RETURN TO CALLAO--LIMA ABANDONED--HESITATION OF GEN. SAN MARTIN TO
OCCUPY THE CITY--LOSS OF THE SAN MARTIN--EXCESSES OF THE
SPANIARDS--PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE--SAN MARTIN ASSUMES AUTOCRATIC
POWER UNDER THE TITLE OF PROTECTOR--MY REMONSTRANCE--HIS REPLY--MUTINOUS
STATE OF THE SQUADRON FROM NEGLECT.
We arrived at Callao on the 2nd of July, when learning that Lima was no
longer tenable from want of provisions, and that an intention existed on
the part of the Viceroy to abandon it, I forebore to make any hostile
demonstration which might interfere with such decision, and withdrew to
a distance from the port, awaiting the result, which could not be far
distant, as the people had become clamorous, and all hope of assistance
from Spain was abandoned.
Having, however, learned, on the 5th of July, that an attempt was being
made by the Viceroy to obtain a still further prolongation of the
armistice, I again entered the bay with the _San Martin_--my former
flag-ship, the _O'Higgins_, being absent on the coast.
On the 6th the Viceroy abandoned the city, retaining, however, the
fortresses at Callao, the garrison of which was reinforced from the
troops which had evacuated Lima; a large quantity of warlike stores
being also deposited in the forts, thus securing greater efficiency
than before.
To the astonishment of the Peruvians and Chilenos, no movement was made
by the liberating army to take possession of the Capital; and as the
Spanish troops were withdrawn, whilst no government existed, serious
disorders were anticipated, so that the _Cabildo_ applied to Capt. Basil
Hall, then in command of the British ship of war _Conway_, for his
assistance to maintain tranquillity and protect public and private
property. Captain Hall immediately despatched a party of marines, who
contributed to maintain order.
General San Martin having been apprised by the Viceroy of his intention
to abandon the capital, had entered the harbour in the schooner
_Sacramento_, but nevertheless gave no orders for its occupation. On the
7th a detachment of cavalry, _without orders_, entered Lima, and those
on the 8th were followed by another detachment of infantry.
On working up to the port on the 8th, I was surprised to find General
San Martin still afloat in his schooner, though the liberating army was
now entering the city in a body, and the occupation was complete;
General San Martin remained on board till the evening of the 10th, when
he privately landed.
As the forts at Callao were still in the possession of the enemy, I made
preparations to attack them, and to destroy the shipping still sheltered
under them. Aware of my intentions, the garrison, on the 11th, sank the
_San Sebastian_, the only frigate left in the harbour, in order to
prevent her falling into our hands On the following day, the
_O'Higgins, Lautaro, Puyrredon_, and _Potrillo_ arrived, so that the
squadron was again complete.
It was mentioned in the last chapter that I had seized a considerable
quantity of wheat at Mollendo, on account of a breach of the armistice.
This was still on board, and the city being in a state of famine,
General San Martin directed that the wheat, of which there were upwards
of two thousand _fanegas_, should be landed at the Chorillos free of
duty. As the _San Martin_ was deeply laden, I objected to this from the
dangerous nature of the anchorage, but more especially, that the only
anchor on board was made from the remains of two broken anchors lashed
together; this objection was nevertheless overruled, and, as I had
anticipated, she went ashore at Chorillos, where, from the heavy swell
which set in, she became a total wreck.
On the 17th I received an invitation from the _Cabildo_ to visit the
city, and on landing, found that preparations had been made to give the
visit the character of a public entry, carriages being provided, with
deputations from the various corporations. Finding this to be the case,
I declined entering Lima in a manner so ostentatious, as General San
Martin had entered the city privately by night. I was, however,
compelled to hold a _levee_ at the palace, where the compliments of the
established authorities and principal inhabitants were tendered to me.
General San Martin declined to attend this complimentary manifestation,
remaining at La Legua, about halfway between Lima and Callao, where he
had established his head quarters; probably considering such honours out
of place towards one whom as Captain-General he might regard as a
subordinate, and the more so, as no such compliment had been offered to
himself.
On the following day, General San Martin directed a civic guard to be
organized in place of the Spanish guard which had evacuated the city,
the Marquis of Torre Tagle being appointed its commandant. At the same
time the General retained the whole of the liberating army, though had
even a portion of these followed the retreating Spaniards, the greater
part would have joined the patriot standard--it being afterwards
ascertained that Colonel Rodil who commanded them, had shot great
numbers in the attempt to desert; even the patriot guerilla parties,
unaided, had defeated those who were kept together; so that had a
division of the liberating army been sent to co-operate with the
guerillas, the entire Spanish force might have been annihilated, in
place of forming the _nucleus_--as they afterwards did--of a force
which, after my departure from Chili, threatened not only the
independence of Peru, but even that of the Chilian Republic itself.
