Review (_continued_).--Relations with Mexico.--General Taylor
marches his Army to the Rio Grande.--First Encounter with the
Mexican Army.--Excitement in the United States.--Congress declares
War against Mexico.--Ill Temper of the Whigs.--Defeat of the
Democrats in the Congressional Elections of 1846.--Policy of Mr.
Polk in Regard to Acquisition of Territory from Mexico.--Three-
Million Bill.--The Famous Anti-slavery Proviso moved by David
Wilmot.--John Quincy Adams.--His Public Service.--Robert C. Winthrop
chosen Speaker.--Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.--Presidential Election
of 1848.--Effort of the Administration to make a Democratic Hero
out of the Mexican War.--Thomas H. Benton for Lieutenant-General.
--Bill defeated.--Nomination of General Taylor for the Presidency
by the Whigs.--Nomination of General Cass by the Democratic Party.
--Van Buren refuses to support him.--Democratic Bolt in New York.
--Buffalo Convention and the Organization of the Free-soil Party.
--Nomination of Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams.--Mr. Clay's
Discontent.--Mr. Webster's Speech at Marshfield.--General Taylor
elected.--The Barnburners of New York.--Character and Public Services
of Mr. Van Buren.
By a suggestive coincidence, the practical abandonment of the line
of 54 deg. 40' by the administration was contemporaneous with the
outbreak of the Mexican war. The modified resolution of notice to
Great Britain was finally passed in both branches of Congress on
the 23d of April, and on the succeeding day the first blood was
shed in that contest between the two Republics which was destined
to work such important results in the future and fortunes of both.
The army of occupation in Texas, commanded by General Zachary
Taylor, had, during the preceding winter, been moving westward with
the view of encamping in the valley of the Rio Grande. On the 28th
of March General Tyler took up his position on the banks of the
river, opposite Matamoros, and strengthened himself by the erection
field-works. General Ampudia, in command of the Mexican army
stationed at Matamoros, was highly excited by the arrival of the
American army, and on the 12th of April notified General Taylor to
break up his camp within twenty-four hours, and to retire beyond
the Nueces River. In the event of his failure to comply with these
demands, Ampudia announced that "arms, and arms alone, must decide
the question." According to the persistent claim of the Mexican
Government, the Nueces River was the western boundary of Texas;
and the territory between that river and the Rio Grande--a breadth
of one hundred and fifty miles on the coast--was held by Mexico to
be a part of her domain, and General Taylor consequently an invader
of her soil. No reply was made to Ampudia; and on the 24th of
April General Arista, who had succeeded to the command of the
Mexican army, advised General Taylor that "he considered hostilities
commenced, and should prosecute them."
BEGINNING OF MEXICAN WAR.
Directly after this notification was received, General Taylor
dispatched a party of dragoons, sixty-three in number, officers
and men, up the valley of the Rio Grande, to ascertain whether the
Mexicans had crossed the river. They encountered a force much
larger than their own, and after a short engagement, in which some
seventeen were killed and wounded, the Americans were surrounded,
and compelled to surrender. When intelligence of this affair
reached the United States, the war-spirit rose high among the
people. "Our country has been invaded," and "American blood spilled
on American soil," were the cries heard on every side. In the very
height of this first excitement, without waiting to know whether
the Mexican Government would avow or disavow the hostile act,
President Polk, on the 11th of May, sent a most aggressive message
to Congress, "invoking its prompt action to recognize the existence
of war, and to place at the disposition of the Executive the means
of prosecuting the contest with vigor, and thus hastening the
restoration of peace." As soon as the message was read in the
House, a bill was introduced authorizing the President to call out
a force of fifty thousand men, and giving him all the requisite
power to organize, arm, and equip them. The preamble declared that
"war existed by the act of Mexico," and this gave rise to an animated
and somewhat angry discussion. The Whigs felt that they were placed
in an embarrassing attitude. They must either vote for what they
did not believe, or, by voting against the bill, incur the odium
which always attaches to the party that fails by a hair's-breadth
to come to the defense of the country when war is imminent.
Prominent Whigs believed, that, as an historical and geographical
fact, the river Nueces was the western boundary of Texas, and that
the President, by assuming the responsibility of sending an army
of occupation into the country west of that river, pending negotiations
with Mexico, had taken a hostile and indefensible step. But all
agreed that it was too late to consider any thing except the honor
of the country, now that actual hostilities had begun. The position
of the Whigs was as clearly defined by their speakers as was
practicable in the brief space allowed for discussion of the war
bill. Against the protest of many, it was forced to a vote, after
a two hours' debate. The administration expected the declaration
to be unanimous; but there were fourteen members of the House who
accepted the responsibility of defying the war feeling of the
country by voting "no"--an act which required no small degree of
moral courage and personal independence. John Quincy Adams headed
the list. The other gentlemen were all Northern Whigs, or pronounced
Free-Soilers.
The Senate considered the bill on the ensuing day, and passed it
after a very able debate, in which Mr. Calhoun bore a leading part.
He earnestly deprecated the necessity of the war, though accused
by Benton of plotting to bring it on. Forty senators voted for
it, and but two against it,--Thomas Clayton of Delaware and John
Davis of Massachusetts. Mr. Crittenden of Kentucky and Mr. Upham
of Vermont, when their names were called, responded, "Ay, except
the preamble." The bill was promptly approved by the President,
and on the 13th of May, 1846, the two Republics were declared to
be at war. In the South and West, from the beginning, the war was
popular. In the North and East it was unpopular. The gallant
bearing of our army, however, changed in large degree the feeling
in sections where the war had been opposed. No finer body of men
ever enlisted in an heroic enterprise than those who volunteered
to bear the flag in Mexico. They were young, ardent, enthusiastic,
brave almost to recklessness, with a fervor of devotion to their
country's honor. The march of Taylor from the Rio Grande, ending
with the unexpected victory against superior numbers at Buena Vista,
kept the country in a state of excitement and elation, and in the
succeeding year elevated him to the Presidency. Not less splendid
in its succession of victories was the march of Scott from Vera
Cruz to the city of Mexico, where he closed his triumphal journey
by taking possession of the capital, and enabling his government
to dictate terms of peace.
DEMOCRATIC DEFEAT IN 1846.
