PATRISTIC USE OF THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS
From this account of the general attitude of the ante-Nicene writers
toward a possible knowledge of God, it will readily be anticipated that
the forms of the theistic argument used by Plato and by Aristotle will
find no place in their system. St. Clement of Alexandria, in a passage
already referred to,[60] shows that any Ontological or Idealogical
argument can only lead us to an "Unknown," which may be "understood" and
given meaning "by the Word alone that proceeds from Him;" and he and
others of the early Christian writers seem to hint at that distinction
between Epistemology and Ontology which has always been the chief enemy
of any purely rational theistic argument. The Aetiological argument,
too, is not explicitly stated by them; and, though Lactantius does, in
opposing atheistic atomism, ask the question, "Whence are those minute
seeds?" yet the casual character of the inquiry shows the small emphasis
he placed on it, and the silence of the other writers, even when there
was every opportunity for calling attention to such an argument, gives
evidence to their estimate of its usefulness.
It is the more "practical" and "common-sense" forms of the theistic
argument--the Cosmological, the Teleological, the argument from common
consent, and mixtures of these types--that the early Christian writers
use most frequently, and in this they do but conform to the general
tendency of their age, as well as to the practical spirit of
Christianity. As we have seen, the more artificial and abstract
arguments of Plato and Aristotle did not take much hold upon others than
their originators or formulators, and the distinct tendency of the
theology of the later Greek and Latin schools of philosophy was toward
the more concrete forms of the theistic argument. And this inclination
would be emphasized in the early Christian writers, so far as they make
use of the argument at all, by the eminently simple and common-sense
attitude of Christianity toward all such problems, and also by the
peculiar work which the primitive Church had to do in the conversion of
the "common people," to whom an abstract argument would have been a
waste of words.
But we should expect that to men, upon whom a close perusal and study of
the Old Testament Scriptures had impressed the idea of God as the
Creator, Law-Giver and Governor of the universe, the Cosmological
argument would appeal strongly. Moreover, the strong Stoic influence
which is seen in their works, particularly in their treatment of
questions of morals, and in their ethical terminology, would naturally,
one would think, pre-dispose them to regard with favor this argument, so
in vogue among the philosophers of the Porch. It is, therefore, all the
more remarkable that, among the important works of the Ante-Nicene
Fathers, not more than a dozen instances, at most, of this argument can
be found; and of these more than half are merely passing references to
the patent fact of order in the world. Thus Tertullian asserts (quite
incidentally, in the course of an argument on an ethical question), that
"Nature herself is the teacher" of the fact "that God is the Maker of
the universe,"[61] but even here it is doubtful whether he means to
appeal to order or design in the world. In another place he makes the
mere statement that the fact of God's existence is tested by His works;
His character by the beneficence of them;[62] in another that the
"Creator ought to be known even by nature;"[63] and in still another
that nature teaches all men the existence and character of God.[64]
Origen in a passage sometimes quoted, appeals to the order and harmony
of the world,[65] but it is to prove the unity of God rather than His
existence. Perhaps the best and most elaborate example of the use of the
Cosmological argument by the Ante-Nicene authors, is that made of it by
"Athenagoras the Athenian; Philosopher and Christian," as he styled
himself.[66] He is concerned with making a distinction between God and
matter, in opposition to the popular idolatry, and declares that
Christians see the "Framer" behind the orderly world--whose relation one
to the other he likens to that between the artist and the materials of
his art. "But as clay cannot become vessels of itself without art, so
neither did matter, which is capable of taking all forms, receive apart
from God the Framer, distinction and shape and order."
And these few incidental and scattered instances represent practically
the explicit use of the Cosmological argument in the writings with which
we are occupied. When we consider how constantly they must have met with
the statements of it which are prevalent in the writings of the Stoics,
by whom they were, we know, profoundly influenced in both the form and
the terminology of their thought, we must surely consider this omission
a significant fact, for which it is worth while trying to account.
Nor does the "Socratic proof," the argument to design, meet with any
more cordial reception at the hands of early Christian writers. Although
the cases in which it is used are generally more explicit and fully
developed, yet the appeals to design in nature are fewer even than those
to order. The earliest, and one of the best examples of the use of this
argument is that made by Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, in his work
addressed to the idolater Autolycus.[67] He seeks to prove that the
invisible God is perceived through His works. As the soul is unseen, yet
perceived through the motion of the body; as the pilot is inferred from
the motion of the ship; as the king, though not present in person, is
believed to exist from his "laws, ordinances and authorities;" so the
unseen God is "beheld and perceived through his providence and works."
