[Illustration: Bust of Thucydides.]
Prosecution of the Persian war—Rise of Athens to maritime empire, and
consequent undermining of the aristocratical interest—Administration
of Cimon—of Pericles—Education of the Athenians—Commencement of the
Peloponnesian war.
No country, looking only to external circumstances, had ever a fairer
opportunity of establishing a mighty empire than Greece, after the
total overthrow of the Persian invasion. The power of Persia broken,
Egypt in decay, Rome in its infancy, Carthage distant and intent upon
western conquests, her own soldiery inspirited by success, and preceded
by that opinion of their invincibility which is an almost certain
earnest of future victory, there seemed to be no power capable of
withstanding Greece had she been zealous and unanimous in prosecuting
foreign conquest. But instead of tracing the march of a victorious
nation to empire, these pages will describe little but the growth of
civil dissensions, bloody enmities, and long and destructive warfare
between kindred states. Until the reign of Alexander, the Greeks
never possessed a foot of land in Asia or Africa beyond the narrow
territories, acquired long before the period of which we treat, of the
numerous cities which lined the Mediterranean, and those smaller seas
which communicate with it.
The cause of this want of foreign enterprise is to be sought chiefly
in the non–existence of any acknowledged head of the nation, and in the
selfishness and want of union which, as we have seen, characterized
their councils even in the time of danger. Sparta, in right of her
pre–eminent reputation in arms, claimed and was allowed to lead the
confederate troops of Greece in the field; but in their councils she
had only an equal voice. That reputation, and the lofty, self–denying,
though stern and unlovely temper fostered by the institutions of
Lycurgus, had excited so much respect, that at the games of assembled
Greece the presence of a Spartan was enough to turn the eyes of the
spectators from the competitors to himself: and the command of the
fleet collected to oppose Xerxes was vested in a Spartan at the
instance of the allies themselves, who, notwithstanding the smallness
of the Lacedæmonian naval force, refused to serve under any other than
a Spartan commander. But the pride and presumed treason of Pausanias
soon disgusted the allies, and threw the naval command into the hands
of the Athenians; and that people soon converted the force meant to
prosecute the quarrel with Persia into an instrument of their own
aggrandisement, and assumed an authority nothing less than despotic
over free states, which had confederated with them as one equal with
another. Hence arose two different and often conflicting interests: the
Athenians powerful by sea, the Lacedæmonians by land. Opposed in the
nature of their government as in the nature of their strength, they
became the rallying points to which two factions, implacable in their
enmity, looked for support; and to the care with which they fomented
the civil discords on which their power was based, the evils which
we are about to describe may in great measure be referred. But the
circumstances which led to this rivalry require to be more fully told.
The states which had confederated to repel the invasion of Xerxes
did not rest satisfied with self–defence. After the battle of Salamis,
the fleet proceeded to liberate the islands of the Ægean Sea, and the
Grecian cities of Asia Minor; and the forces of those states gladly
combined with their deliverers to prosecute the war against their
common enemy. In the third year after the battle of Salamis, the
haughtiness and misconduct of Pausanias so alienated the allies, that
the Peloponnesians returned home, and the Asiatic, Hellespontine, and
Island Greeks transferred the right of leading their united forces
to the Athenians. Aristides’ high character for integrity appears to
have been the chief instrument in procuring for his countrymen this
great increase of power. By his advice they proceeded to draw out an
assessment, in which each state, according to its strength, was rated
to furnish a certain number of ships, and a stated sum of money, for
the purposes of the confederacy; and the difficult and invidious task
of apportioning the contributions was assigned to him. This he executed
with such success that not a complaint of injustice or partiality was
heard. The whole assessment amounted to 460 talents, about 101,000
English pounds. At his death, Cimon, hitherto the partner of his
influence, succeeded to the sole possession of it. Cimon was one of
the most honest of Grecian statesmen; but he was not governed by that
scrupulous love of justice which distinguished Aristides. Under his
guidance the first steps were taken towards making the contributions of
Greece for the maintenance of the Persian war the means of establishing
the dominion of Athens over Grecian cities. The allied states by
degrees grew weary of exertions to which they were no longer urged by a
sense of danger; and when it was proposed that they should commute the
personal service of their citizens for a sum of money, the Athenians
undertaking to provide and man a fleet for the general purposes of
the confederacy, the suggestion was readily adopted by many. “By this
means Athens was at once obliged to build and employ more ships, and
supplied with the means, while the navy of the allies proportionally
declined. The Athenians, feeling their strength, became haughtier in
their conduct, and more harsh in enforcing the same services which grew
