois and the Border-State
Senators Davis of Kentucky, Henderson of Missouri, and Carlile of
Virginia. To the Michigan senators the bill was too weak; to the
others it was too strong. Mr. Willey of Virginia was the only
senator from a slave-holding State who voted on the radical side.
With the exceptions noted, Republican senators all voted for the
bill.
CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY.
A series of measures in the House relating to confiscation were
under discussion while the Senate was considering the same subject.
The House passed a more stringent bill than the Senate would accept,
and the subject was finally sent to a committee of conference,
which from the points of disagreement framed the measure that
ultimately became a law. As in the Senate, the Border-State men
opposed the measure, but were overborne by the popular opinion
which nearly consolidated the Republican vote of the North in favor
of it. It was however an undoubted weakness, morally and politically,
that such men as Crittenden and Mallory of Kentucky, James S.
Rollins of Missouri, and Francis Thomas and Edwin H. Webster of
Maryland were recorded against it. The bill was passed in the
House by a vote of 82 to 42. The conference report having somewhat
strengthened the original measure passed by the Senate, Messrs.
Howard and Chandler of Michigan gave it their support, but for the
same reason Mr. Cowan of Pennsylvania and Mr. Willey of Virginia
opposed it. The final vote was 27 in favor to 12 against it.
The Act, as it finally passed, affixed to the crime of treason the
punishment of death, or, at the discretion of the court, imprisonment
for not less than five years and a fine of not less than ten thousand
dollars,--all the slaves, if any, to be declared free. "To insure
the speedy termination of the present rebellion" it was made the
duty of the President to cause the seizure of the estate and
property, money, stocks, credits, and effects of the following
classes of persons: First, all those hereafter acting as officers
of the army or the navy of the rebels in arms against the government
of the United States; second, of any person acting as President,
Vice-President, member of Congress, judge of any court, cabinet
officer, foreign minister, commissioner, or consul of the so-called
Confederate States; third, of any person acting as governor of a
State, member of a convention or Legislature, or judge of any court
of any of the so-called Confederate States of America; fourth, of
any person who having held an office of honor, trust, or profit in
the United States shall hereafter hold an office in the so-called
Confederate States; fifth, of any person hereafter holding any
office or agency under the so-called Confederate States or under
any of the several States of said Confederacy; sixth, of any person
who owning property in any loyal State or Territory of the United
States, or in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter assist and
give aid and comfort to the rebellion. "And all sales, transfers,
or conveyances of any such property shall be null and void; and it
shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such persons for
the possession or use of such property, or any of it, to allege
and prove that he is one of the persons described in this section."
In the provisions of the Act directly affecting slavery it was
declared that "All slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged
in rebellion against the Government of the United States or who
shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such
persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army, and all
slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming
under the control of the Government of the United States, and all
slaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied by
rebel forces and afterward occupied by the forces of the United
States, shall be deemed captives, shall be forever free of their
servitude, and not again held as slaves." This provision had a
very sweeping application. Even if the war had ended without a
formal and effective system of emancipation, it is believed that
this statute would have so operated as to render the slave system
practically valueless. When the war closed it is probable that
not less than one-half of all the slaves of the rebel States had
come within the scope of this statute, and had therefore been
declared legally free by the legislative power of the United States.
CONFISCATION OF REBEL PROPERTY.
Mr. Lincoln signed the Confiscation Act with reluctance. Indeed
he had prepared a veto, but a joint resolution had been passed in
order to remove the objections which in the President's view were
absolutely fatal to the original bill, either as regarded its
justice or its constitutionality. He had insisted to certain
senators that the Confiscation Law must in terms exclude the
possibility of its being applied to any act done by a rebel prior
to its passage, and that no punishment or proceeding under it should
be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the
offender beyond his natural life. These, with some minor defects,
being corrected, the President affixed his signature and made public
proclamation of the intended enforcement of the Act as qualified
by the joint resolution approved on the same day. But there is
good reason for believing that Mr. Lincoln would have been glad to
confine its application to slave property, and he felt moreover
that he could deal with that subject without the co-operation of
Congress. The military situation was so discouraging that in the
President's view it would have been wiser for Congress to refrain
from enacting laws which, without success in the field, would be
null and void, and which, with success in the field, would be
rendered unnecessary. Congress adjourned on the same day that Mr.
Lincoln approved the bill, and on returning home the senators and
representatives found their constituents depressed, anxious, and
alarmed for the country.
It cannot be said that the results flowing from this measure, either
in restraining the action of Southern men or in securing to the
National Treasury money derived from confiscated property, were at
all in proportion to the importance ascribed to it in the discussion
of both branches of Congress. Indeed the effect both morally and
materially was far short of expectation. It is highly probable
that if the stringent measure of the Confederate Congress and its
stringent enforcement under the vigorous administration of Attorney-
General Benjamin had not been attempted, the Congress of the United
States could not have been induced to enter upon a course of
legislation concerning which there existed much doubt and division
of opinion among the Republicans. It is at least certain that but
for the causes named, the scope of the Confiscation Act would have
been confined within those limits which would have directly influenced
the institution of Slavery, and would not have interfered with any
other species of property. Whatever distress therefore came to
Southern men, from the provisions in the Confiscation Act outside
of those relating to Slavery, may fairly and properly be traced to
the spirit of retaliation (always an effective weapon in time of
war) which naturally followed the causeless and cruel procedure of
the Confederate Government.