THE GREAT STEEL STRIKE
During the World War, there began to gather on the industrial horizon
a cloud no bigger at first than a man’s hand, but one that grew fast
in size until it broke in a storm the effects of which made themselves
felt in every corner of the globe.
This was a general feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction, by no means
confined to one country or one class of people, but having its most
virulent manifestations among the laboring classes, the proletariat.
This unrest was fostered and seized upon by radical leaders everywhere
to further their own ambitions, their object being the overthrow of
capital, the nationalization of industry, and their own aggrandizement.
Nor were they without considerable success in some countries. Russia,
of course, provided the most notable example, and England to-day
is suffering by reason of the same forces; but the United States,
notwithstanding its aloofness from the centre of disturbance, its
prosperity, and the general high average of common sense among its
inhabitants, did not entirely escape.
Here the radical manifestations took the form of industrial strikes
which broke out sporadically in all quarters. It was natural that the
steel industry should not be immune. In fact, it was inevitable that
steel, more than any other industry, should be selected for especial
attention by those who hoped to do away with private ownership and to
establish mob rule.
Among the reasons that may be cited for the selection of the steel
industry, and the United States Steel Corporation in particular, for a
grand attack by the radical forces were the following:
Steel was “open shop.” Since 1892, when the Carnegie Steel Co., in one
of the bloodiest and bitterest industrial conflicts in history, crushed
the Homestead strike, the labor leaders unions had never succeeded in
regaining a foothold in the trade, and it was looked upon as a lost
province by labor leaders who never abandoned the hope of some day
organizing the steel workers. This fact gave the radicals in the labor
ranks confidence that they could count upon the support of the usually
conservative heads of organized labor in America to further their plans
if steel were chosen as a battle-ground. And the events proved that
their confidence was not misplaced.
Further, the physical necessities of steel making are hard on the
worker. Although employers have done much to ameliorate conditions in
the mills and mines, it is impossible to make the work really pleasant
and it was therefore comparatively easy to give verisimilitude to
distorted statements regarding the hard lot of the steel worker.
Again, a large percentage of the common labor in the steel plants was
of alien birth, usually lacking in education and easily influenced by
inflammatory doctrines.
Labor leaders, doubtless, also believed that the long litigation which
the Government had conducted against the Steel Corporation had turned
public sentiment against the big company. If this was a factor in their
calculations they were sadly deceived.
So, briefly, we have the genesis of the steel strike--the determination
of organized labor to absorb steel workers and the seizing upon this by
the radicals as the tool to further their own anarchistic ends.
The strike, when it came, was inaugurated ostensibly to compel the
manufacturers to grant recognition to union “representatives” of the
workers. Steel company officials claimed that its real object was
twofold--to force upon the industry the “closed shop,” and to overthrow
the social scheme upon which the American Republic was grounded.
Labor leaders throughout the struggle consistently denied any intention
of forcing a closed shop. And it is true that they at no time demanded
this in so many words; but the closed shop would have resulted
inevitably had they won. One has only to examine their demands to
realize this.
And the lust for power on the part of the leaders of organized labor
was used by the radicals as a tool with which they hoped to gain a much
greater goal than the closed shop--the nationalization of the steel
industry and, using that as a wedge, of all American industry.
In fighting and smashing the strike the Steel Corporation performed an
invaluable service, not alone to its stockholders or to capital, but to
the vast majority of workers who claimed the right to work at their own
volition and not the dictates of self-appointed leaders; a service to
the American public at large.
Says Mr. Charles Piez, one-time head of the Emergency Fleet
Corporation, in a recent article in _The Independent_:
The real or imaginary wrongs of the workers played not the
slightest part in the decision to organize the steel industry.
It was a citadel of the open shop that was the subject of attack,
it was the last barrier against complete and final unionization of
American industry, against which Foster and Fitzpatrick combined
their wits and resources.
And it is to the everlasting credit of Judge Gary that he
successfully resisted this attack, for it is to the interests of
the public that the principle of the open shop be sustained.
[Illustration: (_Upper_) Part of the Duquesne Works]
[Illustration: (_Lower_) Detail of Unloading Ore--a Hulett Machine]
How important to the labor unions was the hope for organization of
the Steel Corporation is obvious. Between 500,000 and 600,000 workers
are engaged in the industry, the Corporation alone employing about
275,000. Possibly another half million are employed in closely allied
industries. And the steel trade, as well as these allied industries,
has for years looked to the Corporation for guidance on important
questions of public polity. Hence, United States Steel’s adherence to
the open-shop principle was a deep and rankling wound in the side of
the labor unions.