to be less punctually rendered. Hence rose wars with the defaulters,
in which, Athens uniformly prevailing, the fleet of the conquered
city was taken from it, and a heavier tribute levied: and since every
such contest brought fresh power and wealth to the predominant state,
and diminished the resources which could be at the command of any
combination among its dependants, Athens, from the leader, became the
mistress of her allies. The first state so subjected was the island
Naxos, which revolted, and was conquered in the twelfth year of the
Athenian command.”[76] Thus Athens became the best nursery for seamen
in Greece, and increased her fleet at the expense of others, who grew
weak from the very causes which made her strong. Moreover, having
monopolized the naval arm, she was released from all shadow of control
from the council of associate states, and was left at full liberty to
employ her strength against the Persians, or the pirates, or her own
refractory allies, as might best suit the exigencies of the moment. Her
power reached its greatest height about the year 450 B.C.,
when it extended over almost all the islands of the Ægean, including
Eubœa, and over the maritime Grecian settlements in Thrace, Macedonia,
and Asia Minor. On the continent her influence directed the policy of
Megaris, Bœotia, Phocis, and the Opuntian Locris; by the strong towns
of Naupactus and Pegæ, she commanded both ends of the Corinthian gulf;
Trœzen was subject to her; her influence was predominant in Achaia;
and Argos, always jealous of its overbearing neighbour, Lacedæmon, was
bound by that jealousy in close alliance with the only countervailing
power.
So great a change in the political influence of Athens did not occur
without corresponding alterations in the private circumstances and
temper of the citizens. Cimon was himself attached to aristocratical
principles, and endeavoured to maintain close alliance with Lacedæmon;
but still the necessary result of the policy and events which raised
Athens to such extensive empire was to diminish the influence of
the aristocracy of wealth and birth, and to throw a preponderating
influence into the hands of the poorer class of citizens. Such, in
Greece, was the invariable effect of cultivating naval power. The
military force of every people consisted principally of _hoplitæ_,
as they were called—literally, armed men, whose equipment consisted
of body armour, greaves, a helmet, a large shield, a long spear, and
sword. A body of these troops was always attended by a body of men
more lightly armed, and fitter for reconnoitring, for the duty of
outposts, and similar uses; but little to be relied on in the shock
of battle, and principally composed of slaves and mercenaries. The
heavy foot, on the contrary, in the flourishing times of Greece, were
almost universally citizens, and citizens of the richer classes; for
the state supplied no armour, and the poorest class could not afford to
keep the expensive equipment necessary to pass muster in the ranks. The
citizens of Athens were divided into four classes, according to their
income. The two wealthiest were obliged to keep a horse, and serve in
the cavalry, an expensive service in the barren country of Attica: the
third class was obliged to be provided with the full equipment of a
heavy–armed soldier: the fourth were allowed to serve in that capacity,
if possessed of proper armour: if not, they were enrolled among the
light–armed force, or served in the fleet. The poorer class, at Athens
as elsewhere, was the most numerous; and it is evident, from what has
been said, that its importance would increase or diminish in proportion
as the main exertions of the state were made by sea or by land. Where
naval power was uncultivated the power of the sword fell into the
hands of the rich: where war and commerce were alike carried on by
sea, the lowest class became important by its services, as well as by
its numbers. Hence the cultivation of maritime strength was always
considered favourable to the cause of democracy.
The total devastation of Attica in the Persian invasion must, of
course, have reduced great numbers from competence and comfort to
poverty. For some time the lucrative war carried on against Persia
at once filled the treasury, and enabled the state to supply the
wants of this class by military pay. A further resource was found in
the splendid liberality of Cimon, who, possessed of vast hereditary
wealth, had the good fortune to increase it greatly by plunder and
other perquisites of a commander–in–chief, without incurring the
charge of dishonesty or rapaciousness. This wealth was freely spent
in maintaining his influence. His gardens and orchards were thrown
open to the public; a table was daily spread at his house for the free
use of the poorer citizens; and he readily lent money to those who
required it. Partly at his own, partly at the national expense, many
splendid public buildings were erected while he ruled the councils
of the state; and an example was given for the still more splendid
subsequent improvements of Pericles. But in spite of his services and
his magnificence, Cimon experienced a reverse of favour, to which
his professed aristocratical principles, and avowed admiration and
attachment to Sparta, contributed in no small degree. In the year 461
B.C. he was banished by ostracism, and a new party came into
power, headed by Ephialtes and Pericles, then a young man just rising
into eminence. These men were pledged to hostility to Sparta, and
bound to gratify the poorer citizens, by whose favour they had been
raised to direct the councils of the republic.