"Consider, O man, His works," he exclaims; and proceeds to enumerate the
evidences of design in the universe--"the timely rotation of the
seasons," "the regular march of the stars," the various beauty of seeds
and plants and fruits, and many others. It is a passage of considerable
beauty, and evidences no mean rhetorical skill.
It is in this same connection--in the refutation of idolatry--that St.
Clement of Alexandria uses this argument, contrasting the living
organism of man with the heathen idols.[68] "None of these (artists)
ever made a breathing image, or out of earth moulded soft flesh. Who
liquefied the marrow? or who solidified the bones? who stretched the
nerves? who distended the veins? who poured the blood into them? or who
spread the skin? who ever could have made eyes capable of seeing? who
breathed spirit into the lifeless form? who bestowed righteousness? who
promised immortality? The Maker of the universe alone; the great Artist
and Father has formed us, such a living image as man is. But your
Olympian Jove, the image of an image, greatly out of harmony with truth,
is the senseless work of Attic hands." This, it will be readily seen,
is more an attempt to show the insufficiency of idolatry to account for
man's nature, than a deliberate attempt at theistic proof.
The other examples of the use of this form of the argument for the
existence of God are found in Lactantius, "the Christian Cicero." In
speaking of Socrates he introduces[69] with approval an epitome of the
Athenian sage's argument, which we have already considered,[70] and, in
combatting the atomistic theory of the origin of the world, he
asserts[71] that neither atoms nor the "Nature" of Lucretius can account
for the adaptations in the actual world; and the phenomena of mind,
especially, proclaim an intelligent Providence. His treatise "On the
Workmanship of God, or the Formation of Man," is almost entirely an
argument to design from the phenomena of man's physical and mental
nature. From the standpoint of the physiology and psychology of his
time, he discusses in detail the function and working of the different
parts of man's nature, and from the adaptation of means to ends, of
organs to their functions, which, even with the scanty data of the
science of that day, is a striking consideration, he concludes that
man's being can only be accounted for on the supposition of an Arranger
or Planner, whose purposes are carried out in exercise of the various
functions.
The argument _e Consensu Gentium_ has often been accredited with being
peculiarly the patristic argument for the existence of God,[72] and for
this conclusion the use of it in Epicurean theology, and the doctrine of
the natural, innate idea of God already considered, would fully prepare
us; but the fact is that, apart from frequent passing references to the
"natural opinion" mentioned in the preceding chapter, the instances in
which the argument is explicitly made use of are not much more numerous
than in the case of the other forms. They constantly appeal to the
common consent, but it is generally against polytheism, as indicating a
consciousness of _the unity_ of God. St. Justin Martyr, in the passage
to which we have already alluded, asserts[73] this common consent, but
only as preparatory to the certainty which he finds in revelation. St.
Clement of Alexandria, after asserting that "the Father and Maker of all
things is apprehended by all things, agreeably to all, by innate power,
and without teaching," goes on to confirm his statement in this
manner:[74] "But no race anywhere, of tillers of the soil, or nomads,
and not even of dwellers in cities, can live without being imbued with
the faith of a superior being. Wherefore, every eastern nation, and
every nation touching the western shore; or the north, and each one
toward the south--all have one and the same preconception respecting
Him, who hath appointed government; since the most universal of His
operations equally pervade all." It is with the principles and end of
this argument in view that Tertullian appeals[75] to the witness of the
soul, "not as when fashioned in schools, trained in libraries, fed in
Attic academies and porticoes," but "rude, uncultured and untaught, such
as they have thee who have thee only; that very thing of the road, the
street, the workshop wholly;" and from his examination of this ordinary
soul he concludes that "the knowledge of our God is possessed by
all."[76] Minucius Felix appeals to this same common instinct and
exclaims:[77] "What! is it not true that I have in this matter the
consent of all men?" and Origen, in his reply to the attack of Celsus,
points to "the ineradicable idea of Him."[78] Novatian asserts[79] that
"the whole mind of man is conscious" of Him, "even if does not express
itself," and Lactantius thinks that for Cicero "it was no difficult
task, indeed, to refute the falsehoods of a few men who entertained
perverse sentiments by the testimony of communities and tribes, who on
this one point had no disagreement."[80]
Besides these instances in which the different types of the theistic
argument are used in an undeveloped, but yet in a pure form, there are
several places where a mixed form appears, the different conventional
processes being used in combination without being clearly
differentiated. Thus the argument from common consent and the argument
based on order or design are used in conjunction, the necessity of the
universal knowledge of God's existence being seen from the witness to
Him found in nature.[81] So, too, the arguments from order and from
design in nature are often used in conjunction, and in many passages it
is difficult to decide to which one of these two the author intends to
appeal primarily.[82] These undifferentiated or mixed arguments are
quite frequently to be seen in the patristic writings, and serve to
illustrate the eclectic character of their thoughts, often presenting in
one passage the forms of the theistic arguments peculiar to two opposed
schools in Greek philosophy; and they also indicate how incidentally and
naïvely the Fathers used such weapons, not taking the trouble to
differentiate one form from the other, though they could not have been
ignorant of such distinctions.
