[Illustration]
Salamis—Siege of Leyden—Spanish Armada.
While Leonidas was guarding Thermopylæ, the Grecian fleet took its
station nearly opposite to him at Artemisium and the coast of Eubœa.
The Euripus, the narrow channel extending between that island and the
continent, was well calculated for defence by an inferior force; and
as the voyage along the seaward side of the island was considered
difficult and dangerous in the imperfection of ancient navigation, a
reasonable hope was entertained that the progress of the invader might
be stopped both by land and sea. His fleet originally consisted of
1208 galleys of war, besides transports and smaller vessels, and had
been reinforced by 120 ships from the Thracian Greeks; but this vast
armament was considerably reduced on the coast of Thessaly, by a storm,
in which, according to the lowest report, not less than four hundred
galleys were destroyed. Numerically, the Grecian fleet was little
calculated to engage such an enemy, for it reckoned but 271 trireme
galleys, with a few of the smaller vessels called penteconters. “The
penteconter, the vessel of Homer’s age, had, like the modern rowboat,
only one tier of oars, and its complement of rowers was from fifty to
sixty. The trireme, it is generally supposed, had three tiers of oars,
by which it gained that swiftness so important in the ancient mode
of naval action. Its ordinary complement of rowers was, at the time
of which we are treating, from 150 to 160; besides whom it commonly
carried forty soldiers, and sometimes more, but on emergencies,
particularly when boarded, the whole crew acted with arms.”[45] Of the
triremes now in the Grecian fleet, no less than 127 were furnished by
Athens, and 40 by Corinth; the rest were supplied in smaller quotas
by the other Peloponnesians and islanders. With this superiority in
force the Athenians were fully entitled to claim the chief command: but
such was the reputation of Sparta at this time, that the Peloponnesian
states refused to serve except under a Spartan leader; and the
Athenians, with a rare and most laudable moderation, waived their claim
rather than run the hazard of discord at so critical a moment. The
credit of this forbearance is ascribed to Themistocles.
The Grecian commanders felt their inferiority of force, and were
as willing to abandon the Eubœans to their fate, as shortly after to
desert the Athenians. The former petitioned Eurybiades, the Spartan
admiral, to remain awhile for their protection, until they could remove
their families and portable effects. Failing in their application,
they went to Themistocles, the Athenian admiral, who for thirty
talents, about 7000_l._, promised to detain the fleet; and succeeded,
for Eurybiades was brought over by five, and the Corinthian commander
by three talents; the rest appears to have been converted to his own
use. Disinterestedness is not to be reckoned among the many brilliant
qualities of Themistocles: but his interference, however corrupt in its
origin, was wise and beneficial; for to retreat from Artemisium would
have been equivalent to deserting the army, and most injurious to the
common cause. The Persian commanders, seeing the small force opposed
to them, were chiefly afraid lest it should escape, and detached two
hundred galleys round Eubœa to blockade the other end of the Euripus,
and cut off all retreat. Meanwhile, three battles, unattended with
any decisive result, were fought, in all of which the Greeks appear
to have gained the advantage, and their spirits were heightened by a
reinforcement of fifty–three Athenian triremes, bringing news that the
detachment sent round Eubœa had been overtaken by a storm and totally
destroyed. But they were severely handled in the last engagement;
and the news of the battle of Thermopylæ determined them to retreat
nearer to their homes. Previous to his departure, Themistocles engraved
these words upon the rocks at the watering place of Artemisium: “Men
of Ionia, you do ill in making war upon your fathers, and helping to
enslave Greece.[46] By all means therefore come over to us, or, if that
cannot be, remain neuter, and persuade the Carians to do the same. But
if the necessity which compels you to the part you are engaged in is
such as to make a secession impracticable, yet, when we come to action,
avoid exertion against us; remembering that you are descended from one
blood with us, and that the enmity of the Persians was first drawn
upon us in your cause.” In this he probably had a double object: if
possible, to induce the Asiatic Greeks to desert; and if not, at least
to render them suspected, and procure their exclusion in future from
the Persian line.
The fleet doubling the promontory of Sunium, the southern point of
Attica, took its second station in the bay of Salamis; a situation
recommended to the Athenians by its proximity to their capital; and
to the Peloponnesians by the neighbourhood of the Isthmus, the key of
Peloponnesus. It was here recruited by fresh ships, so that the fleet
now mustered 372 triremes, of which 180 were Athenian. The Athenians
expected, with good reason, that the whole strength of Peloponnesus
would assemble in Bœotia for the protection of Attica, and were thrown
into great consternation on finding themselves deserted, and that
their Dorian neighbours had returned to their favourite scheme of
fortifying the Isthmus, and there making their final stand. No hope
remained, except in unconditional submission or flight, and in this
dilemma the people came to the high–minded resolution of abandoning
their homes and fortunes to the invader, and seeking a temporary refuge
in the neighbouring islands of Salamis and Ægina, and the territory
of Trœzen on the opposite coast of the Saronic gulf. Still, when the
time arrived, they were unwilling to move, until Themistocles, never
at a loss for expedients, called the influence of superstition to his
aid. It was believed that a sacred serpent kept watch over Pallas’s
temple in the Acropolis. Every month a preparation of honey was placed
before the shrine, and believed to be devoured by the animal: but the
last offering, the priestess said, remained untouched, and hence the
inference was drawn, that the goddess had deserted her city, which
availed much towards reconciling the people to depart. Proclamation
was therefore made, that the city should be committed to the charge
of Pallas the protectress, and that all men of age to serve should
embark on board the triremes, having provided for the security of their
families as best they might. All complied, except some who were too
poor to support themselves in a foreign land, and a few who, putting
confidence in an ambiguous oracle, believed safety to be promised to
such as remained in the Acropolis. A law was passed for the recall of
all exiles.
Meanwhile the Persian land–force advanced from Thermopylæ unopposed
through Doris into Phocis, which alone, says Herodotus, “among the
states in that quarter, did not join the Mede, for no other cause,
as far as I can find upon inquiry, but from their hatred to the
Thessalians; for if the Thessalians had adhered to the cause of Greece,
the Phocians, as I believe, would then have joined the Mede.” But
they could not pretend to withstand such an overwhelming force, and,
retiring from the level country, took refuge in the recesses of Mount
Parnassus; and the invader carried fire and desolation through the rich
but deserted vale of the Cephisus. Arriving at the Bœotian border,
Xerxes, while he prosecuted his march towards Athens, detached a force
to seize the treasure at Delphi, “with the contents of which,” says
the historian, “he was better acquainted than with what he had left
at home; so general was its celebrity, especially for the offerings
dedicated by Crœsus, son of Alyattes. The citizens were naturally in
great alarm both for themselves and their temple, and consulted the
oracle whether they should conceal or remove the sacred deposits.
The god forbad their interference, saying that he was able to defend
his own: but their confidence in their patron seems not to have been
unmixed with scepticism, for they transported their families across
the Corinthian Gulf into Achaia, and betook themselves to the wilds of
Parnassus and other strongholds, leaving in the place only Aceratus,
the expounder of oracles, together with sixty men.
“When the barbarians were near at hand, and beheld the temple, at that
moment the prophet observed that the sacred arms which it was unlawful
for any man to touch had been brought forth from the shrine and laid in
front of the building;[47] and he went to tell the Delphians, who were
there, this wonder. But greater marvels occurred when the Persians came
opposite to the temple of Athene Pronaia; though it is no small wonder
that armour should spontaneously change its place; but that which next
happened, among all manner of prodigies is most worthy of admiration:
for then thunderbolts fell from heaven among them, and two crags,
broken from Parnassus, were borne amongst them with a dreadful crash,
and slew many; while a noise of shouting was heard from the temple of
the goddess.
