THE SOMME
_August 1916_
Domléger proved to be a real haven of rest. Training was carried on
without interruption, and life was made to resemble peace time so far as
it was possible. Courses of all kinds were arranged by the higher
authorities, in particular for the training of junior officers as
company commanders and for N.C.O.’s. The maintenance and further
improvement of discipline was always the first consideration, as this
could do so much to counterbalance the unavoidable discomforts to which
all ranks were so often subjected.
Every effort was made to prevent the troops becoming tired or stale
under training. Physical rest was a necessity, and it was only by
adequate periods of relaxation in rest billets that the troops could
recover from the heavy moral strain and nerve themselves for the next
effort. We were now reinforced by a draft of ninety-seven men, mostly
drawn from the Hunts Cyclist Battalion. These were the first “strangers”
sent to us, but they proved to be an excellent lot, and many afterwards
became N.C.O.’s.
Our stay in these comfortable billets was all too short for the amount
of work to be done, for on August 9 the Battalion started marching back
to the line by the way it had come, and on the 11th we were once more in
the neighbourhood of our old friend Bouzincourt, which did not appear to
have become any more attractive in our absence. The Battalion from whom
we took over informed us that the Boche had lately taken to shelling the
camp, and had burnt out one of the huts on the previous evening by
registering a direct hit on it. No sooner had that Battalion left us
than a covey of seven or eight shells came over and landed in or around
the camp, demolishing yet another hut. This appeared to be no spot for a
so-called rest, and we were not long in finding more healthy
surroundings.
At 6 a.m. on August 13, the Battalion moved forward through Albert, and
took over a line of gunpits a little to the west of Usna Redoubt. Here
we were in reserve to the remainder of the Brigade, who were holding a
line immediately west of Pozières and on the extreme crest of the ridge.
The front trench was known as Sixth Avenue or Skyline Trench (Map No.
1). The Australians were on the right, round Pozières Windmill.
A heavy attack delivered by the enemy during the early part of the night
of August 13/14, drove the 1/4th Oxfords out of Skyline Trench. At 3
a.m. on the 14th C and D Companies were hurriedly sent up to the old
German front line at Ovillers, and were placed under the orders of O.C.
1/4th Royal Berks, to be in reserve while two companies of that regiment
were engaged in making a counter-attack on Skyline. The forming up for
this attack was observed by the enemy, and the assault proved a very
costly failure.
The Bucks Battalion was then ordered to retake this trench, and in the
afternoon of August 14 moved up and relieved the 1/4th Oxfords in the
positions they were then holding, namely Fifth Avenue.
The expression “moved up and relieved” does not give quite the picture
of what actually occurred, for in reality it was one of the most
uncomfortable proceedings ever taken part in. The ground all round was
going up like a bank of earth due to the enemy’s 5·9’s, and progress was
distinctly difficult. There certainly were casualties, but not one
quarter the number that one would have expected.
The position to be attacked consisted of a trench about 800 yards long,
approached from Fifth Avenue by two badly damaged communicators, E and
F, each about 250 yards long. It was decided to carry out a bombing
attack up these communicators, for which C Company (Captain P. A. Hall)
was detailed. Shortly after 10 p.m. bombing sections from this company
worked their way up the right-hand communicator and succeeded in gaining
Skyline Trench. They then worked outwards. A Company established a =⟙=
head at the top of the left communicator.
The operation was completely successful, and only slight opposition was
met with, the enemy running away down the north slope of the hill after
throwing a few bombs. Contact was regained with the Australians on the
right, and the whole of Skyline Trench, with the exception of about 100
yards, was in our hands by 5 a.m. the next day (August 15).
About 8 a.m. A Company (Captain N. S. Reid, D.S.O., M.C.) were sent back
for a few hours’ rest to the west entrance to Ovillers, and C and D
(Lieutenant F. D. Earle) Companies took over the line, B Company
(Captain G. R. Crouch) being in immediate support to them.
This was the situation on the morning of August 15. At 11.30 the enemy
opened heavy shell fire on the right of Fifth Avenue. At mid-day he
started on Skyline Trench with an intense enfilade bombardment carried
out mostly with heavy guns up to 12-inch, though a fair number of
trench-mortars and several _Minenwerfers_ which fired from Mouquet Farm
also took part. It seemed as if all the power of destruction in Germany
had suddenly got to work on this trench, and that the enemy were
determined that, since they were not able to hold it themselves, no
other men should either. Every size of shell was flung with unerring
accuracy, so that one great volume of smoke rose from the ridge and
covered the trench in a dense black pall. This terrific bombardment
continued for nine consecutive hours, systematically destroying
everything.