Being thus unopposed, and the towns which had given in their adhesion to
the cause of independence being left defenceless--the retreating
Spaniards committed great excesses amongst the inhabitants of the
interior, who found themselves exposed to more than the rigours of
martial law, without the least attempt for their protection; though a
promise of this had formed one of the principal inducements for
throwing off their allegiance to the Viceroy, at whose mercy--or rather
want of it--they now found themselves exposed.
In place of protecting the Peruvians in the interior, a number of highly
inflated proclamations were issued, in which it was left to be inferred
that the city had been taken by hard fighting, though not a blow had
been struck, except by the detachment of Colonel Arenales and the
squadron, whose vigilance of blockade and previous actions had so
dispirited the enemy and reduced them to such straits, that abandonment
of the capital was inevitable. Nor was the large force present even
required to maintain Lima, the inhabitants having for a long period been
subjected to miseries which they had no disposition to re-encounter.
But General San Martin had other views in retaining the army than
protecting those who had confided in his promises; the military force
being required for very different purposes to that which had been set
forth in his proclamations and in those entrusted to him by the Chilian
government.
On the 24th I ordered Captain Crosbie to proceed to Callao in the boats,
and cut out as many of the enemy's vessels as he could bring away. The
service was gallantly performed, for on the following day he brought out
two large merchantmen, the _San Fernando_ and _Milagro_, and the sloop
of war _Resolucion_, together with several launches; burning moreover
two vessels within musket shot of the batteries.
On the 27th, the _Cabildo_ sent me an invitation to be present at the
public proclamation of the independence of Peru. As their letter fully
recognises the obligations of the Limeños to the services of the
squadron,--I shall transcribe it:--
"Lima is about to solemnize the most august act which has been
performed for three centuries, or since her foundation; this is the
proclamation of her independence, and absolute exclusion from
the Spanish government, as well as from that of any other foreign
potentate, and this _Cabildo_--wishing the ceremony to be conducted
with all possible decorum and solemnity, _considers it necessary that
your Excellency, who has so gloriously co-operated in bringing about
this highly desired object_, will deign to assist at the act with your
illustrious officers, on Saturday, the 28th instant."
Imagining that myself and officers had been mainly instrumental in
establishing the independence of Peru--for I had in vain urged the
Captain-General to action, as far as the army was concerned, the
invitation was accepted, but judge of my surprise at the ceremony, when
medals were distributed, ascribing to General San Martin and the army
the whole credit of having accomplished that which the squadron had
achieved! The inscription on the medals was as follows.--"Lima secured
its independence on the 28th of July, 1821, under the protection of
_General San Martin and the liberating army_." The declaration of
independence was however complete, according to the promises and
intentions of the Chilian government. On hoisting the national flag,
General San Martin pronounced the following words:--"Peru is from this
moment free and independent, by the general vote of the people, and by
the justice of her cause, which God defend."
The inhabitants of Lima were in a state of great delight at this
termination of centuries of Spanish misrule, and that their independence
of action was fully recognized as had been stipulated by Chili. As a
mark of gratitude, a deputation from the _Cabildo_, on the next day
waited on General San Martin, offering him, in the name of the
inhabitants of the capital, the first presidency of their now
independent state. To the astonishment of the deputation they were
curtly told that their offer was altogether unnecessary, as he had
_already taken the command, and should keep it as long as he thought
proper, whilst he would allow no assemblies for the discussion of public
matters_. The first act of the freedom and independence so
ostentatiously proclaimed on the previous day, being the establishment
of a despotic government, in which the people had neither voice nor
share; and this by the General of a Republic which existed only by the
will of the people!
In this extraordinary assumption of power I had not been at all
consulted, probably because it was known that I would not countenance
anything but carrying out intact the intentions of the Supreme Director
of Chili as declared in his proclamations. It now became evident to me
that the army had been kept inert for the purpose of preserving it
entire to further the ambitious views of the General, and that with the
whole force now at Lima the inhabitants were completely at the mercy of
their pretended liberator, but in reality their conqueror.