For the first and only time in our political history, an administration
conducting a war victorious at every step, steadily lost ground in
the country. The House of Representatives which declared war on
the 11th of May, 1846, was Democratic by a large majority. The
House, elected in the ensuing autumn, amid the resounding acclamations
of Taylor's memorable victory at Monterey, had a decided Whig
majority. This political reverse was due to three causes,--the
enactment of the tariff of 1846, which offended the manufacturing
interest of the country; the receding of the administration on the
Oregon question, which embarrassed the position and wounded the
pride of the Northern Democrats; and the wide-spread apprehension
that the war was undertaken for the purpose of extending and
perpetuating slavery. The almost unanimous Southern vote for the
hasty surrender of the line of 54 deg. 40', on which so much had been
staked in the Presidential campaign, gave the Whigs an advantage
in the popular canvass. The contrast between the boldness with
which the Polk administration had marched our army upon the territory
claimed by Mexico, and the prudence with which it had retreated
from a contest with Great Britain, after all our antecedent boasting,
exposed the Democrats to merciless ridicule. Clever speakers who
were numerous in the Whig party at that day did not fail to see
and seize their advantage.
The Mexican war had scarcely begun when the President justified
the popular suspicion by making known to Congress that one of its
objects was to be the acquisition of territory beyond the Rio
Grande. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that he expected such
acquisition to be one of its results. He ably vindicated the policy
of marching a military force into the territory between the Nueces
and the Rio Grande, by the fact that he was memorialized to do so
by the still existing Congress of Texas, on the urgent plea that
Mexico was preparing to move upon the territory with a view to its
recapture. In this Congress of Texas, the same body that completed
the annexation, there were representatives from the territory in
dispute beyond the Nueces; and the President felt that they were
in an eminent degree entitled to the protection of our government.
Events were so hurried that in three months from the formal
declaration of war, and before any victory of decisive significance
had been achieved, the President sent a special message to Congress,
in which he suggested that "the chief obstacle to be surmounted in
securing peace would be the adjustment of a boundary that would
prove satisfactory and convenient to both republics." He admitted
that we ought to pay a fair equivalent for any concessions which
might be made by Mexico, and asked that a sum of money should be
placed in his hands to be paid to Mexico immediately upon the
ratification of a treaty of peace. As a precedent for this unusual
request, the President cited the example of Mr. Jefferson in asking
and receiving from Congress, in 1803, a special appropriation of
money, to be expended at his discretion. As soon as the reading
of the message was concluded, Mr. McKay of North Carolina, chairman
of the committee of ways and means, introduced a bill, without
preamble or explanation, directing that two millions of dollars be
appropriated, to be "applied under the direction of the President
to any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in our foreign
intercourse." The war was not referred to, Mexico was not named,
and the simple phraseology of the Jefferson Act of 1803 was repeated
word for word.
A very animated debate followed, in which Northern men took the
lead. Mr. Robert C. Winthrop spoke of the administration with
unwonted harshness, declaring that "it and its friends had thought
fit, during the present session, to frame more than one of these
important measures, so as to leave their opponents in a false
position whichever way they voted." . . . He "could not and would
not vote for this bill as it now stood. . . . It was a vote of
unlimited confidence in an administration in which, he was sorry
to say, there was very little confidence to be placed." Mr. John
Quincy Adams differed from Mr. Winthrop, and could not refrain from
a pardonable thrust at that gentleman for his previous vote that
"war existed by act of Mexico." He differed from his colleague,
Mr. Adams demurely affirmed, with a regret equal to that with which
he had differed from him on the bill by which war was declared.
He should not vote for this bill in any form, but suggested that
it be so amended as to specify expressly that the money is granted
for the purpose of negotiating peace with Mexico.
THE WILMOT PROVISO.
The bill was promptly modified in accordance with the desires of
Mr. Adams, and at the moment when its passage seemed secure it was
arrested by an amendment of momentous character, submitted by a
young member from Pennsylvania. David Wilmot represented a district
which had always given Democratic majorities, and was himself an
intense partisan of that political school. He was a man of strong
_physique_ and strong common sense; of phlegmatic temperament,
without any pretension to genius; a sensible speaker, with no claim
to eloquence or oratory. But he had courage, determination, and
honesty. He believed the time had come to arrest the progress and
extension of slavery. He knew that the two-million bill was urged
by the President because he wished to use the money to promote the
acquisition of territory, and he determined then and there to make
a stand in favor of free soil. He thereupon, on the 8th of August,
1846, moved a _proviso_ to the two-million bill, declaring it to
be "an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any
territory from Mexico, that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
shall ever exist therein."
Mr. Wilmot was in the first session of his first Congress, was but
thirty-three years of age, and up to that moment had not been known
beyond his district. His amendment made his name familiar at once
throughout the length and breadth of the Republic. No question
had arisen since the slavery agitation of 1820 that was so elaborately
debated. The Wilmot Proviso absorbed the attention of Congress
for a longer time than the Missouri Compromise: it produced a wider
and deeper excitement in the country, and it threatened a more
serious danger to the peace and integrity of the Union. The
consecration of the territory of the United States to freedom became
from that day a rallying cry for every shade of anti-slavery
sentiment. If it did not go as far as the Abolitionists in their
extreme and uncompromising faith might demand, it yet took a long
step forward, and afforded the ground on which the battle of the
giants was to be waged, and possibly decided. The feeling in all
sections became intense on the issue thus presented, and it proved
a sword which cleft asunder political associations that had been
close and intimate for a lifetime. Both the old parties were
largely represented on each side of the question. The Northern
Whigs, at the outset, generally sustained the proviso, and the
Northern Democrats divided, with the majority against it. In the
slave States both parties were against it, only two men south of
Mason and Dixon's line voting for free soil,--John M. Clayton of
Delaware in the Senate, and Henry Grider of Kentucky in the House.
Mr. Grider re-entered Congress as a Republican after the war.
Among the conspicuous Whigs who voted for the proviso were Joseph
R. Ingersoll and James Pollock of Pennsylvania, Washington Hunt of
New York, Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts, Robert C. Schenck
of Ohio, and Truman Smith of Connecticut. Among the Democrats were
Hannibal Hamlin, and all his colleagues from Maine, Simon Cameron
of Pennsylvania, Preston King of New York, John Wentworth of
Illinois, Allen G. Thurman of Ohio, and Robert McClelland of
Michigan, afterwards Secretary of the Interior under President
Pierce.
Mr. Webster voted for the proviso, but with gloomy apprehensions.
