“The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General
personally, and the material failure of the general German
administration in the most various fields of decisive importance
has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the
native population, but has also brought about the result that
the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly
disunited throughout their history, have come together in a
united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In
a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which
alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the
Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in
the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run.
The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general
administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the
Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which
made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich
Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and
the Police) to take over these tasks.”
Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly
mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer of 19 June 1943.
The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the
Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very
points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely
criticized.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page
20?
DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have
already finished the report which begins on Page 20.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20?
DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which
begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.
DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum
which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted
under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the
Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and
11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only
those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the
Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to
the Führer.
I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page
27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote
under Section 2:
“The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for
participation in the cultural field has led, even among the
lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent.
The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for
self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of
cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from
the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently
comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the
restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German
authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the
Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural
activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet
citizens...
“3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools
is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without
doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The
realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the
necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests.
As the war goes on the German interest increases in the
mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields
of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the
crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of
cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body,
led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was
not possible during the course of Polish national history, what
even the first years of German dominion could not bring about,
namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to
hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a
reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures.
German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the
individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in
the face of the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German
leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural
concessions and should be able to play one class off against the
other.
“4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even
though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of
circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist
agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes.
The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve
to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage.
Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued
effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of
Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however
meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a
rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to
work and increased production in the German interest.
“5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning
of the war the Polish element was removed from all important
positions. The available German staff had always been inadequate
in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a
considerable number of German personnel have had to be
transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces.
Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be
obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of
the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all
necessary precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to
collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the
present amount of personnel—not to speak of future
transfers—cannot continue to function. The increased
participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale
itself.
“Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a
number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles
should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the
duration of the fighting in Europe.
“1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation
and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and
irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is
the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure
of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably
embittered those affected by it, who naturally represent that
strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But,
because of their numerically small strength and their complete
isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not
count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the
population which consists mainly of small farmers. The
evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt
necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an
unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers.
At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial
limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part
of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary
hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin
district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the
Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling
racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have
already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried
out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among
the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those
able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and
children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened
in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in
considerable loss of life, especially among members of the last
mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete
expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the
farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that
these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of
the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general
impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that
of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a
welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own
peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government
General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long
time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the
population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in
territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably
increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a
tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These
desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset
agricultural and industrial production according to a definite
plan.
“2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become
obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an
absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the
fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against
seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for
communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children,
and old men in public, which took place again and again without
the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be
prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to
the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of
collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons
and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically
indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot
possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and
executions should be carried out only after a trial based at
least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied
by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is
carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner,
it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a
punitive measure which the population considers purely
arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that
these German measures are only the prelude to future events.
Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed
primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced
or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of
strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to
strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them
from the insecurity which burdens them.”