To preserve that favour it was necessary that the present administration
should not be eclipsed by the splendour and beneficence of the
preceding one. But the means of the leaders were far inferior; nor
from their private fortunes could they feed the hungry, and provide
splendid places of resort for the tenants of hovels, as their
magnificent predecessor had done. The only resource was to bribe the
public with its own money; and with this view a law was proposed, by
which the issues from the treasury, which hitherto had been controlled
by the court of Areopagus, were placed under the immediate command
of the people. The next step was to allow pay for attendance at the
general assemblies and in the courts of justice, in each of which a
considerable number of _dicasts_[77] sat, taken indiscriminately from
the citizens. This measure was introduced and carried by Pericles, or,
according to another statement, there was before a small sum allowed
for these services, which was increased by him. The total number of
persons who thus derived no small part of their subsistence from the
public funds was very considerable; for in one alone of the courts
fifty persons was the smallest number that ever sat, and the usual
number was from two to five hundred. Sometimes two or more courts were
consolidated, and then from one to two thousand persons sat in judgment
at once. The effect of this law was twofold: it secured the popularity
of those who had procured such a boon for the poor; it secured also a
large attendance of the poor in the general assembly, for attendance
there secured a sufficient provision for the wants of the day; and as
stated assemblies occurred four times in thirty–five days, the payments
for these and other extraordinary attendances, with public feasts, and
sacrifices, and duty in the courts, formed nearly a subsistence for
those who had neither property nor employment.
Not less careful was Pericles to gratify national pride by the
splendour of his public improvements. In this respect he far outdid
even Cimon, and stamped on Athens that character of magnificence in
respect of its public buildings, which has made it the wonder and
admiration of strangers even to this day. One of the long walls, the
temple of Eleusis, and the Odeon or musical theatre, were erected under
his direction; and, above all, the Parthenon was built, and adorned
with those celebrated sculptures, part of which, after the lapse of
twenty–three centuries, have found a new resting–place in our national
Museum. The Propylæa, or gateway leading into the Acropolis, was
another of his works, “which are the more wonderful because they were
completed in so short a time, and have lasted so long; and because,
while perfect, each of them was redolent of antiquity in respect of
beauty, and yet for grace and vigour it seems to this day as if each of
them were newly finished; there resides in them such an ever–springing
freshness, which prevents the injuries of time being felt, as if each
of the said works were tenanted by an ever youthful spirit, a soul
never waxing old, which still retains them in that vigour.”[78]
To meet the expenses of a line of policy such as we have described,
the mere revenue of Attica was of course insufficient; but the impost
originally contributed by the confederate Greeks towards avenging
the aggression of Persia was rigorously exacted, and applied without
scruple to the private purposes of the state and its governors. It was
matter of great complaint throughout Greece, that the money raised for
the common benefit of the nation should be perverted to the luxury
of an overweening and oppressive city; and the political enemies
of Pericles made it a constant subject of invective in the public
assemblies, that the people of Athens were openly defamed for this act
of robbery, and that it was “an overgreat injury to the rest of Greece,
and too manifest a token of tyranny, to behold before their eyes how
we do employ the money which they were enforced to gather for the
maintenance of the wars against the barbarian, in gilding, building,
and setting forth our city like a glorious woman, all to be gauded with
gold and precious stones; and how we do make images and build temples
of wonderful and infinite charge. Pericles replied to the contrary,
that the Athenians were not bound to make any account of this money
unto their friends and allies, considering that they fought for their
safety, and that they kept the barbarian far from Greece, without
troubling them to set out any one man, horse, or ship of theirs, the
money only excepted, which is no more theirs that paid it than theirs
that received it, so they bestow it to that use they received it for.
