THE
FIRST BUCKINGHAMSHIRE
BATTALION
1914–1919
[Illustration:
LT.-COL. L. L. C. REYNOLDS, D.S.O., T.D.
[Frontispiece
]
The First Buckinghamshire Battalion
1914–1919
BY
CAPTAIN P. L. WRIGHT, D.S.O., M.C.
With a Foreword
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT FANSHAWE
K.G.B., D.S.O.
HAZELL, WATSON & VINEY, LD.
LONDON AND AYLESBURY, BUCKS
_Copyright
First published 1920_
_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._
FOREWORD
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ROBERT FANSHAWE
K.C.B., D.S.O.
The 1st Bucks Battalion of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry was trained and modelled on the traditions of the Light
Division of Peninsular fame, and served through the War in the 145th
Brigade of the 48th South Midland Division. The Battalion went out to
the War with that great fighting asset—a strong _esprit de corps_. This
they maintained; and whether it was training, “holding the line,”
marching, or the attack, I, as their Divisional Commander, felt
confident that their task would be thoroughly done, and carried through
with the determination, endurance, dash, and with that proper use of
initiative for which the Light Division officers and men were noted a
hundred years ago. The officers, N.C.O.s, and men could be relied on to
act as the occasion required, in carrying out what they knew to be the
general plan.
In no case was this confidence misplaced, whether the affair was that of
a patrol or post, or for the whole Battalion.
Amongst the officers were many fine leaders of men, none more so than
Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds, who led the Battalion through most of the
War. He was backed by many officers imbued with the same spirit and
energy.
Amongst the N.C.O.s and men were always many ready ably to second this
good leadership, and determined to make the Battalion a name of which
their whole county might be proud.
The engagements during my command of the Division which to my mind stand
prominently out were first on July 23, 1916, during the Battle of the
Somme, when the 48th Division were carrying out an attack to break the
German line of defence which linked Pozières to Thiepval, in order to
assist in the capture of the former place, and pave the way towards the
capture of the latter. The Battalion was in brigade reserve when the
battle started. The Brigade Commander had been warned that, if his
initial attack did not succeed everywhere, a fresh attack would be made
to secure our objective. I well remember my conversation on the
telephone during the attack, and being assured that the Battalion would
be ready by the time the Artillery said they would be.
The right of the Brigade attack succeeded, but that on the left was
checked, and to the Bucks Battalion was given the task, at short notice,
of capturing the point, without which the gains on the right of the
Brigade could not have been held for long. The success of the attack is
well told in these pages. The difficulty of the Battalion’s task is only
to be appreciated by those who, in the long war, have seen how seldom a
fresh attack of this sort could be organised and carried out
successfully by the immediate use of troops in reserve. The attack cost
the Battalion a heavy price—Captain E. V. Birchall, the brilliant
company commander who led his company in the attack, being mortally
wounded.
The second occasion was the capture of Tombois Farm on the night of
April 16–17, 1917. The task of the Division was to keep such continual
pressure on the enemy opposite, that he should feel that that part of
the Hindenburg Line in our front was really being worked up to. The
advanced posts of Epéhy—Lempire—Ronssoy in front of his outpost line had
been captured, and a footing gained in his outpost line, which was
covered by a belt of wire, south of Tombois Farm. The object of the
attack on this night was to gain this line of wire and the fortified
outposts along it on the rest of our Division front, which was on a very
wide one. The operation is accurately described. It was a case where
good arrangement, determination to win, and the initiative of those on
the spot led to success in spite of all obstacles.
It was said that on this occasion the Army Commander called up the Corps
Commander on the telephone, and asked whether the operation would be
carried out in such weather. The Corps Commander’s reply showed his
confidence in, and knowledge of, the troops employed, when he replied in
the affirmative without even asking the Division.
The third occasion was on August 16, 1917, at St. Julien, during the
Third Battle of Ypres, when the Battalion and certain battalions of the
145th Brigade completed the capture of St. Julien, and only
circumstances over which the Battalion had no control prevented their
success being still more complete.
The last occasion was on June 15, 1918, when the Austrians made their
great attempt to break our line along the Asiago Plateau. Although, as
the history relates, the Battalion was only holding the rear line on
that day, yet by its action it enabled the troops fighting in front of
this line to carry out their difficult task, showing what confidence
they felt in the Bucks Battalion. The initiative with which the
Battalion, finding that the right of the 1/4th Oxford & Bucks Battalion
was exposed by the line being left unoccupied beyond our own posts,
pushed out to close this gap, was of especial value to their side.
