CHAPTER XIV.

INJUSTICE TO THE SQUADRON--INCONSISTENCY OF THIS--ESTATE TAKEN FROM

ME--MY LOSSES BY LITIGATION--ENDEAVOURS TO ENFORCE MY CLAIMS--PETTY

EXCUSES FOR EVADING THEM--I AM CHARGED WITH EXPENSES OF THE ARMY--AND

WITH COSTS FOR MAKING LEGAL CAPTURES--MY CONDUCT APPROVED AT THE

TIME--MINISTERIAL APPROBATION--PALTRY COMPENSATION AT LENGTH

GIVEN--MINISTERIAL CORRUPTION--PROVED BY SAN MARTIN--CAUSE OF OFFICIAL

ANIMOSITY TO ME----CONCLUSION.

My services to Chili and Peru have been so fully narrated in these

pages, that recapitulation is unnecessary. I will, therefore, briefly

notice their reward.

I was compelled to quit Chili by the political dissensions previously

related--without any of the emoluments due to my position as

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, or any share of the sums belonging to

myself, officers, and seamen; which sums, on the faith of repayment had,

at my solicitation, been appropriated to the repairs and maintenance of

the squadron generally, but more especially at Guayaquil and Acapulco,

when in pursuit of the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_. Neither was any

compensation made for the value of stores captured and collected by the

squadron, whereby its efficiency was chiefly maintained during the whole

period of the Peruvian blockade.

The revolutionary movements already detailed, also compelled me to quit

the Pacific without any compensation from Peru, either to myself or the

officers who remained faithful to Chili--though my absence ought not to

have operated as a bar to such compensation as the Sovereign Congress

awarded to the generals and field officers of the army, who, though

restrained by General San Martin from effecting anything of importance

towards the liberation of the country, nevertheless received 500,000

dollars as a reward, whilst nothing was bestowed on myself or the

squadron, except thanks for "hazardous exploits on behalf of Peru,

hitherto," as the Congress expressed it, "under the _tyranny of military

despotism_, but now the arbiter of its own fate." To the "military

despot" himself, a pension of 20,000 dollars was granted, no doubt, as

has been said, in order to be rid of him; but it was I who gave the

death-blow to his usurped power, by seizing the treasure at Ancon to pay

the squadron, and by my constant refusal of his insidious overtures to

aid him in further treading under foot the liberties of Peru. It is

scarcely possible that the Government of Peru, even at this day, can

contrast with any degree of satisfaction, the empty thanks which were

alone given to one--to use the words of the Sovereign Congress in its

laudatory vote to myself--"by whose talent, worth, and bravery, the

Pacific Ocean has been liberated from the insults of enemies, and the

standard of liberty has been planted on the shores of the South"--and

its lavish reward to the enemy of that liberty, and even to those

officers who deserted from Chili to aid the specious views of the

Protector, of which rewards all who remained faithful to their duty were

wholly deprived.

Still more inconsistent has been the neglect of succeeding Peruvian

Governments in not fulfilling existing obligations. The Supreme Director

of Chili, recognising--as must also the Peruvians--the justice of their

paying, at least, the value of the _Esmeralda_, the capture of which

inflicted the death-blow on Spanish power, sent me a bill on the

Peruvian Government for 120,000 dollars, which was dishonoured, and

never since paid by any succeeding Government. Even the 40,000 dollars

stipulated by the authorities at Guayaquil as the penalty of giving up

the _Venganza_ was never liquidated, though the frigate was delivered to

Peru contrary to written stipulations previously adduced--and was thus

added to the Peruvian navy without cost to the State, but in reality at

the expense of the Chilian squadron, which ran it down into Guayaquil.

How the successive Governments of Peru can have reconciled this

appropriation to the injury of one whom their first independent

Government so warmly eulogised, it is difficult to conceive.