The first thing that strikes one's attention in this examination of the
use of the theistic argument in the early Christian writers is, as has
been indicated, the paucity of examples. When we consider the emphasis
laid upon this subject in the contemporaneous philosophical schools; the
constant appeal to one form or another of the argument by Stoic and
Epicurean alike; the various combinations and adaptations made by
Eclectics and Syncretists; the use of such material in the exercises of
the rhetorical instruction then so prominent in education; it would seem
that a weapon so ready to their hand must have been seized upon by the
Fathers, and made full use of for the advancement of the cause in which
they were enlisted. And this silence on their part cannot be due to
ignorance of what had been written on the subject, or of what was going
on in the world about them. The patristic writings show the keenest
interest in, and fullest knowledge of what men were thinking about in
the outside world as well as within the Church. Many of the Fathers, as
we have had occasion to notice, had been trained in the philosophical
schools,[83] and show themselves fully conversant not only with such
subjects, but with poetry and general literature as well.[84] In the
course of their education, as well as in their reading, they must have
become fully acquainted with all the forms of the theistic argument. And
this knowledge they had every opportunity to use. Many of their works
that have come down to us are either apologies or else answers to
critics of Christianity, who attacked its doctrines from the stand-point
of either polytheism or atheism. In maintaining the Christian doctrine
of God against these opponents, the theistic argument would seem to be a
most natural weapon for one who was confident of its validity. But the
fact is, that in most of these apologies no such reasoning is employed,
and even when it is to be found in their pages, is only incidental and
by way of illustration, to explain the rational character of the
Christian doctrine of God by a sort of _argumentum ad hominem_.
One reason for this neglect of the theistic argument may be readily
found in the subject-matter of the treatises themselves. Almost
exclusively with the earlier Fathers, as we have seen, and very largely
with their successors, the emphasis was laid on life, rather than on
thought, and the appeal was to authority rather than to reason. Men were
asked to judge of Christianity by its fruits, and to receive the faith
which it professed, not because of its rational demonstration, but
because of the authority of Him who promulgated it. The persons to whom
the arguments were addressed, too, explain much of the silence of the
Fathers. To the Jew or religious Gentile it would be superfluous to
address elaborate arguments to prove the existence of God, and it was to
these classes that many of the works under discussion were addressed. To
them the argument, such as we frequently find, from the Old Testament
types and prophecies, or from the superior beauty and morality of the
Christian doctrine and life, taking for granted the existence of God,
was what the case required. And when, as is very frequently the case,
they address the popular idolaters, it is a negative argument to show
the unworthiness of idol-worship, and the superiority of their own
doctrine, of which they naturally make use, and not a theistic argument
which would have no significance to those who were already "too
religious."
Many of the apologies of the early Church were called forth by the
attacks which were made on the Christians by the adherents of the
popular religions. The charges usually brought against them were those
of atheism, because of their rejection of the gods of Greece and Rome;
of immorality, because of the secrecy and mystery of their meetings, and
cannibalism, because of their doctrine of the partaking of the Body and
Blood of Christ in the Eucharist. In refuting these charges, especially
the first, no place was afforded for the use of a theistic argument, but
they naturally exhibit their belief in God as superior to that of their
accusers, and appeal to their lives as justifying their belief.
But aside from these cases in which the theistic argument would have
been superfluous, there are many places in which it is conspicuous for
its absence. That they had other arguments besides those from scripture
and authority, and that they believed in using them when necessary, we
have, as we have seen, many proofs in their writings. Their position is
well indicated by Lactantius, who blamed St. Cyprian for using a
Scripture argument to an unbeliever,[85] and we shall be obliged to look
deeper than mere ignorance or lack of occasion to account for the
paucity of cases in which they use the argument for the existence of
God.