And their city being already well furnished with all things necessary
for the wars, it was good reason they should bestow the surplus of
their treasure in things which, in time to come, would make their fame
eternal. Moreover, he said, that whilst they continue building, they
should be presently rich, by reason of the diversity of work of all
sorts, and other things which they should have need of; and to compass
these things better, and to set them in hand, all manner of artificers
and workmen that would labour, should be set on work. So should all the
citizens and townsmen receive pay and wages of the common treasure, and
the city by this means should be greatly beautified, and much more able
to maintain itself.”[79]
As a defence the reply is valueless, but it shows how small a portion
of reason or justice is sufficient to supply a pretext when backed by
power, and points out the certain, and not unmerited, lot of those
nations which give the sword out of their own hand, and trust to
wealth to purchase defenders. Farther ground for discontent might be
found in the increased amount of the tax, which, at the beginning of
the Peloponnesian war, had been raised from four hundred and sixty
talents, the sum levied by Aristides B.C. 477, to about six
hundred talents.
To this splendour Pericles seems to have been led alike by
policy and taste. The Athenians were naturally a vain people, and their
self–complacency was nurtured by the unequalled rapidity with which
their fame and power had increased. Every thing which ministered to
that fame became precious in their eyes, and a good instance of this is
given by Plutarch, if we may trust the accuracy of that gossiping and
amusing historian. “Pericles, perceiving that his enemies did still cry
out upon him, that he did vainly waste and consume the common treasure,
and that he bestowed on the works the whole revenue of the city, one
day, when the people were assembled together, he asked before them all
whether they thought that the cost bestowed were too much. The people
answered him, a great deal too much. Well, then, said he, the charges
shall be mine (if you think good), and none of yours; provided that
no man’s name be written on the works, but mine only. When Pericles
had said so, the people cried out aloud, that they would none of that
(either that they wondered at the greatness of his mind, or else for
that they would not give him the only honour and praise to have done so
sumptuous and stately works), but willed him that he should see them
finished at the common charges, without sparing for any cost.”[80] “In
his political course,” says Professor Heeren, “Pericles was guided by
a simple principle, to be the first in his own city, while he secured
it the first place among cities.” Hence in arts, as well as in arms,
he wished it to obtain pre–eminence; and, instead of following the
narrow policy of Sparta, which discouraged in every way the approach
of strangers, he endeavoured to make his city the resort and wonder
of the world, and to adopt every means of turning the wealth of other
nations into her treasury; and he was himself singularly qualified to
direct the public taste, as well as the public arms, not merely by
natural talents, but by a more refined education than, when he was
young, generally fell to the lot of a Greek citizen. The celebrated
philosopher Anaxagoras was his preceptor in youth; the musician Damon,
characterized by Socrates as possessing every quality which could fit a
man to take charge of youth, and said to be deeply versed in matters of
government, was his friend and associate in riper years; in the company
of the celebrated Aspasia he is said to have found advantages, as well
as fascinations, such as no other society in Greece could supply; and
his personal accomplishments were set off by a style of oratory which,
in polish and eloquence, surpassed all that had yet been heard, and
singularly caught the minds of the Athenian people.
In all this there was much to refine and elevate the national taste;
there was also much which injured the national character in more vital
points, as we may now easily trace in the consequences. Few Athenians
had recourse to any species of labour, except military service, to gain
a subsistence. Of those who had no means, the number, the just claims,
and the expectations were alike increased by the Persian invasion; and
the events which followed it, first a long and profitable war, secondly
the consecutive administrations of Cimon and Pericles, who lavished,
the one his own, the other the national resources, to keep the poor
in good humour, were well calculated to foster their natural dislike
to labour, and equally natural desire to enjoy the produce of other
men’s industry. The result was, that a people jealous to excess of its
own supreme authority, and braggart of its own exertions in the cause
of freedom, became a harsh and oppressive ally in name, but sovereign
