QUESTIONS OF POLICY
Almost since the date of its organization the activities of the
Steel Corporation have been guided by a definite set of policies. At
the beginning, when the Corporation was going through what might be
described as its “tooth-cutting” period, this was, perhaps, not the
case, as there was, as suggested elsewhere in these pages, a lack of
concordance on its Board on many questions, particularly in regard to
relations with competitors, with employees, and the general public.
But the policies advocated from the very beginning by the chairman
eventually were accepted in full by all concerned, and they have for
many years ruled the Corporation’s actions.
[Illustration: Ingot on Way to Rolling Mill]
Broadly speaking, the Corporation’s policies might be divided under
five heads--relations with competitors, prices, publicity, relations
with employees and, finally, with stockholders.
No better proof can be offered of the wisdom and success of the big
company’s methods of treating its competitors than the fact that, in
its hour of trial, when the Government of the United States was seeking
to disintegrate it, its competitors, the men who met and fought it for
industrial success, came forward practically in a body to its defense
and testified that its dealings with them and with the public had
always been fair and honorable.
The era that preceded the birth of the Corporation was one of
unrestrained, bitter, and often unfair, competition in the steel trade.
Too many manufacturers then worked, to paraphrase a well-known piece
of advice, on the principle of: “Sell steel, honestly if you can, but
sell steel.”
But the management of the big company had the foresight to realize that
a new day was dawning and, to help to make the morning of that day
brighter, it adopted the policy of candid treatment of competitors,
the principle of coöperation. Possibly its motives were not entirely
altruistic. The Corporation itself benefited, as appeared later, from
its course of action. However this may be, it sought to make friends
rather than enemies of its competitors.
In this it had no easy task, for the trade had too long been used to
fear gift-bringing Greeks, to view with suspicion every unhostile
act of a competitor, to believe that business could possibly be done
on the higher plane adopted by the new consolidation. “Live and let
live” was then unknown in business, or, at least, in the steel trade.
But gradually the fears alluded to were overcome and the steel trade
changed, or its methods did.
The Steel Corporation was an evolution, the natural result of the
integration in the industry that had been going on for many years. In
it were concentrated into a single organization all the processes of
steel making from ore mining to the manufacture of the most highly
finished products of all kinds, including transportation. And the
evolution was not merely a physical one. The new company stood for
development along the lines of modern thought of business methods and
practices.
It was a fortunate thing that the Corporation from its organization had
as its chief executive officer a man far-sighted enough to see that so
vast an enterprise must avoid unfair practices and methods that, even
if fair legally, were hardly so morally, if it would live itself; a man
with sufficient acumen to realize that the Corporation’s very strength
contained the germ of weakness, and to guide it clear of the dangers to
which it might otherwise easily have fallen prey.
In formulating its policies governing competition the Corporation had
a difficult course to steer. The laws governing the actions of big
business in the United States were by no means clear and for that
matter, are not so to-day. On one side was Scylla and on the other
Charybdis. To obey the law, the Corporation was bound to engage in
active and sustained competition with other steel makers; at the same
time, it had equally to refrain from any act which might be interpreted
as an attempt to take advantage of its great size and resources and to
overdo this competition.
In endeavoring to avoid the legal rocks, the Corporation, perhaps
naturally, did not meet with the most complete success. Indeed, to
do so would have been impossible, as there is no true middle course
between competition and coöperation--the best that can be hoped for is
a compromise.
It is interesting to note that the Government, in attacking the great
company, charged it with doing both the apparently forbidden things,
drawing from the Supreme Court the suggestion that these charges were
paradoxical and presented contradictions. Said the Court: “In one,
competitors (the independents) are represented as oppressed by the
superior power of the Corporation; in the other, they are represented
as ascending to opulence by imitating that power’s prices, which
they could not do if at disadvantage from the other conditions of
competition.” And the Court naturally asks, respecting competition:
“Are the activities to be encouraged when militant and suppressed or
regulated when triumphant, because of the dominance attained?”