[Illustration: Making Wire Rods--Old Method]
So long as the big enterprise of which Judge Gary is head remained
outside of the union’s fold there was small hope of herding into it any
material number of workers in other plants. U. S. Steel was a citadel
of the open shop, the bulwark between free and union labor. If it could
be converted from “open” to “closed” shop, the early unionization, not
of the steel trade merely, but of all American industry, would follow,
and the power of the union leaders would be expanded to an almost
illimitable extent.
It is doubtful if the older and wiser among the union chieftains would
have forced the issue at the time they did had they been left to their
own decisions. But they were not. They had the radical element to
reckon with.
It is perhaps unnecessary to explain that organized labor in the
United States is divided into two parts: On the one hand, there is the
American Federation of Labor, headed by Samuel Gompers, and including
the great majority of unionized workers. This organization recognizes
property rights and is loyal to the principles of American government.
But its leaders, being only human, are apparently determined to bring
all industry under its sway and are impatient of the ideas of those
workers who prefer to stand on their own feet.
On the other hand, there is a smaller organization, the Industrial
Workers of the World, better known as the I. W. W. or, sometimes, the
“I Won’t Works.” “The wobblies,” as they prefer to call themselves, are
as bitterly opposed to the principles of the larger Federation as they
are to capital. Chief among their tenets is the Marxian fallacy that
labor produces all and capital nothing and that, therefore, capital
must be abolished.
Some years ago there arose to prominence in the councils of the
I. W. W. one William Z. Foster, a man of unquestioned ability but of
principles dangerous and subversive to government. These principles
he set forth in a book on “Syndicalism,” a book which constitutes
one of the most extreme examples of anarchistical literature. Foster
characterizes the wage system as “the most brazen and gigantic robbery
ever perpetrated since the world began.”
Although advocating the most drastic measures for the overthrow of
capital, Foster was apparently sufficiently astute to realize that a
vast majority of the American people, and even of organized labor,
would not and could not accept his views, and that the I. W. W. which
did was not a powerful enough weapon with which to achieve his ends.
He believed, however, and events proved that he was not mistaken, that
the American Federation of Labor could be inoculated with radicalism if
the poison were spread from the inside. He therefore publicly advocated
what he described as the process of “boring from within,” urging that
the radicals join the more conservative Federation and, once inside
that body, disseminate their vicious doctrines from within.
Not long after this we find Foster a member of the Federation,
ostensibly converted from his I. W. W. leanings, enjoying the
confidence of Gompers and his co-workers, and high in their councils.
His “boring” process had met with eminent success.
Meanwhile, the World War was approaching its end, leaving in its wake a
world-wide wave of industrial unrest. Russia was being misgoverned by
its most radical element, who held their power in the midst of a sea of
blood. Communistic doctrines were being preached, openly or _sub rosa_,
in every land and clime. American labor was restless, and the foreign
element, particularly, showed that it had been infected with the fever
of anarchism that was rampant in parts of Europe. The time had come
for the radicals to strike, for the “boring-from-within” process to
bear fruit.
In the early summer of 1918, only a few months before the war ended,
the American Federation of Labor held its annual convention at St.
Paul, Minn., and there passed a resolution offered by Foster for the
organization of the steel industry. A committee was appointed to take
charge of the work and the converted radical, Foster, was made a member
of this committee.
For a full year the committee’s work was carried on quietly. At the
next annual convention of the Federation, this time at Atlantic City,
N. J., John Fitzpatrick, one of Foster’s associates, reporting to
the Federation, claimed that 100,000 steel workers had affiliated
themselves with one or other of the unions belonging to the Federation.
Fitzpatrick was a man of an entirely different type from Foster. Mr.
Piez thus describes him: “He has in the ten years I have known him
never to my knowledge advanced or even advocated any constructive
piece of legislation, and he has held his position with the Chicago
Federation (Fitzpatrick is president of this Federation) because he is
honest and because he is a skilled labor politician. John Fitzpatrick
hasn’t the slightest idea of the problems of industry, he can’t
conceive of overhead expense as anything more than graft, and lacks all
knowledge of the problems of production, distribution, and the sale of
the products of industry. His horizon begins and ends with the wrongs
that labor has suffered, and he usually refers to wrongs that wise
legislation and a changed relationship have remedied years ago.”
