The Electoral Commission Bill was considered with great secrecy by the
Joint Committees of the House and Senate. Its terms were in direct
contravention of Mr. Tilden’s plan. This was simplicity itself. He was
for asserting, by formal resolution, the conclusive right of the two
Houses acting concurrently to count the electoral vote and determine
what should be counted as electoral votes, and for denying, also by
formal resolution, the pretension set up by the Republicans that the
President of the Senate had lawful right to assume that function. He
was for urging that issue in debate in both Houses and before the
country. He thought that if the attempt should be made to usurp for
the President of the Senate a power to make the count, and thus
practically to control the Presidential election, the scheme would
break down in process of execution.
Strange to say, Mr. Tilden was not consulted by the party leaders in
Congress until the fourteenth of January, and then only by Mr. Hewitt,
the extra-constitutional features of the Electoral Tribunal measure
having already received the assent of Mr. Bayard and Mr. Thurman, the
Democratic members of the Senate Committee. Standing by his original
plan, and answering Mr. Hewitt’s statement that Mr. Bayard and Mr.
Thurman were fully committed, Mr. Tilden said: “Is it not, then,
rather late to consult me?” to which Mr. Hewitt replied: “They do
not consult you. They are public men, and have their own duties and
responsibilities. I consult you.” In the course of the discussion with
Mr. Hewitt which followed Mr. Tilden said, “If you go into conference
with your adversary, and can’t break off because you feel you must
agree to something, you cannot negotiate--you are not fit to negotiate.
You will be beaten upon every detail.” Replying to the apprehension
of a collision of force between the parties, Mr. Tilden thought it
exaggerated, but said: “Why surrender now? You can always surrender.
Why surrender before the battle, for fear you may have to surrender
after the battle?”
In short, Mr. Tilden condemned the proceeding as precipitate. It
was a month before the time for the count, and he saw no reason why
opportunity should not be given for consideration and consultation by
all the representatives of the people. He treated the state of mind of
Bayard and Thurman as a panic in which they were liable to act in haste
and repent at leisure. He stood for publicity and wider discussion,
distrusting a scheme to submit such vast interests to a small body
sitting in the Capitol, as likely to become the sport of intrigue and
fraud.
Mr. Hewitt returned to Washington and, without communicating to Mr.
Tilden’s immediate friends in the House his attitude and objection,
united with Mr. Thurman and Mr. Bayard in completing the bill and
reporting it to the Democratic Advisory Committee, as, by a caucus
rule, had to be done with all measures relating to the great issue then
before us. No intimation had preceded it. It fell like a bombshell
upon the members of the Committee. In the debate that followed Mr.
Bayard was very insistent, answering the objections at once offered by
me, first aggressively and then angrily, going the length of saying,
“If you do not accept this plan I shall wash my hands of the whole
business, and you can go ahead and seat your President in your own way.”
Mr. Randall, the Speaker, said nothing, but he was with me, as was a
majority of my colleagues. It was Mr. Hunton, of Virginia, who poured
oil on the troubled waters, and, somewhat in doubt as to whether the
changed situation had changed Mr. Tilden, I yielded my better judgment,
declaring it as my opinion that the plan would seat Hayes, and there
being no other protestant the Committee finally gave a reluctant assent.
In “open session” a majority of Democrats favored the bill. Many of
them made it their own. They passed it. There was belief that justice
David Davis, who was expected to become a member of the Commission, was
sure for Tilden. If, under this surmise, he had been, the political
complexion of “eight to seven” would have been reversed. Elected to the
United States Senate from Illinois, Judge Davis declined to serve, and
Mr. Justice Bradley was chosen for the Commission in his place. The day
after the inauguration of Hayes my kinsman, Stanley Matthews, said to
me, “You people wanted Judge Davis. So did we. I tell you what I know,
that Judge Davis was as safe for us as Judge Bradley. We preferred him
because he carried more weight.” The subsequent career of Judge Davis
in the Senate gives conclusive proof that this was true.