To return, however, to my relations with Chili. Shortly after my

departure for Brazil, the Government forcibly and indefensibly resumed

the estate at Rio Clara, which had been awarded to me and my family in

perpetuity, as a remuneration for the capture of Valdivia, and my

bailiff, Mr. Edwards, who had been left upon it for its management and

direction, was summarily ejected. Situated as this estate was, upon the

borders of the Indian frontier, it was, indeed, a trifling remuneration

for overthrowing the last remnant of Spanish power in the continental

territory of Chili. To have resumed it then, without pretext of any

kind, was an act reflecting infinite discredit upon those who

perpetrated that act, whether from revengeful feelings or baser motives.

The sum of 67,000 dollars, the speedy payment of which was promised to

me by the Supreme Director after our return from Valdivia, was never

paid, though the conquest of that fortress proved the immediate cause of

success in negociating a loan in England, which, before that event, had

been found impracticable. By a remarkable coincidence, the first

instalment of the loan arrived at Valparaiso at the period of my

departure; but the English merchants to whose care it was consigned,

refused to permit the money to be landed, in consequence of the

disorganization in which the corrupt conduct of the ministry had

involved the State.

No compensation for the severe wounds received during the capture of the

_Esmeralda_ was either offered or received--though for these all States

make separate provision. Even the Grand Cross of the Legion of Merit,

conferred for the capture of the _Esmeralda_, was suspended; whilst, in

its place, I was exposed to the greatest imaginable insults, even to the

withdrawal of every ship of war from under my command.

Unhappily, this ingratitude for services rendered was the least

misfortune which my devotedness to Chili brought upon me. On my return

to England, in 1825, after the termination of my services in Brazil, I

found myself involved in litigation on account of the seizure of

neutral vessels by authority of the then unacknowledged Government of

Chili. These litigations cost me, directly, upwards of £.14,000, and

indirectly, more than double that amount; for, in order to meet the

expenses, I was compelled to dispose of property at a great sacrifice,

amongst which the loss arising from the sale of my residence and grounds

in the Regent's Park alone was upwards of £.6,000--whilst that on other

property also sacrificed was as much more; thus, in place of receiving

anything for my efforts in the cause of Chilian and Peruvian

independence, I was a loser of upwards of £.25,000, this being more than

double the whole amount I had received as pay whilst in command of the

Chilian squadron: in other words, not only did I obtain no compensation

for my services in Chili--but was, in addition, compelled to sacrifice

all I afterwards earned in Brazil to satisfy claims arising from

seizures made under the authority of the Chilian Government! No

consideration whatever for these losses has been shewn by those whom I

so zealously and faithfully served in their hour of need; not even by

Peru, in behalf of which country nearly all these litigations arose,

though the services of the squadron cost nothing to that country or

Chili, beyond the expense to the latter of its original ineffective

equipment, the provisioning and maintenance of the ships having been

provided for at the cost of the enemy, even to the payment of the crews

with their own prize-money, none of which was ever refunded!

For sixteen years I made unceasing efforts to induce the succeeding

Governments of Chili to liquidate my claims, but without effect. At the

expiration of that period, I was no less surprised than annoyed by

receiving from the Accountant-General a demand for explanation of my

accounts, though, whilst I remained in Chili, I had urged incessantly

their official investigation, for, notwithstanding that the Government

had pronounced its approbation upon all I had done, I foresaw that

quibbles might arise as the pretext for continued injustice.

That the accounts were not adjusted previous to my departure from Chili,

was no fault of mine, as I was, in self-defence, compelled to quit the

country, unless I chose to take part with the late Supreme Director, in

supporting a ministry which, unknown to him, were guilty of the most

avaricious and injurious acts--or aid Gen. Freire in overthrowing one to

whom I was attached, as having always believed him to be a sincere and

honourable man.

To call upon me, therefore, in the year 1838, for an explanation of

complicated accounts delivered to the Chilian Government and

unquestioned in 1821-2, was an unworthy course, the more so as most of

the explanations required were of a paltry description, even to the

expenditure of a single dollar in the purser's accounts--as though

amidst operations of such magnitude as had successfully resulted in the

accomplishment of every object proposed, my time could be occupied in

minor details, yet even to these I was compelled to attend, the

Government not furnishing me with a competent person to register the

expenditure of the squadron.