But while the labor leaders had been busy collecting dues from and
enlisting sympathy for the “oppressed” steel workers there had, strange
to say, come no call for help from the steel workers themselves. They
made no claim of being down-trodden; rather did many of them resent,
as a slur on their manhood, the insinuation that they were. The union
chiefs have since claimed that they were appealed to by the workers,
but not one iota of evidence has ever been adduced to support this
claim.
Whether or not Fitzpatrick’s report of 100,000 enlistments
was correct--subsequent events indicate that it was grossly
exaggerated--the ruling powers in the American Federation evidently
believed that they now had sufficient strength in the field to attempt
an issue, and events consequently moved forward quickly after the
Atlantic City convention.
Their first move was the sending of a letter by Samuel Gompers to
Judge Gary, asking the head of the Steel Corporation to meet a union
deputation to discuss question affecting the welfare of the workers.
This letter was never answered.
Judge Gary’s refusal to reply to Gompers has been severely criticized
by union sympathizers and others. For example, by some of the members
of the Senate Committee that later investigated the strike. Gompers,
who, in the past, had seen legislatures bow to labor’s mandate, was not
unnaturally shocked at the “discourtesy.” But Judge Gary had enjoyed
a previous experience in corresponding with union representatives. A
courteous reply to a letter on somewhat similar lines from Michael F.
Tighe, president of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and
Tin Workers, in which the Judge had said that the Corporation did not
negotiate with labor unions as such, had been used as a basis for a
report that the big company was “in communication” _ergo_, negotiating,
with the unions, and the Judge did not want this experience repeated.
Whether it might not have been wiser had Judge Gary answered Mr.
Gompers’ letter and obviated the possibility of any misunderstanding
by giving the correspondence to the press is an open question. But he
was probably averse to being drawn into what would likely prove the
beginning of a long epistolatory controversy with the head of the
Labor Federation. This could not but have had an unsettling effect
on the more easily influenced among the steel workers, playing into
Gompers’ hands.
It is also not unlikely that Judge Gary believed the labor unions were
resolved on forcing the issue of organizing the steel industry and that
any verbal preliminaries to the conflict would be worse than useless.
After this abortive attempt on the part of the union to start
negotiations with the steel industry through Judge Gary, and, _ipso
facto_, to gain recognition from the leaders of the industry, events
moved quickly to a climax. Early in July, 1919, the steel-trade
organizers announced that they were taking a vote of the workers, and
not long after made the claim that 98 per cent. of the men employed in
steel making had approved a strike unless the Corporation yielded to a
set of twelve demands drawn up by Foster and his associates. As soon as
these demands were made public it became plain that a steel strike was
inevitable unless the labor organizers receded from their position. The
demands were:
1. Right of collective bargaining.
2. Reinstatement of men discharged for union activities.
3. An eight-hour day.
4. One day’s rest in seven.
5. Abolition of twenty-four-hour shifts.
6. Increase in wages sufficient to guarantee American standard of
living.
7. Standard scales of wages in all trades and classifications of
workers.
8. Double rate of pay for all overtime, holiday, and Sunday work.
9. Check-off system of collecting union dues and assessments.
10. Principles of seniority to apply in maintenance, reduction, and
increase of working force.
11. Abolition of company unions.
12. Abolition of physical examination of applicants for employment.
Some of these demands were merely camouflage, inserted to give the
public an idea of imaginary wrongs against the steel worker. The
steel companies generally have been trying for years to institute a
real eight-hour day and have made the eight-hour day the basis of
wage payments. Practically all steel workers work only six days a
week. The twenty-four-hour shift is borne by a very small percentage
of the workers and by these only on widely separated occasions. The
Corporation and its competitors as well, following its lead, have
repeatedly advanced wages without solicitation from the men, and
the claim that the wage they pay is insufficient to permit American
standards of living has not borne investigation.
