THE WAR AND AFTER
Never did year dawn so black for American industry as did 1915. The
financial world, stunned by Germany’s unexpected attempt at world
conquest, could see only the immense economic waste that war is. That
the conflict in Europe could have a stimulating effect on American
industry seemed unthinkable at that dark period, and industry as a
whole seemed shaken to its foundations. Steel, the barometer of trade,
naturally reflected this situation sharply.
At the close of 1914, as we have seen, operations of the Corporation’s
subsidiaries reached the lowest point on record and the new year
brought with it no sign of early betterment. Hence it was natural that
all except the most confirmed optimists faced the future with doubt if
not with dread.
This situation reflected itself plainly in the big company’s profits,
which that January fell to $1,687,150. This proved to be the low point,
however, a slight revivification of business beginning to make itself
felt the following month, and being even more pronounced in March, when
operations reached 60 per cent. capacity. But even then conditions were
far from being satisfactory, earnings for the last month of the quarter
aggregating only $7,132,081, and for the three months, $12,457,809.
But, difficult as it was to realize it at the time, the war was
destined to bring to American business the biggest boom it had ever
experienced. As the struggle developed the Allied powers had brought
home to them sharply their great shortage of war materials. Germany,
preparing years before for the struggle, had at the start an immense
preponderance of guns, shells, automobiles, airplanes, and other
articles, and there was no hope of crushing the Kaiser’s hordes unless
and until the Entente could meet its foe on equal terms measured in
material.
It had become a war of machines, a war largely of steel. And the
Allies’ production of steel and machines could not be brought up to
the point necessary to make victory certain. There was no country but
America to turn to for the needed supplies.
Wire was the first product which felt the stimulus of the new demand.
Before the beginning of 1915 both sides had settled down to the slow
warfare of the trenches, and for the protection of these hundreds
of thousands of miles of barbed wire were necessary. England,
although until the beginning of the twentieth century the principal
steel-manufacturing country in the world, had never devoted much of
her capacity to wire products, and even before the war had been in the
custom of importing a large part of her need of this commodity from the
United States. And in their extremity both England and France looked
across the Atlantic for more and more of this particular product, and
the wire mills of the Steel Corporation and other producers here began
to increase output and to show improving earnings.
Then came the demand for shrapnel bars, steel for explosive shells,
guns, automobiles, trucks, and almost every article used in modern
warfare. Russia, attempting to move immense armies with inadequate
railroad transportation facilities, began to ask for locomotives and
steel cars in large numbers, as well as steel rails to run them on,
and the export steel trade of this country grew to unprecedented
proportions.
[Illustration: Making a Steel Tube]
Before the middle of the year the Corporation was operating on 90 per
cent. capacity and was sending abroad one third of all the steel it
produced. In the best pre-war year foreign shipments had amounted to
only 18 per cent. of the output of the big company’s plants.
[Illustration: Steel Transportation by Man Power in China]
With the revival of the steel and Allied industries caused by the war
demand domestic trade began to pick up, industry generally revived,
and a spirit of optimism replaced the gloom that had been casting
its shadow over the business world. As the trade balance of the
United States for the first time in history reached and passed the
billion-dollar mark it became plain that the war, great evil as it was,
was making America rich. A boom was on.
How marked was the trade revival in 1915 is indicated by a comparison
of the Corporation’s earnings for the four quarters of the year: First
quarter, $12,457,809; second, $27,950,055; third, $38,710,644; fourth,
$51,277,504.
Keener and keener grew the war demand as the months rolled on. The
Allies, calling more and yet more on their man power to fill up the
gaps in the fighting line, found it increasingly difficult to meet the
ever-growing need for war materials and leaned more and more heavily on
our manufacturers. The price of steel, under the enormous buying power
from abroad and the increased demand at home, advanced rapidly, nor did
this advance let up until the latter part of 1917, when, the United
States having at length united her fortunes with England, France,
and the other countries defending civilization, prices were fixed by
agreement with the Government.