“From these things combined a panic seized the barbarians; and the
Delphians, observing that they retreated, issued down and slew a
considerable number; the rest fled straight to Bœotia. And those who
returned said, as I hear, that they saw other prodigies besides, for
that two warriors of more than mortal stature followed their retreat,
slaying them. These the Delphians affirm to have been two heroes,
natives of the country, Phylacus and Antinous, to whom ground is
consecrated in the neighbourhood of the temple.”[48]
It is curious that two hundred years later, when the Gauls invaded
Greece and attacked Delphi, the same answer was returned by the
oracle, and the assailants were again defeated in consequence of a
panic terror.[49] Stripped of the miraculous, these stories seem to
denote that the measures of the Delphian leaders were prudent and
successful. The first step was to inspire confidence, which was done
by a favourable oracle, and by the reported supernatural removal of
the armour; the next, to provide for defence,—and the plan adopted is
indicated by the seasonable descent of the rocks. Suppose also that a
thunderstorm did really occur thus seasonably, and the whole miraculous
tale will be readily and credibly explained.
The main body of the army advanced through Bœotia, which now openly
espoused the Persian cause, burning on their way the patriotic towns
of Thespiæ and Platæa, and took possession of deserted Athens. The few
who had sought refuge in the Acropolis, trusting in the oracle, alone
refused submission, and, owing to the natural strength of the fortress,
were not reduced without considerable trouble.
The fleet had been with difficulty detained thus long at Salamis, and
now the enemy’s approach inspired general consternation: some hurried
to their ships to seek safety in immediate flight; and a council
being called, it was resolved by the majority of those who remained
to retreat to the Isthmus, where, if defeated, they would have the
support and protection of their countrymen. This was a consideration
of no small importance, for the ancient vessels drew so little water,
that they could be run close ashore before they grounded; and it has
happened that ships so abandoned, and even taken possession of by
the enemy, have been recovered by the opportune arrival of succours
by land, who have dashed into the sea and overpowered the intruders.
Mnesiphilus, an Athenian, met Themistocles departing from the assembly,
and having heard what was determined, observed, “Then you have no
longer a country to fight for: the fleet will separate: neither
Eurybiades nor any one else will have power to retain it together,
and Greece is ruined by lack of counsel.” Struck by the justice of
his friend’s views, Themistocles returned to the Spartan admiral, and
persuaded him to reassemble the council; and in his eagerness, before
Eurybiades, as commander–in–chief, had explained the purpose for which
they were met, he proceeded earnestly and at great length to enforce
the impolicy of a retreat, when Adeimantus, the Corinthian captain,
stopped him with the affronting reproof, “Themistocles, in the games
men are beaten with rods who rise before their time.” He replied
temperately, “But those who are left behind are never crowned,” and
continued to urge the inexpediency of their present determination.
“If they retreated,” he said, “they would give up Salamis, Megara,
Ægina, thus leading the Persians to the very gates of Peloponnesus;
and be obliged to risk a battle in the open sea, which would be
doubly prejudicial to an armament inferior both in the number and the
swiftness of its vessels. By remaining, on the contrary, they gained
the advantage of fighting in a strait; they preserved Salamis, where
were the families of a large part of the Athenians; and protected
Peloponnesus as effectually as if they fell back and fought at the
Isthmus, without committing the error of suffering the enemy to advance
unopposed so far. Moreover, if they obtained the victory, there was
reason to expect that the enemy would never advance beyond Attica;
and thus they would preserve from ravage Megara, Ægina, and above all
Salamis, which was marked out by an oracle as the spot where they
should overcome their enemy. Here Adeimantus again attacked him,
bidding him be silent, as a man without a country, and objected to
Eurybiades putting the proposal of one without a city to the vote;
saying that Themistocles must first show what city he represented, then
come and compare his own with others’ opinions. Themistocles replied
in anger, with bitter taunts against Adeimantus and the Corinthians,
that the Athenians possessed both the better country and the better
city, so long as they had two hundred ships equipped for service, which
no Grecian power, go where they would, could repel. He then turned to
Eurybiades, and spoke with great earnestness. “If you abide here, and
abiding, shall approve your courage—well: if not, you will be the ruin
of Greece. For our ships bear the burden of the war. Be advised by me
therefore. If not, we will immediately take our domestics, and make
sail for Siris in Italy, which of old time is ours, and as oracles say
is destined to be colonised by us: and you being abandoned by allies
such as we are, will remember my words.” The concluding argument was
irresistible, and they resolved to remain.[50]
The next morning an earthquake occurred at sunrise; upon which it
was resolved to implore the favour and protection of Æacus,[51] and
the heroes descended from him, whose assistance, according to Grecian
superstition, was especially to be depended on in those seas, where
they had reigned, and where they were peculiarly worshipped. They paid
their vows on the spot to Ajax and Telamon, in their native Salamis,
and sent a vessel to offer the same tribute to the other heroes of the
family at Ægina; and the appeal was believed, or at least fabled, to
have been answered. One Dicæus, an Athenian exile high in the Persian
service, asserted that one day, when he was in the Thriasian plain,
which stretched from Eleusis northward, in company with Demaratus,
the banished king of Sparta, who followed in Xerxes’ train, and was
much consulted by the monarch throughout this war, they saw a cloud of
dust, such as might be raised by the trampling of 30,000 men, advance
from Eleusis. As they were wondering what this might be, they heard a
noise, which seemed to him to be the song which the initiated[52] sang
in praise of the mystic Iacchus. Dicæus then assured his companion that
some great evil was about to befall the Persians; for the gods were
manifestly quitting Eleusis on the desolation of Attica to proceed
to the assistance of the Greeks, and if they should direct their
course towards Peloponnesus, the blow would fall on the land army; if
towards Salamis, then Xerxes would run great risk of losing his fleet.
Demaratus wisely counselled him to keep silent, or his head might be
in no less danger than the Persian marine; and presently the dust rose
into a cloud, which was borne off in the direction of Salamis![53]
The losses of the Persian fleet by storm and battle were repaired
by reinforcements drawn from the islanders, Bœotians and others, upon
its arrival at Phalerum, one of the ports of Athens. Xerxes in person
presided at a council of war, when it was debated whether the fortune
of another battle should be tried or no. All raised their voices in the
affirmative, except Artemisia, a Grecian heroine, daughter of Lygdamis,
and widow of another tyrant of Halicarnassus, who had joined the fleet
with five galleys, which she herself commanded, attended regularly at
the council board, and was high in the favour of the Persian monarch.
She urged him to spare his ships, and not engage with an enemy as
superior to his troops at sea as men to women; and said that nothing
was to be gained by a battle, for he was already in possession of
Attica, the great object of the campaign; and the adverse fleet, if
he only remained quiet, would soon be compelled to disperse for want
of provisions; while, if he advanced by land against Peloponnesus, it
would immediately separate, and all would fly to their several homes,
without caring to stay and fight in defence of the Athenians. Xerxes
acknowledged the advice to be good, but was guided by the opinion
of the majority; and attributing former defeats to the want of his
personal presence and encouragement, he determined to be a spectator
of the battle, which was ordered to take place upon the morrow. That
same night the land forces marched towards the Isthmus, which so much
alarmed the Peloponnesians, already discontented and uneasy lest they
should be defeated and blockaded in Salamis, that the indecision of
Eurybiades was loudly reprobated, and it was tumultuously resolved not
to stay to risk a battle in behalf of an already conquered country.
In this crisis Themistocles had recourse to a measure singularly
illustrative of the bold and crooked policy which he loved to pursue.