But the acceptance of such demands as the recognition of the right of
collective bargaining, coupled with the check-off system of collecting
union dues and assessments, would have handed over the companies,
bound hand and foot, to the unions. The application of the seniority
principle in maintaining, reducing, and increasing working forces
would have obviously made for inefficiency and destroyed the incentive
to effort and good work on the part of the men. Finally, physical
examination of applicants for employment in an industry where sound
health, active muscles, and keen eye-sight are necessary not only for
the safety of the worker himself, but for that of his associates, was
a precaution which the companies could not dispense with in fairness
either to themselves or to their employees.
It is hardly necessary to discuss these demands in further detail. All
the circumstances indicated that they were merely a gauge of battle,
hardly intended for discussion.
These demands were announced by E. J. Evans, who in an interview with
press representatives was quoted as declaring that either they would
be accepted in toto by the Corporation or the steel workers would
strike within a week, shutting down the entire industry. This was about
the middle of August, 1919.
Nothing actually happened, however, until the 26th of that month. On
that day a committee of union leaders composed of the five gentlemen
whom Gompers had previously asked Judge Gary to meet arrived in New
York City and called at the offices of the Corporation seeking an
interview, only to meet with another polite refusal. Returning to
their hotel, the members of the committee thereupon sent the head of
the Steel Corporation a letter stating that they represented a “vast
majority” of the workers of the steel industry, and on this basis for
the third time asked a hearing. To this letter Judge Gary sent the
following reply:
August 27th, 1919.
Messrs John Fitzpatrick, David J. Davis, William Hannon, William Z.
Foster, Edward J. Evans, Committee.
Gentlemen:
Receipt of your communication of August 26th is acknowledged.
We do not think you are authorized to represent the sentiment of a
majority of the employees of the United States Steel Corporation
and its subsidiaries. We express no opinion concerning any other
members of the iron and steel industry.
As heretofore publicly stated and repeated, our Corporation
and subsidiaries, although they do not combat labor unions as
such, decline to discuss business with them. The Corporation
and subsidiaries are opposed to the “closed shop.” They stand
for the “open shop,” which permits one to engage in any line of
employment whether one does or does not belong to a labor union.
This best promotes the welfare of both employees and employers. In
view of the well-known attitude as above expressed, the officers
of the Corporation respectfully decline to discuss with you,
as representatives of a labor union, any matters relating to
employees. In doing so, no personal discourtesy is intended.
In all decisions and acts of the Corporation and subsidiaries
pertaining to employees and employment their interests are of
highest importance. In wage rates, living and working conditions,
conservation of life and health, care and comfort in times of
sickness or old age, and providing facilities for the general
welfare and happiness of employees and their families, the
Corporation and subsidiaries have endeavored to occupy a leading
and advanced position amongst employers.
It will be the object of the Corporation and subsidiaries to give
such consideration to employees as to show them their loyal and
efficient service in the past is appreciated, and that they may
expect in the future fair treatment.
Respectfully yours,
E. H. GARY,
Chairman.
Upon receipt of this letter the members of the Union Committee returned
to the steel centres and set on foot preparations for the strike.
Shortly before this the President of the United States had announced
his intention of calling an “Industrial Conference” at Washington,
beginning October 6th, to consider the grave industrial questions
facing the country in the wake of the World War, and particularly
the relations between capital and labor. It was obvious that one of
the President’s reasons for calling the conference at this time was
to forestall the threatened steel strike, which had been brewing for
months, and to bring about, if possible, harmonious relations between
the steel companies and organized labor.
But the President did not stop there. He used the power of his
great office in every legitimate way to ward off the blow that was
threatening the country’s industry. Bernard M. Baruch, former head of
the War Industries Board, was commissioned by Mr. Wilson to endeavor
to persuade Judge Gary to confer with the unions, but Mr. Baruch was
unable to change the attitude of the head of the Corporation, who saw
plainly what few others realized at the time, that the issue was not
merely that of a strike, but that the very foundations of the country’s
liberty were threatened, and that it was no time for compromising. On
the 10th of September, when all hope of averting the strike seemed
gone, the President made still another effort and dispatched a
telegram to Samuel Gompers, urging that action be postponed until after
the Industrial Conference.
At this time the situation stood thus: The organized portion of the
steel trade had voted to strike, leaving details and the decision as
to the date in the hands of the committee already named. Mr. Gompers
referred the President’s letter to the committee, which had full power
to comply with the request of the nation’s Chief Executive, but the
committee declared that postponement was out of the question. The
strike date was set for September 22nd, on which day, the union leaders
confidently asserted, there would not be a wheel turning or fire
burning in any steel mill west of the Alleghanies.