By 3 p.m. the Battalion was only holding the tops of the two
communicators and a few posts in between, and casualties from the two
companies had been very heavy. That men lived at all in such a place of
death, when shells were bursting above them, under them and round them,
was nothing less than a miracle. There were but few unwounded, and when
at 8 p.m. it became necessary to send up B Company to relieve the
remnants of C and D, the survivors were found to be dead-beat, both
physically and mentally.
But no attack ensued, and at 9 p.m. the situation became quieter. It was
then decided, in order to reduce casualties, that the remains of the
ploughed-up trench should be evacuated, and that posts should be pushed
out in shell-holes in front of it.
By night the whole Battalion was tired out, but a still further effort
was required of it in order to complete the work of the previous
morning. At midnight of August 15/16, in conjunction with the 5th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, a bombing attack was delivered by A
Company against that portion of Skyline Trench on the extreme left which
was still in enemy hands. The attack was pressed with great
determination, and casualties were heavy, but success could not be
attained owing to the exhaustion of the supply of bombs, which could not
be kept up by the efforts of the worn-out remnants of C and D Companies.
The shelling in Skyline Trench and Fifth Avenue was undoubtedly the
heaviest and most prolonged that the Battalion had ever undergone, and
the endurance of all ranks throughout was of the very finest. Our
casualties were:
_Officers._—Wounded. Capt. V. C. Heathcote-Hacker.
Lieut. F. D. Earle.
2/Lieut. F. C. Dixon.
2/Lieut. D. Fallon.
_Other ranks._—Killed—8 (including 1 sergt.).
Wounded—165 (including 8 sergts.).
Missing—20.
It is certain that all the missing were killed, and so killed that no
trace could be found of them. The casualties included many of our best
N.C.O.’s, among whom may be mentioned Sergts. H. Watts, C. Fowler, A. J.
Hart and W. G. Cartwright. The greater part of the losses were borne by
C and D Companies, especially the former, who were now a mere handful of
men.
At 11 a.m. on the 16th, the exhausted Battalion was relieved by the 4th
Oxfords, and moved back to a new camp of bivouacs, trenches and smells
between Bouzincourt and Albert. On our way out of the front trenches we
passed the Divisional General, who, as usual, was one of the first on
the spot after a show, and had a cheery word for everyone.
The forty-eight hours allowed us in this camp was no great rest, as
there was so much to be done to prepare ourselves for action again. A
lot of equipment had been lost during the bombardment of Skyline, much
of it having been blown to pieces. The exact deficiencies of each
article had to be ascertained, and returns which would satisfy the
Quartermaster, the Staff Captain and D.A.D.O.S., made out. In addition
there were fresh drafts to be inspected and posted, and a thousand
inquiries to be made as to when all the missing had last been seen and
what had been their probable fate. This, if it did not make everyone
busy, supplied the Adjutant and company commanders with more than
sufficient work.
At the end of forty-eight hours, we received sudden orders to move at
once to the neighbourhood of Usna Redoubt. This we did, bivouacking for
the night in the open, without blankets. The 143rd Infantry Brigade were
attacking at dawn on August 19, and we had been sent up to be in support
and to be ready to exploit any success.
The attack was a complete success, and when the Divisional General, who
passed us on the roadside as he was going up to an O.P. at Ovillers,
instructed us to “get all the rest you can,” qualifying it by “You’ll
want your arms and your legs to-night,” we made sure we were in for more
trouble. This, however, did not mature, and by the evening of the 20th
we were back in Bouzincourt again for another forty-eight hours, before
being once more sent up to Ovillers Post to support the 144th Infantry
Brigade.
A day later we ourselves received orders for an attack to be made by the
Battalion the following afternoon on the enemy’s forward positions
between Pozières and Thiepval. The attack was to include the capture of
a trench shown as X—Y on Map No. 1, and was to be carried out in
conjunction with the 7th Infantry Brigade, 25th Division, who were to
assault other trenches on our left.