He despatched a trusty dependant to the hostile fleet, to say that
the Athenian admiral, being well disposed to the king, had sent him
to give information that the Greeks were on the point of flight; and
that now was the time to strike a decisive blow, because they were at
variance with each other, and in an engagement many would espouse the
Persian cause. The bait was taken; the Persians landed a detachment on
the little islet of Psyttaleia, lying between Salamis and the main,
to overpower the crews of any vessels that might be driven ashore
there, and sent a force round Salamis to occupy the other end of the
strait between that islet and the continent, in which the Greeks were
posted, and thus deprive them of the possibility of retreat. All this
passed in the course of one evening, during which the dissensions of
the Greeks, ignorant that they were blockaded, had protracted their
council to a late hour of the night, when Aristides, surnamed the Just,
a man hostile above all others to Themistocles, and who, through his
influence, had been banished from Athens, came to help his country in
her distress as he best might, and forgot all private animosity in her
service. Sailing from Ægina, he fell in with the enemy; and having
heard that the Peloponnesians were urgent to retreat upon the Isthmus,
he called Themistocles out from the assembly and addressed him thus:
“It becomes us to contend, both at other seasons and at this also,
which of us two shall most benefit his country.” He added that they
were now surrounded, and that deliberation concerning flight was vain,
because Eurybiades and the Corinthians could not depart if they would:
and bid Themistocles inform the assembly of this. Themistocles avowed
in return that this was done by his own contrivance, adding, that since
the Greeks would not fight of their own good will, it was necessary
to compel them; and bid Aristides himself carry in the tidings to
the council. While the dispute still raged, some believing, others
rejecting the intelligence, it was confirmed by a Tenian vessel which
deserted from the enemy.
At break of day, October 20th, B.C. 480, if we may trust
implicitly to chronologers, they prepared for battle, and were no
sooner in motion than the Persians advanced to meet them, Xerxes being
stationed at the foot of Mount Ægaleos, near the port Phoron,[54]
on a spot which commanded a view of the scene of action. The wind
at that hour mostly blew fresh from the sea, and rolled up a strong
current; two circumstances which gave the low–built Grecian ships a
decided advantage over their loftier and more unwieldy opponents.
For a naval conflict was chiefly carried on by means of the iron
beaks with which vessels’ bows were armed, the great object being to
strike an enemy upon the side, and thus, if the shock were direct and
violent, sink her altogether, or at all events dash away her oars, and
thus render her unmanageable. It was therefore of vital importance
that they should readily obey the helm. Now a side wind had little
effect upon the Grecian ships, but it disordered the Persian, which
were built high in the bows and stern, to procure the advantage in a
close engagement, when, as was the older usage, ship grappled with
ship, and the issue, as in a land battle, depended chiefly upon the
exertions of the heavy–armed soldiers: and by disordering them, it
at once broke the momentum of their charge, and exposed them to what
was so much dreaded, an oblique attack. The Greeks, when fairly
confronted with the first mass of the hostile fleet, were seized with
something like a panic; and reversing the action of their oars fell
back toward the land, still keeping their prows turned towards the
enemy. Ameinias, brother to the poet Æschylus, and to Cynægirus, who
was slain at Marathon after distinguishing his valour, broke the spell
by dashing singly into the hostile ranks; and the rest then followed
his example. It was said that at this moment a female figure appearing
in the air gave the word to charge loud enough for the whole fleet to
hear, exclaiming reproachfully, “How long for shame will ye yet back
your vessels?” The event, however, seems not to have been very long
doubtful. The Persians came to the attack without order, so that when
the first line was routed, fresh ships crowding up from the rear, and
eager to distinguish themselves under the eyes of their sovereign,
ran foul of their comrades, and thus completing their wreck, were
themselves thrown into confusion, and rendered unable to attack in
concert, and with any probability of success. Numbers of ships were
driven ashore on Salamis and destroyed, and while the action was going
on Aristides landed with a body of troops upon the island Psyttaleia,
and put to the sword all the Persians who were there, under the very
eye of their monarch. When the Persians began to fall into confusion,
the ship of Artemisia was hard pressed by an Athenian galley commanded
by Ameinias, who had commenced the action, and was one of the three
who were considered to have acquitted themselves best in the conflict.
Being unable to retreat for the press of friendly vessels, she steered
against the ship of Damasithymus, prince of Calynda in Lycia, and
sunk him outright. Whether chance directed her against his vessel,
or whether she selected it on account of any previous ill will, the
historian professes his inability to inform us; the stratagem at least
succeeded, for the Athenian took it for granted that he was pursuing
one of his own side by mistake, and turned to seek some other enemy.
On seeing this feat, Xerxes, who was eager to inquire by whom each
action worthy of observation was performed, expressed his admiration,
supposing that it was a foe that had perished, and said that his men
had turned women, and his women men. No historian has attempted to give
a detailed account of such a scene of confusion as the battle must
have presented, nor has any statement of the respective losses of the
combatants been preserved. We may presume that of the Persians to have
been immense, not only from the strong expression of Æschylus,[55] that
the sea was scarce visible for the wrecks and gore which overspread
it, and that the shores were covered with corpses, but from knowing
that, when collected the next spring at Samos, their fleet numbered
only 300 vessels. Immediately after the battle the remnant of the
armament returned to the Hellespont, so broken in spirit, that upon
the sight of a few rocks lying near the promontory Zoster, the most
projecting point on the western coast of Attica, they mistook them for
the enemy, and dispersed in dismay.
The supernatural appearance at the moment of commencing the engagement
is mentioned by Herodotus in terms that leave it doubtful whether it
was a fiction propagated in the heat of action to remove a timidity
fatal to the Grecian cause, or the growth of later times. If the
former, it is a stratagem creditable to the ready wit of him who
invented it, unless we rather believe it to have been a preconcerted
fraud on the part of the Athenian commanders. The example of
Pisistratus will prove that such a fraud was not alien to the character
of the Athenians; and a similar story is related of Pericles, not
half a century later. That eminent general and statesman, previous to
a battle, observed a dark and extensive wood, consecrated to Pluto,
situated so as to be visible to both armies alike. Within its shelter
he stationed a man of extraordinary stature, whose appearance was
rendered more imposing by all that dress and equipage could supply.
His natural height increased by high–soled buskins, clothed in purple,
and with flowing hair, he was placed in a lofty chariot drawn by white
horses, with orders to advance upon the signal of battle being given,
and call upon Pericles by name, and exhort him to confidence by the
assurance that the gods were on the Athenian side. The effect was such
that the enemy scarce waited for the first flight of javelins to turn
their backs.[56] Not less useful to the Spanish cause was the belief
that Santiago fought upon their side against the Moors. Ramiro, king
of Arragon, had fought a whole day with the Moors: darkness separated
the combatants, and preserved the Christian power from destruction.
The king having spent the first part of the night in deep anxiety
concerning the fate of the morrow, was at length overtaken by sleep,
and in a dream saw one who bade him be of good cheer, for that
assuredly the Christians would gain the victory; and declared himself
to be the Apostle James, to whose ward Spain was committed, and whose
protection they should experience on the morrow provided they pacified
their minds by wholesome confession, and, fortified with the holy
sacrament, advanced with a firm hope to the renewal of the fray. The
king communicated his dream to the prelates and barons, who hailed the
assurance with joy, and having obeyed the saint’s injunctions, charged
the Saracens in the name of God and St. James with such alacrity,
that 60,000 were left dead upon the field. The apostle himself was
conspicuous amidst the fight, mounted on a white horse, with a
snow–white banner, charged with a red cross. From that time it has been
usual with the Spaniards in all battles, especially with unbelievers
and heathens, to call upon the name of God and St. James, which serves
them for their watch–word.[57]
This disaster put a final stop to the advance of the Persians. Xerxes,
wearied and discouraged by a series of misfortunes, willingly listened
to a proposal, that he should return himself to Persia with the bulk
of the army, and leave his brother–in–law, Mardonius, with 300,000
picked men, to complete the reduction of Greece. One story runs, that
he crossed the Hellespont without fleet or army in an open boat: but
not the smallest countenance is given by Herodotus to this report,
which probably has no other foundation than the practice common to
story–tellers in all ages, of adding ornament to what is in itself
sufficiently striking. His retreat was protected by 60,000 men detached
by Mardonius; but the sufferings of the multitude who followed him,
and of whom no care could be taken, were dreadful. They left behind
them a track, like that of locusts; even the grass and bark of trees
were devoured; and disease, the natural consequence of cold and hunger,
carried off thousands whom the sword and famine had spared.