The explanations thus demanded, after a lapse of nearly twenty years,

were one hundred in number--no great amount in a series of accounts

extending over more than three years' prosecution of an arduous service,

during which I had to find the means of supporting the squadron, the

expenditure of which was now, for the first time, called into question.

The paltry character of many of the matters in dispute will be best

judged of from the following items:--

No. 4. Vouchers demanded for ten dollars' worth of mutton.

23 to 32. Certificates for cases of gin lost in the San Martin.

40. Deficiency of nine dollars in the pay-books of the Lautaro.

42. Do. of three dollars in the pay-books of the Independencia.

69. Error of three dollars in the valuation of goods captured at

Arica.

73. Forty dollars for repairing pumps at a time when the ships

could hardly be kept afloat.

75. Imputed error of _one dollar!_ in the purchase of 756 gals.

of gin, &c. &c.

In addition to many such petty items, I was accused of giving bounty to

seamen unauthorised--though the seamen had captured the very monies with

which they were rewarded--and was expected to refund some which had been

stolen. My having supplied rudders and rigging to the vessels cut out

from before the batteries at Callao, was called into question, though

the ships could not be sent from the port without re-equipment, the

Spaniards having dismantled them before their capture. I was expected,

after the lapse of sixteen years, to produce the pursers' books of the

division of stores captured, the books having been sent in due course to

the Minister of Marine's office; yet the Government had not furnished

the squadron with the necessary articles for the safety of the ships,

whether under sail or at anchor, whilst the stores which were taken from

the enemy and applied to the use of the expedition, were so much clear

gain to the State.

A still more unjust act of the Chilian Government was that of calling

upon me for vouchers for the expenditure of 50,000 dollars, captured by

Col. Miller, in Upper Peru, and expended by him in paying and

provisioning his troops, of which transactions I was not at all

cognizant: the sums, however, were no doubt faithfully applied by Col.

Miller to the exigencies of the service in which he was engaged; he

merely apprising me that he had captured or otherwise collected 32,000

dollars, with which he had given his men two months' pay, and an

additional month's gratuity for their gallantry, a transaction no less

essential than honourable, but one which the narrow views of the

ministry failed to appreciate. No vouchers were, however, remitted to me

whilst I remained on the coast, as the following letter from Col. Miller

will shew:--

Ica, Aug. 27, 1821.

My Lord,

Inclosed is a memorandum of money received and

disbursed to the division under my command. So soon as time will

permit, another more detailed and circumstantial account shall be

forwarded for your Lordship's approval.

I have written to Major Soler, who is in Lima, to furnish your

Lordship with the necessary particulars relative to the capture of

the cash.

I have the honour, &c.

Wm. MILLER,

Col. Comm. Southern Division.

I never afterwards saw Col. Miller nor his division in Peru; but the

whole that was expended by him in emancipating the country, was charged

to me, and thus I was made responsible for the price of his victories,

though they did not cost either Government a dollar.

But the most flagrant act of injustice was the deduction from my claims

of costs and damages for the detention of neutral vessels seized under

the orders of blockade issued by the Chilian Government. The

circumstances were as follows:--

The Spanish Government had chartered the _Edward Ellice_ and other ships

to transport troops from Spain to Peru, but internal divisions in the

parent state prevented their despatch. The masters of these vessels

thereupon claimed demurrage, which it was not convenient for the Spanish

Government to pay--but in lieu thereof licences were granted to carry

Spanish goods to Peru. These ships, being thus loaded, proceeded to

Gibraltar, where the house of Gibbs & Co. provided them with British

papers, in addition to the Spanish manifests supplied at Cadiz--this

fact alone shewing that they considered the speculation illegitimate.