Accordingly the Battalion took over the line from the 6th Battalion
Gloucestershire Regiment. A and C Companies were detailed for the
attack, zero being fixed for 3.5 p.m., August 23. A bombardment was
carried out by the Heavy Artillery from 1 p.m. to 2.45 p.m., which not
only had no effect on the enemy trenches, but served merely to define
the precise limits of the objective. At 3 p.m. an intense bombardment
was put down for five minutes by the field guns, under cover of which
the attack was launched. The barrage was good but a trifle short, as
when it lifted the attacking troops had still some way to go, and the
enemy was manning his trench thickly, apparently very little affected by
it and firing hard on our men. In addition the enemy barrage came down
immediately after our own. The result was that casualties were heavy and
progress almost impossible. 2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates, who was commanding
C Company, ran forward to try to rush the position, but was instantly
killed. C.S.M. F. Smith endeavoured immediately afterwards to do the
same thing, but was severely wounded. The only other officer in this
company was also wounded.
On the left, A Company’s fate was much the same, 2/Lieut. W. R. Heath
being killed and Lieut. M. Bowen wounded. A few N.C.O.’s and men of C
Company reached their objective on the extreme right, but all were at
once either killed or wounded, Sergt. S. G. Bishop alone getting back.
The remnants of the two companies had to lie out in No Man’s Land until
dark, during which time more became casualties through shell fire and
sniping.
Very great gallantry was displayed by the officers and N.C.O.’s, but the
losses in both companies were irreparable, coming on the heels of
previous fighting, and in 2/Lieutenants Bates and Heath the Battalion
lost two very able and gallant officers. No real gain resulted except
that we captured almost the whole of a diagonal trench running from our
centre to the enemy’s right, and on the left advanced our bomb-stop some
50 yards.
Out of a total of four officers and 150 other ranks who actually went
over the top, our casualties were:
_Officers._—Killed. 2/Lieut. E. G. H. Bates.
2/Lieut. W. R. Heath.
Wounded. Lieut. M. Bowen.
2/Lieut. H. M. Breton.
_Other ranks._—Killed—24.
Wounded—71.
Missing—13 (all subsequently presumed killed).
The Battalion spent three more nights in these trenches before being
relieved by the 5th Gloucesters on August 25. During this time every
effort was made to improve our position, and to gain certain points by
means of bombing attacks.
Some sort of revenge for the failure of the attack on the 23rd fell to
the Battalion early one morning, when an enemy relief was spotted coming
over the open and heavy casualties were inflicted on them with Lewis-gun
fire.
Constant patrols, too, were sent out at night and gathered much useful
information concerning the enemy’s dispositions, and a German prisoner,
belonging to the 28th I.R., confirmed much of this, and added more. This
information was handed over to the 5th Gloucesters, and assisted them in
making a most successful attack on the position on the 27th.
On the 28th the whole Division was relieved, and started moving back to
Bus-les-Artois via Hédauville, Forceville and Bertrancourt.
Throughout this month’s fighting on the Somme, the Battalion had been
greatly handicapped by a shortage of thoroughly trained men, more
especially in bombing and Lewis-gun work. Bombing had proved itself to
be all important in this kind of fighting, and it was really necessary
that every man, as far as possible, should be a trained bomber: merely
to have been taught to throw a Mills bomb was not sufficient. In
clearing Skyline Trench, eight bombing sections were absorbed in a few
hours through casualties and the manning of bomb-stops.
It was found essential to collect a very plentiful supply of bombs and
rifle grenades at several advanced dumps before bombing operations were
undertaken, for they were used up at an incredible rate. The
replenishing of these forward dumps was often a great difficulty, unless
a permanent party had been detailed for the purpose, as troops in
support, if they had been relieved recently from the front line, were
often far too exhausted to be detailed for carrying, which is one of the
most fatiguing duties a soldier has to perform.
It must be said, however, that although great importance was rightly
attached to bombing, it was found later that the men had come to rely
overmuch on this form of weapon, and were apt to forget that the rifle
is, and always will be, their main weapon of defence.
It would not be right to fail to add here some word of praise for our
gunners. Their shooting had by this time won the entire trust and
confidence of the Infantry. As for our own divisional gunners, they were
the best, and there was not a man in the ranks of the Battalion whose
_moral_ was not the better, when going forward to an attack, for the
knowledge that it was the 48th Divisional gunners who were supporting
him.