During the first few days of November, the same year, the Battalion
showed how it could play its part in that last phase of victory, when,
after the long and arduous struggle, the enemy finally broke, and the
fruits of victory had to be gathered by a vigorous pursuit. Truly has
the Battalion played a great and glorious part in this great War.
R. FANSHAWE,
_Major-General_.
_July 1, 1920._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
FROM MOBILISATION TO PLOEGSTEERT 1
CHAPTER II
HÉBUTERNE 13
CHAPTER III
THE SOMME 24
CHAPTER IV
THE SOMME 36
CHAPTER V
LE SARS—CAPPY 45
CHAPTER VI
THE GERMAN RETIREMENT 54
CHAPTER VII
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 69
CHAPTER VIII
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES—VIMY 83
CHAPTER IX
ITALY 91
CHAPTER X
THE AUSTRIAN ATTACK OF JUNE 15 103
CHAPTER XI
RAIDS 115
CHAPTER XII
THE AUSTRIAN DÉBÂCLE 123
CHAPTER XIII
AFTER THE ARMISTICE—THE END 138
APPENDIX I
OPERATION ORDERS 144
APPENDIX II
ROLLS OF OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE MAIN ACTIONS OF
1916–1917–1918 163
APPENDIX III
HONOURS AND DECORATIONS GAINED BY OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BUCKS
BATTALION 172
APPENDIX IV
HONOURS AND DECORATIONS GAINED BY WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S, AND
MEN OF THE FIRST BUCKS BATTALION WHILE SERVING WITH THE
BATTALION 176
APPENDIX V
ROLL OF OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION DURING
THE PERIOD MARCH 1915–DECEMBER 1918 179
APPENDIX VI
NOMINAL ROLL OF WARRANT OFFICERS, N.C.O.’S AND MEN WHO SERVED WITH
THE BATTALION DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 1915–DECEMBER 1918 197
APPENDIX VII
TRANSLATION OF THE ITALIAN DIPLOMA 215
ILLUSTRATIONS
LT.-COL. L. L. C. REYNOLDS, D.S.O., T.D. _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
BATTALION OFFICERS, CHELMSFORD, MARCH 1915 4
A TYPICAL FLANDERS ROAD 8
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, PLOEGSTEERT 8
COY. H.Q. IN THE “KEEP” AT HÉBUTERNE 16
HÉBUTERNE CHURCH, 1915 16
OUR TRENCHES IN FOREGROUND. GOMMECOURT WOOD IN
BACKGROUND, WITH Z HEDGE IN FRONT OF IT 18
REST BILLETS, COUIN 18
LT.-COL. F. O. WETHERED, C.M.G., V.D.; LT.-COL. C. P.
DOIG, D.S.O.; LT.-COL. L. C. HAWKINS, T.D. 20
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, HÉBUTERNE 22
FRONT LINE COY. H.Q., LE SARS 48
REPRODUCTION OF A FRENCH POSTCARD OF PÉRONNE AFTER
GERMAN EVACUATION IN MARCH 1917. (WITH CRUDE
TRANSLATION) 54
PÉRONNE CHURCH 58
RONSSOY SUGAR FACTORY 58
CHEDDAR VILLA, ST. JULIEN 72
THE STEENBEEK 76
THE BATTLE-FIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN, YPRES 76
RESERVE BATTALION H.Q., KABERLABA N. 120
THE C.-IN-C. PRESENTING MEDALS TO THE BATTALION AT
GRANEZZA, AUGUST 1918 120
THE LAST QUARTER GUARD, ITALY, 1919 140
THE CADRE, 1919 142
ITALIAN MEMORIAL CERTIFICATE 216
MAPS AND PANORAMA
MAP No. 1. SOMME OPERATIONS, JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1916 28
„ No. 2. ATTACK ON TOMBOIS FARM, NIGHT 16/17, APRIL,
1917 60
„ No. 3. THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, JULY TO OCTOBER, 1917 80
„ No. 4. ITALIAN OPERATIONS _In pocket of
cover_
„ No. 5. AREA RAIDED ON NIGHT 26/27 AUGUST, 1918 116
PANORAMA FROM MT. TORLE 128
IMPORTANT NOTE
On the eve of publication, and too late for mention in the text, the
officer commanding the 1st Bucks Battalion has received a letter from
the War Office enclosing a translation of an Italian diploma and a
facsimile in bronze of a gold medal presented to H.M. the King of Italy.