Germany’s submarine warfare tended still further to aggravate the
world’s shortage of steel. The enormous tonnage of vessels sunk by
the undersea raiders necessitated replacement by new ships, and in
the summer of 1917 purchases of ship plate became so heavy that this
particular product sold in some instances at twelve cents a pound or
more, compared to an average price of around one and a quarter cents
before the war.
United States Steel’s management, however, notwithstanding its desire
to show large profits to stockholders, could not, consistently with
the price policy it had followed for many years, countenance these
extravagant prices. Its quotations at no time were as high as 50 per
cent. of these levels. It steadfastly set its face against taking
advantage of the world’s need to exact the highest prices the market
could bear. Nevertheless, it showed enormous profits and paid large
dividends to stockholders during the period.
One branch of the steel industry that was immensely stimulated by the
war was by-product coke production. In this particular field Germany
had led the world for years, although it was not until the war started
that the other nations realized her secret object in fostering the
development of these by-products and had brought home to them the cost
of their neglect in this respect.
Coke by-products, benzol, toluol, xylol, etc., form the bases of
practically all modern explosives. They also form the bases for modern
dyes. And Germany for years had studiously cultivated the color markets
of the world, and encouraged her manufacturers and scientists to
increase production of these bases and to refine processes until she
had practically eliminated competition in dyes.
Other countries, lacking in militarism as well as in foresight, did
nothing to assist the development of this industry. They failed to see
that in eliminating competition in dyes in peace time Germany left her
intended victims without the means of making explosives in wartime. She
could well afford, her intentions being what they were, to sell the
world dyes even at a loss, believing as she did that the result was to
give her a death grip on the throats of all possible enemies.
Fortunately, Germany was not able to achieve complete success. And
it was the United States Steel Corporation that, more than any other
single factor in this country, stood in her way.
Many years before the war, the Corporation’s management, realizing the
value of saving the by-products of coal, had itself started to develop
this field, and it was therefore a comparatively simple thing for it to
make necessary additions to by-product plants to turn out the benzol,
toluol, and other products which go into high explosives. Within a
comparatively short time after the conflict started the Corporation was
producing these materials at the rate of 10,000,000 gallons a year,
and by the time the war closed it had increased its capacity to around
40,000,000 gallons.
Hand in hand with the development of this branch of the steel industry
the American dye industry grew. In this respect, at least, Germany
benefited the world. But, it might be stated parenthetically, our
dye industry is not yet strong enough to stand of itself against the
German competition that will most certainly be renewed. It is to be
hoped that the Government of the United States will never forget the
lesson learned in the war, and will lend American dye manufacturers
encouragement at least sufficient to make it certain that no possible
future attack will find us unready in the matter of explosive
production.
The years 1916 and 1917 were by far the most profitable ever enjoyed
by the Steel Corporation. In the final quarter of 1916 net earnings
reached the unprecedented figure of $105,917,438 while earnings for the
year were $333,574,177.
And that earnings for 1917 did not exceed those of the previous year
was due only to the imposition in that year of excess profits taxes. In
1917 the Corporation, after deducting over $233,000,000 from earnings
to cover these taxes, showed a balance of $295,292,180. In other words,
its earnings before taxes were close to $530,000,000.
On April 6, 1917, the United States became a participant in the
struggle which had now come to be called the “World War.” And shortly
after this occurred American steel manufacturers were called upon to
sacrifice to patriotism part of their profits and to sell steel to the
Government, its Allies, and the public at prices considerably lower
than those which would otherwise have been obtainable in the open
market.
J. Leonard Replogle was appointed Director of Steel Supplies, and he,
in conjunction with the War Industries Board appointed by the President
to regulate and coördinate for war purposes the supply of industrial
products generally, met with the steel manufacturers early in September
of that year and agreed on a scale of prices for steel which, in the
case of some products at least, were less than half those quoted in the
open market.