As the existence of this self-constituted authority was no less at
variance with the institutions of the Chilian Republic than with its
solemn promises to the Limeños, I again shifted my flag on board the
_O'Higgins_, determined to adhere solely to the interests of Chili; but
not interfering in any way with General San Martin's proceedings till
they interfered with me in my capacity as Commander in Chief of the
Chilian navy.
On the 3rd of August, General San Martin issued a proclamation to the
same effect as his declaration to the now extinct _Cabildo_; setting
forth that although it was abundantly notorious that he aspired only to
retirement and tranquillity, nevertheless a moral responsibility
required him to unite all government in his own person, and he therefore
declared himself "Protector of Peru," with Don Juan Garcia del Rio, Don
Bernardo Monteagudo, and Don Hipolito Unanue, as his three ministers of
state.
Being at the time on board the flag-ship, I knew nothing of this
proclamation; but as the squadron had not been paid their twelve months'
wages, nor the 50,000 dollars promised by General San Martin, I went on
shore on the 4th of August, to make the demand on behalf of the
squadron, the seamen having served their time. Being ignorant of the
self-imposed title which General San Martin had assumed, I frankly
asked him to devise some means for defraying these payments.
I forbear personally to relate what passed at this interview; but as my
secretary was present, and on his return to England published an account
thereof, which is in every respect substantially true, I will give it in
his words:--
"On the following morning, August 4th, Lord Cochrane, uninformed
of the change which had taken place in the title of San
Martin, visited the palace, and began to beg of the General in
Chief to propose some means for the payment of the foreign seamen,
who had served their time and fulfilled their contract. To this,
San Martin answered, that 'he would never pay the Chilian
squadron unless it was sold to Peru, and then the payment should
be considered part of the purchase money!' To this Lord Cochrane
replied, that 'by such a transaction the squadron of Chili
would be transferred to Peru by merely paying what was due to the
officers and crews for services done to that state.' San Martin knit
his brows, and turning to his two ministers, Garcia and Monteagudo,
ordered them to retire, to which his Lordship objected, stating that
'as he was not master of the Spanish language, he wished them to
remain as interpreters, fearful that some expression, not rightly
understood, might be considered offensive.' San Martin now turned
round to the Admiral, and said--'Are you aware, my Lord, that I
am Protector of Peru?'--'No,'--said his Lordship, 'I ordered my
secretaries to inform you of it,' returned San Martin. 'That is
now unnecessary, for you have personally informed me,' said his
Lordship; 'I hope that the friendship which has existed between
San Martin and myself will continue to exist between the Protector
of Peru and myself.' San Martin then--rubbing his hands--said,
'I have only to say, that I am Protector of Peru!'"
"The manner in which this last sentence was expressed, roused
the Admiral, who, advancing, said--'Then it becomes me, as
senior officer of Chili, and consequently the representative of the
nation, to request the fulfilment of all the promises made to Chili
and the squadron; but first--and principally--the squadron.' San Martin
returned--'Chili! Chili! I will never pay a single _real_ to Chili! As
to the squadron, you may take it where you please, and go where you
choose; a couple of schooners are quite enough for me;' '_Chili! Chili,
yo nunca pagare 'un real a Chili! y en quanto a la esquadra, puede V
llevarla donde quiere, e irse quando guste, con un par de golestas me
basta a mi_.'"
"On hearing this, Garcia left the room, and Monteagudo walked to the
balcony. San Martin paced the room for a short time and turning to his
Lordship, said,--'Forget, my Lord, what is past.' The admiral
replied--'I will, when I can,' and immediately left the palace."
His Lordship was now undeceived by the man himself; the repeated reports
he had heard of his past conduct crowded on his imagination, and knowing
what might be attempted, from what had been already done, his Lordship
agreed with me, that his life was not safe ashore. He therefore
immediately took horse--rode to Boca Negra, and went on board his
frigate[1].
[Footnote 1: "_Twenty Years Residence in South America_,"
by W.B. STEVENSON, Secretary to Lord Cochrane, Vice-Admiral of Chili,
&c. &c. 1825.]
One thing has been omitted in the preceding narrative. General San
Martin, following me to the staircase, had the temerity to propose to me
to follow his example--viz. to break faith with Chilian Government to
which we had both sworn--to abandon the squadron to his interests--and
to accept the higher grade of "First Admiral of Peru." I need scarcely
say that a proposition so dishonourable was declined; when in a tone of
irritation he declared that "he would neither give the seamen their
arrears of pay, nor the gratuity he had promised."