in reality (our language affords no term to express accurately the
relation in which the dependant, _ὑπήκοος_, stood to the leading
state), ruthlessly vindictive in punishing every attempt to shake off
its yoke. “Had Athens commanded no resources but its own, it would
have been impossible to support in idleness so large a portion of the
people; but the subject states were liable to unlimited extortion. Any
proposed exaction, however oppressive, was eagerly caught at by the
swarm of idlers who looked for maintenance and pleasure to the lavish
expenditure of the state, and their number and frequent attendance in
the assembly would generally ensure the success of any measure which
united them in its favour. Hence arose a crew of profligate demagogues,
who obtained a paramount influence by being ready to propose, at any
cost of justice, humanity, and ultimate advantage, whatever promised
to the multitude an immediate gain, and who frequently turned their
ascendancy to profit, by taking presents from the allies, as the price
of forbearance and protection. The populace drew both gain and pleasure
from the submission of the allies; the pride of each was flattered,
in proportion to his personal insignificance, by the homage paid him
as a citizen of the sovereign republic; their hopes of individual
enjoyment were all bound up in the continuance and extension of the
empire, and the passions thence resulting were studiously exasperated
by unprincipled orators: what wonder, then, that we shall henceforth
find their sway as jealous as oppressive; and, in case of revolt, their
vengeance as cruel as their rule had been unjust!”[81]
Another cause of the deterioration of the Athenian character is
to be found in the growth of a new system of education about this
period, and the introduction of new accomplishments, new teachers,
and new principles. The brief notice of this subject, which we shall
introduce, is principally derived from the only English writer who has
treated it in a popular manner, and who is well calculated to discuss
the question by his intimate acquaintance with Aristophanes and the
Socratic writings, though his vehement dislike of all democracies,
and especially the Athenian, is such as to make his testimony on some
points rather suspicious; we allude to Mr. Mitchell, the translator of
Aristophanes. It is to be premised, however, that these are matters on
which great difference of opinion exists among scholars; and that many
persons among those best qualified to judge take a very different view
of the subject from that here given.
Before the age of Pericles, the education of an Athenian of
rank and wealth consisted in obtaining, through the instructions of
the grammarians, an intimate acquaintance with the writings of the
older poets, especially Homer; after which he passed into the hands
of the music–master, and the keeper of the gymnasium, or school of
bodily exercises. The two latter were the most important branches of
education, not so much for purposes of display, as for the effect which
they were held to possess in the formation of character. To those
whose curiosity prompted some research into the secrets of nature,
the schools of the philosophers offered abundant gratification. There
they might hear treated the most abstruse topics of physical and
metaphysical science; the nature of God, the nature and origin of the
universe and its most striking phenomena, the nature of man, were all
discussed with a zealous interest and attention on the part of the
pupils, which appears to have led them into no small extravagances.[82]
But some years previous to the Peloponnesian war, as the cause of
democracy gained ground, and the minds of all men were fired by the
examples of Themistocles, who had risen from the people, or Pericles,
who had risen on the people, to fame and power, a species of knowledge
more suited to practical purposes was eagerly sought after, and a
class of teachers soon rose up to supply the want. These persons,
the most distinguished of them not natives of Athens, were called
sophists, and they boldly undertook to supply all deficiencies, and
qualify their pupils for any station whatever which they might be
called on to fill, or for any pursuit by which they hoped to rise to
eminence. They professed to have acquired, and to be able to teach,
all knowledge; and one of them, by way of advertising his own merits,
appeared at the Olympic games with a stock of literary samples of
various sorts, tragedy, epics, &c.; and further, with the announcement
that every article of use or ornament about his person was the work
of his own hands. This folly, if it were all, might excite a smile;
but these men laid claim to a more mischievous power, that of being
able to confound truth and falsehood, and to show how either of two
contradictory propositions might be proved with equal certitude and
success, according to the interest or inclination of the disputant.