Furnished with these double sets of papers, they came to Peru for the

purpose of trading; but as I had advice of this proceeding--and

afterwards found the Spanish duplicates in the Peruvian Custom Houses--I

seized the vessels on account of the fraudulent papers, they having also

on board contraband of war, and was about to send them to Valparaiso for

adjudication, when their commanders offered to surrender to me all the

anchors, cables, and other illegal cargo, if I would forego this

determination, which I did, and applied these articles to the use of the

Chilian squadron, which at that time had not a trustworthy anchor in any

of the ships.

The course pursued was satisfactory to the masters and supercargoes, and

subsequently, on explanation, to Sir Thomas Hardy, whilst it was highly

approved by the Chilian Government. After my return to England, actions

were brought against me for even the contraband which had been

voluntarily surrendered by the masters; but as I was fortunately enabled

to produce the Spanish duplicates, they were abandoned, otherwise I

should have been involved in utter ruin, for releasing British vessels

subject to condemnation, and at the same time _gratuitously providing_

for the Chilian ships of war, the essential articles of which they were

entirely destitute.

In order to conciliate the English merchants at Valparaiso, the

Admiralty Court acquitted various vessels seized under the orders of the

Government, charging the costs and damages to my account! and that in

the face of its own right to blockade and seizure as expressed to the

British Commodore, Sir Thomas Hardy, who, though he insisted on the

protection of British ships, disavowed their taking advantage of his

protection to supply the enemy with contraband of war, as had been done.

Sir Thomas Hardy's view was this, that if the blockading power was not

in a position to render the blockade efficient over the whole coast, it

was not recognisable anywhere by the law of nations; but, whilst

expressing this erroneous view of blockade, he added, "nor can I resist

the right which the Government of Chili has to establish and maintain

blockade on the same footing as other belligerents."

But even in the extreme views of Sir Thomas Hardy, we were competent to

establish and maintain a blockade in its widest extent, and the best

proof of the fact is, that the blockade was established. Even Zenteno,

the Minister of Marine, pointed out to Sir Thomas Hardy, the ability of

the squadron to maintain the blockade which he recognised.

"Our naval forces, perhaps diminished in apparent magnitude by

distance, was not believed sufficient to maintain the blockade in all

its extent, yet it has had the glory of setting at liberty, and of

placing in the hands of the American Independents, all the ports and

coasts of Peru, excepting only the port of Callao. Moreover, from the

very centre even of that port, and from under the fire of the

batteries, the Spanish ship of war, _Esmeralda_, has been cut out by

our naval forces, and our strength thereby augmented, whilst that

of the enemy is reduced to nothing."

(Signed) "JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO."

So that, in face of this declaration by the Chilian Minister himself, as

to the naval supremacy of the squadron on the coast of Peru, and its

consequent right of seizure, the Admiralty Court, for its own sinister

purposes, chose to decide that I was liable for seizures of neutral

vessels made by my captains, without my knowledge--condemning me in

costs and damages for their acts; the result being that I was mulcted in

this, and every other charge it saw fit to make in my absence. The

injustice of this was the more striking, as San Martin was appointed

Commander-in-Chief of the squadron as well as the army, so that, even

supposing the decisions of the Admiralty Court to be right, the onus lay

upon him, not me. Yet he was rewarded, and I was compelled to pay for

acts executed under his authority.

In the year 1845, _twenty-three years after_ the liberation of Peru, and

the annihilation of the Spanish power in the Pacific, the Chilian

Government deducted all charges thus unjustly placed to my account, and

awarded me the balance of 30,000 dollars (£.6000) for all the services

rendered to the country. I have before mentioned that, from the

consequence of litigation proceeding from obedience to the orders of the

Chilian Government, I was subjected to a loss in England of nearly

£.25,000; so that in place of my reaping any reward whatever for my

services to Chili and Peru, the liberation of the latter and the

completion of independence of the former cost me £.19,000 out of my own

pocket!