Xerxes seems to have entirely abandoned Attica, so that the Athenians
returned without further contest to their homes: not, indeed, to enjoy
them in quiet, but to give a fresh example of disinterestedness and
devotion to the cause of their allies requited by ingratitude little
short of treachery. Mardonius wintered in Thessaly, but, early in
the spring, he sent ambassadors to detach, if possible, Athens from
the Grecian cause. Xerxes, he said, had ordered him to announce that
their offences should be fully forgiven, their territory restored, and
increased by any other which they might choose, their temples rebuilt,
and their independence secured, if they would only make submission to
the king. “Why then,” he added, “are you so frenzied as to continue a
war, in which you cannot conquer, nor yet resist for ever? For you know
the multitude and the exploits of Xerxes’ army, and have heard what
force is now under my command; and if you should vanquish me, which,
however, you have no ground to hope, still you will be attacked by
another armament many times as great.” The friendly envoy, Alexander,
king of Macedonia, in vain added his own persuasions to these tempting
offers: the reply is worthy of being preserved. “We know that the
power of the Mede is many times greater than our own, so that it was
unnecessary to reproach us therewith; but yet, being ardently desirous
of liberty, we will defend ourselves as best we may. Tell Mardonius,
therefore, that the Athenians say, so long as the sun shall run his
present course, we never will submit ourselves to Xerxes, but will
march against him, relying on the gods, who fight for us, and the
heroes; whose temples and images he, holding them in no respect, has
burnt.” To the Lacedæmonians, who sent a pressing embassy to remind
them of their obligations to support the confederate cause, and,
professing sympathy and regret for the losses which they had sustained,
offered to support their women and those who were unserviceable for
war, they replied in a similar tone, that no wealth should bribe them
to be accessory to the enslaving of Greece; and that to avenge the
insulted honour of their gods was a sacred duty: they declined, though
with thanks, the offer of assistance to support their families, and
only requested, that since their reply would unquestionably produce
an immediate invasion, the Lacedæmonians would be ready at the first
notice to march into Bœotia, and save them, if possible, from being
again obliged to abandon their country.[58]
In return for this devotion, the Spartans, as before, suffered
Mardonius unopposed to occupy Attica, and, unmoved by the pressing
entreaties of the Athenians, they remained at home, until it was
suggested that to fortify the Isthmus would be of little use, if
the sea were left free to the barbarians by the defection of the
better half of the Grecian fleet. This observation produced immediate
effect, and an army of 5000 Spartans and 35,000 Helots was instantly
despatched, though not until the Persian invasion had again compelled
the Athenians to remove their families and effects to Salamis.
Mardonius, finding the Athenians immovable, burnt the city, which he
had hitherto spared, and retreated into Bœotia, as offering a better
field for the evolutions of his cavalry. There this eventful war was
closed by the glorious victory of Platæa.
But it is not to Salamis and to Platæa that we wish especially to
direct the reader’s admiration, for military virtue is a plant of
hardy and extensive growth. It is the spectacle of a nation once and
again quitting an endeared home (and there is much of misery comprised
in these few words) in preference to owning a foreign master; and
persevering in its exalted course, unchanged even by the ingratitude
and injustice of those countrymen for whose welfare, conjointly with
its own liberty, it rejected the most tempting offers of wealth
and security, to which we look as the best justification of those
high–flown eulogiums which the later Athenians bestowed so liberally
upon their ancestors. In seeking for a parallel case in modern history,
the conflagration of Moscow at once suggests itself; but the obscurity
which involves the origin of that remarkable and important event
renders it impossible to determine how far the same spirit prompted the
one and the other sacrifice; and the recent occurrence and notoriety
of the latter furnishes an additional reason for passing it over. In
its place, therefore, we shall select the most striking incident,
perhaps, in the long and glorious war waged by the Low Countries for
the recovery of their liberties:—the siege of Leyden, in the year 1574,
when the Dutch, in greater straits than the Athenians, and unable
either to defend or abandon their country, called in the powers of
nature to their assistance, and sank it under the waters, rather than
surrender its strongholds to the Spanish tyrant.
“Now follows the Siege of Leyden, which was particularly memorable for
the condition of the succour, which so altered the order of affairs,
as the besiegers became besieged; and look,—what unhappy success the
assailed expected, the assailant made trial of the very same. Leyden
is one of the chief towns of Holland; it is seated low, amongst, as
may be said, a labyrinth of channels, part of which are running, part
standing waters, and which cut through the territories thereof on all
sides. The Rhine runs through it with one of its branches, which now is
the weakest, but hath formerly been the most frequented; though this
retain its ancient name, whereas the rest, as they draw near the sea,
change it into that of other rivers. So many other channels are derived
from this branch within the town itself in several parts, as the space,
which is there broken off by the islands, is in a sort larger than what
is united to the continent. But if it be divided by so many channels,
it is rejoined by many more bridges. Of which there are about an
hundred and fifty, where they may serve either for use or ornament; and
the most of them are of stone. The town is well peopled; her streets
are large buildings, well polished; it is well flanked round about; her
ditch is everywhere deep; and in fine she is in all circumstances of
such condition, as the king’s men had good reason to use all endeavours
to gain her, as also the rebels to keep possession of her.
“The royalists betook themselves with diligence to be masters of
all avenues, whereby succour might be kept from the town. The parts
thereabouts (as hath been said) are full of channels and rivers:
wherefore it was thought necessary to block up all passages with sundry
forts, by which the city might be come to, either by land or water; so
as, ere long, there were little less than sixty forts built round about
it, whereby almost all possibility of relieving it was taken away. The
Leydenists this meanwhile were not wanting on their parts in preparing
for defence. And judging that the royalists intended rather to take
the town by famine than by the sword, they thought it not convenient
to receive many foreign soldiers into the city; as well the longer to
preserve their victuals, as for that they hoped they had men enough of
their own to maintain and defend it.[59]
“John Douza, a famous Latin poet in those days, very nobly born, and
of other high deserts, had the chief government of the affairs of
the city. He failed not in acting his part well; he still encouraged
the Leydenists, and fed them with hopes that the other cities would
speedily join with them, and relieve them. In confirmation of this,
sometimes letters, sometimes messages came from without, and some
news was cunningly raised within the town itself: though it were very
true, that Orange and the rest of the rebels in that province laboured
nothing more than how to keep a place of such consequence still at
their devotion. ‘Twas now the month of August; and the Leydenists began
already to suffer want of victuals. Therefore the states of the country
met to treat of so weighty a business, and to find out some way whereby
the city might be relieved; and this affair began to be mightily
earnest. The deputies differed in their opinions, some thought that the
town might be the easiliest got into by making a gallant assault by
land, others held it might better be relieved by some river or channel;
but the greatest part concluded that there was small hopes of doing it
either one way or other, the king’s men having so strongly fortified
themselves everywhere. Lewis Boisot, admiral of Holland, chanced to be
at this meeting; a man very expert in maritime affairs, of a manlike
spirit and good at execution; and one who was very well esteemed of
over all the province. He, whilst they were hottest in the variety of
their opinions, stept forth to propound his, and began to speak thus:—
“’I wish that our own misfortunes did not too deplorably teach us
how perverse the fury of the sea proves sometimes to our countries.
Who sees not how we are daily inforced to oppose our industry to the
threats thereof? Nor have our mountainous banks been sufficient so to
curb the tempest of her waves, but that sometime she hath swallowed up
whole islands on some sides, and caused miserable and unheard–of ruins
in other parts. We are now to seek for remedy, in this our present
necessity, from these evils which do so often afflict us. Let nature
work the same effect to–day, for our good, which she useth upon so many
other occasions to do for our hurt. And by those weapons wherewith she
makes war against us, let us by her example make war upon our enemies.