On arriving at the flag-ship, I found the following official
communication, requesting me to fire a salute in honour of San Martin's
self-elevation to the protectorship:--
Lima, 4th Aug. 1821.
MY LORD,
His Excellency the Protector of Peru commands
me to transmit to you the annexed organic decree, announcing his
exaltation to the Supreme Authority; in order that the squadron
may be informed of this momentous event, and that the new
Government may be acknowledged by the naval department under
your command, belonging to the Republic of Chili.
I hope, that duly estimating this high act, you will cause it to be
celebrated with all the dignity which is compatible with the martial
usage of the naval service.
(Signed) MONTEAGUDO.
Attested by the _Rubrica_ of the Protector.
Though this was a request to acknowledge General San Martin as invested
with the attributes of a Sovereign Prince, I complied with it in the
hope that quiet remonstrance might recal him to a sense of duty to the
Chilian Government, no less than to his own true interests. On the 7th
of August, I addressed to him the following letter:--
Callao Roads, 7th Aug. 1821.
MY DEAR GENERAL,
I address you for the last time under your late designation,
being aware that the liberty I may take as a friend might
not be deemed decorous to you under the title of "Protector," for I
shall not with a gentleman of your understanding take into account,
as a motive for abstaining to speak truth, any chance of your
resentment. Nay, were I certain that such would be the effect of this
letter, I would nevertheless perform such an act of friendship, in
repayment of the support you gave me at a time when the basest
plots and plans were laid for my dismissal from the Chilian Service,
for no other reason than that certain influential persons of shallow
understanding and petty expedients hate those who despise mean
acts accomplished by low cunning.
Permit me, my dear General, to give you the experience of
eleven years during which I sat in the first senate in the world,
and to say what I anticipate on the one hand, and what I fear
on the other, nay, what I foresee; for that which is to come, in
regard to the acts of Governments and Nations, may as certainly
be predicted from history, as the revolutions of the solar system.
You have it in your power to be the Napoleon of South America,
as you have it in your power to be one of the greatest men now
acting on the theatre of the world; but you have also the power
to choose your course, and if the first steps are false, the eminence
on which you stand will, as though from the brink of a precipice,
make your fall the more heavy and the more certain.
The rocks on which the South American Government have
split have hitherto been bad faith, and consequent temporary
expedients. No man has yet arisen, save yourself, capable of
soaring aloft, and with eagle eye embracing the expanse of the
political horizon. But if in your flight, like Icarus, you trust to
waxen wings, your descent may crush the rising liberties of Peru,
and involve all South America in anarchy, civil war, and political
despotism.
The real strength of Government is public opinion. What
would the world say, were the Protector of Peru, as his first act, to
cancel the bonds of San Martin, even though gratitude may be a
private and not a public virtue? What would they say, were the
Protector to refuse to pay the expense of that expedition which
placed him in his present elevated situation? What would they
say, were it promulgated to the world that he intended not even to
remunerate those employed in the navy which contributed to his
success.
What good can be arrived at by a crooked path that cannot be
attained by a straight and open way? Who has advised a tortuous
policy and the concealment of the real sentiments and intentions of
Government? Has an intriguing spirit dictated the refusal of pay
to the Chilian navy, whilst the army is doubly paid? Is it proposed
thus to alienate the minds of the men from their present service, and
by such policy to obtain them for the service of Peru? If so, the
effect will, I predict, be the contrary, for they have looked, and do
look, to Peru for their remuneration, and, if disappointed, they will
feel accordingly.
See to what a state the Senate had brought the beautiful and
fertile province of Chili. Nay, had not their notorious want of
faith deprived them, notwithstanding their mines, their confiscated
and public lands, of the means possessed even by the Spanish
Government, and of the credit necessary to procure a dollar in any
foreign country, or even in their own? I say, therefore, my dear
General, that whoever has advised you to commence your Protectorship
with devices unworthy of San Martin, is either a thoughtless
or a wicked man, whom you should for ever banish from your
counsels.
My dear General, look to the flattering addresses presented by
the servile of all countries to the most base in power. Think not
that it is to the person of San Martin that the public are attached.
Believe not, that without a straight and dignified course you can
obtain the admiration or love of mankind. So far yet you have
succeeded, and, thank God, it is in your power to succeed yet
farther. Flatterers are more dangerous than the most venomous
serpents, and next to them are men of knowledge, if they have not
the integrity or courage to oppose bad measures, when formally
discussed, or even when casually spoken of.