I would ask the Chilian people and Government whether they do not now

see the injurious treatment pursued towards me--arising from the base

impositions then practised upon them, though these have been partly

compensated by the present enlightened Government, which, as its recent

decision has shewn, is composed of men of a far higher stamp than those

with whom I was placed in contact, and, as I have every reason to

believe, would redeem the stigma left on the national character by their

corrupt predecessors of 1820-23, on fully comprehending the treatment to

which I was subjected. That explanation is here truthfully laid before

them, enabling them to judge for themselves. I will only add that not a

single statement has been made in this narrative which is not based on

original documents, the more important of which have been incorporated,

the whole being about to be photographed and sent out to Chili, so that,

comparing them with their official originals, their authenticity shall

be beyond question.

I have said that the ministry which paralysed my operations, and by

their ill-disguised mercenary practices overthrew the Supreme Director,

O'Higgins, was corrupt, though I have thought it beneath the dignity of

historical narrative, more particularly to expose their dishonest

practices, of which I was well apprised. I feel, however, that in making

such a charge, some proof thereof is incumbent on me, I will therefore

in conclusion simply adduce a solitary instance of those practices, so

damning, that, unless supported by irrefutable testimony, I might well

be deemed a malicious libeller for making accusations otherwise utterly

incredible.

It has been proved by the narrative--as indeed it has never been

disputed--that the vigilance of the blockade before Callao starved the

Spanish garrison out of Lima, and ultimately out of the fortress of

Callao, this being the main object of the blockade. Whilst I was thus,

as the only means within my power, endeavouring to starve out the

Spaniards, _the Chilian Ministers were sending corn to be sold, at a

thousand per cent, profit, to the blockaded garrison!_

To such an extent was this carried, that even Gen. San Martin, aware of

the villainy of his pretended supporters in the Chilian ministry, and

dreading the result, put me on my guard by writing to me the following

letter:--

Haura, Feb. 21, 1821.

My esteemed Friend,

I am expecting information from you with great

anxiety, and sincerely hope that it may be as favourable as that

which I received in Ancon when I was in similar uncertainty.

The _Miantinomo_ is on her way from Valparaiso, _by permission of

the Government, to introduce a cargo of corn into Callao! It is most

essential at all risks to avert this mischief, for it would be perfect

ruin to admit such a cargo under existing circumstances!_ I have

officially given you information on this subject.

The day before yesterday the _Andromache_ arrived at Huacho;

Capt. Sherriff tells me that in a few days he shall return to Callao.

Lady Cochrane is at Huaita, making shift in the best way she

can. God give you happiness, my friend. Always count on the

sincere esteem of your affectionate

JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.

This testimony from one whose creatures the more influential of the

Chilian ministers were, is indisputable, but in the present case their

rapacity alarmed even their patron. San Martin is however wrong in

attributing the traitorous attempt to the Government collectively--the

Supreme Director, O'Higgins, not being capable of such practices as were

carried on under his authority--of which this is only one solitary

instance. The real perpetrators of these enormities are fresh in the

recollection of many Chilenos still living. Yet these were the men who,

under the mask of patriotism, originated the most unworthy charges

against me, without giving me the slightest credit for having carried on

the naval war without national assistance either in money or stores. The

present generation of Chilenos are proud of their country, and--as their

present excellent President, when awarding me an admiral's pay for the

remainder of my life has stated--desire to reward those illustrious

foreigners who assisted them in their struggles for independence--but

they have great reason to regret the conduct of those ministers who

imperilled that independence, and jeopardised the liberties of Chili for

private gain.

It is scarcely necessary to add that not a grain of corn in the

_Miantinomo_, or other vessels similarly despatched, with the exception

of one which arrived during my absence, found its way to the starving

garrison of Callao. Yet on their arrival I was implored to permit its

landing, and on replying that no such treachery to the people of Chili

should be carried on before my face, I was coolly asked to stand off

during the night from the blockade, _that I might not see what was going

on!_ Such was ministerial honesty in the first days of Chilian

independence.