Thus was the fatal die cast. From that time both sides girded up their
loins and prepared for the conflict.
The steel companies expressed quiet confidence in the outcome, while
their opponents loudly boasted of certain victory. The officials of
the Steel Corporation and of the other companies threatened must have
known that a considerable element among their foreign-born employees
had been led astray by the radical preachings of labor organizers,
but they believed that the best element among their men was satisfied
with conditions and would continue at work. And this confidence proved
justified.
The steel trade, outside the Corporation, had been watching the
issue with some misgiving, but as it became plain that Judge Gary
was standing firm in his attitude, general satisfaction was evident
and confidence in the final result increased. For the trade was not
unduly worried as to the outcome in the event of a showdown. The
opinion generally expressed was that the issue must be forced sooner or
later, and that it was probably best to have it settled as speedily as
possible by a decisive conflict. But in many quarters apprehension was
felt that the Judge, realizing his immense responsibility, might allow
himself to be persuaded into a compromise.
However, Judge Gary was firm, as those who knew him best were sure
he would be. For there was a matter of principle involved, the right
of the independent worker to work when, where, and with whom he
desired and could obtain employment. And for Judge Gary, compromise
on questions of principle was out of the question. As this became
realized, all misgivings vanished. Judge Gary’s already recognized
position as leader of the steel industry was made more secure than
ever before. The trade left the issue in his hands, assured as to the
result, and this assurance was not abused.
It is not too much to say that the entire country waited with bated
breath for the events of September 22nd. It was recognized that this
was not a mere skirmish between employer and employee, but a gigantic
struggle between capital and radical labor. As time wore on it
developed that there was another and stronger party to the conflict,
the vast mass of unorganized workers; and this threw its strength on
the side of the Corporation, dooming the hopes of the strike leaders.
At first the strike organizers unquestionably struck hard and with
considerable result. Between the conflicting claims from all sides it
is impossible to say just how many men went out in the steel mills,
voluntarily or through intimidation, but it is certain that at many
centres, such as Youngstown, where the Corporation and some of the
larger independents--Republic Iron & Steel, Youngstown Sheet & Tube
and Brier Hill Steel--have big plants, operations were practically
suspended in toto. At Gary, the Corporation’s largest plant, operations
were reduced to a low point, and at many other centres, the results, at
the outset, were apparently in favor of the strikers.
But Pittsburgh, the world’s steel centre, was almost unaffected. At
Homestead, Braddock, Duquesne, and other big Corporation plants the
workers unequivocally proved their loyalty by sticking to their jobs,
and the strike leaders failed utterly to make headway. Day after day
the smoke ascending in volumes from the stacks of these plants gave
assurance that the steel companies were far from crippled and sent
to the union chiefs the message of certain defeat unless they could
succeed in quenching these furnaces.
Although, ostensibly, the strike was directed against the Steel
Corporation and no attempt had been made to negotiate with the heads
of other concerns, all steel companies west of the Alleghanies were
affected by the walk-out as much as or more than was the Corporation.
So far as the big company was concerned the greatest number of men
out when the strike was at its worst, or within a few days of its
inception, was 28 per cent. of its total of employees or 40 per cent.
of its manufacturing force. These were the figures given by Judge Gary
in his testimony at Washington in October, and undoubtedly they are as
nearly accurate as possible. And of the men out there is no question
that many were kept from work not by persuasion but by intimidation,
the strikers having used threats freely to keep the loyal workers from
the mills.
Such tactics are not at all a new thing in similar conditions. Steel
workers who sought to report for duty were sent letters threatening
them with injury or death to themselves or families. In some cases the
threats were sent to the men’s wives or other dependents where their
effect was perhaps greater.
The strike had not been in progress two days before its genesis became
patent. The American public soon realized that probably 98 per cent.
of the strikers were alien-born and that the native worker, with few
exceptions, and large numbers of naturalized foreigners, were sticking
to the steel companies. This, together with the inflammatory utterances
of the strikers themselves, convinced the public that the strike was
not what it claimed to be, an effort to get fair wages and improved
living conditions for the workers--the American workers who remained
at their posts insisted that they already had these and the evidence
adduced by the steel companies verified the statement--but an attempt
to deliver the steel mills and factories into the hands of the radical
foreign element among our industrial workers. It was, in a word, but
the first step toward the seizure of the means of production by labor.