It is a matter of gratification that our steel manufacturers, nearly
all of them, responded freely and patriotically to the Government’s
request. And of them all there was none that showed more willingness
to assist Mr. Replogle in his difficult task of fixing a fair scale of
steel prices than United States Steel. As a matter of fact, the prices
eventually agreed on were not very far away from those being charged by
the big company, which had for many months been consistently below the
market established by its competitors.
Throughout 1918 this scale of prices was maintained with no important
change. On several occasions increases or adjustments were requested by
various manufacturers, but never by the Steel Corporation. And there is
ground for the belief that it was the assistance of this company that
enabled the representatives of the Government to resist the pressure
sometimes brought to bear to secure an adjustment upward. In any event,
the profits of all producers during the period in which prices were
fixed proved clearly that no such increases were necessary to permit
the manufacturers substantial profits.
In fact, all steel companies enjoyed large earnings in 1918. United
States Steel showed net profits for the year, after an appropriation
for taxes of $274,277,835, of $199,350,680.
The immense war profits piled up by the big company in the three
years, 1916 to 1918, permitted more liberal distribution to
shareholders, and for some time extra dividends were paid, making total
disbursements 8¾ per cent. in 1916, 18 per cent. in 1917, and 14 per
cent. in 1918. Throughout the whole period, however, the regular rate
of dividends did not change from 5 per cent. which it still is.
In 1918 the Steel Corporation’s sales grew to the largest volume
on record, $1,288,029,255 or, including inter-company sales,
$1,692,572,000.
During the war boom the rights of the worker had not been forgotten.
Early in 1916, as soon as the improvement in industry became evident, a
wage advance of 10 per cent. was put into effect. Since the beginning
of the war, and up to the date of writing, wages of common labor have
been advanced as follows:
CUMULATIVE
PERCENTAGE AS
DATE OF INCREASE PERCENTAGE OF COMPARED WITH
INCREASE 1915 WAGE
Feb. 1, 1916 10 10
May 1, 1916 13.6 25
Dec. 15, 1916 10 37.5
May 1, 1917 9 50
Oct. 1, 1917 10 65
April 16, 1918 15 90
Aug. 1, 1918 10.5 110
Oct. 1, 1918[C] 10 131
Feb. 1, 1920 10 153
[C] This figure based on ten-hour day. At this time basic day
was changed to eight hours and time and a half paid for
overtime.
With the signing of armistice on November 11, 1918, new problems were
presented to American industry generally and the steel trade was not
exempt. Not even the most far-sighted could tell with any assurance
what would be the effect of the letting up in war demand. It was
realized that capacity had been greatly increased to meet war needs
for steel and it was questioned whether a normal peace demand would be
sufficient to keep the mills employed. Moreover, the trade, recognizing
that a readjustment from a war to a peace basis was inevitable, asked
when it would occur and how long it would last.
In view of these uncertainties many steel manufacturers felt that
Governmental regulation of prices should be continued temporarily,
and at a meeting in Washington with the War Industries Board and the
Director of Steel Supplies, Judge Gary representing the trade, offered
to submit a new scale of prices to replace those in effect during the
war. The Government’s representatives, however, took the viewpoint that
it would be better to let prices be regulated only by the law of supply
and demand, and left the manufacturers free to sell steel at whatever
levels they could obtain.
Nevertheless, the trade put into effect the suggested new scale and
this continued to operate for about four months. This scale averaged
about $7.00 a ton lower than the prices obtaining under Government
control.
But peace was to bring yet another reduction in prices. About the
beginning of March, 1919, President Wilson, taking the stand that
deflation of prices generally was necessary before business could
return to normal, and that this deflation could be regulated and made
orderly if the Government assisted, appointed an Industrial Board
at the head of which was George N. Peek, to bring about the desired
results. The steel manufacturers were called upon first to coöperate
with this Board, and they responded readily. On March 20th a new scale
of prices, about $5.00 a ton below the levels existing in the first
part of the year, and about $12.00 a ton below the War Industries Board
prices, was agreed to.
But the settlement of steel prices was the only thing ever accomplished
by the Board. The President’s plans for regulated deflation came to
naught.