The cause of official animosity to me is now apparent. Had I

participated in these nefarious practices, or had I accepted the rank,

decorations, and estates offered to me by San Martin as the price of my

defection from Chili, I should now be rich, however despicable to

myself--in place of having long and severely suffered in consequence of

my rigorous adherence to the national interests--with the proud

consciousness of never having done an act which I desire to conceal.

APPENDIX.

_Recent Address of the President of Chili to the Senate and Chamber of

Deputies, recognising Lord Dundonald's services, and according to him

full pay as Admiral for the remainder of his life._

_Fellow Citizens of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies,_

Towards the end of 1818, when Chili celebrated the first maritime

triumph obtained by our squadron in Talcahuano, the gallant seaman

Thomas Lord Cochrane, now Earl of Dundonald, and an admiral in the

British service, appeared upon our seas, decided to assist the noble

cause of our independence.

The important services of this chief in the British Navy are well known

during the European war which ended in 1815.

He was a post captain, not in active service, when the squadron of his

country was reduced to the peace establishment, and he accepted the

invitation which was made to him in London by the Chilian agent, to

enter the service of this country, and came to take the command of our

naval forces, bringing in the prestige of his name, his great skill and

intelligence, his active and daring spirit,--a powerful contingent to

that struggle of such vital importance for our independence, the

dominion of the Pacific.

In how far the well-founded hopes in the cooperation of Lord Cochrane

were realised by the able direction which he knew how to give to our

maritime forces, are facts which have been judged by the world at large

and history. Still alive in our memory is the taking of Valdivia, the

feats at Callao, the bloody and splendid triumph of the _Esmeralda_, the

taking of the Spanish frigates _Prueba_ and _Venganza_ on the coast of

the Ecuador, and the complete annihilation of the power of Spain in

these seas executed by our squadron under the command of Lord Cochrane;

and this Chief upon leaving the service of Chili in January 1823, and

when he delivered over to Government, when there were no longer any

enemies to contend with, the triumphant insignia of his rank, he might

with justice and truth have said, "I return this into your hands when

Chili has ensured the dominion of the Pacific."

Chili at the same time that she resists unjust and exaggerated

pretensions, has always been proud of her desire to reward, in a

dignified and honourable manner, the services of illustrious foreigners

who have assisted us in the glorious struggle for our independence. This

noble and spontaneous sentiment of national gratitude was what dictated

the law of 6th October, 1842, incorporating, during his life with the

full pay of his rank, General D. Jose San Martin, even when he might

reside in foreign parts; and it is the same sentiment which induces me

to propose to you at present, and with consent of the Council of State,

the following project of law:--

Sole Article.--Vice-Admiral Thomas Lord Cochrane,

now Earl of Dundonald, is to be considered during the term

of his life as in active service of the squadron of the Republic,

with the full pay of his rank, even although he may reside

without the territory of Chili.

Santiago, July 28, 1857.

Manuel Montt.

Jose Francisco Gana.

* * * * *

_Lord Dundonald's reply to the preceding._

_To His Excellency the President in Council and Congress of Chili._

Your Excellency magnanimously presented to Congress

a brief but lucid enumeration of my services to the State, which

being taken into consideration by the enlightened representatives of

a judicious and gallant people, "full pay during my life," and an

honorary medal, were voted to me, accompanied by the truly

gratifying announcement that such estimable gifts were "en

testimonio de gratitud nacional por grandes servicios que prestò a

la Republica durante la guerra de Independencia."

These honours I most thankfully accept, as highly gratifying

proofs that, after the lapse of more than thirty years, my zealous,

official, extra-official, and successful exertions, to ensure to Chili

complete independence, internal peace, and the dominion of the

Pacific, are held in grateful remembrance by the Government and

People of that highly respected nation. Nevertheless I must be

permitted to observe that the grant of full pay, only prospectively,

to one who is upwards of eighty years of age, is little more than

nominal, as my life, in all human probability, is approaching its

close. I had hoped that, as vast benefits have uninterruptedly

accrued to the State, ever since the completion of the services so

honourably recognised, the grant would have dated from that period,

in the same manner that has recently been accorded to me by the

Government of Brazil, which has decreed the restitution of arrears

of pay from the period that my actual command ceased, and also its

continuance during my life.