And the public, with the example of Russia before it, could not and did
not sympathize with the strikers.
With some notable exceptions the strike was a bloodless one. This
was due principally to the prompt action taken by the local public
authorities at the various points affected to prevent trouble and
to the refusal of the steel companies generally to attempt to bring
in strike breakers. Because of this passive attitude on the part of
the employers the strikers were robbed of the opportunity to make
sufficient trouble to force intervention by the Government.
In no previous conflict between capital and labor, it is likely, has
the public had as excellent an opportunity of judging the rights and
wrongs as in the steel strike. One day after the struggle eventually
began the Senate of the United States passed a resolution instructing
the Committee on Education and Labor to investigate the strike and
report on its causes. The committee conducted public hearings in
Washington where Judge Gary and a number of loyal workers were heard on
the side of the Steel Corporation, while Foster, Fitzpatrick, Gompers,
and other union leaders had equal opportunity, which they availed
themselves of, to present their case. The committee also visited the
affected districts to secure first-hand evidence on conditions there.
In an essentially fair and complete report, submitted to the Senate
on November 8, 1919, the committee reviewed the claims of the strike
leaders and of the Corporation. While criticizing the steel companies
on the question of too long work hours and suggesting that the six-day
week could be extended to include all workers the report characterized
some of the statements of the strike organizers as false and dismissed
their claim of pauper wages, expressing the opinion that the employees
of the steel industry were fairly well satisfied with wages received
and that the question of wages was not persuasive at all in the
consideration of a strike. The committee, in fact, in its own language
found little to complain of as to conditions in general outside of long
work hours.
On the other hand, the committee reported the underlying cause of
the strike to be “the determination of the American Federation of
Labor to organize the steel workers in opposition to the known and
long-established policy of the industry against organization,” and “the
seizing upon this cause by some radicals who are seeking to elevate
themselves to power in the A. F. of L.”
On this point the committee further found that “behind this strike
there is massed a considerable element of I. W. W.’s anarchists,
revolutionists, and Russian Soviets,” and expressed the opinion
that the American Federation of Labor had “made a serious mistake
by permitting the leadership of this strike movement to pass into
the hands of some who have entertained most radical and dangerous
doctrines.”
Still further pursuing this point the committee reported: “There may
be, in view of the radical utterances and actions of certain strike
leaders, some warrant for the belief that the strike in the steel
industry is a part of a general scheme and purpose on the part of
radical leaders to bring about a general industrial revolution. The
committee, however, do not go to that extent because they feel there
were some real grievances.” This, of course, is just what steel men and
the greater part of the public believe.
While this report served to prove that the conclusions arrived at long
before by the great mass of the public were correct the strike was
dying out before it was presented. In fact, the majority of the steel
mills of the country had resumed nearly full operations by early in
November. The strike gradually lessened in importance from the end of
September and, although it was not actually called off by its leaders
until nearly the middle of January it was to all practical purposes
dead long before the end of the year.
The story of the Industrial Conference called by President Wilson in
an effort to bring together the conflicting forces of capital and
organized labor and to work out a new industrial scheme rightly belongs
with that of the steel strike. The decision of the President was
unquestionably due, to some extent at least, to the imminence of the
strike, his plans for the Conference having been announced at the time
when the union organizers were attempting to get recognition from Judge
Gary. While the conference was not called, ostensibly, to deal with the
particular situation it is obvious that Mr. Wilson, realizing what a
danger the strike would be to the country’s prosperity if it occurred,
sought to avert it and at the same time to reduce to a minimum the
danger of other conflicts between the two great opposing industrial
forces. That he had the steel situation in mind was further indicated
by his request to the labor leaders to postpone action until after the
Conference--a request that was refused.
To the Industrial Conference the President invited a number of men
supposed to represent the three great groups concerned in industrial
disputes--labor, capital, and the public. The country’s workers were
represented officially only by the leaders of organized labor, Samuel
Gompers, Matthew Woll, Frank Morrison and other prominent members of
the American Federation, with some representatives of the railroad
unions. The interests of capital were in the hands of the so-called
employers’ group which included representatives of various commercial
bodies, of the railroads, and of farmers’ organizations. The so-called
public group also included a number of employers, among whom were Judge
Gary; the late Henry B. Endicott, the Massachusetts shoe manufacturer
who had gained a reputation for the interest he took in the welfare of
his employees, and others; social workers and writers such as Ida M.