Prior to their conferences with Mr. Peek the steel men had been given
to understand that if a price scale satisfactory to both sides could be
reached the Railroad Administration, then operating all the country’s
transportation systems, would place necessary orders for steel, and
this understanding accounted in large part for their readiness to meet
the Government representatives halfway.
The railroads, it was generally recognized, needed steel badly for
rails, cars, locomotives, and other equipment. For years their
purchases had been entirely inadequate to meet the growing needs of
the country’s commerce, and their potential demand was therefore
very large. In the then period of uncertainty it was felt that the
purchasing of these railroad supplies would steady business and
stimulate other demands, acting as a safety valve against a possible
depression.
But the Railroad Administration declined to honor the promise,
expressed or implied, of the Government. Director-General Walker D.
Hines claimed that the prices agreed on for rails were unreasonably
high and the three-cornered dispute that followed between Mr.
Hines, Mr. Peek, and the railmakers resulted in the dissolution of
the Industrial Board and the withdrawing by the Government from
any attempt to regulate the price of steel or other commodities.
Followed a period of general business uncertainty, a let-up in buying
activities felt keenly by the steel mills. The responsibility for
this situation must be placed largely at the door of the Railroad
Administration. The roads, with the possible exception of the farmers,
are the largest consumers of steel and of many other products in the
country. Prosperity was hardly possible in steel trade without railroad
buying, that is, under normal conditions. There was no question that
the railroads were exceedingly short of supplies and the practically
unanimous opinion was that if they began to place orders covering their
requirements it would have a stimulating effect on business generally
and would dissolve the doubt and hesitation that hung over the
financial world during the period of transition from war to peace.
But the Railroad Administration declined to make any move. One of its
highest officials informed the writer, who pointed out to him the
importance of some definite action to help restore business balance,
that he did not consider it the Railroad Administration’s duty to in
any way “hold the bag” for business.
Ostensibly, the Railroad Director based his refusal to place orders
for rails and other material required by the roads on the ground
that prices were too high. There is little question that he and his
associates believed that, by holding off, the steel companies would
be forced to reduce prices further to induce railroad buying. The
result must have been a severe disappointment, for when the roads did
begin to buy, they had to pay, for a substantial part of the tonnage
purchased, prices $10.00 a ton or more higher than those agreed on by
the Industrial Board, though the Steel Corporation has consistently
maintained the Industrial Board prices.
As a matter of fact, the end of the war found the whole world starving
for steel. For five years steel needed for a million uses of commerce
had been diverted to the terrible business of war. And it did not take
long for this dammed-up demand to begin to make itself felt. By the
early part of October pulses of business were again beating firmly, and
by the beginning of 1920 a peace boom had taken the place of the war
boom that ended at the close of 1918.
For the year 1919 the Corporation, despite the brief depression the
steel trade went through, reported earnings of $143,589,062 (after
deducting interest and obligations of subsidiary companies), and a
balance available for dividends of $76,794,582. Earnings on the common
stock were $51,574,905, or the equivalent of $10.20 per share.
In the early part of 1920 the steel trade enjoyed a boom that
approached that experienced during the war. The world was filling its
most pressing requirements of material of which it had been starved
while the products of industry were going into munitions and other
war needs. Steel prices ascended to the highest levels attained since
1917, although the Corporation maintained the lower levels fixed by
the Industrial Board in March, 1919. The closing months of the year,
however, witnessed a sharp depression, and at the close of the period
the so-called independent companies were operating at a very low rate
of capacity with practically no forward orders. The Corporation,
because of its price policy earlier in the year, went into 1921 with
its order books filled and with operations at fully 90 per cent. of
capacity.
Earnings of the Corporation for 1920 were $177,126,126 and the net
for the junior stock was equivalent to $16.70 a share. Production of
steel ingots was approximately 19,278,000 tons and of finished steel
14,233,000 tons.