He could "see little of the future, and that little gave him no
satisfaction." He spoke with portentous gravity, and arrested the
attention of the country by the solemnity of his closing words:
"All I can scan is contention, strife, and agitation. The future
is full of difficulties and full of dangers. We appear to be
rushing on perils headlong, and with our eyes all open." There
was a singular disagreement between the speech and the vote of Mr.
Webster. The speech indicated his real position. His vote was in
deference to the opinion of Massachusetts. The most conspicuous
Northern Whigs who voted against the proviso were Alexander Ramsey
of Pennsylvania, since the distinguished Republican senator from
Minnesota, and Secretary of War under President Hayes; and Samuel
F. Vinton of Ohio, one of the oldest and ablest representatives in
Congress.
The House attached the proviso to the two-million bill, and thus
defeated it for the session. The Democratic Senate took it up on
the day fixed for final adjournment. The majority were not willing
to accept the appropriation with the anti-slavery condition upon
it, and John Davis of Massachusetts, fearing if the bill went back
to the House the proviso might on reconsideration be defeated,
deliberately held the floor until the session expired. In the next
session the two-million bill, increased to three millions, was
passed without the proviso, the administration being strong enough,
with the persuasions of its patronage, to defeat the anti-slavery
amendment in both branches.
During the proceedings on the three-million bill, an interesting
and instructive incident occurred. The venerable John Quincy Adams
appeared in the House for the first time during the session, on
the 13th of February (1847), having been detained by a very severe
illness. As he passed inside the door the entire House voluntarily
rose, business was suspended, and Mr. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee
(afterwards President of the United States), addressing the Chair,
said, that in compliance with the understanding with which he
selected a seat at the beginning of the session, he now tendered
it to the venerable member from Massachusetts, and congratulated
him on being spared to return to the House. Mr. Adams, enfeebled
by disease, tremulous with age, returned his thanks, regretting
that he had not "voice to respond to the congratulations of his
friends for the honor which had been done him." Among those who
paid this unusual, indeed unprecedented, mark of respect to a fellow-
member, were many from the South, who within a few years had voted
to censure Mr. Adams, and had endeavored in every way to heap
obloquy upon him for his persistent course in presenting anti-
slavery petitions. Spontaneous in impulse, momentary in duration,
simple in form, it was yet one of the most striking tributes ever
paid to moral dignity and lofty character.
PUBLIC LIFE OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.
Mr. Adams was nearing the end of his illustrious life, and a year
later was stricken down in the seat which had been so graciously
tendered him. His career was in many respects remarkable. He had
been minister to five different European courts, senator of the
United States, appointed to the Supreme Bench, had been eight years
Secretary of State, and four years President. His opportunities
were great, his advantages rare, his natural abilities strong. To
those he added a high standard of morality, and a love and endurance
of labor possessed by few. But it may fairly be doubted whether,
if his Presidency had closed his public life, his fame would have
attracted special observation. He would scarcely have ranked above
Monroe, and would have borne no comparison with Madison. In the
Senate he had made no impression. His service abroad was one of
industrious routine. His career as Secretary of State was not
specially distinguished. The only two treaties of marked importance
that were negotiated during his incumbency, were carried, on test
questions, by the Cabinet against his judgment. His dispatches
have been little quoted as precedents. His diplomatic discussions
were not triumphs. Indeed, he was not felicitous with his pen,
and suffers by contrast with some who preceded him and many who
followed him in that office. But in his sixty-fifth year, when
the public life of the most favored draws to a close, the noble
and shining career of Mr. Adams began. He entered the House of
Representatives in 1831, and for the remainder of his life, a period
of seventeen years, he was the one grand figure in that assembly.
His warfare against those who would suppress free speech, his heroic
contest in favor of the right of the humblest to petition for
redress of grievances, are among the memorable events in the
parliamentary history of the United States. The amplitude of his
knowledge, his industry, his unflagging zeal, his biting sarcasm,
his power to sting and destroy without himself showing passion,
made a combination of qualities as rare as it was formidable. His
previous career had been one of eminent respectability, to be coldly
admired and forgotten. His service in the House gave him a name
as enduring as the Republic whose history he adorned.
In breadth and thoroughness of learning, Mr. Adams surpassed all
his contemporaries in public life. His essays, orations, and
addresses were surprisingly numerous, and upon a great variety of
subjects. It cannot be said, however, that he contributed any
thing to the permanent literature of the country. Nor, in a true
estimate of his extraordinary career in Congress, can it be asserted
that he attained the first rank as a parliamentary debater. It
must be borne in mind that much of his fame in the House of
Representatives was derived from the nature of the one question
with which he became so conspicuously identified. It was in large
degree the moral courage of his position which first fixed the
attention of the country and then attracted its admiration. The
men with whom he had exciting scenes in regard to the "right of
petition" and its cognate issues were in no case the leading
statesmen of the day. Wise, Bynum, Dromgoole, Pinckney, Lewis,
Thomas F. Marshall, and the other Southern representatives with
whom Mr. Adams came in conflict, were ready and brilliant men, but
were far below the first rank of debaters. Indeed, with few
exceptions, the really eminent debaters were in the Senate during
the period of Mr. Adams's service in the House. Mr. Clay, Mr.
Webster, Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Benton, Mr. Hayne, Mr. Silas Wright, Mr.
Crittenden, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Watkins Leigh, Mr. Rives, Mr. Choate,
Mr. John M. Clayton, Mr. Berrien, were an altogether higher and
abler class of men than those with whom Mr. Adams had his frequent
wrangles in the House. The weapons which he so successfully employed
against the young "fire-eaters" would have proved pointless and
valueless in a contest with any one of the eminent men who in that
long period gave character to the Senate.
The only time Mr. Adams ever crossed swords in the House with a
man of commanding power was in the famous discussion of January,
1836, with George Evans of Maine. Mr. Adams had made a covert but
angry attack on Mr. Webster for his opposition to the Fortification
Bill in the preceding Congress, when President Jackson was making
such energetic demonstrations of his readiness to go to war with
France. To the surprise of his best friends, Mr. Adams warmly
sustained Jackson in his belligerent correspondence with the
government of Louis Philippe. His position probably cost him a
seat in the United States Senate for which he was then a candidate.
Mr. Webster preferred John Davis, who had the preceding year beaten
Mr. Adams in the contest for governor of Massachusetts. These
circumstances were believed at the time to be the inciting cause
for the assault on Mr. Webster. The duty of replying devolved on
Mr. Evans. The debate attracted general attention, and the victory
of Mr. Evans was everywhere recognized. The _Globe_ for the Twenty-
fourth Congress contains a full report of both speeches. The
stirring events of forty years have not destroyed their interest
or their freshness. The superior strength, the higher order of
eloquence, the greater mastery of the art of debate, will be found
in the speech of Mr. Evans.