This same idea was suggested by Judge Gary in his testimony before the
Stanley Committee, where he said:
It has seemed to me that the Sherman Law, so-called, has two
different provisions that, in their application, are more or less
antagonistic one to the other. One provision is against monopoly
and the other is against restraint of trade. If one manufacturer
should undertake to enter into any combination or agreement,
expressed or implied, to fix prices, to restrict output, to divide
territory, it would be considered an arrangement in restraint of
trade and inimical to that provision. On the other hand, except
for some basis whereby destructive competition could be avoided,
whereby the old methods of doing business under which, as you
probably know, a few only of the steel companies were allowed to
survive and do business, and a large majority were wrecked; if we
should enter into that kind of competition, it would mean that a
large percentage at least of the manufacturers of steel would be
wrecked; and that would secure to the survivors, to a greater or
less extent, a monopoly; and our effort was to find a position
between those two extremes and what we have done has been open
and aboveboard, whether right or wrong. We have met and laid our
business on the table, so to speak, telling one another frankly and
freely just what we were doing, and while that has not maintained
prices, that has not prevented a good deal of cutting by different
ones at different places and times; while it has not controlled the
business in any sense of the word, yet it has had a very steadying
influence, and has prevented the destructive competition to which
I have adverted. That is the frank and honest statement of facts,
whether they are justified or not.
In its answer to the Government’s charges, the Corporation claimed
that, far from restraining competition, it had fostered it, and the
majority of its competitors themselves swore to the truth of this
defense. The United States District Court, before which the suit was
first tried, pointed, in summing up, to facts and figures of the
growth of competitors which fully and completely substantiated the
Corporation’s claims. These figures showed that the Corporation’s
business from 1901 to 1911, in which year the suit was brought, had
increased over 40 per cent., but that in the same time the Bethlehem
Steel Co. had shown a gain of 3,780 per cent. in business, the La Belle
Iron Works of 463 per cent., Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. of 206 per
cent., the Cambria Steel Co. of 155 per cent., the Colorado Fuel & Iron
Co. of 153 per cent., the Republic Iron & Steel Co. of 91 per cent.,
and the Lackawanna Steel Co. of 63 per cent., to say nothing of the
rise and expansion of entirely new companies, such as the Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., during the same period.
For many years, ever since the period of consolidation in manufacturing
and other industries began, big business had been viewed with suspicion
and something of hatred by the mass of the people--and by no means
without cause, in many instances. There was no question that the powers
that controlled more than one great industry used their resources
to crush competition and, too often, their money and influence for
political ends. No argument is necessary to convince the unprejudiced
mind that such acts were inimical to the good of the nation. It was
perhaps natural that the stigma that attached to some as a result of
this was used by demagogues and others, often sincerely enough, against
big business in general as an aid to themselves politically. In short,
“Smash the trusts” was for years the great vote-getting slogan, and
unfortunately, is so still to some extent.
Small wonder then that the Steel Corporation, the largest and most
powerful of all the so-called “trusts,” was a shining mark for these
attacks. Small wonder that the man in the street, looking to his
leaders for guidance in such matters, was easily persuaded that the
giant company was necessarily a menace to the body politic.
Apparently this it was that Judge Gary foresaw when he insisted that
the organization at whose helm he stood must so conduct itself in all
its dealings with competitors and the public that it could at any
time show clean hands; could prove that its power had been used not
destructively but constructively for the good of all affected by its
actions--and this means the entire population of the United States.
He has said publicly either in a public address or when testifying
that these policies were justified on two grounds either of which
is sufficient, namely: first, because they are right, and secondly,
because they will pay in the end.
He evidently saw that the very life of the Corporation depended upon
this; and time has proved the accuracy of his judgment. It is safe to
say that had the Corporation misused its power it would have been
picked out many years before it was for legal attack, and the attack
would have been successful. The Corporation would not have been in
existence to-day.
To the lay mind, it is passing strange that the so-called “Gary
dinners,” which provided the principal example of the Corporation’s
attitude toward its competitors and the public, should have been
made the subject for special attack by the Stanley Committee and the
Government’s attorneys, and should have been criticized by the Lower
Court. However, the Court’s criticism appears to have been based
largely upon a technicality, as the judges in their opinion practically
admitted that there was no intent shown on the part of Judge Gary or
his associates to restrain trade by these functions. In fact, the
criticism seems rather to have been based on certain meetings held in
Pittsburgh as a result of these dinners, but at which meetings the head
of the Corporation was not present.
Judge Woolley, who rendered a separate opinion, said of these dinners:
The first Gary dinner was given on November 20, 1907, to meet an
unquestioned exigency arising out of the panic then existing....