The events of the closing months of 1920 completely vindicated the
judgment of Judge Gary and his associates, both on the matter of prices
and in their preparation for the inevitable reaction of the earlier
boom period. During the previous three years the Corporation had been
steadily creating a reserve for anticipated inventory losses, this
reserve amounting to $90,000,000 at the end of 1919. Thus, when the
reaction did arrive the Corporation was not faced with the necessity,
as others were, of scaling down inventories with consequent losses of
earnings.
Within the past few weeks the independents, who for a year or more
had been quoting prices greatly in excess of those charged by the big
company, reduced their prices to an average several dollars a ton below
the Corporation’s, with an accompanying, and substantial, cut in wages
(20% to 30%). The Corporation at the time this is written (February
18, 1921) is “still doing business at the old stand” both as regards
prices and wages and is thus safeguarding the interests of both its
customers and its employees.
We have now followed the Corporation’s fortunes through practically
twenty years, seeing it grow stronger and more firmly established both
as a manufacturing entity and financially, as well as with the public
and particularly with the investor, from year to year. What of the
future?
There are, of course, uncertainties at present, and there will be from
time to time as the years go by. The history of business has been one
of prosperity and depression periodically, and the Corporation is not
exempt from the effect of these. But its immense accumulated financial
strength, its huge working capital, the good will it has erected
among consumers, employees, and the public generally, combined with
the fact that it has come scatheless and with increased honor through
a bitter attack by the Government, give ample justification for the
belief that it will grow and expand along healthy lines and to the
increasing financial benefit of stockholders as the years roll on. The
Corporation, in the past, has proven itself strong enough to weather
business depressions and it is now many times as strong financially and
in every other respect as it has ever been.
Conditions in the steel trade are not encouraging for the immediate
future. The industry is apparently going through the period of
deflation from a war to a peace basis just as are other industries all
over the world, but while the immediate future is somewhat cloudy, the
outlook for steel, if one looks ahead several years, is unquestionably
bright. The world shortage of the metal caused by the war was by no
means filled during the period of activity that lasted from October,
1919, to September, 1920. There is every reason to believe that the
world still needs steel in immense quantities for the myriad uses in
which the metal is employed, not only for future expansion but for
replacement which should have occurred during the war years. As soon as
the economic and financial difficulties from which the world is now
suffering have been overcome--and the signs on the sky are that these
clouds are already being dissipated--a great demand for steel can be
prognosticated.
And United States Steel with its twenty-two million odd tons of
capacity, its great resources, its good will, and its wonderful
organization, will undoubtedly share generously in this anticipated
trade revival. For it and for its stockholders the future holds a
bright and glowing promise.
Perhaps no better conclusion for this volume can be found than the
remark recently made to the writer by one of the leading independent
steel makers. He said:
“United States Steel is a remarkable organization. Nothing like it
exists or ever existed. It is in a class by itself.”
APPENDIX
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION
Table showing percentage of total steel and iron output of the United
States produced by the U. S. Steel Corporation in the years 1901, 1911,
1913, and 1919. Figures for 1901 and 1911 are from the exhibit in the
dissolution suit and for 1913 and 1919 from the reports of the American
Iron & Steel Institute.
1901 1911 1913 1919
Iron ore from Lake Superior Ranges 61.6 54.3 50.46 45.94
Total iron ore 45.1 45.8 46.37 42.05
Total blast furnace products 43.2 45.4 45.47 43.97
Steel ingots and castings 65.7 53.9 53.21 49.61
Steel rails 59.8 56.1 55.51 61.96
Heavy structural shapes 62.2 47.0 54.03 43.77
Plates and sheets 64.6 45.7 49.13 44.30
Wire rods 77.6 64.7 58.44 55.42
Total finished products 50.1 45.7 47.81 44.60
Wire nails 65.8 51.4 44.55 51.86
Tin and terne plates 73.0 60.7 58.64 48.44
Summary of earnings and distribution thereof since organization:
Net profits from April 1, 1901 to December 31, 1919 $1,732,070,796
Deductions; special reserves, etc. 32,227,566
Balance of profits 1,699,843,230
Preferred dividends paid (131¼ per cent.) 496,391,722
Common dividends paid (89½ per cent.) 454,908,882
Total dividends paid 951,300,604
Surplus profits 748,542,626
Appropriations for capital expenditures, etc. 280,494,424
Balance of profits carried to surplus account 468,048,202
Summary of undivided surplus:
Surplus or working capital provided at organization $ 25,000,000
Balance of surplus accumulated to Dec., 1919 468,048,202
Total undivided surplus 493,048,202
Appropriated surplus 280,494,424
Total appropriated and undivided surplus 773,542,626
Table of number of common stockholders as shown by the Corporation’s
books each quarter since organization in 1901. These figures indicate
how the Corporation’s junior stock has been widely distributed and how
it has grown in favor with investors in recent years particularly.