GEORGE EVANS AS A DEBATER.
As a parliamentary debater, using that term in its true signification
and with its proper limitations, George Evans is entitled to high
rank. He entered the House in 1829, at thirty-two years of age,
and served until 1841, when he was transferred to the Senate. He
retired from that body in 1847. Upon entering the Senate, he was
complimented with a distinction never before or since conferred on
a new member. He was placed at the head of the Committee on Finance,
taking rank above the long list of prominent Whigs, who then composed
the majority in the chamber. The tenacity with which the rights
of seniority are usually maintained by senators enhances the value
of the compliment to Mr. Evans. Mr. Clay, who had been serving as
chairman of the committee, declined in his favor with the remark
that "Mr. Evans knew more about the finances than any other public
man in the United States." The ability and skill displayed by Mr.
Evans in carrying the tariff bill of 1842 through the Senate, fully
justified the high encomiums bestowed by Mr. Clay. The opposition
which he led four years after to the tariff bill of 1846 gave Mr.
Evans still higher reputation, though the measure was unexpectedly
carried by the casting vote of the Vice-President.
When Mr. Evans's term of service drew near to its close, Mr. Webster
paid him the extraordinary commendation of saying in the Senate
that "his retirement would be a serious loss to the government and
the country." He pronounced the speech just then delivered by Mr.
Evans, on the finances, to be "incomparable." The "senator from
Maine," continued Mr. Webster, "has devoted himself especially to
studying and comprehending the revenue and finances of the country,
and he understand that subject as well as any gentleman connected
with the government since the days of Gallatin and Crawford,--nay,
as well as either of those gentlemen understood it." This was the
highest praise from the highest source! Of all who have represented
New England in the Senate, Mr. Evans, as a debater, is entitled to
rank next to Mr. Webster!
The next Congress met in December, 1847. Besides the venerable ex-
president, there were two future Presidents among its members--
Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. Mr. Robert C. Winthrop was
chosen Speaker. He was nominated in the Whig caucus over Samuel
F. Vinton of Ohio, because he had voted for the Wilmot Proviso,
and Mr. Vinton against it.* Mr. Vinton was senior in age and long
senior in service to Mr. Winthrop. Mr. Vinton had entered the
House in 1823 and Mr. Winthrop in 1840. Mr. Vinton had moreover
been selected as the Whig candidate for Speaker in the preceding
Congress, when that party was in minority. The decision against
him now created no little feeling in Whig circles, especially in
the West where he was widely known and highly esteemed. But, while
Mr. Winthrop was rewarded by this nomination for his vote in favor
of the Wilmot Proviso, the more pronounced anti-slavery men were
hostile to him. In the end he owed his election to timely aid from
Southern Whigs. This fact, no doubt, had its effect on Mr. Winthrop's
mind, and with other influences tended to separate him rapidly and
conclusively from the anti-slavery wing of the Whig party.
It would, however, be unjust to Mr. Winthrop not to recognize that
the chief reason for his selection as Speaker was his pre-eminent
fitness for the important post. He was a young man, and, other
conditions being equal, young men have been uniformly preferred
for the arduous duties of the Chair. From the organization of the
government the speakers, at the time of their first election, have
been under forty-five years of age,--many, indeed, under forty.
In only four instances have men been selected beyond the age of
fifty. Mr. Clay when first chosen was but thirty-four, Mr. Polk
thirty-nine, Mr. John Bell thirty-seven, Mr. Howell Cobb thirty-
three, and Mr. Robert M. T. Hunter, the youngest man ever elected
Speaker, was but thirty. Mr. Winthrop was thirty-eight. He was
bred to the law in the office of Mr. Webster, but at twenty-five
years of age entered political life as a member of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives. He was soon after promoted to the
speakership of that body, where he earned so valuable a reputation
as a presiding officer that some of his decisions have been quoted
as precedents in the National House, and have been incorporated in
permanent works on Parliamentary Law. He was chosen in Congress
when he was but thirty, and was in his fifth term in the House when
he was advanced to the Speakership. As an orator he was always
graceful and effective, but never took high rank in the House as
a debater. His early life gave promise of a long public career in
Massachusetts as the successor of the older Whig leaders who were
passing off the stage. He followed Mr. Webster in the Senate for
a brief period, when the latter became Secretary of State under
Mr. Fillmore. His conservative tendencies on the Slavery question,
however, were not in harmony with the demands of public opinion in
Massachusetts, and in 1851 he was defeated for the governorship by
George S. Boutwell, and for the senatorship by Charles Sumner.
Mr. Winthrop's political career closed when he was forty-two years
of age.
WHIGS ABANDON THE WILMOT PROVISO.
The events of the year 1847 had persuaded the Whig leaders that,
if they persisted in the policy embodied in the Wilmot Proviso,
they would surrender all power to control the ensuing Presidential
election. By clever management and the avoidance of issues which
involved the slavery question, they felt reasonably sure of the
votes of Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee,
with a probability of securing Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida.
To throw these States away by an anti-slavery crusade was to accept
inevitable defeat, and disband the Whig party. Mr. Winthrop was
therefore representing the prevailing wishes of Northern Whigs when
he used his influence to restrain rather than promote the development
of the anti-slavery policy which had been initiated with such vigor.
The result of this change was soon visible. In the preceding House,
with a large Democratic majority, the Wilmot Proviso had been
adopted. In the Whig House, over which Mr. Winthrop presided, it
was found impossible to repeat the vote during the preparations
for the national contest then impending. The treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, by which we acquired a vast territory from Mexico, was
ratified by the Senate, and the House voted the fifteen millions
demanded by it without adding a restriction of any kind on the
subject of slavery. Every acre of the nine hundred thousand square
miles was free territory while under the rule of Mexico, and the
Commissioners of that government were extremely anxious that the
United States should give a guaranty that its character in this
respect should not be changed. They urged that to see slavery
recognized upon soil once owned by Mexico would be so abhorrent to
that government as it would be to the United States to see the
Spanish Inquisition established upon it. Mr. Nicholas F. Trist,
the American commissioner, gave a reply which a free Republic reads
with increasing amazement. He declared that if the territory
proposed to be ceded "were increased tenfold in value, and, in
addition to that, covered a foot thick with pure gold, on the single
condition that slavery should be forever excluded," he would not
"entertain the offer for a moment, nor even think of sending it to
his government. No American President would dare to submit such
a treaty to the Senate."