The fact is that the history of Greek thought had shown conclusively the
absolute futility of any efforts to arrive at a certain proof of the
existence of God by purely rational methods. The attempts of each school
to attain such certainty were repudiated by their successors, and even
by their contemporaries; and the later trials--which the religious
instincts and aspirations of men would not permit them to forego, even
when they were sceptical of obtaining any valid and positive
results--frequently became, instead of a sincere seeking after God, mere
practice in the art of Rhetoric. And not only was it true that no one of
the forms of the theistic argument brought conviction to any other mind
than that of the man who regarded it with the partial enthusiasm of an
originator or formulator, but even such an one was led to only the most
vague and indefinite results. We have already seen how even the best
theology of the Greeks led to nothing but a sort of organized or unified
polytheism. A vague, fanciful first cause of physical phenomena, a
general idea, abstracted out of all content, so as to leave no meaning
for the human mind--whatever the imagination might make of it--a
mechanical, magnetic force, to which all motion might conveniently be
referred; a deified principle of order--and these held in conjunction
with the popular polytheism, and impregnated with the national
pantheistic conceptions--was all that Greek philosophy could offer to
the higher religious aspirations of the educated man. The opinion of the
Greek mind itself as to the character of the knowledge of God, to which
the thought of their race had led them at the beginning of the Christian
era was fitly expressed by those Athenians, who erected near the
Areopagus the "altar on which was written, 'To the Unknown God.'"[86]
The opinion (for in most cases it did not amount to a conviction) that
there was an Unknown (or even, as many thought, an Unknowable) Divinity
of some sort, which might account for the phenomena of the world, and
which might be the truth behind the vagaries of the anthropomorphic
polytheism, was as far as Greek thought had led men at the period with
which we have to do. Their {theos} was really nothing more than Mr. Herbert
Spencer's "Unknowable,"--a mysterious "force," to which everything was
referred which could not be accounted for on the basis of scientific
principles.
Now if this was the case with the adherents of the heathen philosophical
schools, how must the realization of the poverty of this result, and the
distrust of the means which led to it, have been emphasized by the
conversion of individuals from them to Christianity. It is a graphic
picture which some of the Fathers paint for us of their eager search, in
the different schools in turn, for some religious truth which would
bring with it conviction; of their disappointment and consequent despair
and scepticism, and then of the satisfaction which they had found for
their aspirations in the teaching of Jesus Christ, who, they were
convinced, was the very Word of God. Viewed merely from the historical
point of view, this process is full of interest as illustrating that
which was going on in many minds that stopped at the sceptical stage,
and, for one reason or another, never found refuge in the Christian
Church. But for those who did take this step, their former distrust of
the theistic argument, as a basis for religious conviction, must have
been greatly emphasized. The contrast between their former scepticism as
to man's ability to attain to any knowledge of things beyond the
phenomenal world, and their present faith and conviction which their
belief in the Person of Christ gave them, must have made the part of any
such means of arriving at truth as the already discredited theistic
argument most insignificant. They, themselves, had no need for it. All
it had been able to do for them, as for those to whom they wrote, was to
raise an aspiration which "would not down"--to bring them to the
hypothesis (substituted for polytheism, now outgrown) of an "Unknown
God," and they felt that their message to their contemporaries was, like
that of St. Paul to the Athenians on Areopagus: "Whom, therefore, ye
ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you."
It is with this attitude in mind, I am convinced, that we must interpret
the doctrine, so often enunciated by the early Christian writers, but
especially by St. Justin Martyr and St. Clement of Alexandria, of the
"partial," "fragmentary" character of the theological truth arrived at
by Greek philosophy. They have sometimes been charged with
inconsistency in thus characterizing the work of men from whom they
borrowed so much, but they seem, in fact, to have been remarkably
appreciative of their old masters when we consider the position in which
they stood. In fact, they seem to grant to Greek philosophy all that its
adherents would claim for it, namely, that, by means of the arguments
adduced by its different schools, the Greeks had attained to the opinion
that there was something behind the phenomena of nature, but this might
as well be a transcendent force or a pantheistic world-soul as an
immanent God. With the Apostle on Mars' Hill they would say that the
best theology of the Greeks simply put them in a position "that they
should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him."