YEAR 4TH QTR. 3D QTR. 2D QTR. 1ST QTR.
1920 95,776 90,952 87,229 83,583
1919 73,318 73,456 74,071 78,018
1918 72,779 65,862 63,507 61,044
1917 51,689 44,789 43,482 42,564
1916 37,720 40,430 41,156 41,910
1915 45,767 51,169 55,907 56,825
1914 52,785 50,195 47,695 47,221
1913 46,460 44,398 41,324 38,679
1912 34,213 34,645 35,106 36,555
1911 35,011 31,472 29,853 29,235
1910 28,850 28,910 24,435 22,033
1909 18,615 16,861 17,342 21,522
1908 21,093 24,804 27,439 29,563
1907 28,435 20,513 18,539 15,975
1906 14,723 14,879 [D]---- 17,525
1905 20,075 [D]---- [D]---- 24,531
1904 33,395 35,706 [D]---- 36,980
1903 37,237 34,997 28,987 26,830
1902 24,636 21,321 19,640 17,723
1901 15,887 13,318 ---- ----
[D] No figures available.
PRODUCTION (GROSS TONS)
=================================================================
| 1902 | 1903 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
Ore mined | 16,063,179 | 15,363,355 |
Coal mined--not for making coke | 709,367 | 1,120,733 |
Limestone | 1,313,120 | 1,268,930 |
Coke | 9,521,567 | 8,658,391 |
Pig Iron, Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese | 7,975,530 | 7,279,241 |
Bessemer Steel | 6,759,210 | 6,191,660 |
Open-hearth Steel | 2,984,708 | 2,976,300 |
Finished Steel | 8,197,232 | 7,635,690 |
Cement (bbls.) | 486,357 | 644,286 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
=================================================================
| 1904 | 1905 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
Ore mined | 10,503,087 | 18,486,556 |
Coal mined--not for making coke | 1,998,000 | 2,204,950 |
Limestone | 1,393,149 | 1,967,355 |
Coke | 8,652,293 | 12,242,909 |
Pig Iron, Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese | 7,369,421 | 10,172,148 |
Bessemer Steel | 5,427,979 | 7,379,188 |
Open-hearth Steel | 2,978,399 | 4,616,015 |
Finished Steel | 6,792,780 | 9,226,386 |
Cement (bbls.) | 539,951 | 1,735,343 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
===============================================================
| 1906 | 1907
--------------------------------------+------------+-----------
Ore mined | 20,645,148 | 22,403,801
Coal mined--not for making coke | 1,912,444 | 3,550,510
Limestone | 2,227,436 | 2,957,163
Coke | 13,295,075 | 12,373,938
Pig Iron, Spiegel and Ferro-Manganese | 11,058,526 | 10,631,620
Bessemer Steel | 8,072,655 | 7,556,460
Open-hearth Steel | 5,438,494 | 5,543,088
Finished Steel | 10,578,433 | 10,376,742
Cement (bbls.) | 2,076,000 | 2,129,700
--------------------------------------+------------+-----------
=================================================================
| 1908 | 1909 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
Ore mined | 16,662,715 | 23,431,047 |
Coal mined--not for coke making | 3,008,810 | 3,089,021 |
Limestone | 2,186,007 | 3,496,071 |
Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 7,591,062 | 11,896,211 |
Coke Manufactured--By-product | 578,869 | 1,693,901 |
Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 6,934,408 | 11,618,350 |
Bessemer Steel | 4,055,275 | 5,846,300 |
Open-hearth Steel | 3,783,438 | 7,508,889 |
Finished Steel | 6,206,932 | 9,859,660 |
Cement (bbls.) | 4,535,300 | 5,786,000 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
=================================================================
