THE NAVY AND ARMY TRANSPORT
What of the mark?
Ah! seek it not in England;
A bold mark, an old mark
Is waiting over-sea;
Where the string harps in chorus,
And the lion flag is o’er us,
It is there our work shall be.
_Sir A. Conan Doyle._
The stupendous and scarcely calculable operation of transporting
by sea the enormous armies which are employed in many theatres of
the hostilities is the index and measure of the greatest of all the
triumphs of naval power in the war, namely, that of establishing and
maintaining essential command of the sea. Against this bulwark the
enemy’s naval forces have battled in vain. The submarine may, in some
degree and in some circumstances, affect command of the sea, but it
cannot exercise it.
It is difficult to realise all that the transport of millions of men,
organised as armies and provided with all that armies require, has
meant to the Allies, or to bring home to ourselves a full sense of
what the responsibilities of the Navy have been in safeguarding them.
The armies of Frederick and Napoleon were pygmies compared with the
vast hosts which are set in the field to-day. When Frederick invaded
Silesia he had with him not more than 30,000 men. The motley army with
which Napoleon invaded Russia—the greatest that had ever been brought
under a single command—did not greatly exceed 600,000 on a liberal
computation. Wellington in the Peninsula never commanded 50,000 men.
But in March, 1916, Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
said that 4,000,000 combatants had already been transported under the
guardianship of the British Fleet, with 1,000,000 horses and other
animals, 2,500,000 tons of stores, and 22,000,000 gallons of oil, for
British use and the use of the Allies. In January, 1917, Admiral Sir
John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord, said that over 7,000,000 men had been
transported, together with all the guns, munitions, and stores they
required. Six months later, when the United States troops began to
arrive, the figure may be estimated to have reached 10,000,000.
The victory of Germany would have been swift and decisive if the great
armies represented by these figures had not come to the support of
France. French troops from Northern Africa and the East also joined
her brave army, because transport in the Mediterranean was secure. The
great army of Russia could have made no offensive movement if she had
not received the immense supplies of guns, munitions, motors, and other
material which came to her from abroad. Because of British supremacy
at sea and the shipping that consequently came there, Archangel, from
being a sleepy harbour, developed into one of the busiest ports on
the continent of Europe. Italy could have made no headway if many of
the things she required had not come to her by sea. Greece would have
remained permanently on the side of the enemy if sea-power and the
troops transported there had not rallied her to the Allies. The German
colonies would not have been occupied if fleets had not carried to them
the troops for their subjection. England, by virtue of sea command
guaranteed by her Fleet, has gathered her armies from India, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and from every colony and possession, and
has sent them to serve in France, Belgium, Greece, Gallipoli, Egypt,
Palestine, Macedonia, Mesopotamia, and Africa. Not a soldier has gone
afloat but a seaman has carried him on his back.
Before we can appreciate this aspect of the work of the Navy in the
war, we must gain some idea of what is implied by the military service
of these armies in the field. It is not enough to dispatch armies.
They must be maintained and supplied. The communications of an army
are vital to its operations, and the communications of all the armies
that England is employing are by sea, and are guarded by the Navy.
It would not be an easy thing to estimate the vast requirements of
fighting forces; but that is unnecessary. They are on an infinitely
greater scale, in proportion to the strength of the troops employed,
than in any previous war. Guns are far more numerous and much heavier
than they were. The expenditure of ammunition has gone beyond all
anticipation, and a real fleet is required for its transport. Horses,
mules, many descriptions of heavy and light ordnance and ammunition for
them, warlike and general stores of innumerable kinds, aeroplanes,
balloons, the gigantic “tanks,” hospitals and hospital requisites,
clothing, food, forage, camp equipment, transport vehicles, traction
engines, pontooning, railway, telegraph, building, and mining material,
locomotives of many kinds, petrol, and a hundred other stores and
things are necessary, and they must day and night be in transit,
without rest or pause. It will illustrate the gigantic nature of the
operation if we record that between November, 1916, and June, 1917,
2,000 miles of complete railway track were shipped, with nearly 1,000
locomotives, and other supplies by railway companies. Labour and work
for a hundred different services have to be provided also. The United
States and other countries have contributed enormous supplies, and,
with the coming of the American Army, the volume of the ceaseless
torrent—the veritable Niagara—will increase still more. History has no
parallel for such operations.
This vast business being the charge of the British Navy and of the
navies allied with it, we see how great an object it must be of the
enemy to strike at the lines of supply. That they have completely
failed would appear almost miraculous, if we did not know that the
reasons for the failure are altogether of a practical character. It
was inevitable that there should be some losses when submarines and
mine-layers were at work, but the destruction effected has been a
mere fraction of the whole, and the influence upon the campaigns is
entirely negligible. The Ministry of Munitions imports 1,500,000 tons
of material every month. The most considerable loss due to attack
has been in the matter of shell components, but it did not amount to
more than 5.9 per cent. of the whole supply from the beginning of the
submarine campaign up to June, 1917. The most serious disasters were
in the Mediterranean, where submarines sank the French transports
_Provence II._ and _Gallia_, engaged in the Salonika expedition, with
the loss of about 1,600 lives. The enemy will certainly continue his
efforts.