Under a democracy, eloquence was the readiest path to power; and
eloquence, they taught, was of all acquisitions the most important;
that eloquence, and skill in word–splitting, by which, as Plato has
farcically described it in the Euthydemus, it could be shown that a
man could speak and be silent at the same time; that it was equally
easy to a professor of this art to prove that a man knew or did not
know the same thing, or that he both knew it and did not know it at
the same time; and by which the sophists, in the above–named dialogue,
prove to the satisfaction of their fellow–disputant, “that he had a
father—that he had no father—that a dog was his father—that his father
was everybody’s father—that his mother had a family equally numerous,
in which horses, pigs, and crab–fish were all common brethren, with the
same rights and ties of consanguinity and affection.”[83] This was the
eloquence by which, according to the grave professions of Protagoras,
the founder of the school, the worse might be made to appear the better
cause, and right and wrong confounded; so that alike in the agora, in
the courts of justice, or in social converse, no standard of right or
wrong could be set up, except that which the convenience of the speaker
should dictate. “As the first step towards this important acquisition,
the pupil was carefully initiated in all the niceties of that language,
whose mazes and subtleties sometimes led from premises apparently
simple to conclusions which looked more like legerdemain than the
effects of sober reasoning. He was then told that there were two sorts
of persuasion; that by the one an auditor’s mind was imbued with actual
knowledge, by the other with a knowledge consisting only in belief and
opinion; and when he was asked which of these two persuasions rhetoric
was meant to create in the courts of law and the public assemblies,
he was answered, belief of knowledge without actuality; for rhetoric
was defined to be the art of enabling an ignorant man to speak among
the ignorant, with more appearance of knowledge than the man who was
actually master of the subject under discussion.”[84] Having imparted
this valuable faculty to the pupil, the next step was to teach him to
use it fearlessly, undeterred by any visionary considerations of right
or wrong, of justice or injustice. With this view it was asserted,
“that might makes right; that the property of the weak belongs to the
strong; and that, whatever the law might say to the contrary, the
voice of nature taught and justified the doctrine.” They proclaimed
that the only wise persons were those who aspired to the direction
of public affairs, and who were stopped in this attempt by no other
consideration than the measure of their capacity; and they added that
those who, without any command over themselves, could acquire a command
over others, had a right to have their superior talent rewarded by
possessing more than others. For temperance, self–restraint, and a
dominion over the passions and desires, were set down by them as marks
of dulness and stupidity, only calculated to excite derision. They
asserted, with confidence, that nature itself made it both just and
honourable, that he who wished to live happily, ought to permit his
desires as large a sway as possible, and in no way to restrain them:
they bargained indeed for the possession of courage and political
wisdom in their scholars; but once in possession of these, a man, in
their opinion, was at liberty to administer to his passions in all
other respects, and to leave nothing unindulged which could contribute
to their gratification. They declared that those who attached disgrace
to this doctrine, did it only from a sense of shame at wanting the
means to gratify their own passions; and their praises of moderation
they asserted to be mere hypocrisy, and to proceed solely from the
wish of enslaving better men than themselves. With the same power
of self–indulgence, they maintained, these assertors of moderation
would pursue the same path as those who were now the objects of their
animadversions; they concluded therefore that it was ridiculous in
those who were above restraint, to lay a restraint upon themselves,
and they proclaimed, in the most unqualified terms, that luxury,
licentiousness, and intemperance were alone virtue and happiness, and
that all other declarations were mere specious pretences, compacts
contrary to nature, the triflings of men who deserved no manner of
consideration.
“The sacred principles of justice were treated with a contempt equally
daring. They often began with the bold definition that justice itself
was nothing but the interest of the strongest; that the masterpiece of
injustice was to appear a man of virtue without being really one; and
they proceeded to prove (and in a town like Athens the demonstration
perhaps was not difficult), that, on all occasions, the just man came
off worse than the unjust. In the mutual compacts of private life,
they said, the just man is always a loser, and the unjust a gainer.
In public affairs, when a contribution is to be made, the one with
equal property always contributes less than the other; whereas, when
a disbursement is to be made, the former receives nothing, and the
latter is a considerable gainer. If both are in office, one mischief
at least happens to the just man; his private affairs go to ruin from
being neglected, and the public give him no redress, merely because he
is a just man; he becomes odious besides to his relations and friends,
because he will not, for their service, overstep the bounds of right;
whereas, to the unjust man the very reverse, said they, is the case. To
paint this more forcibly, they drew the picture of a tyranny, where the
unjust man was in the highest state of felicity, the voluntarily just
in the lowest state of depression; and they proved that the former,
though outraging every rule of humanity, was loaded with praises, not
only those who were conscious of his crimes, but even those who had
suffered by them, considering him as a happy man; for if injustice,
added they, is ever blamed, the blame proceeds not from the fear of
committing it, but from the fear of suffering by it. Improving upon
this notion, they declared that to be able to commit an injury was in
itself a blessing, to receive an injury was in itself an evil; but
that there was more of ill in receiving, than there was of good in
committing, and that to set this right was the origin and object of
legislation. Justice therefore they considered as the medium between
the greatest of blessings, that of committing wrong with impunity,
and the greatest evil, which consists in not being able to revenge an
injury received; and hence, according to them, was derived the common
attachment to justice, not as being a blessing in itself, but because
persons being in a capacity to hurt others, oblige them to consider it
as such; for he, they continued, who has power in his hands, and is
really a man, would never submit to such a convention: it would indeed
be complete folly to do so. Give the good man and the bad man, they
triumphantly concluded, power to act as they pleased; present them with
rings like that of Gyges, which should make them invisible, and what
will be the consequence? The virtuous man would soon be found treading
the very same path as the villain, and if he should be so ‘adamantine’
as to act otherwise, he would be considered as the most pitiful and
stupid of his species. In public indeed every one would eulogise his
virtues; but this would be done with a design of deceiving others, and
in the fear of risking fortune if a contrary course were pursued.”[85]
The character and doctrines of the sophists have been made known to
us chiefly by the writings of an inveterate enemy, and it is expedient
therefore to collect any testimony which may confirm the picture,
such as it is given by Plato. Such corroboration will be found in
the unexceptionable testimony of the contemporary historian. His
description of the state of morals in Athens at the time of the plague,
is sufficient proof that some powerful influence had been at work to
root out every principle of justice and morality; and we may trace in
it the natural consequences of the sophistical tenets, as they are
delivered by Socrates, through the medium of Plato. We shall hereafter
have occasion to quote this celebrated passage, and can therefore do no
more here than refer to it.