With this suppression, if not indeed re-action, of the popular
feeling in the North, on the subject of slavery, the two great
parties approached the Presidential election of 1848. Each was
under peculiar embarrassment in the selection of a candidate, and
the presentation of the principles on which support was to be asked.
The anomaly presented in the Congressional election of 1846, where
an administration conducting a successful war was defeated before
the people, promised to be repeated. The Democratic party had
precipitated the war, had organized the military force that prosecuted
it, had controlled its immense patronage, and had brought it to a
victorious conclusion, yet had gained no political strength in the
country. The two gallant soldiers who had so largely shared, if
indeed they had not absorbed, its glory, were Whigs, and both were
in ill-humor with the administration. After the battle of Buena
Vista, Taylor's victorious progress had been checked and his army
crippled by orders from Washington, which reduced his force, and
turned the Regulars over to Scott. Scott ended his brilliant
campaign in a flagrant quarrel with the Secretary of War, and was
summoned home peremptorily with the prospect of a court-martial.
He was ordered to leave General William O. Butler, a Democratic
general, in command of the army in the city of Mexico after resistance
had ceased.
DEMOCRATIC OFFICERS IN MEXICAN WAR.
The administration had obviously endeavored from the first to create
a Democratic hero out of the war. Authorized to appoint a large
number of officers in the increased military force, raised directly
by the United States, an unjust discrimination was made in favor
of Democrats. Thus William O. Butler, John A. Quitman, and Gideon
J. Pillow, prominent Democratic leaders in their respective States,
were appointed Major-generals directly from civil life. Joseph
Lane, James Shields, Franklin Pierce, George Cadwalader, Caleb
Cushing, Enos D. Hopping, and Sterling Price, were selected for
the high rank of Brigadier-general. Not one Whig was included,
and not one of the Democratic appointees had seen service in the
field, or possessed the slightest pretension to military education.
Such able graduates of West Point as Henry Clay, jun., and William
R. McKee, were compelled to seek service through State appointments
in volunteer regiments, while Albert Sidney Johnston, subsequently
proved to be one of the ablest commanders ever sent from the Military
Academy, could not obtain a commission from the General Government.
In the war between Mexico and Texas, by which the latter had secured
its independence, Johnston had held high command, and was perhaps
the best equipped soldier, both by education and service, to be
found in the entire country outside the regular army at the time
of the Mexican war. General Taylor urged the President to give
Johnston command of one of the ten new regiments. Johnston took
no part in politics; but his eminent brother, Josiah Stoddard
Johnston, long a senator from Louisiana, was Mr. Clay's most intimate
friend in public life, and General Taylor's letter was not even
answered. The places were wanted for adherents of the administration,
and Tibbatts of Kentucky, Jere Clemens of Alabama, Milledge L.
Bonham of South Carolina, Seymour of Connecticut, and men of that
grade,--eminent in civil life, active partisans, but with no military
training,--were preferred to the most experienced soldiers. This
fact disfigures the energetic record of Mr. Marcy as secretary of
War, and was eminently discreditable to the President and all his
advisers.
Perhaps the most inexcusable blunder of the administration was the
attempt to take Thomas H. Benton from the Senate, where he was
honored, eminent, and useful, make him Lieutenant-general, and send
him out to Mexico to supersede both Scott and Taylor in command of
the army. The bill to enable this to be done actually passed the
House. When under discussion in that branch, a prominent Democratic
member from Ohio declared, as one reason for passing the bill, that
two of the generals are opposed politically to the Democratic party,
and "by their own acts or those of their friends are candidates
for the Presidency." The evident basis of this argument was, that
the Mexican war being a Democratic venture, no Whig had the right
to profit by it. The bill was fortunately stopped in the Senate,
though that body at the time had a Democratic majority. The measure
was killed by one convincing speech from Mr. Badger of North
Carolina. The senators knew Colonel Benton's temper and temperament,
and understood how completely unfitted he was for military command,
and how his appointment would demoralize and practically destroy
the army. To the end of his life, however, Colonel Benton himself
believed a serious mistake had been made. He had been commissioned
colonel in the war of 1812, but though of unquestioned bravery,
and deeply read in military science, it had never been his fortune
to engage in battle, or to see the face of an enemy. Yet in the
autobiographical sketch which precedes his "Thirty Years' View,"
he complacently assured himself that his appointment as Lieutenant-
general over Scott and Taylor "could not have wounded professional
honor," as at the time of his retiring from the army he "ranked
all those who have since reached its head."
WHIG OPPOSITION TO GENERAL TAYLOR.
But all the efforts to make a Democratic hero out of the war failed.
The line-officers appointed from civil life behaved gallantly.
The volunteers under their command were exceptionally excellent,--
almost competent themselves to the conduct of a campaign. The
political generals who vaulted from law-offices into the command
of brigades and divisions were furnished by the War Department with
staff-officers carefully chosen from the best educated and most
skillful of the regular army. All would not suffice, however, to
displace Taylor and Scott from the post of chief heroes. "Old
Rough and Ready," as Taylor was called by his troops, became a
popular favorite of irresistible strength, and in the Whig convention
of 1848 was chosen over Mr. Clay as the standard-bearer of his
party. He was placed before the people on his record as a soldier,
unhampered by the political declarations which make up the modern
platform. Mr. Clay had expected the nomination, and General Scott
had offered to run on the same ticket as Vice-President; but against
the constantly rising tide of Taylor's popularity both ordinary
and extraordinary political combinations gave way. Even the Kentucky
delegation divided,--in accordance with Mr. Crittenden's judgment,
though not by his advice. To the overwhelming chagrin and
mortification of Mr. Clay, a man unknown in political circles was
preferred as the candidate of the party of which he felt himself
to have been the creator. Mr. Clay was enraged by the result, and
never became reconciled to it. Though he gave in the end a quiet
vote at the polls for Taylor, he stubbornly refused during the
campaign to open his lips or write a word in favor of his election.