Copies of the letter and diploma will be found printed in Appendix VII
to this Record, and will be read with pride.
It will be seen that, out of all the Infantry Battalions engaged on the
Italian Front, the 1st Bucks Battalion, the 1st Battalion Royal Welsh
Fusiliers, and the H.A.C. are the three selected recipients of this high
honour.
THE
FIRST BUCKINGHAMSHIRE
BATTALION
1914–1919
CHAPTER I
FROM MOBILISATION TO PLOEGSTEERT
_August 1914 to June 1915_
It seemed almost incredible news, too good to be true, when on March 28,
1915, we received orders to proceed overseas. The 48th Division, of
which we were part, had been mobilised on August 4, 1914, immediately on
the outbreak of war. From that day our thoughts and hearts had been at
the Front—and how we longed to follow them; if war news sometimes seemed
bad it only made us the keener to be given our chance, more confident
that we should help to turn the tide. Since then eight months had all
but gone, long months of waiting, full of hopes and expectations so
often to be disappointed, but now to be realised.
The Division was commanded by Major-General H. N. C. Heath, C.B., and
consisted, as regards Infantry, of three Brigades—the Warwick, the
Gloucester and Worcester, and the South Midland, which later became
known as the 143rd, 144th, and 145th Infantry Brigades respectively. The
145th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General W. K. McLintock,
consisted of four battalions: the 1/5th Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment, the 1/4th Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry, our own 1/1st Buckinghamshire Battalion, and the 1/4th
Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment.
Our Battalion was at first commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel F. O.
Wethered, T.D., but this officer was taken ill in January 1915, and
shortly afterwards the command was taken over by Lieutenant-Colonel C.
P. Doig, Seaforth Highlanders.
Before mobilisation, the Bucks Battalion had not adopted the
four-company system, but on outbreak of war this was at once organised.
The following table shows how it was effected, and from what districts
each company drew its recruits:
A Company Marlow │A Company.
│ Captain L. L. C. Reynolds.
B „ High Wycombe│ „
— ——————— ————————————│————————————————————————————
C „ Buckingham │B Company.
│ Captain L. W. Crouch.
D „ Aylesbury │ „
— ——————— ————————————│————————————————————————————
E „ Slough │C Company.
│ Captain G. E. W. Bowyer.
F „ Wolverton │ „
— ——————— ————————————│————————————————————————————
G „ Wolverton │D Company.
│ Captain E. V. Birchall.
H „ High Wycombe│ „
The order to mobilise was received at Battalion Headquarters at
Aylesbury at 6.30 p.m. on August 4, 1914. With the exception of the
Wolverton Company, whose train was put into a siding owing to some
misunderstanding, the whole Battalion was concentrated at Aylesbury
before midnight on the 4th/5th. On the evening of the 5th we entrained
for Cosham, the Battalion’s war station, where transport was drawn, and
three days were spent in digging trenches on the hills overlooking
Portsmouth harbour.
Entraining again on August 9, the Battalion journeyed to Swindon, where
a week’s hard training was carried out, and after this a succession of
moves, partly by rail, but mostly on foot, carried us via Dunstable,
Hitchin, Ware, Harlow and Great Dunmow to Chelmsford, where we arrived
on August 25. Here, with the exception of a most bitterly cold fortnight
in November spent under canvas at Great Totham, where the Battalion was
employed digging defences of the East coast, we remained for seven
months, training vigorously and praying for our early dispatch to
France.
After so long a sojourn in Chelmsford we had become part and parcel of
the town, and even rumour, who for four months had been sending us out
“in two days’ time,” had given us up as hopeless. Some had even started
wondering whether, after all, the war could not be won without the Bucks
Battalion winning it.
However, here at last was the order we had longed for, and this time
there seemed to be no mistake about it.
Officers, who had spent six months buying useless things for their kit,
now bought more feverishly and imprudently than ever. The men took it
all very quietly, on the principle, no doubt, that “an order is an
order, but it’s got to be cancelled at least twice before being carried
out.” For once they were wrong, and on the afternoon of March 30, 1915,
the Battalion paraded for the last time on the Chelmsford parade-ground
and marched to the station.
Chelmsford turned out _en masse_ and gave us a first-rate send-off. Not
a few had become fond of us and we of them, but we were too cheerful and
thankful to be off to allow our farewells to damp our spirits. At 5.30
p.m. the train steamed out of Chelmsford Station and we were on our way
to the war. The detrainment and embarkation at Folkestone were carried
out without difficulty, and at 11 p.m. we were at Boulogne.