Every one knows that at the two equinoxials of the year the ocean
swells extraordinary high upon our coasts; and, by the season of the
year, we are shortly to expect the effects thereof. My counsel shall
therefore be, that we may immediately, at the high tides, begin to let
the waters loose into the neighbouring ground of Leyden: greater tides
will hereafter follow. And thus, turning the siege upon the besiegers,
we may hope to destroy our enemies within their own works, and at
the same time to free the city from all danger. It may be thought
impossible to relieve it by land, or by the ordinary way of channels
or rivers; whereas, by the way which I have prescribed, we may believe
that our enterprise will be smiled on by success. It will be in our
power to let in the inundation where we please. We shall see the enemy
strangely astonished and confused between the shame of abandoning the
siege and the horror of continuing it. But being forced at last to fly,
we shall see our own weapons and those of nature conspire together
in slaughtering them on all sides; and shall see that punishment
justly transferred on them which they with open violence prepared for
the innocent. The country which shall be drowned will doubtlessly
be somewhat indamaged thereby; but who would not bear with such an
inconvenience, whereby their country shall receive so great a benefit?
On the contrary, whose hair will not stand on end to think, that, after
the loss of Harlem and of Leyden, all the whole province will shortly
remain at the cruel will of the Spaniards? We must sometimes be wicked
to be good. How oft do we cut off some one member for the welfare and
safeguard of the rest of the body? Yet this evil will not prove finally
so great, but that it will in time be paid with great usury. Some
worldly actions prove so memorable, as they strike envy dumb and add
new tongues to fame. This of ours will certainly be such, and will be
everywhere highly celebrated. I, who so boldly give the advice, do as
confidently pronounce the augury; and hope that the event will crown
both of them with fortunate success.’
“At the hearing of so strange a proposition, the deputies were much
confused, whether they should accept of it or reject it. But it is
oft–times seen that need, passing into necessity, necessity passeth
luckily into desperation. And thus it proved in what we shall now
relate. For all of them, joining at last in opinion that Leyden was
not to be freed by any other way than by what Boisot had propounded,
it was resolved that at all adventures, they would follow his advice.
The chief banks or ditches of the Meuse and Isell between Rotterdam and
Tergowe, were presently cut in divers places; and at the high tide the
waters began to break in everywhere, and overflow all the grounds which
lie between Tergowe, Rotterdam, Delf, and Leyden. At the sight of this
unlooked–for inundation, the Spaniards were at first much astonished;
but they were soon aware of the enemies’ design. The king’s forts were
very many, as we have said, and divers of them were seated in the
lowest places. These the inundation did quickly reach, and therefore
they were quickly forsaken, and those who kept them went to join with
those that kept the chiefest forts, which were so placed as they might
be the more easily maintained. This meanwhile, when once the enemy had
pitched upon the aforesaid resolution, they applied themselves apace to
get together great store of vessels which should be fitting to relieve
Leyden. They were very careful to build them with shallow bottoms,
to the end that they might pass over such grounds where the waters
were shallowest: the greatest part of them were built in Rotterdam by
reason of the nearness and opportunity of its situation. Whole Holland
was in great expectation what the success would prove, and therefore
people flocked from all parts to help to build boats; many of which
were to be in the form of gallies with oars, to the end that they might
the easier get by the passes, and assault the forts, which were yet
in the royalists’ possession. These boats were therefore furnished
with many pieces of artillery, and such people as were judged fit to
fight. Whilst they were making this preparation, the admiral of Holland
endeavoured, with some ships prepared for that purpose, to force
certain passes, and to bring some succour into Leyden; for the besieged
suffered very much for want of victuals, and did very earnestly solicit
succour. But his design did not at that time take effect; for the
waters were not yet so far increased, as that his vessels could come
near Leyden. All Holland joined therefore in their prayers, that the
sea might suddenly swell higher; and that the province, by raising the
siege of Leyden, might receive so desired a misfortune.
“On the other side, the king’s men were not wanting in securing their
forts, and repairing them with earth, hay, and whatsoever else they
could come by of most commodious; and hoping that the waters would
swell no higher, they persuaded themselves that they should, within a
few days, finish their business. They very well knew the townsmen’s
necessities; and that all their victuals being already spent, the
affairs within were drawing to great extremity. While both sides were
in these hopes and fears, the time came wherein nature, by way of her
hidden causes, was likewise to work her effects. About the end of
September the sea began to swell exceedingly, according as she useth
to do in that season of the year; and pouring in at the high tides,
no longer waves, but even mountains of waters, into the most inward
channels and rivers, made so great an inundation, as all the country
about Leyden seemed to be turned into a sea.[60] It cannot be said how
much the rebels were hereby encouraged, and the king’s men discouraged.
The former came presently forth with their fleet, which consisted of
about one hundred and fifty bottoms, a great part whereof were made
like gallies; and to these were added many other boats which served
only to carry victuals. The whole fleet was thus assembled together
about the beginning of October, and put to water in good order, to
execute their designed relief: the gallies went on the outsides; the
other greater vessels, which, if need should be, were to play upon the
forts in the midst; and those which bore the victuals in the rear. But
there was no occasion of any great contention: for the king’s men,
having valiantly defended themselves in sundry places, considering that
they were not now to fight with men, but with the elements, thought
rather how to withdraw themselves into places of safety, than rashly
to oppose the enemy. Yet they could not forego their fortifications,
neither so soon nor in so good order, but that many of them remained a
prey either to the sword or to the water. And truly it was a miserable
spectacle to behold from all parts, one slain, another drowned; and
many endeavour to save themselves in the highest places, where, when
they were freed from the waters, they were inexorably slain by the
enemy.[61] ‘Tis said that above fifteen hundred of the king’s men
perisht thus, and most of them Spaniards; as those who were chiefly
employed in ordering the siege, and who desirous to bear away the
greatest glory, fell into the greatest misfortune. Thus was Leyden at
last relieved, after five months’ siege, to the exceeding great joy of
the rebels and all that favoured them. But howsoever, the memory of
this siege remained a long time very sorrowful in the city; for about
ten thousand died within the town of hunger and other sufferings; and
all the most unclean and vilest nourishment was already so consumed
when the relief was brought in, and the besieged resolving rather to
die than to yield; nothing was expected but that the city should give
up her last breath, and remaining a miserable carcass, should be buried
within her own walls and houses.”[62]
In this siege the Spanish general committed a fatal error in not trying
an assault, which might probably have succeeded, since there were no
regular troops within the town; a body of English auxiliaries who were
placed in advance near Gouda, and intended by the Prince of Orange to
form the garrison of Leyden, when dislodged, having behaved so ill in
the first skirmish, that the citizens refused them entrance within
the walls. And this step, which might have been their ruin, became
the cause of their safety, for the additional number of consumers
must have brought their provisions to an earlier end, besides that no
troops, comparatively uninterested in the event, would have endured
the extremity of distress to which the men of Leyden were reduced. Of
the amount of their suffering, which the Italian historian just quoted
barely notices, the reader will be enabled to form a fuller idea by a
few particulars derived from other authorities.
“With extreme impatience they now expected the approach of those tides
which are commonly the object of their dread and terror. The situation
of the besieged was become the most desperate and deplorable. During
seven weeks there had not been a morsel of bread within the city; and
the only food had been the roots of herbs and weeds, and the flesh
of dogs and horses. Even all these were at length consumed, and the
people reduced to live on soup made of the hides of animals which had
been killed. A pestilence succeeded to the famine, and carried off in
a few weeks some thousands of the inhabitants. Those who survived,
overwhelmed with anguish at the dismal scenes which they daily
beheld, were scarcely able to perform the mournful office of burying
the dead. In this dreadful situation they saw from their walls the
flags and sails of the vessels destined for their relief, but had the
mortification to perceive that it was utterly impossible for them to
approach. It is not surprising that some of the people, finding their
misery greater than they were able to endure, should have entertained
the thoughts of surrendering the town to the enemy. Some conspiracies
were again formed for this purpose, but they were discovered and
defeated by the vigilance of Douza, supported by a great majority of
the people, to whom neither the pestilence, nor famine, nor death in
its most hideous forms, appeared so dreadful as the tyranny of the
Spaniards.