Mr. Webster, though without the keen personal disappointment of
Mr. Clay, was equally discontented with the nomination. He had
spoken in a semi-public way for several months previous to the
convention, of the folly of nominating "a swearing, swaggering,
frontier colonel" for the Presidency,--an allusion to General
Taylor, which was scandalously unjust, and which was contradicted
by his whole life. When Taylor was finally nominated, Mr. Webster
resented the selection as an indignity to the statesmen of the Whig
party. His only ray of comfort was the defeat of Abbott Lawrence
for the Vice-Presidency by Millard Fillmore. Mr. Lawrence was a
man of wealth, the most prominent manufacturer at the time in the
country, of high personal character, and of wide political influence.
He was the leading Taylor-Whig in New England, and his course had
given offense to Mr. Webster to such an extent indeed, that on a
public occasion, after the Presidential election, he referred to
Mr. Lawrence in an unfriendly and discourteous manner.
The situation became still further complicated. The Whigs believed
they had avoided the responsibility of positive declaration on
either side of the issue embodied in the Wilmot Proviso, by selecting
a military hero as their candidate. In the phrase of the day, he
could make a "Star and Stripe" canvass, with fair chance of success,
on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line. There was loss to be
incurred by either course. The Whig managers saw plainly that an
anti-slavery policy would give almost the entire South to the
Democrats, and a pro-slavery policy would rend the Whig party
throughout the North. They wisely concluded, if the canvass were
merely a game to win votes, that the non-committal plan was the
safe one. But this evasive course was not wholly successful.
There was a considerable body of men in New England, and especially
in Massachusetts, known as "Conscience Whigs," who had deep
convictions on the subject of slavery, and refused to support
General Taylor. Conspicuous among these were Henry Wilson, E.
Rockwood Hoar, and Charles Francis Adams. A defection of the same
kind among the Whigs of New York was prevented by the active
influence of Mr. Seward, but it developed rapidly in the northern
section of Ohio. Throughout the country the Whigs began to fear
that a mistake had been made, and that the old leaders had been
thrown overboard without due thought of the consequences. Mr.
Clay's private correspondence exhibited unmistakable gratification
at this aspect of affairs, for he felt assured that the influential
Whigs who were now organizing against Taylor would have supported
him as cordially as they had done in 1844.
These troubles in the Whig ranks tended, of course, to encourage
the Democrats, and to give them for a time great promise of success.
The selection of their own candidate, however, had not been unattended
with difficulty and dissension. Mr. Polk was from the first out
of the question,--verifying the Scripture that those who draw the
sword shall perish by the sword. The war inaugurated by him had
been completely successful; "a glorious peace," as it was termed,
had been conquered; a vast addition to our territory had been
accomplished. Yet by common consent, in which Mr. Polk had gracefully
concurred in advance, it was admitted that he was not available
for re-election. He had sown the dragon's teeth, and the armed
men who sprang forth wrested his sceptre from him. But it would
not be candid to ascribe his disability solely to events connected
with the war. He had pursued the most unwise course in dealing
with the New-York Democracy, and had for himself hopelessly divided
the party. He made the great blunder of not recognizing the strength
and leadership of Van Buren and Silas Wright. He had been led to
distrust them, had always felt aggrieved that Wright refused to
run on his ticket as Vice-President, and was annoyed by the fact
that, as candidate for governor, Wright received several thousand
votes more than the electoral ticket which represented his own
fortunes. This fact came to him in a manner which deeply impressed
it upon his memory. At that time, before railroad or telegraph
had hastened the transmission of news beyond the Alleghanies, Mr.
Polk in his Tennessee home was in an agony of doubt as to the result
in New York. The first intelligence that reached him announced
the certain victory of Wright, but left the electoral ticket
undecided, with very unpleasant rumors of his own defeat. When at
last the returns showed that he had a plurality of five thousand
in New York, and was chosen President, it did not suffice to remove
the deep impressions of those few days in which, either in the
gloom of defeat or in the torture of suspense, he feared that he
had been betrayed by the Barnburners of New York as a revenge for
Van Buren's overthrow at Baltimore. As matter of fact the suspicion
was absolutely groundless. The contest for governor between Silas
Wright and Millard Fillmore called out intense feeling, and the
former had the advantage of personal popularity over the latter
just as Mr. Clay had over Mr. Polk. Mr. Wright's plurality was
but five thousand greater than Mr. Polk's, and this only proved
that among half a million voters there may have been twenty-five
hundred who preferred Mr. Clay for President and Mr. Wright for
governor.
PRESIDENT POLK AND MR. VAN BUREN.
But there was no manifestation of feeling or apparent withholding
of confidence on the part of Mr. Polk when the result was finally
proclaimed. On the contrary he offered the Treasury Department to
Mr. Wright, feeling assured in advance, as the uncharitable thought,
that Wright could not leave the governorship to accept it. When
the office was declined, Mr. Polk again wrote Mr. Wright, asking
his advice as to the New-York member of the cabinet. Mr. Wright
submitted the names of three men from whom wise choice could be
made,--Benjamin F. Butler, who had been attorney-general under
President Jackson; John A. Dix, then recently chosen to the United-
States Senate; and Azariah C. Flagg, eminent in the party, and
especially distinguished for his administration of financial trust.
Mr. Polk, under other and adverse influence, saw fit to disregard
Mr. Wright's counsel, and selected William L. Marcy, who was hostile
to Wright, and distrusted by Van Buren, for Secretary of War. From
that moment the fate of Mr. Polk as candidate for re-election was
sealed. The cause might seem inadequate, but the effect was
undeniable. The Democratic party at the outbreak of the civil war,
sixteen years afterwards, had not wholly recovered from the divisions
and strifes which sprung from the disregard of Mr. Van Buren's
wishes at that crisis. No appointment to Mr. Polk's cabinet could
have been more distasteful than that of Mr. Marcy. He had lost
the State during Mr. Van Buren's Presidency in the contest for the
governorship against Mr. Seward in 1838, and thus laid the foundation,
as Mr. Van Buren believed, for his own disastrous defeat in 1840.
The disputes which arose from Marcy's appointment in the cabinet
led to Wright's defeat for re-election in 1846, when John Young,
the Whig candidate, was chosen governor of New York. To three men
in the cabinet the friends of Mr. Wright ascribed the Democratic
overthrow,--Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Robert J. Walker, and Mr. Marcy,--
each anxious for the Presidency, and each feeling that Mr. Wright
was in his way. Mr. Wright died suddenly the year after his defeat,
and it was supposed for a time that harmony in the New-York Democracy
might be restored over his grave. But his friends survived, and
their grief was the measure of their resentment.