If my services to Chili be acknowledged to have been great, might

I not expect an equal boon from a country which owes the blessings

of peace and subsequent tranquillity, and consequent prosperity, to

the speedy termination of war? I plead not for myself, most

Excellent Sir, for at my advanced age, I have few wants, but for the

sake of my children and for the honour of my family. I need only

point to the additional examples of Spain and Portugal, where all

general officers and admirals of first rank, employed in the struggle

for the emancipation and independence of those countries, were

rewarded by the subsequent continuance of their pay during their

lives; an engagement ever punctually discharged.

I have no doubt that had the recollection of my advanced age been

present to the mind of your Excellency when you proposed the project

of law in my behalf, and had you remembered that a merely

prospective grant would be of little personal benefit to me or to my

numerous family, your Excellency would have been happy to have

recommended, and the Congress to have conceded, that it should

likewise be retrospective, especially as Chili had not (as is the case

in my native country) to rear and maintain numerous officers for

one found suited to command.

In order to convince your Excellency that I do not desire _full_ pay

to be granted to me during the long period elapsed since my services

were rendered (though from the privations I have suffered and the

losses I have sustained, such delay in truth might be deemed an

additional title), I therefore beg most respectfully to suggest to the

consideration of your Excellency, to that of the Council and National

Congress, as well as to the just feeling of the honourable people of

Chili, that _one half_ of the pay which I received in actual service, be

accorded to me retrospectively, in the same manner that a similar

boon was granted by the Brazilian nation. This I should accept

with deep gratitude, in compensation for the wounds I received this

day thirty-six years, in the capture of the _Esmeralda_, for other

perilous extra-official services rendered, and the heavy

responsibilities incurred, all of which terminated in results most

important to the national cause.

Be assured, most Excellent Sir, that it is only my advanced age

that prevents me from attempting to re-visit your now peaceful and

prosperous country, personally to acknowledge your Excellency's

courtesy, and the kind feeling evinced towards me by the Council of

State, by the representatives, and people of Chili. It would be with

delight that I should see steam vessels now introduced into the

national marine, the great railroad from Valparaiso to Quillotta and

Santiago, now in progress, and witness the various important

improvements accomplished, and advancement in national prosperity

effected in the course of the last third of a century. Such happy

results testify highly to the merits of the Government and to the

character of the Chilian people.

COCHRANE--DUNDONALD.

London, Nov. 5, 1857.

_Letter from the Supreme Director of Chili, approving all I had done in

Peru. This letter was written in English, in which tongue His Excellency

was by no means unversed, having, in early life, had the advantage of a

few years spent at Richmond; a circumstance which, in after years, gave

to his mind an English tone, elevating him far above the then

narrow-minded men by whom, unfortunately for Chili, he was surrounded

and thwarted._

Most secret and confidential.

Santiago, Nov. 12, 1821.

My Dear Friend Lord Cochrane,

Capt. Morgell, the bearer of this, has delivered to

me the despatches sent by you in the _Ceransasee_, together with your

interesting notes, Nos. 1 to 9, dated 10th to 30th of September

last; as also the documents to which they are referred. I have read

them, with great attention, but have always felt just indignation

against the ungrateful course pursued towards Chili, which can only

be tempered by the pleasure which I feel in reading the dignity,

good judgment, and knowledge with which you knew how to sustain

your rights, and those of this Republic.

It was my wish that this reply should not be in writing, but

personally, and with embraces of approbation for all that you have

said and practised under the difficult circumstances detailed in your

private and official letters; but as the great distance in which you

are from this deprives me of this pleasure, and as you expect to add

new glories to Chili in the seizure of the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, and

to bring them to port Bernardo under your orders, I will hastily

answer the principal points of your communications.