The dinner was given in order to devise ways and means to prevent
calamity to the [steel] industry. Ways and means were found which,
no doubt, contributed greatly in preventing disaster not alone for
the producers of steel but also to those intermediate consumers
who were carrying large and costly supplies. The ways and means
consisted then of nothing more than the urgent request of a strong
man that in the stress of panic all should keep their heads, and
avoid the consequence of reckless cutting of prices. In this the
others acquiesced, and in the light of the emergency then existing
and of the disaster averted, I am of opinion that the purpose and
conduct of those who participated in the first Gary dinner were not
unlawful, improper, or questionable.
In view of the notoriety that these functions had received and of the
use that had been made of them against the Corporation, it may be
worth while to devote a little time to them here.
The Gary dinners! Feasts that will rank in the business history of
the United States as did the feasts of Lucullus in epicureanism or
Cleopatra’s dinners to Antony in romance. Occasions where the heads
of the steel companies of the United States gathered at the festive
board with amity and good will, to consider and discuss a situation
that threatened not themselves alone, but the country at large; where
these Titans of industry, only a few years before mortal enemies, met
as friends and openly and without fear discussed with one another the
intimate details of their businesses.
It was right after the first great shock of the panic of 1907. The
country was still trembling from the effects of the great financial
disaster, and no man knew surely whether the worst had been passed,
whether financial and industrial chaos had been staved off, or not. The
storm clouds had not passed away, and the men engaged in the steel and
iron business, truly called the barometer of trade, having on more than
one previous occasion--many of them, at least--seen a similar situation
lead to years of distress and of prolonged industrial depression and
unemployment, in a word to what the trade knew as soup-house days, had
especial reason to be fearful of what the immediate future held for
them and the concerns with which they were associated.
Nor were these panic fears confined to the steel giants alone. In
fact, the smaller manufacturers, the jobbers and the retailers,
having generally smaller resources, were in much worse case. Most of
these latter were piled up with heavy stocks of steel which they had
purchased during the boom in the earlier part of the year, and a sudden
drop in steel prices would have meant not alone the wiping out of all
hope of profit, but certain bankruptcy for a large percentage of them.
To the head of the biggest of the steel producers, then, all eyes were
turned. Judge Gary was deluged with letters from all quarters asking
him to use all his power and influence to help weather the financial
tempest. Naturally, it was very much to the interest of the Steel
Corporation, as well as of other steel manufacturers, to do all that
was possible to prevent the failure of the steel middlemen. Not only
would bankruptcies have meant the drastic cutting down of accounts due,
perhaps their total loss in some cases, but each failure would have
meant the loss of a customer. These things the steel men knew from past
experience.
One thing above all others seemed to be needed, the great essential
in panic of every kind--that those concerned should keep their heads,
should remain cool and face the danger steadily, and with the strength
of unity. A leader was needed, and a strong one, and Judge Gary, head
of the Steel Corporation, was looked upon to assume the post, which
he did. To Judge Gary it seemed that the first and essential step was
to bring the steel producers together and to explain the situation to
them, pointing out that the only hope of salvation was in coolness and
unity.
So he wrote a letter to practically all the large steel producers
inviting them to a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria, in New York, on
November 20, 1907. The response was unanimous, and on the evening of
that day there gathered around the table in the ballroom of that hotel
the representatives of concerns producing more than 90 per cent. of all
steel made in America, as well as the representatives of some Canadian
companies.
At the proper time the host explained the object of the meeting. What
he said can best be related in his own words:
I stated the purpose and object of the meeting were if possible
to prevent the demoralization of business. I stated that the
first object of the meeting was to secure a better acquaintance
with each other, and come into close contact in order to know one
another, hoping that we might deal with and toward one another as
gentlemen and not as enemies. That the purpose was, if possible, to
prevent demoralization of business, to secure as far as practicable
stability of business conditions, as opposed to wide and sudden
fluctuations; to prevent, if possible, failures on the part of
our customers and to comply with their wishes in every respect;
to prevent, if we could, a long continuance of the panic, which
meant failures to a great many people and manufacturers themselves,
because of their debts at the banks or because of their commitments
for extensions, and to customers because of the large stocks they
had on hand, the sudden change in the prices of which might be
very damaging; and so far as we properly could, to maintain, or to
assist in maintaining, business conditions generally, the opposite
of which should be deplored.
* * * * *
I stated distinctly ... at that time that, as they all understood,
we could not make any agreement, expressed or implied, directly or
indirectly, which bound us to maintain prices or restrict territory
or output; it must leave us free to do as we pleased, and must rely
upon a disposition of all others to do what they considered fair
and right, and for the best interests, not only of themselves, but
all others who had any interest in that or any other work. I made
that perfectly plain.