The course of events which disabled Mr. Polk as a candidate proved
equally decisive against all the members of his cabinet; and by
the process of exclusion rather than by an enthusiastic desire
among the people, and still less among the leaders, General Cass
was selected by the Democratic Convention as candidate for the
Presidency, and William O. Butler of Kentucky for the Vice-Presidency.
The Democracy of New York, in consequence of the divisions arising
under the governorship of Mr. Wright, sent two full delegations to
the convention, bearing credentials from separate organizations.
The friends of Mr. Marcy bore the name of Hunkers; the followers
of Mr. Wright ranged themselves under the title of Barnburners,--
distinctions which had prevailed for some years in New York. It
was in fact the old division on the annexation of Texas, and now
represented the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery wing of the
Democratic party. The National Convention sought in vain to bridge
the difficulty by admitting both delegations, giving to them united
the right to cast the vote of the State. But the Barnburners
declined thus to compromise a principle. On a question of bread,
the half-loaf is preferable to starvation, but when political honor
and deep personal feeling are involved, so material an adjustment
is not practicable. The Barnburners retired from the convention,
disclaimed all responsibility for its conclusions, and proceeded
in due time to organize against the ticket of Cass and Butler.
The Hunkers, left in the convention as the sole representatives of
the New-York Democracy, were startled at the situation and declined
to vote. They were anxious that the nomination of Cass should not
appear to be forced on the Barnburners by the rival faction. It
thus happened that New York, which for twenty years under the
skillful leadership of Mr. Van Buren had dictated the course of
the Democracy, was now so shorn of influence through the factions
engendered by his defeat, that a Presidential nomination was made,
not only without her lead, but without her aid or participation.
CASS BOLTED BY VAN BUREN'S FRIENDS.
The Democratic candidate was a man of high character. He had served
creditably in the early part of the war of 1812, had been governor
of Michigan Territory from 1813 to 1831, had been five years
Secretary of War under General Jackson, and had gone to France as
minister in 1836. He remained at the court of Louis Philippe,
where he received eminent consideration, for six years. When he
returned to this country in 1842, at sixty years of age, he
undoubtedly intended to re-enter political life. He landed at
Boston, and was received with enthusiasm by the New-England Democrats,
especially of that class who had not been in special favor during
the long rule of Jackson and his successor. Popular ovations were
arranged for him as he journeyed westward, and, by the time he
reached his home in Detroit, General Cass was publicly recognized
as a candidate for the Presidency. These facts did not escape the
jealous and watchful eye of Mr. Van Buren. He was aggrieved by
the course of General Cass, feeling assured that its direct effect
would be to injure himself, and not to promote the political fortunes
of the General. But the rivalry continued to develop. Cass remained
in the field, a persistent candidate for nomination, and in the
end proved to be, perhaps, the most powerful factor in the combination
which secured the triumph of Polk. He had deeply wounded Mr. Van
Buren, and, as the latter thought, causelessly and cruelly. He
had disregarded a personal and political friendship of thirty years'
duration, and had sundered ties which life was too short to re-
unite. Cass had gained no victory. He had only defeated old
friends, and the hour of retribution was at hand.
When the delegation of Barnburners withdrew from the Baltimore
Convention of 1848, they were obviously acting in harmony with Mr.
Van Buren's wishes. Had they been admitted, according to their
peremptory demand, as the sole delegation from New York, they could
have defeated Cass in the convention, and forced the nomination of
some new man unconnected with the grievances and enmities of 1844.
But when the demand of the Barnburners was denied, and they were
asked to make common cause with the assassins of Wright, as James
S. Wadsworth had denominated the Hunkers, the indignantly shook
the dust of the city from off their feet, returned to New York,
and forthwith called a Democratic convention to meet at Utica on
the 22d of June.
Before the time arrived for the Utica Convention to assemble, the
anti-slavery revolt was widely extended, and was, apparently, no
less against Taylor than against Cass. There was agitation in many
States, and the Barnburners found that by uniting with the opposition
against both the old parties, a most effective combination could
be made. It was certain to profit them in New York, and it promised
the special revenge which they desired in the defeat of Cass. The
various local and State movements were merged in one great convention,
which met at Buffalo on the 9th of August, with imposing demonstrations.
Many of those composing it had held high rank in the old parties.
Salmon P. Chase of Ohio was selected as president. The convention
represented a genuine anti-slavery sentiment, and amid excitement
and enthusiasm Martin Van Buren was nominated for President, and
Charles Francis Adams for Vice-President. The Barnburners, the
anti-slavery Whigs, and the old Abolitionists, co-operated with
apparent harmony under the general name of the Free-soil party;
and the impression with many when the convention adjourned was,
that Mr. Van Buren would have a plurality over both Cass and Taylor
in the State of New York. The management of the popular canvass
was intrusted to Democratic partisans of the Silas Wright school,
and this fact had a significant and unexpected influence upon the
minds of anti-slavery Whigs.
In the first flush of the excitement, the supporters of the regular
Democratic nominee were not alarmed. They argued, not illogically,
that the Free-soil ticket would draw more largely from the Whigs
than from the Democrats, and thus very probably injure Taylor more
than Cass. But in a few weeks this hope was dispelled. The Whigs
of the country had been engaged for a long period in an earnest
political warfare against Mr. Van Buren. In New York the contest
had been personal and acrimonious to the last degree, and ordinary
human nature could hardly be expected the bury at once the grievances
and resentments of a generation. Nor did the Whigs confide in the
sincerity of Mr. Van Buren's anti-slavery conversion. His repentance
was late, and even the most charitable suspected that his desire
to punish Cass had entered largely into the motives which suddenly
aroused him to the evils of slavery after forty years of quiet
acquiescence in all the demands of the South. Mr. Seward, who
possessed the unbounded confidence of the anti-slavery men of New
York, led a most earnest canvass in favor of General Taylor, and
was especially successful in influencing Whigs against Van Buren.
In this he was aided by the organizing skill of Thurlow Weed, and
by the editorial power of Horace Greeley. Perhaps in no other
National election did three men so completely control the result.
They gave the vote of New York to General Taylor, and made him
President of the United States.
MR. WEBSTER'S MARSHFIELD SPEECH.