And each of the Greek schools, they would say, by resting their case on
some one of the various arguments, and emphasizing some one of the
attributes of the Deity at the expense of the others, had attained only
a partial and inadequate view, though true so far as it went. "Since,
therefore," says St. Clement of Alexandria,[87] "truth is one (for
falsehood has ten thousand by-paths); just as the Bacchantes tore
asunder the limbs of Pentheus, so the sects both of barbarian and
Hellenic philosophy have done with truth, and each vaunts as the whole
truth the portion which has fallen to its lot. But all, in my opinion,
are illuminated by the dawn of Light." These men were deeply
appreciative of the work of Greek philosophy so far as it went--even
assigning to it a place analogous to the Hebrew Scriptures[88]--but they
always attribute to it a distinctly propædeutic office, and are careful
to emphasize its failure to lead to any firm and positive conviction of
the existence of God. That this was the position of the early Christian
philosophers might be shown by many passages, but we will content
ourselves with one example from the pages of St. Clement of Alexandria,
who assigned to Greek philosophy a higher place than any of the
patristic writers--so much so that his orthodoxy has frequently been
questioned because of it. He is fond of designating the knowledge of God
to which the Greeks had attained by the term "{periphrasis}." Thus he
concludes[89] an argument from common consent, already quoted, in these
words: "Much more did the philosophers among the Greeks, devoted to
investigation, starting from the Barbarian philosophy, attribute
providence to the 'invisible, and sole and most powerful, and most
skilful and supreme cause of all things, most beautiful;'--not knowing
the influences from these truths, unless instructed by us, and not even
how God is to be known naturally, but only, as we have already often
said, by a true periphrasis." "The men of highest repute among the
Greeks knew God, not by positive knowledge, but by indirect expression
({periphrasis})."[90] The indefinite and merely "probable" character of the
results which the Fathers think were reached by the theistic argument in
Greek thought explains to us the few examples of these proofs which we
find in their writings, and the certainty which they thought they had
found, and their consequent attitude toward all arguments of this
nature, which we have tried to depict, is the key to the explanation of
a new phase in the history of thought which was to last for several
centuries.
In our examination of these examples of the theistic argument in the
Fathers, it cannot escape our notice that they occur much more
frequently, and in more developed and conventional form in the West than
in the East--under the influence of Rome than under that of Alexandria
and the Orient. The reason for this is not far to seek, and is one that
throws light also on the motive with which the patristic writers made
use of these arguments.
In Alexandria and the East there was no incentive for the Christians to
try to prove the existence of God, for the philosophy of that portion of
the world was essentially religious in its character, and based its
speculation on the existence of God as a fundamental postulate of
revelation and of reason as well. In the combination of Judaism and
Hellenic philosophy made by the "Hellenizing Jews" and by the "Judaizing
Hellenes," the existence of God was admitted quite as freely, and
maintained quite as zealously, as by the Christians themselves, and even
the incipient Neo-Platonists made no quarrel with them on this ground.
So we find that the reference in the Alexandrian and other Eastern
Fathers are mainly of the character of examples and illustrations as to
principles that are well understood and admitted, and are employed
chiefly for the purpose of refuting idolatry by a distinction between
God and matter, or of proving the unity of God in opposition to the
still latent polytheism.
Under the influence of Rome, however, other tendencies came in to give a
rather different significance to the theistic argument. For Rome had
become the chief center of the later schools of Greek philosophy, and
under the shadow of the seven hills rather than in the Athenian groves
and porticoes were found the disciples of Pyrrho, of Zeno and of
Epicurus. Thus, very naturally, wherever Roman civilization was dominant
the teacher of Christian doctrine was obliged to present his subject
with reference to the forces already at work in the minds of those whom
he addressed. In accordance with this, we find, first, a _negative_
influence in the hostile attitude assumed by the Sceptics and members
of other schools who tended toward their position, toward any religious
knowledge. That this influence is not an imaginary one may be seen
especially in the instance already quoted from Lactantius, whose use of
the theistic argument is called forth by the cavils of Sceptics and
atheistic atomists.
But there was also a _positive_ influence at work to facilitate the use
of the theistic argument by the Western Fathers in the prevalence at
Rome of Stoic and Epicurean doctrine. From the former of these schools
would result a familiarity, and, in many cases, an agreement with the
forms of the argument drawn from order and design; from the latter, for
the demonstration from common consent. Both of these influences, no
doubt, had some influence on the shape in which Tertullian of Carthage,
Minucius Felix, Novatian and Lactantius presented their doctrine, and,
together with the more material and less religious character of the
West, accounts in large degree for the comparative frequency of their
appeal to the theistic argument.