Judge Gary’s remarks made a profound impression, and his hearers
unanimously agreed to adopt the means he suggested for obviating the
worst of the panic dangers. Resolutions creating a general and several
sub-committees were made and passed and the meeting adjourned, subject
to call.
Following this dinner similar sessions were held in January, April,
May, and December of 1908. The December feast was the last of the Gary
dinners proper, although some meetings were held subsequent to that
time.
Were prices fixed at the Gary dinners? Let us settle this point as it
was one of the chief things charged against the Corporation in the
Government suit, and is the question on which the ethical morality of
the holding of these dinners rests.
At the first of the Gary dinners the host explained that the fixing of
prices was forbidden by the laws concerning restraint of trade, and
that nothing could or should be done which would not conform in all
ways to the law. Yet it is plain that the effect of these dinners was
to stabilize prices for steel. It does not appear that there was any
definite agreement between the different interests represented as to
what quotation they should ask for their products, but it is obvious
that the mere statement, between gentlemen, that one intended to adopt
a certain course in regard to prices tended to influence his colleagues
to follow a similar course. It must be suggested, nevertheless, that
there was never any question of restraint, as all were free to act
as they saw fit, and it seems that on some occasions there was not
even absolute agreement. At the worst the participants at the Gary
dinners stretched the interpretation of the law a little to do a great
right--the financial salvation of the steel industry, which, remember,
was, and still is, the leading industry of the country.
What was the result of the Gary dinners? Simply that, whereas in
previous panics gravestones of steel producer and middlemen had been
numerous, not one important failure in the trade was recorded as a
result of the 1907 panic. There is no question that this was due to the
leadership of the head of the Steel Corporation.
Early in 1909--on February 18th--another meeting of the steel leaders
was held, this time taking the shape of a luncheon. This occasion, in a
sense, was the formal breaking up of the Gary dinner programme, as it
was then that Judge Gary, satisfied that several of his competitors had
departed from their intention to maintain for themselves respectively
stability of business and prices, announced that the Steel Corporation
would in future “go it alone.” That it would get what business it could
and would not divulge its affairs to competitors. This was followed by
the so-called open market in steel which sent prices down to a very low
level.
And here might be inserted an interesting fact. Orders were sent out
to the various sales managers of the different Corporation subsidiaries
that they were to go after business and get all they could, orders
particularly welcome to those who had longed for the flesh pots of
Egypt, the old Carnegie methods, and who believed that the big company
could force its competitors to the wall by such a course. A vigorous
campaign for orders followed, both on the part of the Corporation
subsidiaries and the independent companies, but the result went largely
to prove that the big company did not have the power which its enemies
claimed it had, of crushing competition. In the words of Colonel H. P.
Bope, vice-president and sales manager of the Carnegie Steel Co., and
a graduate of the Carnegie steel school, the result of the 1909 sales
campaign was a disappointment to him, the Corporation failed to cut
into its competitors’ business, losing a little to them in some lines
as a matter of fact.
There was yet another dinner to come. On October 15, 1909, the steel
makers of the United States and Canada joined together to honor the man
who had first called them together during the stirring and dangerous
panic times two years previous. The leader of the movement was Charles
M. Schwab, and many of the most prominent men in the trade made
speeches in honor of the guest of the evening. It was, as Mr. Schwab
said, “the first time when the heads of all the big concerns in the
United States and Canada had gathered to do honor to a man who has
introduced a new and successful principle in our great industry.”
T. J. Drummond, vice-president of the Algomah Steel Corporation, in his
address defined this principle as the doctrine that “what is good for
my competitors is good for me.”
Referring to the Judge Gary leadership in the trying times the trade
had passed through Mr. Drummond said: “Always the voice of our leader
rang strong and clear, ‘Steady, boys, and play the game.’ And by the
Lord, you played, and played it fair.”
A beautiful cup of gold was presented to the Judge by his steel
colleagues at this, the very last of the Gary dinners.
The question of price restraint, or the Corporation’s influence in
maintaining or depressing the price of steel, is suggested naturally
by that of price fixing at the Gary dinners. This question is one
seriously affecting the Corporation’s existence, being interwoven
closely in that of the treatment of competitors. Getting down to basic
facts the principal objection of the man in the street to trusts or
monopolies is that the securing of unchallengeable power by one concern
in any industry is likely to lead to higher prices or lower quality,
either of which would swell the profits of the monopolistic corporation
and would harm the public. It is therefore important to consider the
Corporation’s general policy in the matter of prices.