What political necessity existed for any temporary concealment
of the sentiments of Government in regard to the fate of the
Spaniards in Peru? Were not the army and the people ready to
support your measures, and did not the latter call aloud for their
expulsion? Believe me, my dear General, that after your
declaration, even the seizing on Spanish property belonging to
those who remain, is an act which ought not to be resorted to without
crime on their part subsequently committed.
In the feelings of my breast no man can deceive me. Of the sentiments
of others, I judge by my own, and I tell you what they are
as an honest man and a friend.
I could say much to you, my dear General, on other subjects of
little inferior importance, but as the foregoing are the only acts
immediately contemplated of which I have acquired a knowledge,
and which are, in their consequences, ruinous, I shall, at present,
only add, that had kings and princes but one man in their
dominions who would, on all occasions, utter the naked truth,
multifarious errors would be avoided, and the mischief to mankind
would be infinitely less.
You will plainly perceive that I have no personal interests in
these, or any other points, at variance with yours; but, on the
contrary, if I were base and interested, I have now taken a decisive
and irrevocable step to ruin my prospects; having no other security
for such not being the consequence of my candour save my good
opinion of your judgment and your heart.
Believe me, under all circumstances, your attached friend,
COCHRANE.
To this letter, on the 9th of August, General San Martin replied as
follows:--
Lima, 9th August, 1821.
My Lord,
The best proof of friendship that can be given by
you is the sincere announcement of your opinions as to the course
I should follow in my new political character.
Assuredly you have not erred, when, under the title of Protector,
you do not anticipate any change in my personal character. Happily,
the alteration is only in a name, which, in my opinion, was
required for the benefit of the country; and if, in the character in
which you have known me, you have met with _civility_ and frankness,
it would be an injustice to deny me confidence, having always
listened to you as an enlightened person, experienced in the world;
especially as you do me justice in enabling me to make observations
on the spirit of your last communication.
I am aware that good faith in one who presides over a nation, is
the vital spirit of its prosperity; and as, in this respect, a singular
current of success has called me temporarily to the supreme magistracy
of this country, I should renounce the advantages acquired
and betray my principles, if vanity or servile acquiescence in bad
advice were to induce me to deviate from the social interests of
Peru, and so expose it to the evils which in such case you dread.
I know, my Lord, that one cannot fly with waxen wings. I perceive
the course I ought to pursue, and that, however great the
advantages already gained, there are rocks which, _without the aid of
prudence and good faith_, must be encountered.
By good fortune, I have not forgotten the maxim of religiously
adhering to the word of a gentleman, which, as General, has been
the pivot on which my anticipations have rested.
It now behoves me to explain my engagements towards the
Chilian squadron, to which, it is very gratifying to declare that
Peru, in part, owes its liberty; an acknowledgment which would
have been made on the medals coined, if, in the hurry of business,
_I had been able to give my attention to the subject of the inscription
that was presented to me as a model!_ You yourself have heard me
eulogise its merits and services.
I have offered to the crews of the squadron of Chili twelve
months' pay, as an acknowledgment of its services, and am employed
in providing the means, and also in endeavouring to collect the
reward of 50,000 dollars which _you_ offered to the seamen who should
capture the _Esmeralda_, and I am not only disposed to pay these sums,
but to recompense valour displayed in the cause of the country.
But you know, my Lord, that the wages of the crews do not
come under these circumstances, and that I--_never having engaged
to pay the amount--am not obliged to do so!_ That debt is due from
Chili, whose government engaged the seamen. Although it may
be just, in the state of its finances, to indemnify Chili in some
degree for the expeditionary expenses, that will be, for me, an
agreeable consideration; but in no degree will I acknowledge a right
to claim arrears of pay!
If I could forget the services of the squadron, and the sacrifices
of Chili, I should manifest ingratitude, which, neither as a public
or private virtue will I ever forego; but it is as imprudent to lavish
rewards, as to withhold them from the meritorious. I am engaged
in finding means to realize measures as regards the squadron, which
I intend to propose to the Supreme Government of Chili, and thus
conciliate all interests.
Your affectionate friend,
JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.
To Lord Cochrane, Vice-Admiral of Chili.
In this letter, San Martin attributes his usurpation to a "singular
current of success;" omitting to state that he neither achieved one
blow, nor devised one plan which led to it, whilst he had all along
offered it every obstruction in his power. He declares that the
arrogation of the fall of the Spaniards, attributed by the inscription
on the medal to the army and himself, was a mistake, brought about by
"his not being able, in the hurry of business, to give attention to the
model presented to him;" whereas the inscription was his own writing,
after days of deliberation and consultation with others, who advised him
not to mention the squadron in the inscription.