“A great number of people having come one day in a tumultuous manner
to a magistrate whose name was Adrian, exclaiming that he ought either
to give them food, or deliver the town into the hands of the enemy: ‘I
have solemnly sworn,’ he replied, ‘that I will never surrender myself
or my fellow–citizens to the cruel and perfidious Spaniard; and I will
sooner die than violate my oath. I have no food, else I would give it
you. But if my death can be of use to you, take, tear me in pieces, and
devour me; I shall die with satisfaction, if I know that by my death
I shall for one moment relieve you from your direful necessity.’ By
this extraordinary answer, the people, struck with astonishment, were
silenced, and their fury was for some time appeased.”[63]
In default of a better parallel to the battle of Salamis, we conclude
this chapter with the overthrow of the Spanish Armada. The points of
resemblance, such as they are, are sufficiently obvious and general,
and consist in the magnitude of the interests at stake, in the alacrity
shown by the English as well as by the Athenian people, and in the
signal defeat of the greater by the less force. We may also direct
attention to the circumstance, that in each case the defeated fleet
was superior to its antagonist in the bulk no less than the number
of its ships, and in each case owed its destruction mainly to that
very superiority; the lighter and more manageable vessels proving
an over–match for their formidable–looking opponents. The incident,
however, is sufficiently striking to deserve notice, even if the
resemblance were weaker, and if national vanity called less strongly
for its insertion; independently of which we have some pleasure
in giving the following high–sounding specimen of a contemporary
historian, who has summoned all his powers to match the dignity of his
subject by the elevation of his style.
“Although this present yeere 1587 were but as the vigil of the next
ensuing yeere 1588, concerning which yeere many ancient and strange
prophecies in divers languages, and many excellent astronomers of
sundry nations, had in very plain termes foretold, that the yeere 1588
should be most fatall and ominous unto all estates, concluding in these
words, or to the like effect, viz. ‘And if in that yeere the world doe
not perish and utterly decay, yet empires all, and kingdomes after
shall, and no man to raise himself shall know no way, and that for ever
after it shall be called the yeere of wonder,’ &c., yet for divers
yeeres past, by reason of the aforesaid generall predictions, all
Europe stood at gaze, vehemently expecting more strange and terrible
alterations, both in imperiall and regall estates, than ever happened
since the world began. Which sayd universall terror was this present
yeere half abated, and plainely discovered that England was the maine
subject of that time’s operation: for albeit, the Spanish provision for
three yeeres past were discerned to be wonderous great, for speciall
service by sea and land, yet used they all possible secrecy concerning
their intent, until they were fully furnished.
“The queene and councell, for two yeeres space, caused the ministers to
manifest unto their congregations the furious purpose of the Spanish
king, dukes of Parma and Guyse, with the dangerous dissimulation of
the French king, by whose paines and industry the whole communality
became of one hearte and mind, and began to retaine a stronger opinion
touching the Spaniards settled resolution for the invasion of England,
than either queene or councell. The English nation were so combined in
heart, that I here confesse I want art lively to expresse the sympathy
of love between the subjects and the sovereigne.
“This yeere 1587, being fully spent, and each man’s mind, more forward
than the spring, of infinite desire to grapple with the enemie, after
many musters both of horse and foote, and due survey of England’s
chiefest strength, to wit, navigation, captaines, commanders, leaders,
and fit officers were appointed unto their severall charges, over all
which land forces, Robert Earle of Leicester was lord generall, and
Henry Lord Hounsdon was generall for the queenes person.
“Cities, counties, townes and villages, the cinque–ports, and all other
havens of England, manifested as great forwardnesse in their zealous
love and dutie, as either subjects could perform or prince expect. To
single out the admirable dexterity and bounty of any one particular
place, or people, were apparent wrong to all, yet for a taste of
trueth in all, thus much may bee sayd for London. After the councell
had demaunded what the citty would doe in their prince and countryes
right, the lord maior and aldermen humbly besought their honours to set
downe what their wisedomes thought requisite in such a case: the lords
demanded five thousand men, and fifteene ships; the city craved two
days respite for answere, which was granted, and then entreated their
lordships, in signe of their perfect love and loyaltie to their prince
and country, kindly to accept tenne thousand men and thirty shippes,
amply furnished. And even as London London–like gave president, the
whole kingdome kept true ranke and equipage.
“The whole nobility, most nobly like themselves, and like planets of
the higher orbes, in kind conjunction knit their hearts in one, whose
princely valour equalling their love, assured their soveraigne of
triumphant victory.”
The English fleet was divided into two squadrons, one under Lord
Henry Seymour of sixteen ships, appointed to watch the narrow seas,
and prevent communication between the Armada and the Duke of Parma,
then commanding in Flanders; the other stationed on the western coast,
to meet their formidable enemy upon his first approach to the British
shore, composed of vessels of all sizes and descriptions, in number
from eighty–five to one hundred. Lord Charles Howard, High Admiral of
England, commanded in chief; Drake, a name of fear to the Spaniard, was
vice–admiral, and among many lords and gentlemen who held subordinate
commands, the well–known seamen Hawkins and Frobisher filled worthy
place and trust. The train bands or militia of the maritime counties,
being summoned to be ready for service on their own coast, at the
earliest warning, two strong armies were collected from the interior,
one of 2000 horse and 34,000 foot for the defence of the queen’s
person, and as a disposable force; the other was encamped at Tilbury;
and the opposite town of Gravesend being fortified, it was proposed to
connect the two banks and shut up the river by a bridge of boats.
“It was a pleasant sight to behold the soldiers as they marched towards
Tilbury, their cheerful countenances, courageous words and gestures,
dauncing and leaping wheresoever they came, and in the campe, their
most felicity was hope of fight with the enemy, where oft times divers
rumours ran of their foes’ approach, and that present battell would
bee given them; then, were they as joyfull at such newes, as if lusty
giants were to run a race: in this campe were many old soldiers and
right brave commanders, who, although in their greatest force did never
exceede the number of 3000 horse and 15,000 foot, yet there were ready
in all places many thousands more to backe and second them, and it was
found good policy not on the sudden to keepe too great an army in one
place.
“Thus England being in all points furnished, and in good readiness
for their own defence, I will speake a word or two concerning the
Hollanders, then leave them awhile, and report of their adversaries’
estate and preparation.
“The Hollanders came in roundly with threescore sayle, brave shippes
of war, fierce and full of spleene, not so much for England’s ayd,
as in just occasion of their own defence, knowing the originall and
ground of this hostility to proceed from themselves, with thirty years’
continued sharpe warre. These men foreseeing the greatnesse of the
danger that might ensue if the Spaniards should chance to winne the
day, and get the mastery over them, in due regard whereof their manly
courage was inferior to none.
“The King of Spaine, after three yeares deliberate advice, was three
yeeres preparing this twofold army in Spain, whereof he made Alphonso
Perez, duke of Medina Sidonia, chiefe generall, and Don Martino
Recaldo, of Cantabria, vice–admirall: which army, by the ayde of the
clergy, the princes of Italy, as well friends as feodaries, the seven
kingdomes in Spain, the entire state of Portugall, together with the
help of mariners, pylots, munition, tackling and victuall from the
north–west parts of Europe, was now fully furnished, about the middle
of May, riding at anchor in the river Tagus, neare Lisbon, consisting
of 128 vessels for warre, viz. carricks, galleons, argoseys, and four
galliasses, 2555 pieces of great ordinance, 12,000 mariners, and 20,000
land soldiers, besides voluntaries, vitlers, hospitals, and shippes
of artificers to attend them. When the king beheld this mighty host,
observing well their matchless strength, and plenteous provision for
sea and land, as well for others as themselves, to wit, oyle, wine,
rice, salt, biskit, horses, mules, carts, carriages, powder, shot,
saddles, apparel, pickaxes, and shovels, hee sayd, it might well
be called the Invincible army. It was ever meant this army should
have been at the Groyne[64] before this time, to have taken the full
advantage of the yeere, for so the Dukes of Guise and Parma did expect,
whose preparations, on all points, were in a better readinesse at the
beginning of June, according to the king’s appointment, than they were
afterward; for seeing the sommer half spent, they doubted whether the
king would send his army this yeere, or no, but the king could not help
it, for that his ships were furnished in divers ports, and through
contrary winds could not be united until this present, so as they were
constrained to anchor at Lisbon, where they should have hoysed sail at
the Groyne, to wit, about the beginning of June.”