During the Steel dissolution suit a number of competitors and of steel
consumers testified that the big company had always endeavored to
“steady” prices, a fact evidenced by the very holding of the celebrated
dinners. That it had always been the last to advance, and was equally
loath to reduce. They agreed, however, that the steadying influence was
brought to bear, not to keep prices at levels where enormous profits
could be reaped, but rather at such quotations as gave the manufacturer
only a fair and equable profit on his investment, evidenced by the
fact that the Corporation, unlike many of its competitors, fixed an
approximate high-water mark for prices in boom times, and made no
attempt, in fact refused to sell above these, although they were much
lower, to use a phrase made familiar in the old days of railroading
“than the traffic could bear.” These witnesses also asserted that the
tendency of prices since the birth of the Steel Corporation had been
downward and finally that the quality of the product, and these were
men qualified to know whereof they spoke, had been appreciably bettered.
In its decision the U. S. District Court pronounced itself as
satisfied that the Corporation did not have the power, even if it
wanted to, to force prices to an abnormal level. The Court found it
proven that steel prices could not be advanced arbitrarily above
the level quoted by any important competitor in the field, and that
the so-called independent companies were themselves too large and
too powerful to be forced to the wall by the methods that have been
employed by some “trusts” to secure monopoly.
Regarding the question of the course or tendency of prices the
testimony of Professor Jeremiah Jenks is particularly illuminating.
Professor Jenks, whose reputation as an economist is world-wide,
verified and explained charts previously put in evidence showing that
the purchasing power of steel, the real price obtained by what is
known as the index system, recognized by economists as the best test
of price fluctuations, had decreased decidedly between the date of the
organization of the Corporation and the time of the steel suit, as
compared with a similar period before the birth of the Corporation. The
same table showed that apart from the economic test and merely on the
basis of actual prices received the average prices of steel and iron in
the same period had declined slightly between the same periods.
From all of this evidence the observer must conclude that the policy of
the Steel Corporation has not been to inflate prices or to depreciate
quality, and that it has been its endeavor to give the consumer the
best steel possible for the smallest amount of money compatible with
decent profits. Incidentally, the lower prices of steel shown by
Professor Jenks’s charts were made in the face of advancing wages
amounting altogether to more than 27 per cent. And labor forms the
most important item of expense in steel making. The chart on opposite
page 230, a copy of one of those testified to by Professor Jenks, is
illuminating and needs no explanation.
[Illustration: _RELATIVE PRICE AND PURCHASING POWER OF IRON AND STEEL
IN THE UNITED STATES._
_TEN COMMODITIES (IRON & STEEL)_
_GENERAL COMMODITIES_
_PURCHASING POWER_
]
Conditions in the steel trade at the time this is written, October,
1920, provide a striking commentary on the Corporation’s attitude
respecting prices. But to understand them one must go back about
eighteen months.
In March, 1919, the President of the United States, desiring to bring
about a deflation of the high prices for all commodities that had
prevailed during the war, created an Industrial Board to take charge
of the matter and urged manufacturers in all industries to coöperate.
Because of the immense importance of steel in the country’s economic
life the steel trade was selected to set the example of deflation, and
it responded loyally. As a result, on March 20th of that year, a scale
of prices was agreed on at a level which it was calculated would give
the lower-cost producers a reasonable profit, and those prices were
immediately put into effect generally.
Shortly afterward the Government itself, through one of its agencies,
the Railroad Administration, refused to abide by this agreement. The
immediate effect was injurious to the industry, but shortly afterward
the demand for steel became so strong that prices, beginning in the
late fall of the year, advanced rapidly till they were, in some cases,
$50.00 a ton or more above the quotations agreed on between the
manufacturers and the Industrial Board.
But the Corporation, holding that public policy demanded that living
costs and all factors entering into living costs should be held down
as low as possible, continued and still continues to sell steel at the
prices fixed the previous March. This, notwithstanding the fact that
it has since advanced wages and that its costs have been materially
increased by the advance in railroad rates on its raw materials, put
into effect on August 26, 1920.
The Corporation could easily have obtained the same prices as did its
competitors and would have reaped enormous profits as a result, but it
contented itself with a reasonable return and the consumer and the
public at large have benefited from its course.