The new–formed empire of Athens had lasted some forty years, and
had allowed time for those changes, which we have endeavoured to
describe, to exert their seductive influence on the national character,
when circumstances, which it is not necessary here to relate, led
to a quarrel between the Athenians and Corinthians, the latter
being a principal member of that confederacy consisting chiefly of
Peloponnesian states of which Sparta was the head. At their instance
a congress of the confederates was held at Sparta, in which they
complained loudly of their injuries, and reproved the sluggishness of
the Spartan councils, which had suffered so many Grecian cities to be
deprived of independence. Finally it was resolved that the treaties
then existing between Sparta and her allies, and the Athenians, were
broken, and that a subsequent meeting should be held, to consider the
expediency of declaring war. This took place in the autumn of the
year 432 B.C.
War, however, was not immediately declared. Several embassies passed
between Sparta and Athens, partly for the sake of procrastinating a
contest for which neither party felt quite ready, partly to produce
discord and embarrass the Athenian government. One of these was
commissioned to require that due atonement should be made for the
murder of Cylon, to avert the anger of the gods from Greece. The
Lacedæmonians required that all persons descended from the guilty
family should be banished, in the number of whom Pericles was included
by his maternal descent, not from any hope of obtaining his banishment,
but with the view of throwing on him the odium of involving the city in
war on his own account. He eluded the difficulty by reminding them of a
similar instance of impiety committed by the Spartan government, which
had never been atoned for, and bidding them first make due expiation
for that. A second and a third embassy were sent, without producing
any hopes of a reconciliation; and when the people were convoked to
consider of the last of these, Pericles addressed the assembly in
a speech urging it decidedly to reject the haughty demands of the
Peloponnesians, which were merely the forerunners of more extensive
requisitions. He proceeded to encourage them by contrasting their own
wealth with the scanty revenue of the Peloponnesians; a poverty which
prevented the latter from engaging in long and distant wars, and which
had kept them unacquainted with maritime affairs. He admitted that in
one battle they might be victorious over all the rest of Greece; but
asserted that they would neither expect nor be able to support a long
and expensive war. He explained the manner in which he proposed to
conduct the contest which he advised, abandoning Attica to the ravage
of the enemy, and taking ample satisfaction by a series of predatory
excursions round the coast of Peloponnesus. “It is a very different
matter,” he continued, “that the whole of Attica, or that a small part
even of Peloponnesus, should be laid waste. For our antagonists can
find no other territory except by fighting for it; whereas for us there
is abundance, both on the continent and in islands; for the dominion
of the sea is a mighty thing; and consider, if we were islanders, who
would be so secure from attack as ourselves? Now then we should aim
at placing ourselves as nearly in that situation as possible, caring
not for houses and lands, but looking to the safety of our city and
the sovereignty of the sea, and taking care not to be led by passion
to give battle to the Peloponnesians, who are much our superiors in
number. For if we beat them, they will fight again in equal force; but
if we are beaten, we lose our allies, wherein lies our strength. Let
our lament be for men’s bodies, not for houses and lands, for these do
not get men, but men get them.”[86]
The Athenians approved of what Pericles had said, and answered, that
they would do nothing upon compulsion; but were willing to submit any
disputes to arbitration, according to the terms of existing treaties.