The terms of naval architecture just used require some explanation.
Carracks, argosies, and galleons, were names for the largest species
of sailing vessels in use. Some idea of their size may be formed from
the dimensions of a Portuguese vessel captured in 1592. Her burthen was
1600 tons, she carried 32 pieces of brass ordnance, and between 600 and
700 passengers, and was built with decks seven stories high. She is
said to have been in length from the figure–head to the stern 165 feet;
in breadth near 47. Carrack was a name given by the Portuguese to the
vessels built for the Brazil and East–Indian trade: their capacity was
chiefly in their depth. Galleasses were the largest vessels impelled by
oars, and differed from galleys only in their superior size, and in the
arrangement of the artillery.
A minute detail of the number and force of the Spanish fleet is given
in Charnock’s History of Marine Architecture. It appears that the
vessels classed as galleons mounted from 50 to 20, or even so few as 15
cannon, and the largest of them were from 1000 to 1600 tons burthen.
The following summary will convey some notion of the size and equipment
of the vessels in use, and show the immense superiority of the Spanish
over the English force.
No. of Smaller
Tonnage. Galleons. Vessels. Guns. Sailors. Soldiers.
7,739 Portuguese} 10 2 389 1,242 3,086
squadron}
5,861 Biscayan 10 4 302 906 2,117
8,054 Castilian 15 2 474 1,793 2,924
8,692 Andalusian 10 1 315 776 2,365
7,192 Guypuiscoan 11 4 296 608 2,120
8,632 Italian 10 0 319 844 2,792
10,860 Medina 0 24 466 930 3,570
2,090 Mendoza[65] 0 25 204 746 1,481
———— —— —— ————— ————— ——————
59,120 66 62 2,765 7,845 20,455
Slaves
Four Neapolitan Galleasses, }
mounting 50 guns each } 200 477 744 1,200
Four Portuguese 50 ” ” 200 424 440 888
————– ————– ————– ————–
400 901 1,184 2,088
2,765 7,845 20,455
————– ————– ——————
3,165 8,746 21,639
The English force is less minutely given: numerically it was superior
to the Spanish, for it consisted of 175 vessels, besides others classed
as victuallers; but the inferiority of the several ships in size and
force will appear from a comparison of their tonnage and the number
of their crews. The largest of the royal navy was of 1100 tons: the
collective burthen of the fleet amounted only to 29,744 tons, barely
more than half that of the Spanish navy, and their crews consisted
of 14,501 men, opposed to a numerical force more than double their
number. The number of guns and weight of metal of the English fleet,
we have not been able to obtain—in this respect the disproportion was
probably even greater. The reader will observe that we have not taken
into account the Dutch squadron, which did good service in blocking up
in their harbours the forces collected by the Duke of Parma, but never
were opposed to the Spanish fleet.
The Armada in its passage from Lisbon to the Groyne was considerably
injured by stress of weather, which still further delayed it, and June
and July being almost spent, and no appearance of the enemy, it began
to be thought that for that year at least the Spaniards would not come.
Many of the volunteers, therefore, being indifferently provided for
keeping the sea, dispersed themselves into different harbours, and the
queen, economical even to parsimony, countenanced this imprudence by
recalling from the high admiral four of her great ships. Meanwhile the
Duke of Parma had assembled in Flanders 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, and
collected in his ports 340 flat–bottomed vessels, great and small, to
land his men readily upon an open strand, with store of all necessaries
to make good his descent, even in the face of an enemy. The plan of
the campaign was this: the Duke of Medina was ordered to steer direct
to Flanders, place himself under the command of the Duke of Parma, who
under convoy of the Armada should disembark in Kent or Essex, as near
to London or to the camp as he could. It was also meant that the Duke
of Guise should first have landed in the west, under protection of the
Spanish navy as it passed along, to effect a diversion in favour of the
real attack; while, after the arrival of the Duke of Parma, the fleet,
passing northward, was appointed to land in Yorkshire 12,000 men.
“The Spanish navy having refreshed themselves at Groyne, after
twenty–eight days’ rest, set forward for England, about the 11th of
July, in the greatest pompe that eye ever beheld, matchlesse in state,
commaunding their passage whersoever they came, exceeding far the force
of those two thousand warlike sayle of great Symeramis,[66] or the
like number at commaund of the Egyptian Cleopatra, or those 1200 well
prepared ships raised by Charles of Fraunce, with like full purpose of
invasion, for revenge upon King Richard the Second, for dammage done
by his graundsire Edward the Third, in his French conquest; but this
proud navy hath more skilfull guides, and in the overweening of her
strength sets forward boldly to perform her charge (though in stealing
wise), as if necessity hadde constrained them to take advantage of
home–bred traytors, or ambitious rebels, risen against their state,
and not like souldiers, sent in cause of just hostilitie, to encounter
with an honourable enemy, without due summons, or defiance unto armes,
according to the law of nations.
“The 19th of July the English admirall, upon direct knowledge of the
enemies approach, sends speedy summons unto all the English fleet, who
still retained their former courage. The Spaniards by this time were
entered the mouth of the narrow seas, whose number, state and strength
being well observed by the lord admirall, and rightly considered, that
it was now no time to dally or flatter in so imminent daunger, in depth
of humane judgment, and discharge of duty to his prince and country,
instantly addressed his letters by his brother in law, Sir Edward
Hobby, unto her majesty, signifying the great difference in power
betwixt the English and the Spaniard, and therefore seeing the English
navall forces far inferior to the Spanish army, advised the queene to
send more ayde to the sea, and to make ready the chiefe strength of her
land forces: at which newes the queene forthwith commands more ships
to the sea, whereupon yet in voluntary manner, the earles of Oxford,
Northumberland and Cumberland, Sir Thomas Cecill, Sir Robert Cecill,
Sir Walter Rawleigh, master Thomas Gerrard, master Arthur Gorge, Sir
Thomas Vavasor, and many other honourable personages, were suddenly
embarked, committing themselves unto the present chaunce of warre.
“Gentlemen and yeomen of sundry shires, bordering on the sea, knowing
many of the English shippes to bee very weakly furnished with victuall
and munition, out of their singular zeale and loyalty sent cheerefully
such provision as they either could make, or was provided for their
families; yea, such was the integrity of the English, as the recusants
offered their service, and were desirous to take their fortune with the
common souldiers.
“The 21st July the Spaniards came as high as Plimmouth, where divers
English shippes lay fast in harbor, the rest gave charge upon the
enemie; the Armado then daraines[67] itselfe into the fashion of the
crescent moone; each side prepares themselves speedily to fight with
braves and bravadoes, their shrill sounding trumpets and their ratling
drums lent mutuall courage unto both batalions, and loud thundring
canons send swift messengers of death: both armies strive to get
advantage of the wind, but the English, beeing much more quick and
yare, winne their desire, and England’s admirall in person gave the
onset, and for two houres space maintained a valiant fight untill night
drew on, and wanting forty of the English fleete, which as yet could
not by any meanes come unto their ayde, they tackt about.