The party and the words you mention, do not leave any doubt of

the small hopes which Chili is to have for its sacrifices; yet there

is nothing to fear from such intentions when discovered. Whilst

the squadron under your orders commands the Pacific, this Republic

is very well covered, and it is in our hands to be the masters of the

moral, political, commercial, and even of the physical force of this

part of America.

* * * * *

Although the battery placed at Ancon _after_ the enemy went away

in tranquillity, and the threat (_from San Martin_,) about not paying

one _real_, unless Chili should sell the squadron to Peru, made it

excusable not to send any mission there; yet I have named my

Minister of Finance, in whom I have the greatest confidence,

to go to Lima to fix the basis of relations, and to ask compensation

for the active debt of Chili against Peru. My Minister has orders

to return as soon as possible, let the end of his mission be what it

will, and by that time you may have returned to Chili, and then

we will accord the ulterior.

It is very painful that the garrison of Callao would not capitulate

under your flag! Then you and Chili would have been implored

for grants,--then all should have been paid without excuse,--and

then you would not have found yourself under the necessity

of taking the property retained, to pay and save the squadron. I

_would have done the same if I had been there, therefore I say again

all has my approbation_, and I give to you, as to the meritorious

officers under your orders, my cordial thanks for their fidelity and

heroism, in favour of Chili, where, in a more glorious and decorous

way, the fortune of all will be made in the course of progress which

events are preparing for this happy country; whilst it is not known

what is to be had in Peru, because, as you observe, the war is only

beginning, which will be followed by poverty, discontent, and above

all, anarchy. They will soon feel the want of you and of the

squadron, and those ungrateful officers who separated themselves

from you to enter the Peruvian navy will also feel their deceit and

punishment. They have been scratched out of the list of the

Chilian navy, and I only wait your arrival or an official detail

relating to the expedition, to assign lands and premiums to those

who have not abandoned you, and in particular to the honourable

Captains Crosbie, Wilkinson, Delano, Cobbet, and Simpson, whom you

recommend.

Although we live in poverty, and the Exchequer continues in

affliction, yet we have sufficient resignation and courage to make

convenient sacrifices. All my efforts shall be employed in making

the _Rising Star_ one of the vessels of our squadron, and then we

shall be invincible, and by keeping good relations with Sir Thomas

Hardy, and by his means with England, we shall establish fundamental

principles to our glories. I am satisfied of the conferences

and deliberations you had with this gentleman, and I approve the

whole, although the Valparaiso merchants might scream.

I like the precautions you have taken in sending correspondence

directly to me, and not to the ministry. But you must

understand that even before I had read your private and official

letters, much of their contents was known to the public, no doubt

by the private communications of some officers, or by what was

verbally communicated in Valparaiso by the officers of the _Aransasu_.

On my part, I also recommend you all necessary secrecy on the

contents of this letter, so that our reserve may not be frustrated,

and our best measures disappointed.

I shall claim from the Lima Government satisfaction for putting

in prison the First Lieutenant of the _O'Higgins_, and also for

imprisoning him of the same class belonging to the _Valdivia_, as

also for the threat of the Ungrateful Guida, as narrated in your

favour of the 29th of September last. I assure you that I will

never permit the least insult against the flag of this Republic. I

felt the greatest pleasure in the answer you gave to Monteagudo

and Guida in your note of the 28th and 29th.

As you have left Callao there is nothing officially to communicate

upon your conduct there. You have not submitted to Lima neither

directly nor indirectly, and from the moment the independence of

that country was declared under the protectoral Government of San

Martin ceased the provisional control that he had upon the

squadron.

The province of Conception is almost free of enemies, and I hope

Chiloe will be so very soon, to accomplish our greatness. There is

a nursery for a good navy, and when you can visit that archipelago

you will discover advantages and richness, relieved from the care of

indolent and despotic Spain.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Your eternal friend,

O'HIGGINS.

Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination, Volume 1 · 第 14 / 14 章