Tarbell and Gertrude Barnum; two prominent Socialists, Charles Edmund
Russell and John Spargo. To these were added Dr. Charles W. Eliot,
educator; Thomas M. Chadbourne and Gaven McNab, lawyers; Bernard M.
Baruch, erstwhile stockmarket operator but lately head of the War
Industries Board, and several others.
Sincere as was the desire of the President to create amicable relations
between capital and labour and equally sincere as was the attitude
of the majority of the participants to the Conference to reach an
understanding that would reduce to a minimum the danger of industrial
disputes and establish a satisfactory method of settling them when they
did arise, it was obvious from the outset that the Conference would be
abortive; that a panacea for industrial ills would not be discovered by
it.
It was unfortunate that illness prevented Mr. Wilson from taking
personal charge of the proceedings. The influence of his high office
might have prevented the disagreements that occurred and held the
Conference together long enough to enable the participants to arrive at
some basic points of agreement. But this was not to be.
It was also unfortunate that the Conference took place during a big
industrial dispute, probably the greatest the country had ever faced.
For although it was obviously convened to deal with industrial problems
in the abstract rather than in the concrete, Samuel Gompers and the
other union representatives at the very beginning demanded that one of
its first actions should be the settlement of the steel strike.
This might readily have been foreseen. The labor leaders undoubtedly,
by the time the Conference came together on October 6th, realized that
in their conflict with the Steel Corporation and the steel companies
generally they had engaged in a losing fight. At the very time strikers
in large numbers were going back to the mills and the operations of the
steel companies were steadily increasing. The continuation of the fight
meant a total loss to the unions while arbitration would have permitted
them to gain some of their points, or at least to yield gracefully and
save their faces. They saw, or thought they saw, in the Industrial
Conference, a means to force the Corporation to accept arbitration.
Defeated in their efforts to end the steel strike without sacrificing
prestige among their followers with the assistance of the Industrial
Conference, the labor leaders then made another demand--that the
Conference, before proceeding further, recognize the principle of
collective bargaining and the right of workers to be represented by
men of their own choosing. This demand, fair as it seemed on the
face of it, was so presented as to make it clear that by “collective
bargaining” was meant bargaining through unions, and that by
“representatives of their own choosing” was meant union leaders
selected not by the men but by unions, and the employers insisted
that, while the right of collective bargaining could not be gainsaid,
the unions must recognize the exercise of this right through shop
committees, a form of collective bargaining which has proved successful
in many instances but to which unionism is firmly and irrevocably
opposed.
[Illustration: Coils of Red Hot Wire]
And it was upon this rock that the Conference eventually split after
several weeks of argument, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of
Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, who acted as chairman.
In justice to the unions, however, it must be said that, on the last
day, before organized labor withdrew from the Conference, giving it
its death-blow, Mr. Gompers presented a final resolution for the
recognition of the right of collective bargaining without restriction.
Had the employers’ group accepted this resolution or had the union
representatives given their opponents time to consider it, as the
latter with good reason asked, even this difficulty might have been
overcome.
[Illustration: Annealing Wire]
And here it might be pointed out that John Spargo, Socialist and
writer, offered a compromise resolution that was intended to satisfy
all parties to the controversy. But unfortunately this resolution
was presented while the Conference was in the death throes and never
received the consideration it deserved. Mr. Spargo’s resolution read:
“That the Conference proceed to develop and formulate a general
programme which will clearly define and establish the right of
organization and collective bargaining and furnish the basis for a
constructive policy to direct the relations of employers and employees
during the days immediately ahead.”
Both sides, capital and labor, had agreed to collective bargaining in
theory. They could not agree on its definition. Mr. Spargo’s suggestion
that the Conference “define” the phrase, it seems to the writer who
was present through the entire proceedings, provided a basis on which
both sides might have come together with some hope of establishing an
amicable basis of agreement--if such a basis were humanly possible.
It was the only resolution offered that at all tended to harmonize
conflicting ideas.