When the consideration of the disputed votes before the Commission
had proceeded far enough to demonstrate the likelihood that its final
decision would be for Hayes, a movement of obstruction and delay, “a
filibuster,” was organized by about forty Democratic members of the
House. It proved rather turbulent than effective. The South stood
very nearly solid for carrying out the agreement in good faith.
“Toward the close the filibuster received what appeared formidable
reinforcement from the Louisiana Delegation.” This was in reality
merely a “bluff,” intended to induce the Hayes people to make certain
concessions touching their State government. It had the desired effect.
Satisfactory assurances having been given, the count proceeded to the
end--a very bitter end, indeed, for the Democrats.
The final conference between the Louisianians and the accredited
representatives of Mr. Hayes was held at Wormley’s Hotel and came to
be called “the Wormley Conference.” It was the subject of uncommon
interest and heated controversy at the time and long afterward.
Without knowing why or for what purpose, I was asked to be present
by my colleague, Mr. Ellis, of Louisiana, and later in the day the
same invitation came to me from the Republicans through Mr. Garfield.
Something was said about my serving as “a referee.” Just before the
appointed hour General M. C. Butler, of South Carolina, afterward
so long a Senator in Congress, said to me: “This meeting is called
to enable Louisiana to make terms with Hayes. South Carolina is as
deeply concerned as Louisiana, but we have nobody to represent us in
Congress and hence have not been invited. South Carolina puts herself
in your hands and expects you to secure for her whatever terms are
given to Louisiana.” So, of a sudden, I found myself invested with
responsibility equally as an “agent” and a “referee.”
It is hardly worth while repeating in detail all that passed at
this Wormley Conference, made public long ago by Congressional
investigation. When I entered the apartment of Mr. Evarts at Wormley’s
I found, besides Mr. Evarts, Mr. John Sherman, Mr. Garfield, Governor
Dennison and Mr. Stanley Matthews, of the Republicans, and Mr. Ellis,
Mr. Levy, and Mr. Burke, Democrats of Louisiana. Substantially, the
terms had been agreed upon during previous conferences; that is, the
promise that, if Hayes came in, the troops should be withdrawn and
the people of Louisiana be left free to set their house in order to
suit themselves. The actual order withdrawing the troops was issued by
President Grant two or three days later, just as he was going out of
office.
“Now, gentlemen,” said I, half in jest, “I am here to represent South
Carolina, and if the terms given to Louisiana are not equally applied
to South Carolina, I become a filibuster myself to-morrow morning.”
There was some chaffing as to what right I had there and how I got in,
when with great earnestness Governor Dennison, who had been the bearer
of a letter from Mr. Hayes which he had read to us, put his hand on my
shoulder and said, “As a matter of course, the Southern policy to which
Mr. Hayes has here pledged himself embraces South Carolina as well as
Louisiana.” Mr. Sherman, Mr. Garfield, and Mr. Evarts concurred warmly
in this, and, immediately after we separated, I communicated the fact
to General Butler.
In the acrimonious discussion which subsequently sought to make
“bargain, intrigue, and corruption” of this Wormley Conference, and
to involve certain Democratic members of the House who were nowise
party to it, but had sympathized with the purpose of Louisiana and
South Carolina to obtain some measure of relief from intolerable
local conditions, I never was questioned or assailed. No one doubted
my fidelity to Mr. Tilden, who had been promptly advised of all that
passed and who justified what I had done. Though “conscripted,” as
it were, and rather a passive agent, I could see no wrong in the
proceeding. I had spoken and voted in favor of the Electoral Tribunal
Bill and, losing, had no thought of repudiating its conclusions.
Hayes was already as good as seated. If the States of Louisiana and
South Carolina could save their local autonomy out of the general
wreck, there seemed no good reason to forbid. On the other hand, the
Republican leaders were glad of an opportunity to make an end of the
corrupt and tragic farce of Reconstruction; to unload their party of a
dead weight which had been burdensome and was growing dangerous; mayhap
to punish their Southern agents who had demanded so much for doctoring
the returns and making an exhibit in favor of Hayes.