Important among the policies of the Corporation, in its dealings with
the public, has always been publicity. The organization of the big
company was marked by open dealing, all details of the proposed merger
being published widespread before the deal was carried through. And
ever since the Corporation began its existence the policy of keeping
the public and its stockholders informed as to its actions and business
has been adhered to. The results of the Gary dinners were promptly
given to the public press; and there is testimony in the record in the
Government case that the Department of Justice of Washington was always
kept fully informed. Moreover, no complaint was ever made by any one of
the “Gary dinners” until the Stanley Committee intimated an illegality,
after which it has never been claimed there was any such dinner or
meeting.
Almost since the date of incorporation it has been the custom to issue
quarterly a report of earnings showing the results of the operations
of the three months covered. These reports are issued on the last
Tuesday of the month following the quarter covered in the report. On
the tenth of each month a statement of the unfilled tonnage on the
Corporation’s books is issued from the head office, and in other ways
the stockholders are kept informed as to what is going on in their
company.
[Illustration: Rails on Cooling Bed]
Annual meetings of the Steel stockholders form a decided contrast to
those of many other companies. One is accustomed to look upon the
annual meetings of corporations as mere formalities attended by a few
officials with perhaps a lone stockholder not holding office; and
reticence in discussing the company’s business or policies is the
general thing. But the Steel meetings are always well attended, and
stockholders are encouraged to discuss fully the affairs of their
company, and to criticize to their heart’s content. Chairman Gary
is ready and willing to explain at length on any issue raised, and the
whole effect of these meetings is one of openness, of candor.
[Illustration: Pouring Ingots]
How ready the management of the big company is to meet criticism
half-way is illustrated by the events at the annual meeting in 1911
when a stockholder moved that a committee be appointed to investigate
the condition of the steel workers in the Corporation’s mills and to
report thereon, suggesting such remedies for evils they might find as
seemed wise. The mover particularly criticized the twelve-hour day and
the seven-day-a-week schedule of labor. It was questionable whether the
mass of stockholders present, having absolute confidence in the desire
of Judge Gary to give at all times the fairest possible treatment to
the worker, would have carried such a motion, but Judge Gary himself,
holding proxies for the majority of the stock, voted all this stock
in favor of an investigation, and a committee was appointed. Thus
did the management of the Corporation give proof of its readiness to
face investigation and to answer fully and satisfactorily any honest
criticism, just or unjust.
The attitude of the Corporation’s management in the matter of
publicity, it seems to the writer, is simply that the company’s vast
size and the number of its stockholders, as well as the army of men it
employs and its influence upon industrial conditions generally, render
it in a sense a public institution, one in which there is an enormous
amount of warranted public interest, and that this interest should
be satisfied. That so great a company must work in the open, all its
actions being able to bear the full glare of daylight.
Up to the time of the Corporation’s organization publicity on the part
of big industrial enterprises was almost unknown. Certainly steel
makers did not show any desire to take the public, or even the small
stockholder, into their confidence in regard to details of their
business. The immense profits made by the Carnegie company were not
revealed until the Carnegie-Frick quarrel caused their revelation.
But all this has been changed and the necessity for full reports
to stockholders and to the public at large is recognized by the
corporations themselves. Steel companies, in particular, give detailed
information of their earnings, operations, etc., at least once a year,
and in some cases every quarter. And this is doubtless due to the
example of the Corporation.
Sooner or later all big business must fall into line in the matter of
publicity. For the leaders of business thought are coming to recognize
that secrecy breeds suspicion and enmity, while openness makes friends.
And they will all follow--as many have already done--the example of the
Steel Corporation of doing business in the full glare of daylight.
In the chapter on Welfare Work and in that on the Steel Strike two
aspects of the Corporation’s policies regarding its relations with
employees are discussed at considerable length. Broadly speaking, the
Corporation’s attitude is that every worker is entitled to as large a
wage as conditions in the industry and justice to investors warrant,
decent living conditions, and the right to work when, where, and for
whom he pleases. By encouraging the worker to invest in its stock it
seeks to make sure his full coöperation in its activities and to bring
home to him the realization that the interests of labor and capital are
identical.
Finally, we come to the Corporation’s relations with stockholders, its
financial policy. For twenty years the big company has been steadily
building up its assets with a view to making its common stock the
safest investment of its kind in the world. It is not too much to say
that it has now attained that eminence, and if its stockholders in the
past have not always shared in profits as liberally as they may have
considered their due, there is no question that their loss in the past
has been much more than made up for by the security which the future
promises.