| 1910 | 1911 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
Ore mined | 25,245,816 | 19,933,631 |
Coal mined--not for coke making | 4,850,111 | 5,290,671 |
Limestone | 5,005,087 | 4,835,703 |
Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 11,641,105 | 9,491,206 |
Coke Manufactured--By-product | 2,008,473 | 2,629,006 |
Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 11,831,398 | 10,744,897 |
Bessemer Steel | 5,796,223 | 5,055,696 |
Open-hearth Steel | 8,383,146 | 7,697,674 |
Finished Steel | 10,733,995 | 9,476,248 |
Cement (bbls.) | 7,001,500 | 7,737,500 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
=================================================================
| 1912 | 1913 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
Ore mined | 26,428,449 | 28,738,451 |
Coal mined--not for coke making | 5,905,153 | 6,705,381 |
Limestone | 6,124,541 | 6,338,509 |
Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 11,544,840 | 11,062,138 |
Coke Manufactured--By-product | 5,164,547 | 5,601,342 |
Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 14,186,164 | 14,080,730 |
Bessemer Steel | 6,643,147 | 6,131,809 |
Open-hearth Steel | 10,258,076 | 10,524,552 |
Finished Steel | 12,506,619 | 12,374,838 |
Cement (bbls.) | 10,114,500 | 11,197,000 |
--------------------------------------+------------+------------+
==================================================
| 1914
--------------------------------------+-----------
Ore mined | 17,034,981
Coal mined--not for coke making | 5,271,911
Limestone | 4,676,479
Coke Manufactured--Beehive | 7,092,792
Coke Manufactured--By-product | 4,081,122
Pig Iron, Spiegel, etc. | 10,052,457
Bessemer Steel | 4,151,510
Open-hearth Steel | 7,674,966
Finished Steel | 9,014,512
Cement (bbls.) | 9,116,000
--------------------------------------+-----------
===========================================================
| 1915 | 1916 |
--------------------------------+------------+------------+
Ore mined | 23,669,676 | 33,355,169 |
Coal mined--not for making coke | 5,828,278 | 6,162,430 |
Limestone | 5,795,925 | 7,023,474 |
Coke--Beehive | 9,701,692 | 12,479,160 |
Coke--By-product | 4,799,126 | 6,422,802 |
Pig iron, Spiegel, etc. | 13,641,508 | 17,607,637 |
Bessemer Steel | 5,584,198 | 7,273,766 |
Open-hearth Steel | 10,792,294 | 13,636,823 |
Finished steel | 11,762,639 | 15,460,792 |
Cement (bbls.) | 7,648,658 | 10,425,600 |
--------------------------------+------------+------------+
======================================================================
| 1917 | 1918 | 1919
--------------------------------+------------+------------+-----------
Ore mined | 31,781,769 | 28,332,939 | 25,423,093
Coal mined--not for making coke | 6,942,298 | 6,354,980 | 5,937,487
Limestone | 6,494,917 | 5,141,365 | 5,835,289
Coke--Beehive | 11,177,247 | 9,962,403 | 5,933,056
Coke--By-product | 6,284,428 | 7,795,233 | 9,530,593
Pig iron, Spiegel, etc. | 15,652,928 | 15,940,954 | 13,637,504
Bessemer Steel | 6,405,390 | 5,630,246 | 4,788,242
Open-hearth Steel | 13,879,671 | 13,953,247 | 12,412,131
Finished steel | 14,942,911 | 13,849,483 | 11,997,935
Cement (bbls.) | 10,917,000 | 7,287,000 | 9,112,000
--------------------------------+------------+------------+-----------
INCOME AND DISBURSEMENTS
=========================================================