In this letter he repudiates all connection with Chili, though he had
sworn fidelity to the republic as its Captain General. He denies ever
having engaged to pay the squadron their wages, though on no other
condition had it put to sea from Valparaiso, and his own handwriting to
this specific promise was accepted as the inducement. Though himself an
officer of Chili, he treats Chili as a state with which he had nothing
to do, whose debts he declares that he will not pay, as he had
previously told me on the 4th of August; finally, he says that he will
propose to Chili to pay its own seamen! As to his promises to give the
men a twelvemonths' pay in acknowledgment of their services, this was
neither intended nor given; whilst, as to the 50,000 dollars promised to
the captors of the _Esmeralda_, which he is "endeavouring to collect,"
he had long before "collected" many times the amount from the old
Spaniards--who had offered a similar reward for the capture of any
vessels of the Chilian squadron--and kept it. Fortunately, his own
letters prove these matters, which otherwise I should have hesitated to
mention, unsupported by testimony so irrefutable.
General San Martin afterwards denied to the Chilian Government that he
refused, on the 4th of August, to pay the squadron. Here is the same
assertion, in his own handwriting, on the 9th! During the whole of this
time the squadron was in a state of literal destitution; even the
provisions necessary for its subsistence being withheld from it, though
the Protector had abundant means of supplying them; but his object was
to starve both officers and men into desertion--so as to accelerate the
dismemberment of the squadron which I would not give up to his ambitious
views.
The sound advice contained in my letter General San Martin never
forgave--and he afterwards fell exactly as I had predicted--there was no
merit in the prophecy, for similar causes lead to like effects. Adhering
to my own duty, I felt that I was free from his command, and determined
to follow no other course than to carry out, as far as lay in my power,
the pledge of the Chilian Government to the Peruvian people.
Concealing for the present his resentment, and reflecting that the forts
of Callao were still in the hands of the Spaniards, the Protector
endeavoured to explain away the disagreeable nature of our interview on
the 4th of August, by asserting, "that he only said, or meant to say,
that it might be interesting to Chili to _sell some of her vessels of
war to Peru_, because the latter wanted them for the protection of her
coasts;" adding, that "the Government of Chili would at all times devote
their squadron to the furtherance of the cause of Peru." He repeated,
that the arrears of pay to the squadron should be liquidated, as well as
the rewards which had been promised.
As none of these were forthcoming, the squadron began to shew symptoms
of mutiny at the conduct of the Protector. On the 11th of August I wrote
to him, apprising him of the increasing discontent of the seamen, again
requesting payment. On this a decree was issued, ordering one-fifth of
the customs receipts to be set aside for the joint pay of the army and
navy, but as the fortress and port of Callao were in the hands of the
Spaniards, these receipts were most insignificant, and the measure was
rightly regarded by the squadron as a subterfuge.
To this communication the Protector replied, on the 13th of August--at
the same time hinting that I might _reconsider_ my refusal to accept the
command of the contemplated Peruvian navy.
The subjoined is his letter:--
Lima, 13th of August, 1821. MY LORD,
In my official letter addressed to you on the disagreeable business of
paying the squadron, which causes us so much uneasiness, I have told you
that it is impossible to do as we wish. I have nothing to add, unless my
previous declaration, that I shall never view with indifference any
thing that interests you. I told you in Valparaiso, that "your lot
should be equal to mine" and I believe myself to have proved that my
intentions have not varied--nor can vary, because every day renders my
actions more important.
No, my Lord, I do not view with indifference anything which concerns
you, and I shall be deeply grieved, if you do not wait till I can
onvince you of the truth. If, however, in despite of all this, you
determine on the course, which, at our interview a few days ago, you
proposed to take, it will be for me a difficulty from which I cannot
extricate myself, but I hope that--_conforming yourself to my
wishes_--you will conclude the work begun, on which our common lot
depends.
Adieu, my Lord, I repeat that I am, with sincere esteem, your eternal
friend,
JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.
The assertion, that he could not satisfy the seamen, was a subterfuge;
he had abundance of money, derived from the wholesale spoliation of the
Spaniards, to which indefensible course I had alluded in my letter of
August 7th. He also hoped that "_conforming to his wishes_," I would
accept the appointment of "First Admiral;" the consequence of
which--together with the decree transferring the Chilian
officers--without their consent--to the service of Peru, would have been
to turn over to his Government the Chilian squadron.