And the Lacedæmonians departed home, and sent no more embassies.
This was the origin of that long and injurious struggle to Greece,
commonly called the Peloponnesian war, in the illustration of which
these pages will be chiefly employed. It has obtained a celebrity
greater than even its own intrinsic importance might have gained for
it, in consequence of having been narrated by a contemporary historian,
to whose accuracy, impartiality, and profound knowledge, generation
after generation have borne one never–varying testimony; and who has
well fulfilled the lofty task which he proposed to himself, of leaving,
as his memorial, no collection of idle stories, written to gain the
favour of the moment, but an everlasting record of those things which
have been, and which will again, according to the nature of man, recur
in something of a similar form.[87]
Hostilities commenced in the year B.C. 431. The Lacedæmonian
league comprised all the states of Peloponnesus, except Argos and
Achaia, which were neutral; and nearly all northern Greece, except
Thessaly and Acarnania, which sided with Athens. The Athenian
confederacy contained, besides those two states, Corcyra, Zacynthus,
and the newly established city of Naupactus, held by the Messenians,
who had revolted from Sparta. Chios and Lesbos furnished ships of
war, and were treated as allies; the other islands of the Ægean,
except Melos and Thera, together with the Greek cities on the
coast of Asia and of Thrace, except a few which had revolted, were
tributary subjects, deprived of their ships of war, and subject to the
uncontrolled will of the Athenian people. Of the means of Athens at
this time, we have a tolerably minute account given by Thucydides. The
annual revenue paid by the allies has been stated at about six hundred
talents, besides other sources, such as port–dues and taxes. It is
much to the credit of Pericles’ administration, that, notwithstanding
his lavish expenditure, there was in the treasury at this time six
thousand talents of coined money, besides a quantity of uncoined gold
and silver, in public and private dedications, vessels of sacrifice and
divine service, and Persian spoils, amounting to five hundred talents
more. There was also much valuable property in the temples, which they
might use if necessary, and especially the golden ornaments and drapery
of the statue of Minerva in the Parthenon, made of the purest metal,
and forty talents in weight, which could be taken off without injury
to the statue, and replaced when circumstances should admit of it. The
military force of the state amounted to 13,000 heavy–armed foot, fit
for foreign service; 16,000 of the same class, comprising the old and
young, and foreigners resident in Athens, who were exempt from foreign
service, but liable to be called upon for home duty; 1200 cavalry;
1600 archers; and 300 triremes fit to put to sea. Reckoning the crew
of a trireme at 200 men, the crews of 130, which number put to sea at
once in the first year of the war, would amount to 26,000 men.
[Illustration: Pericles. From a marble bust in the British Museum.]
In accordance with the policy recommended by Pericles, and at his
suggestion, the Athenians abandoned the whole of Attica to the ravages
of the enemy. They removed into the city their families and household
furniture, even to the wooden framework of their houses; their live
stock was transported to Eubœa and the neighbouring islands. “Very
grievous was this removal to them, because they had always been
used, the greater part of them, to reside in the country.”[88] This
preference of a country life the historian traces to the earliest
times; the result no doubt of that superior security of life and
property which induced the Athenians, at an earlier period than other
Greeks, to desist from wearing arms as part of their usual dress. It
was the more grievous, he adds, because after the Median war, in which
all Attica was laid waste with fire and sword, their establishments
had been newly restored; and, we may conjecture, with new comforts
and elegances. Nor was the inconvenience confined to quitting the
homes to which they had been long attached. The introduction of such
a multitude within the walls of a single city led, of course, to
serious inconvenience. Some few had town houses, or found a home with
friends and relations; others set up the framework of their houses or
constructed habitations as they could in the unoccupied spaces within
the walls; and the poorest sheltered themselves in the towers of the
walls, or in the temples, or wherever a place of refuge could be found.
Even that space of ground which was called the Pelasgian,[89] of which
an oracle had declared that it was “better uninhabited,” was not kept
unoccupied by the superstition; “and the oracle,” says Thucydides,
“seems to me to have turned out contrary to what was supposed, for the
threatened evil came not by reason of the forbidden indwelling, but the
necessity of the indwelling came through the war.”[90] Those evils, of
which we have before spoken, arising from a large, indigent, and idle
population, with little employment, except in state affairs, and little
subsistence, except from the public treasury, must of course have been
greatly increased by such an addition to the inhabitants of the city.