But when we consider the frequency with which we meet with the theistic
argument, and with reference to its use in other writers, in the pages
of Cicero, for example, these scanty instances afforded us by the
writings of the ante-Nicene Fathers, whose works occupy, say, 4,500
large, closely-printed pages in the translation, and who were, let us
remember, dealing exclusively with religious thought, indicate plainly a
fundamental change in position, the influence of which was operative for
centuries in this department of thought, and which, even to-day, governs
the attitude of the greater part of the Western world. The absolute
failure of the Greeks to arrive at any certainty of God's existence by
demonstration, the introduction of the Christian doctrine of God, before
which the deductions of Greek philosophy seem empty and unsatisfactory,
even to many who cannot accept that doctrine as truth, and the
substitution of faith in a Person for purely rational proof, render it
impossible, so long as that faith continues, that any one should think
it worth while to devote more than a passing notice to any such
argument, unless for the purposes of an _argumentum ad hominem_. And so
it is not until faith begins to grow cold and men become mere
speculators and debaters about religion, rather than believers in
Christ, that the revival of these arguments under the title of "proofs"
is possible. Even the famous Ontological Argument of St. Anselm was, I
am convinced, no serious attempt to formulate an _a priori_ proof of the
existence of God, but was addressed to a particular case[91]--the "fool"
who "said in his heart, 'There is no God,'" and who _also_ maintained
that God was "that than which no greater can be thought."
From this survey it will be seen that, in the view of the Ante-Nicene
Christian authors, the theistic argument was valuable merely as a
propædeutic to Christianity, but was superfluous for the believer in
Jesus Christ; the use of it cannot, as it had not in Greek thought,
bring proof, but only probability; even this uncertain result is only
vague and fragmentary in character, and was never unified and made
significant by the Greeks; its office in Christian evidences was merely
of an _ad hominem_ sort, and this only in its simpler and more practical
forms, in which the senses as well as reason had their testimony to
bear; and, lastly, the argument was used much more frequently by the
Western than by the Alexandrian and other Eastern Fathers.
FOOTNOTES:
[60] _Stromata_, V, 12.
[61] _De Spectaculis_, II.
[62] _Against Marcion_, I, 17.
[63] _Ibid._, V, 16. This is to justify his doctrine of the punishment
of the heathen.
[64] _Scapula_, II.
[65] _Against Celsus_, I, 23.
[66] _Plea for the Christians_, XV, XVI.
[67] I, 5 and 6.
[68] _Exhortation to the Heathen_, X.
[69] _Divine Institutes_, III, 20.
[70] Chap. II.
[71] _Treatise on the Anger of God_, X.
[72] E.g., Stirling: _Philosophy and Theology_, p. 179.
[73] _Trypho_, III, IV.
[74] _Stromata_, V, 14.
[75] _The Soul's Testimony_, I.
[76] _Of the Resurrection of the Flesh_, III.
[77] _Octavius_, XVIII.
[78] _Against Celsus_, II, 40.
[79] _De Trinitate_, VIII.
[80] _Divine Institutes_, I, 2.
[81] E.g., Irenaeus: _Against Heresy_, II, 9, 1; Tertullian: _Against
Marcion_, I, 10; Origen: _De Principiis_, I, 3, 1; Tertullian:
_Apology_, XVII; Lactantius: _Divine Institutes_, I, 2.
[82] E.g., Minucius Felix: _Octavius_, XVII, XVIII; Novatian: _De
Trinitate_ VIII; Dionysius the Great: _Fragments_, II, 1.
[83] E.g., "Justin, in Philosopher's garb, preached the word of God."
Eusebius, IV, 11.
[84] The mere list of Greek authors _quoted_ by St. Clement of
Alexandria occupies over fourteen quarto pages in Fabricius'
_Bibliotheka Graeca_.
[85] _Divine Institutes_, V. 4.
[86] _Acts_, XVII, 23.
[87] _Stromata_, I, 13.
[88] E.g., _Stromata_, VI, 5: "The one and only God was known by the
Greeks in a Gentile way, by the Jews Judaically, and in a new and
spiritual way by us." In I, 5, he says: "For this (philosophy) was a
schoolmaster to bring "the Hellenic mind," as the law the Hebrews, to
Christ."
[89] _Stromata_, V, 14.
[90] _Ibid._, VI, 5. See also, e.g., I, 19; V, 13.
[91] See Stirling: _Philosophy and Theology_, p. 35.