While the labor leaders were battling for the immediate settlement
of the steel strike by the Industrial Conference, Judge Gary, who it
will be remembered was a member of the “public” group, read a prepared
statement giving the Steel Corporation’s attitude on this point. Judge
Gary said:
I desire to make a brief statement in relation to the question
under discussion as well as others submitted to this Conference.
Further explanation of any vote I may register will probably be
unnecessary.
Like other members of the Conference, I recognize that the public
interest must always be considered as of the first importance; that
all private interests must be subordinated.
I am heartily in accord with the desire of the President firmly to
establish proper and satisfactory relations between all groups of
citizens connected with industry, including of course what has been
designated as capital and labor.
I believe in conciliation, coöperation, and arbitration whenever
practicable without sacrificing principle.
I am of the fixed opinion that the pending strike against the steel
industry of this country should not be arbitrated or compromised,
nor any action taken by the Conference which bears upon that
subject.
Also that there should be maintained in actual practice, without
interruption, the open shop as I understand it--namely, that every
man, whether he does or does not belong to a labor union, shall
have the opportunity to engage in any line of legitimate employment
on terms and conditions agreed upon between employee and employer.
I am opposed to a policy or practice which unnecessarily limits
production, increases costs, deprives the workman from receiving
the highest wage rates resulting from voluntary and reasonable
effort, hinders promotion or advancement in accordance with merit,
or otherwise interferes with the freedom of individual action.
As unorganized labor, which embraces the vast majority of working
people, has no special representation in this Conference, I deem it
appropriate to say that all labor should receive due consideration,
and that it is the obligation and ought to be the pleasure of
employers at all times and in every respect to treat justly and
liberally all employees, whether unorganized or organized.
Thus, without accomplishing a single constructive result, the
Industrial Conference ended. Labor, or rather the union heads, had
endeavored to subvert it to promote their own ends and, failing in this
effort, withdrew dramatically.
President Wilson did not abandon his hope of formulating a basis for
the settlement of industrial disputes, however. He immediately called a
new conference consisting of only one group, supposed to represent the
public, which did not include any of the participants to the former
conference, and this met and drew up a rather innocuous report. But as
a factor in the steel strike the second conference might never have
occurred and need not be considered here.
The strike dragged more or less wearily throughout the fall of 1919
and the early winter. Long before the end of the year it ceased to be
an important factor in mill operations, and its final official calling
off on January 10, 1920, was merely a formal procedure. Long before
that date the whole country had realized that the labor leaders had
over-played their hands and had met their Waterloo. To all intents and
purposes the steel strike was ended before the middle of November.
As it proved, the method adopted by Judge Gary in fighting the strike
was the best. It consisted principally of permitting the public every
opportunity of judging all aspects of the case and of standing pat on
the fairness of the steel companies in dealing with their men. Had the
Judge yielded one iota to the demands of the labor organizers this
would but have convinced the radical element in labor that they held
the whip hand over capital and would have encouraged them to further
excessive demands. Had the Judge, on the other hand, attempted to fight
the strike by meeting violence with violence this would have alienated
public sympathy. And in the final analysis public opinion is the most
important factor in settling industrial disputes.
As an aftermath to the strike came the “investigation” by the
Interchurch World Movement, an organization at the head of which were a
number of bishops and other churchmen. A committee of this organization
visited Pittsburgh and other points and presented a statement, but
it was of a character entirely biassed against the Corporation, its
members, in their investigation, having apparently given heed only to
the arguments of Messrs. Foster and Fitzpatrick.
In the report of this committee stress is laid on the long working
hours of the man in the steel mill, ignoring the fact that steel
companies generally have made great effort to reduce the average of
daily work and that only a comparatively small percentage of the men
work twelve hours. Further, the committee attacked the Corporation on
the question of wages which it declared to be below the sum required
for American standards of living, its statements failing to harmonize
with the findings of other obviously unprejudiced investigators
including the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, which found
otherwise.
In standing on a just basis and refusing to follow the easier way of
compromise the Steel Corporation performed a service not to itself or
to the steel trade alone. It performed a service to the whole country
and even to the world. It gave the first decided check to the growing
strength of radicalism which was then threatening to overwhelm America
and prevented a situation which would have thrown the country into the
same condition that has for some time prevailed in Russia.
The evil of unchecked growth of unionism is illustrated by what is
happening in England at the present writing. The Corporation saved this
country from similar evils. By its stand it established the right of
every worker to earn a livelihood whether or not he belongs to a union.