Never was a more seriously planned attempt made than that of June 22nd,
1917, when General Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force was crossing
the Atlantic. German submarines, in considerable force, made two
attacks upon the transports, and on both occasions were beaten off with
every appearance of loss. One submarine was certainly sunk, and there
was reason to believe that the accurate fire of the American gunners
sent others to the bottom. For purposes of convenience the expedition
had been divided into contingents, each composed of troop-ships and a
naval escort designed to keep off such raiders as might be met with.
An ocean rendezvous was arranged with the American destroyers then
operating in European waters, in order that the passage through the
danger zone might be attended by every possible protection. There
was reason to believe that the Germans had secret intelligence of
the course taken by the transports to the rendezvous and of the time
appointed for their arrival there.
The first attack occurred at 10.30 p.m. at a point well on the American
side of the rendezvous, in a part of the Atlantic which might have
been presumed free from submarines. The heavy gunfire of the American
destroyers scattered the enemy boats, and five torpedoes were seen.
The second attack was launched a few days later, against the other
contingent, on the European side of the rendezvous. Not only did
destroyers hold the boats at a safe distance, but their speed resulted
in sinking at least one submarine. Bombs were dropped firing a charge
of explosive timed to go off at a certain distance under water. In
one instance the wreckage covered the surface of the sea after a shot
at a periscope. “Protected by our high seas convoy destroyers and by
French war vessels,” said the Secretary of the United States Navy, “the
contingent proceeded, and joined the others at a French port. The whole
nation will rejoice that so great a peril has passed for the vanguard
of the men who will fight our battles in France.”
This incident illustrates the method of protection chiefly employed by
the British Navy. When the original Expeditionary Force was sent to
France, the Grand Fleet was in readiness if the High Sea Fleet should
venture to issue to sea. Cruisers, destroyers, naval aircraft, and
submarines were on watch and guard in the North Sea and the Channel,
and the patrol was maintained, day and night, without intermission
until the army had been effectively transported. The patrol was then
organised upon a greater scale as the transport grew in volume. The
Dover Patrol undertook a work of the highest importance, and was
instrumental in holding off all destroyer attacks from the eastward.
Cruisers, destroyers, armed motor launches, mine-trawlers and drifters,
and other vessels have been constantly at work, and observation
balloons and seaplanes have never ceased their vigil. The triumph has
been complete, the enemy submarines have never penetrated the guard,
and the Channel communications of all the armies in France have been
made secure. There are certain features of this organisation which
cannot be dealt with here. The same system has been carried into the
Mediterranean and elsewhere, and the French, Italian, and Japanese
navies have shared in the work.
In this matter of transport protection the British Navy has rendered
magnificent service to all the Allies. General Sir Charles Munro, after
the evacuation of Gallipoli, said it was a stroke of good fortune
for the Army to be associated with a service “whose work remained
throughout this anxious period beyond the power of criticism or
cavil,” and General Sir Ian Hamilton reported that “one tiny flaw in
the mutual trust and confidence animating the two services would have
wrecked the whole enterprise.” This is true not only of Gallipoli but
of every place in which the Navy has been serving as the guard of the
communications, and the base and support of the military forces.
It will be understood that the Transport Department of the British
Admiralty undertook a colossal work at the beginning of the war. It
possessed the unrivalled experience gained during the South African
War, 1899–1901, when about 275,000 men were dispatched and supplied
with all army requirements over a distance of 7,000 miles of sea and
land. Then there was no enemy afloat, but the operation was greater
than any previously undertaken, and evoked the admiration of the world
as a revelation of resource, energy, organisation, national spirit,
good management, and business-like capacity. What will be said when
the now incalculable work of the Transport Department in this war can
be estimated and described? The inspection and selection of ships and
the conversion of them for the accommodation of troops and horses was a
great business. In 1899 it was estimated that a satisfactory transport
should be capable of carrying a number of men equal to 25 per cent. of
her tonnage. What is the rule now one cannot say. There are important
considerations of ballasting, speed, coal consumption, and other
matters in such business, and the removal or adaptation of existing
fittings and the allotting of space for various purposes have occupied
the Admiralty officers and officials.
It was a business both of embarkation and disembarkation, on both sides
of the Channel, and special provision was required for the wounded
and sick. The Naval Transport and Embarkation Officers have had a
very exhausting and anxious time in taking up, fitting, coaling, and
otherwise preparing vessels for sea, and in giving orders for the
movements of ships at the ports on arrival and departure, as well as
in providing for the safety and expedition of all embarkations of men,
horses, and stores, and arranging for docking and like matters. They
merit the gratitude of the country and the Allies. It may be said
that in all the naval and commercial ports of the United Kingdom,
and in the French ports as well, work of this or like kind has been
in progress uninterruptedly since the beginning of the war. It is
strictly naval work, and was set on an excellent and satisfactory
footing by the Admiralty; but, as the war progressed, and the pressure
grew greater, imposing additional duties on the Transport Department,
some matters dealt with by certain of its branches, and concerned with
ship construction, modification, and repair, were placed in charge of
competent civilians.