At an opportune moment for the success of the Whigs, Mr. Webster
decided to support General Taylor. He thoroughly distrusted Cass,
--not in point of integrity, but of discretion and sound judgment
as a statesman. He had rebuked Cass severely in a diplomatic
correspondence touching the Treaty of Washington, when he was
Secretary of State and Cass minister to France. The impression
then derived had convinced him that the Democratic candidate was
not the man whom a Whig could desire to see in the Presidential
chair. In Mr. Van Buren's anti-slavery professions, Mr. Webster
had no confidence. He said pleasantly, but significantly, that
"if he and Mr. Van Buren should meet under the Free-soil flag, the
latter with his accustomed good-nature would laugh." He added,
with a touch of characteristic humor, "that the leader of the Free-
spoil party suddenly becoming the leader of the Free-soil party is
a joke to shake his sides and mine." Distrusting him sincerely on
the anti-slavery issue, Mr. Webster showed that on every other
question Mr. Van Buren was throughly objectionable to the Whigs.
The Marshfield speech, as this effort was popularly known at the
time, had great influence with the Northern Whigs. Mr. Webster
did not conceal his belief that General Taylor's nomination was
"one not fit to be made," but by the clearest of logic he demonstrated
that he was infinitely to be preferred to either of his competitors.
Mr. Webster at that time had the confidence of the anti-slavery
Whigs in a large degree; he had voted for the Wilmot Proviso, and
his public course had been that of a just and conservative expositor
of their advanced opinion. From the day of the Marshfield speech,
the belief was general that Van Buren would draw far more largely
from the Democrats than from the Whigs; that his candidacy would
give the State of New York to Taylor, and thus elect him President.
The loss of Whig votes was not distasteful to Mr. Van Buren after
the prospect of his securing the electors of New York had vanished.
Had he drawn in equal proportion from the two parties, his candidacy
would have had no effect. It would have neutralized itself, and
left the contest between Cass and Taylor as though he had not
entered the race. By a rule of influence, whose working is obvious,
the tenacity of the Democratic adherents of Van Buren increased as
the Whigs withdrew. The contest between Cass and Van Buren finally
became in New York, in very large degree, a struggle between
Democratic factions, in which the anti-slavery profession was an
instrumentality to be temporarily used, and not a principle to be
permanently upheld. As the Whigs left Van Buren, the Democrats
left Cass, and the end of the canvass gave a full measure of
satisfaction, not only to the supporters of Taylor, but to the
followers of Van Buren, who polled a larger vote for him than was
given to Cass. New York, as in 1844, decided the contest. The
friends of Van Buren had not simply beaten Cass at the polls, they
had discredited him as a party leader. In the pithy phrase of John
Van Buren, they had exposed him to the country as the candidate
"powerful for mischief, powerless for good."
The total vote of New York was, for Taylor, 218,603; for Cass,
114,318; for Van Buren, 120,510. The canvass for the governorship
was scarcely less exciting than that for the Presidency. Hamilton
Fish was the Whig candidate; John A. Dix, then a senator of the
United States, ran as the representative of Mr. Van Buren's Free-
soil party; while the eminent Chancellor Walworth, who had recently
lost his judicial position, was nominated as a supporter of Cass
by the Regular Democracy. Mr. Fish had been candidate for Lieutenant-
governor two years before on the Whig ticket with John Young, and
was defeated because of his outspoken views against the Anti-Renters.
Those radical agitators instinctively knew that the descendant of
Stuyvesant would support the inherited rights of the Van Rensselaers,
and therefore defeated Mr. Fish while they elected the Whig candidates
for other offices. Mr. Fish now had his abundant reward in receiving
as large a vote as General Taylor, and securing nearly one hundred
thousand plurality over the Van Buren candidate, while he in turn
received a small plurality over the representative of General Cass.
The result of the two contests left the Van Buren wing, or the
Barnburners, in majority over the Hunkers, and gave them an advantage
in future contests for supremacy, inside the party. Truthful
history will hold this to have been the chief object of the struggle
with many who vowed allegiance at Buffalo to an anti-slavery creed
strong enough to satisfy Joshua R. Giddings and Charles Sumner.
With Cass defeated, and the Marcy wing of the party severely
disciplined, the great mass of the Van Buren host of 1848 were
ready to disavow their political escapade at Buffalo. Dean Richmond,
Samuel J. Tilden, John Van Buren, C. C. Cambreleng, and Sanford E.
Church, forgot their anti-slavery professions, reunited with the
old party, and vowed afresh their fidelity to every principle
against which they had so earnestly protested. Mr. Van Buren
himself went with them, and to the end of his life maintained a
consistent pro-slavery record, which, throughout a long public
career was varied only by the insincere professions which he found
it necessary to make in order to be revenged on Cass. But it would
be unjust to include in this condemnation all the New-York Democrats
who went into the Buffalo movement. Many were honest and earnest,
and in after life followed the principles which they had then
professed. Chief among these may be reckoned Preston King, who
exerted a powerful influence in the anti-slavery advances of after
years, and James S. Wadsworth, who gave his name, and generously
of his wealth, to the cause, and finally sealed his devotion with
his blood on the battle-field of the Wilderness.
CHARACTER OF MR. VAN BUREN.
Mr. Van Buren spent the remainder of his life in dignified retirement
--surviving until his eightieth year, in 1862. In point of mere
intellectual force, he must rank below the really eminent men with
whom he was so long associated in public life. But he was able,
industrious, and, in political management, clever beyond any man
who has thus far appeared in American politics. He had extraordinary
tact in commending himself to the favor and confidence of the
people. Succeeding to political primacy in New York on the death
of De Witt Clinton in 1828, he held absolute control of his party
for twenty years, and was finally overthrown by causes whose origin
was beyond the limits of his personal influence. He stood on the
dividing-line between the mere politician and the statesman,--
perfect in the arts of the one, possessing largely the comprehensive
power of the other. His active career began in 1812, and ended in
1848. During the intervening period he had served in the Legislature
of New York, had been a member of the Constitutional Convention of
1820, had been attorney-general of the State, and had been chosen
its governor. In the national field he had been senator of the
United States, Secretary of State, minister to England, Vice-
President, and President. No other man in the country has held so
many great places. He filled them all with competency and with
power, but marred his illustrious record by the political episode
of 1848, in which, though he may have had some justification for
revenge on unfaithful associates in his old party, he had none for
his lack of fidelity to new friends, and for his abandonment of a
sacred principle which he had pledged himself to uphold.
[* NOTE.--An error of statement occurs on page 72, Volume I, in
regard to the action of the Whig caucus for Speaker in December,
1847. Mr. Winthrop was chosen after Mr. Vinton had declined, and
was warmly supported by Mr. Vinton. The error came from an
incorrect account of the caucus in a newspaper of that time.]