“The next day the English navy beeing well encreased, gave charge and
chase upon the enemie squadron after squadron, seconding each other
like swift horsemen, that could nimbly come and goe, and fetch the
wind for most advantage. Now begins the furious fight on either part,
and manly souldiers firmly keepe their stand upon the starboord and
larboord side, and as occasion serves, some cry keepe aloofe, others
roome ho; if the seas were calme, it serves the English well to charge
upon the greatest bulwarke of the Spanish fleete; and then their
galliasses, as sergeants of the band, would issue foorth sometimes
to succour their distressed friends, and otherwhiles with purpose
to surprise such English as they saw becalmed, whose kindnesse oft
the English with their broadsides would requite, sending their dole
untill the Spaniards blood ranne out at scupper hole; but if the wind
grew bigge and billowes played aloft, then the Spaniards with their
lofty towers make full account to stem the English comming in their
way: sometimes the English in their eager fight fell foule upon the
daunger of their ennemies, and so continued from the evening unto the
breake of day: the lord high admirall himselfe was one whole night
within the maine battell of the Spanish army: both navies showed
great valour in their dayly fight, which commonly continued within
the reach of musket shot, and many times at push of pike without
intermission, save only when for want of wind they were restrained: the
English chiefetaines ever sought to single out the great commaunders
of the Spanish hoste whose loftie castles held great scorne of their
encounter: but whilest both armies were thus conjoyned, Don Pedro de
Valdez, a chiefe commaunder of the army, fell fowle upon one of his
fellowes, and brake his foremast, who being maimed and left behind,
lay like a stiffe elephant in the open field, beset with eager hounds,
who being commaunded to yeelde, sayd, he would yeelde to none but his
equal, and asked in whose squadron hee was fallen, they answered into
Drake’s squadron, then he sayd, fetch him for I will yeeld to none but
to a commander like myself. Drake being returned from chasing certain
Easterlings, Don Pedro beganne to articulate, but Drake peremtorily
told him, it was now no time to stand upon tearmes of composition,
whereupon he yeelded; having caused all their jewels, plate, money,
apparell, with whatever else their present state could any way afford,
to bee layed open, to prevent the fury of the English when they came
aboord.
“After that, another galleon by negligence was set on fire, and
therewith consumed to the lower decke, under which lay store of
gunpowder, never touched. The lord Thomas Howard, pittying their
extream misery, but not being able to stay on boord through extreamity
of stench, caused the remainder of those scorched men to be set on
shore.
“The Spanish navie for sixe dayes space having endured many sharpe
fights and fierce assaults coasting and discoasting from England to
the coast of Fraunce, and from thence to England, and then to Fraunce
again, the seaven and twentieth of July, towards night, they cast
anchor nigh to Callis Roade, the English likewise rid at anchor very
neere unto them.
“Now rides the Armada at her wished post, unto whom the Duke of
Parma sends present word, that within three days their forces should
conjoyne, and with first advantage of wind and tyde, transport their
armies to the English coast, in meane space they would personally meet,
and then determine betweene themselves what was further to be done.
“The Flemings, Walloons, and the French came thicke and threefolde to
behold the fleete, admiring the exceeding greatnesse of their shippes,
and warlike order; the greatest kept the outside next the enemie,
like strong castles, fearing no assault, the lesser placed in the
middleward; fresh victuals straight were brought aboord, captaines and
cavaliers for their money might have what they would, who gave the
French so liberally as within twelve houres an egge was worth sixe
pence, besides thanks.
“Whilest this lusty navie, like a demi–conqueror, ryd thus at anchor,
the Spanish faction in sundry nations had divulged that England was
subdued, the queene taken and sent prisoner over the Alpes to Rome,
where barefoote shee should make her humble reconciliation, &c.
“In Paris, Don Barnadino de Mendoza, ambassador from Spaine, entred
into our lady church (Nôtre Dame) advancing his rapier in his right
hand, and with a loud voyce cryed, Victorie, Victorie, and it was
forthwith bruited that England was vanquished. But the next day when
trueth was known of the Armadoes overthrow, certain pages of adverse
faction unto Spain, in bitter scoffing manner, humbly prayed his
lordship’s letters unto the Duke of Parma, in favour of their good
fortune, to bestow on them some odde wast cast townes or villages,
as London, Canterbury, or York, or so, whereat Mendoza, being much
dismayed, obscured himself, not daring to show his face.
“France, Italy, and Germany, were very doubtfull of the English state,
and in those places the English merchants well perceived their double
eye, one while smyling on Spaines behalf, and then upon the English
casting a fleering looke.
“The queenes navy having well observed the martiall order and
invincible strength of the Spaniards, and that it was not possible to
remove them by force of fight, and therewithall considered the present
purpose of the duke of Parma, and their owne imminent daunger, omitted
no time, but according to the present necessity, the generall with his
councell of warre, concluded to make their first stratagem by fire, and
thereupon, the 28th July, they emptied eight of their basest barkes,
and put therein much combustible matter, which in the evening were
subtilly set on fire, and with advantage both of wind and tyde, guided
within the reach of canon shotte, before the Spaniards could discern
the same; and then the flame grew fierce with sudden terror to the
enemie, who thought these floates to have been like the sundry workes
of wildfire lately made to break the bridge at Antwerpe, in which
feare they all amazed with shrikes and loud outcries, to the great
astonishment of the neere inhabitants, crying, The fire of Antwerpe,
the fire of Antwerpe; some cut cables, others let the hawsers slippe,
and happiest they who could first bee gone, though few could telle what
course to take.
“The first whereof that ran aground, was a galliasse, hard by Callis
walls, where the English freely tooke the common spoyle, until they
began to take the ordinance and to fire the shippe, whereat the
governor being sore displeased, knowing the royalty thereof to be
appropriate to himselfe, discharged his canons from the citadel, and
drove the English from their benefite. The next was a galleon, which
ranne ashoare in Flanders. Divers others fell into the hands of the
Hollanders. The rest endeavoured by all meanes possible to cast anchor
before Gravelyn or Dunkerke, hoping still to have supply from Parma.
“But the English forces being now wholly united, prevented their
enemies conjoyning together, and followed their fortunes to the
uttermost, continuing four dayes fight in more deadly manner than at
any time before, and having incessant cause of fresh encouragement
chased the Spaniards from place to place, until they hadde driven them
into a desperate estate; so as of necessity, as well for that the wind
was westerly, as that their enemies increased, and their own provision
of sayles, anchors and cables greatly wasted, resolved to shape their
course by the Orcades and the north of Ireland. In whose pursuit, if
the English had been but meanly furnished with victual and munition,
they would have brought them all unto their mercy, but when they saw
them past the Orcades and the Scottish seas, they made retreat. And
if the Spaniards had but two days longer continued fight, the English
must have made a retreat for want of shotte and powder, and left the
Spaniards to their most advantage.
“About the end of September the duke of Medina arrived in Spaine,
being as much discountenanced at court, as discouraged in his journey;
and of all his royall navy which he caryed foorth, there returned only
threescore sayle, sore distressed, the rest whereof, some were taken
and spoyled by the English in the narrow seas, and some taken by the
Hollanders, and some made a fayre escape by landing in Scotland; but
the most perished upon the Irish coast, and slaine by Gallowglasses,
whose generall losse was much lamented through Spaine, for that every
noted family had lost a kinsman or a neere ally.
“Shippes under the command of the lord high admirall of England, this
yeare, 1588:
Of shippes Royal 17
Attended by other warlike ships 12
And of lusty pinnaces 6
From London there were sent of brave, warlike ships 16
And of pinnaces 4
From Bristow there were sent of serviceable ships 3
And one pinnace 1
From Barstaple there were sent in this expedition, of ships 3
From Excester there were sent of ships 2
And one pinnace 1
From Plimmouth there were sent of ships well appointed 7
And one flye boat 1
“There was sent a pinnace of the lord admirall’s—also a pinnace of the
lord Sheffield’s, and a pinnace of Sir William Winter’s.
“The merchant adventurers of England set foorth at their own proper
charges, of lusty ships—10.
“Ships under the lord Henry Seymour in the narrow seas:—Of ships
royall, accompanied with other very warlike ships well appointed, being
in number—16.
“Besides all these, there were many other barkes, ships, and pinnaces,
sent out of the north parts and west parts, as also particularly by
divers persons, as by the lord admirall, by divers other lordes,
knights, and gentlemen, and some others his followers, and by sundry
other noble and vallerous gentlemen and gallant marchants, whereof I
could never attaine the certaine knowledge, though I greatly sought it.”
The partisans of the two contending nations differ widely, as is to be
expected, in their estimates of the loss sustained. The victors said
that eighty vessels and 18,000 men had perished: Strada rates it at
thirty–two captured and wrecked, and 10,000 men: but he acknowledges
that the result of the expedition filled all Spain with mourning.
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