| | | |
| | | |
| NET INCOME | NET FOR | PFD. |
| | STOCK | DIVIDEND |
--------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
1901 (9 mos.) | $84,779,298 | $61,395,203 | $26,752,894 |
1902 | 133,308,764 | 90,306,524 | 35,720,177 |
1903 | 109,171,152 | 55,416,653 | 30,404,173 |
1904 | 73,176,522 | 30,267,529 | 25,219,677 |
1905 | 119,787,658 | 68,585,492 | 25,219,677 |
1906 | 156,624,273 | 98,128,587 | 25,219,677 |
1907 | 160,964,674 | 104,565,564 | 25,219,677 |
1908 | 91,847,710 | 45,728,714 | 25,219,677 |
1909 | 131,491,414 | 79,073,695 | 25,219,677 |
1910 | 141,054,755 | 87,407,186 | 25,219,677 |
1911 | 104,305,466 | 55,300,296 | 25,219,677 |
1912 | 108,174,673 | 54,240,049 | 25,219,677 |
1913 | 137,181,345 | 81,216,985 | 25,219,677 |
1914 | 71,663,615 | 23,496,768 | 25,219,677 |
1915 | 130,396,012 | 75,833,833 | 25,219,677 |
1916 | 333,674,177 | 271,531,730 | 25,219,677 |
1917 | 295,292,180 | 224,219,565 | 25,219,677 |
1918 | 199,350,680 | 137,532,377 | 25,219,677 |
1919 | 143,589,062 | 76,794,582 | 25,219,677 |
1920[G] | 177,174,126 | 110,136,105 | 25,219,677 |
--------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
================================================================
| COMMON DIVIDEND | |
+------+-------------+ |
| RATE | AMOUNT | APPRORPRI- | SURPLUS
| % | | ATIONS |
--------------+------+-------------+------------+---------------
1901 (9 mos.) | 3 | $15,227,812 | ---- | $19,414,497
1902 | 4 | 20,332,690 | ---- | 34,253,657
1903 | 2½ | 12,707,563 | ---- | 12,304,917
1904 | -- | ---- | ---- | 5,047,852
1905 | -- | ---- | 26,300,000 | 17,065,815
1906 | 2 | 10,166,050 | 50,000,000 | 12,742,860
1907 | 2 | 10,166,050 | 54,000,000 | 15,179,837
1908 | 2 | 10,166,050 | ---- | 10,342,987
1909 | 4 | 20,332,100 | 18,200,000 | 15,321,918
1910 | 5 | 25,415,125 | 26,000,000 | 10,772,384
1911 | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 4,665,495
1912 | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 3,605,247
1913 | 5 | 25,415,125 | 15,000,000 | 15,582,184
1914 | 3 | 15,249,075 | ---- | 16,971,984[E]
1915 | 1¼ | 6,353,781 | ---- | 44,260,374
1916 | 8¾ | 44,476,469 | ---- | 201,835,585
1917 | 18 | 91,949,450 | 55,000,000 | 52,505,438
1918 | 14 | 71,162,350 | ---- | 28,935,350[F]
1919 | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 26,159,780
1920[G] | 5 | 25,415,125 | ---- | 59,501,303
--------------+------+-------------+------------+---------------
[E] Deficit.
[F] After deducting $12,215,000 special allowance for
amortization of war plants.
[G] Figures subject to adjustment.
THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N. Y.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Most of the photographs were printed back-to-back, but in this eBook,
they appear on the pages given in the List of Illustrations.
Some footnote anchors in tables were moved to the other side of the
cell.
Devices that cannot display characters used in this eBook may substitute
question marks or hollow squares.
Pages 310-311: Each of the three “Production (Gross Tons)” tables
(1902-1907, 1908-1914, and 1915-1919) was printed as a single wide
table, but have been split here to meet width restrictions.
Page 312: Table of “Income and Disbursements” was printed as a single
table with eight columns, but has been split here to meet width
restrictions.