The few _Boulonnais_ who were about did not appear to rate our arrival
nearly so highly as we did ourselves. In fact, to be honest, they were
not interested. They had seen thousands of British troops already, and
confidently counted on seeing millions more.
Eventually, we got formed up and on the move, being told that there was
a march of four or five miles ahead of us. After following a very
winding road for some two hours, we scaled a young mountain and found
ourselves at Ostrehove camp. Why the wind invariably blows icy blasts,
from all directions, on to this peculiarly unattractive spot, is not
known, but apparently it always does. However, the majority of the tents
remained standing throughout the night, though few of us got much sleep,
on account of the cold. Anxiety to see France in daylight turned us all
out of our tents early, and breakfast brought with it rumours of moving
which proved to be correct.
At 3.30 p.m. on March 31, 1915, the Battalion paraded and marched down
another tortuous road to Pont de Briques, where it entrained. We had not
thought much about the composition of a French troop-train, but our
first sight of one was, to say the least, a disappointment. It consisted
of some twenty cattle-trucks, each marked to hold between forty and
fifty men. This particular train, being a novelty, did not have such
scathing remarks passed on it as those which later had the honour of
carrying us, but even this one was not spoken of nicely. When, finally,
the guard blew his penny horn, and “puffing Billy” (as the engine was
immediately dubbed) got busy, laughter knew no bounds, and French
railways were put down as a bad show.
After some five hours of this very crowded travelling, we arrived at
Cassel, and detrained at 11 p.m. A three-hour march brought us to
Terdeghem, where our billets lay. Accommodation being very scanty, many
of us spent the warm night in the open. The wind changed during that
night, with the result that we heard the guns for the first time in the
morning. We had arrived in the neighbourhood of the war.
[Illustration:
BATTALION OFFICERS, CHELMSFORD, MARCH 1915.
]
We were expecting to move hourly closer up to the line, but for three
nights we remained at Terdeghem, the only event of importance being an
inspection on April 2 of the Brigade at Steenvoorde by General Sir H.
Smith-Dorrien, who was at that time commanding the 2nd Army. We then
moved to billets on the Oultersteene-Bailleul Road (S.E. of Méteren),
where two more nights were spent, and on April 7 the Battalion marched
via Bailleul and Armentières to Le Bizet, for trench attachment to the
4th Division. These two marches, although only some twenty-five miles,
were formidable ones. Feet, in spite of the number of route marches
carried out at home, started to blister on these cobbled roads. Heat,
dust, and the monotony of the Flanders country, increased the
discomfort. Billeting parties, sent on in advance on bicycles, had not
yet learnt that it was no kindness to meet the Battalion five miles from
billets and assure them that twenty minutes would see them in.
On April 8, all companies were attached to different units of the 4th
Division (2nd Monmouthshire Regiment, 2nd Battalion Lancashire
Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Essex Regiment), for instruction in the method
of holding trenches. It is doubtful whether our brains ever worked again
so feverishly and incontinently as they did on that first march up to
trenches. The march was carried out in pitch darkness, along a road
which ran up to and through the British front line. Guides met us five
or six hundred yards behind the line, and escorted us as far as the
trenches. These guides, treating us like the ignorant children that we
were, kept the pace as slow as possible, knowing quite truly that we
liked that the least. Several of them, not content with this, insisted
on telling one how the Boche was in the habit of raking that road with
machine-gun fire at that hour precisely, and how two men had met their
end there the previous evening. We arrived therefore with nerves highly
strung.
The number of questions put to our hosts during that night must have
seemed to them phenomenal. How far away was Fritz? Did he do much
shooting? Was he likely to attack? Had there been many casualties? And a
thousand more such questions, all of which were asked for curiosity and
with the object of acquiring knowledge, but could well be taken to mean
we were frightened out of our lives.
Dawn enlightened us considerably and interested us no less, and by
nightfall we thought ourselves veterans at the game. There was, in fact,
a tendency to treat the Boche with much less respect than he was
entitled to, under the circumstances. Sniping was active, and the
Germans were no mean shots at the 50 to 150 yards which separated their
trenches from ours.
On the morning of the second day, April 9, the 4th Division exploded a
mine under the enemy trenches. This very naturally nettled the Boche
considerably, and he retaliated by shelling our line. One shell entered
and burst inside the remains of an old house, containing our A Company
headquarters. By a miracle everyone escaped unhurt, though many of their
possessions were never seen again.
Our attachment for instruction lasted four days, two of which were spent
in the front line, and two in support.
On April 12, the Battalion marched to billets at Steenwerck, some eight
miles distant. Here, although all companies were again very scattered in
farms, the inhabitants were most tolerant to us. Provided their manure
was left alone, and their pigs allowed to move about as they wished, no
objection would be raised to us. The importance in life of owning large
quantities of manure speedily became evident. One might almost say that
a man’s riches were gauged by the size and aroma of the heap he
possessed.
On the 14th the Commanding Officer, Adjutant and company commanders
received orders to reconnoitre the line with a view to the Battalion
relieving the 1st Battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry, who were in
support in Ploegsteert Wood.
As one tour in the line was so like another, it is proposed to give a
general outline of our life during the next two months, which were spent
at Ploegsteert or in billets at Romarin.
The weather, during the first few days we passed in reserve in the wood,
was gorgeous, and one felt grateful to those who had been responsible
for choosing this spot for us to carry on our war. Our quarters were
certainly not luxurious, consisting chiefly of what cover could be made
with a waterproof sheet. But with the whole wood at our disposal,
comfort of a kind was quite obtainable, provided one made the effort.
Some Canadians who had been there before us had indeed started building
operations, and erected a magnificent log hut, known as Plugstreet Hall.
C Company were fortunate enough to secure this as their company
headquarters at first, to the complete astonishment of D Company, who
had no notion that such a palpable error could be made.
To enhance our enjoyment of those first few days in the wood, we were
troubled with very few shells, but few of us will forget the distant
thunder, which reached our ears coming from the direction of Hill 60, on
the evening of the second or third day we were there. It was the first
real, continuous roar of bombardment we had heard, and it impressed us
mightily, suggesting to our minds that we were living in a fool’s
paradise.
The trees had been damaged very little, and the fresh green foliage and
undisturbed bird life made it most difficult to believe in the existence
of a war, and that at no great distance. Paths had been cleared in all
useful directions through the wood, and duck-board tracks laid down to
prevent the paths becoming mud channels in wet weather. The majority of
these tracks were known by London names, such as The Strand, Rotten Row,
Hyde Park Corner, but here and there names like “Dead Horse Corner”
appeared. All the houses behind our lines had names, those which
received the most attention from the German gunners being the best
known: Hull’s Burnt Farm, Three Huns, St. Yves Post Office, are names
which conjure up innumerable memories.
The trenches most frequently held by the Battalion in this area were
situated in front of the village of St. Yves, the line being held with
three companies in the firing line and one in support. The 1/5th
Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment relieved us every four days, when we
were in the habit of moving either into the wood or back to billets at
Romarin.
The trenches consisted of sand-bagged walls, a duck-board bottom, a host
of large flies and an enormous smell. The flies were kindly quiescent at
night, but the smell—never; presumably because it had so many sources to
draw upon that the wind could never really help us.
[Illustration:
A TYPICAL FLANDERS ROAD.
]
[Illustration:
THE 1ST BUCKS BATTALION CEMETERY, PLOEGSTEERT.
]
Our fire trench ran about 200 yards from the German front line, though
in places the two trenches approached to within 100 yards of each other.
To show one’s head over the top of the parapet was therefore risky, in
view of the enemy snipers, who were really first-rate shots and always
on the look-out for a target. Desultory rifle fire was kept up by both
sides throughout the twenty-four hours, always increasing in volume at
“stand to,” each morning and evening, and generally reaching the most
absurd pitch about one hour after darkness. The lunacy of expending
thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition per diem, in this way, had
yet to be fully realised.
Shells were not nearly so plentiful on either side. Certainly the Boche
fired considerably more than did our gunners, who—poor souls—had next to
none to fire. The main targets for German gunners were:
(1) Any new sandbagging in the front line;
(2) St. Yves Post Office and Hull’s Burnt Farm;
(3) Battalion Headquarters.
His dislike for the last-named was often intense. On one memorable
afternoon he put 67 six-inch high-explosive and incendiary shells within
a 70-yards radius of their domain. This shoot was watched by our front
line with enormous interest, bordering with a callous few on
satisfaction.
Rifle grenades were used extensively by the enemy, and as far as
possible by us. But the German grenades had a far greater range than our
own, which could only be employed where trenches were within 170 yards
of each other. One German grenade, fired into the rear of A Company’s
trench, wounded two company commanders, another officer, a company
sergeant-major, and five other ranks.
On occasions when anything in the nature of an attack was taking place
on some other part of the front, we received orders to make a
demonstration. Some idea of what these demonstrations consisted of
should be given here, not only to suggest their utter futility, but to
show the gradual way in which we learnt to play the game of
frightfulness. The demonstration would be carried out by all units who
happened to be holding the Divisional front.
9 a.m.—Long-range rifle fire directed on roads in rear of enemy
trenches.
11 a.m.—Artillery bombard a certain section or sections of enemy
trench with the object of breaching their parapet. (Nothing was ever
to be seen taking place at the spot indicated, but on more than one
occasion shells did reach the war zone, and went dangerously near
breaching _our_ parapet.)
11.5 a.m.—Whole of front-line garrison open five minutes’ rapid fire
on German front line.
1.45 p.m.—A few rifle grenades fired by companies within range of
enemy.
4.15 p.m.—A trench mortar fired; three rifle grenades fired at same
time from either side of it.
6.15 p.m.—Long-range rifle fire directed on roads in rear.
The enemy seldom paid the smallest attention to these demonstrations,
except possibly by spending five minutes in flooding our trench with
rifle grenades.
Soon after one of our demonstrations, however, the Boche pulled our leg
quite successfully. He had been very quiet during one afternoon, and
also during “stand to” in the evening. About an hour after “stand down”
every German in that part of the world started shouting at the top of
his voice. The immediate result (as had been anticipated by the enemy)
was to draw all our men on to their fire-steps; men who were working in
the trench, and those carrying rations, with one accord set aside their
work, took up their rifles, and manned the parapet to see what was
happening. They at once became good targets for the Hun, who opened
rapid fire on our parapet, and hurled at us every available grenade he
could lay his hands on. Twenty minutes later silence reigned again. We
had sustained several casualties, for although it was dark and no shots
could be aimed ones, a few of them succeeded in finding homes.
It is permissible perhaps to give one illustration of the fact that our
gunners were at this time not too well supplied with shells, and that
gunnery had not yet attained that high standard of proficiency which it
afterwards reached. A house which was occupied by a listening post from
our centre company by night and by a German sniper by day, was causing
us considerable annoyance, as it was placed so that from a window in the
gable end the sniper could fire at anyone entering or leaving our right
company headquarters, unless the movement was carried out on hands and
knees. Captain Reynolds, who was commanding the centre company, applied
for some sappers to come and blow the house up at night. That was
refused, but he was told that the gunners would knock it down. This idea
was not received enthusiastically, as the house was at so short a
distance from our line. However, a battery of 15-pounders was ordered to
carry out the shoot, and at 10 o’clock one morning, after we had
carefully cleared that portion of our trench which came in the line of
fire, the excitement started. Several gunner officers superintended the
shoot. Twelve rounds were fired; only one hit the house, and that one
caused no damage. One penetrated our own trench. We were then informed
that the battery had expended their ration of shells for one week (12
rounds), and that they would have another go next week.
The company, however, were quite determined that the gunners should have
no further “go’s.” The next morning, at “stand to,” Captain Reynolds
gave orders that one platoon was to open rapid fire at the gable end.
This soon brought down the entire gable end, exposing the whole attic of
the house. The sniper had lost his nest, and never fired from there
again.
We were fortunate in our sector to be rather too far away from the enemy
for mining operations, though in the sector on our right the 1/4th
Battalion Oxford & Bucks L.I., who owned a section of trench known as
the Birdcage, were blowing up or being blown up most days.
So much for our trench conditions and little excitements. Our billets
lay at Romarin, a village about two and a half miles from Ploegsteert.
Days here were spent in a variety of ways—making roads, digging rear
lines, writing and censoring letters, kit inspections, baths, etc. Here
also was enacted one of the real tragedies of the war, the surrender of
our cameras.
The last period we spent in the line in these parts was in the Douve
trenches facing Messines, after which we began on June 24 a four-day
march to other climes.
Our casualties while in the Ploegsteert area were:
_Officers_: Killed None
Wounded 5
_Other ranks_: Killed 9
Wounded 57
In the middle of June, owing to illness, Major-General H. N. C. Heath,
C.B., handed over command of the Division to Major-General R. Fanshawe,
C.B., D.S.O. (52nd L.I.).