CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES STEEL

_A Corporation With a Soul_

_PUBLISHER’S NOTE_

_This book is planned as an open and aboveboard presentation of the

development of a great business. The story of the steel industry is

the story of the United States Steel Corporation; one cannot be told

without the other. It is hoped that this frank presentation of facts

about our greatest corporation gathered from the records of the company

will be of interest to the general reader._

[Illustration: ELBERT H. GARY

“_The story of United States Steel is the tale of how Gary made his

dream come true_”]

UNITED STATES STEEL

_A CORPORATION WITH A SOUL_

BY

ARUNDEL COTTER

[Illustration]

GARDEN CITY, N. Y., AND TORONTO

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

1921

COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION

INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

COPYRIGHT, 1916, BY MOODY MAGAZINE & BOOK CO.

FOREWORD

When, in 1914-1915, I wrote “The Authentic History of the United States

Steel Corporation,” which has been enlarged and brought up to date in

the present volume, the Government’s suit for the dissolution of the

Corporation had not been decided. In fact, the lower court handed down

its decision just about the time the book was going to press.

It was my good fortune to hear the testimony of the most important of

the more than 400 witnesses and argument of counsel in the suit and

to supplement the information so gained by conversations with steel

men, inside and outside the Corporation, with whom my work brings me

in constant contact. And all that I learned convinced me more and more

that the big company was not illegal, either technically or morally,

and that, in fact, its influence on industry was beneficent. It is

naturally a matter of personal gratification that the suit has resulted

in the complete vindication of the Corporation.

We live in a day of big corporations and the tendency seems to be to

concentrate still more capital and manufacturing facilities. It is

therefore important that we should know something of their activities,

not only economic but social.

I believe that the United States Steel Corporation is one enterprise

that endeavors always to live up fully to the responsibilities it must

perforce assume to its employees and to the public, as well as to its

stockholders. I believe that it has earned the title of “A Corporation

With A Soul”. And, so believing, I have not hesitated to tell the

story of United States Steel as I have learned it by years of personal

observation and contact.

ARUNDEL COTTER.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PROLOGUE. THE MAN AT THE HELM 3

CHAPTER

I. THE WHY AND HOW OF THE BIG COMPANY 6

II. THE BIRTH OF THE BIG COMPANY 22

III. EARLY HISTORY AND GROWTH, 1901 TO 1907 42

IV. THE TENNESSEE PURCHASE 70

V. MEN WHO MADE UNITED STATES STEEL 87

VI. DEVELOPING WORLD MARKETS 111

VII. THE SPIRIT OF THE CORPORATION 132

VIII. THE CORPORATION’S IMPLEMENTS 142

IX. THE STEEL TOWNS 160

X. HUMANIZING INDUSTRY 174

XI. INVESTIGATIONS AND DISSOLUTION SUIT 197

XII. QUESTIONS OF POLICY 217

XIII. STEEL FROM THE INVESTOR’S VIEWPOINT 235

XIV. THE GREAT STEEL STRIKE 246

XV. HELPING UNCLE SAM WIN THE WAR 269

XVI. THE MIDDLE PERIOD, 1907 TO 1914 283

XVII. THE WAR AND AFTER 295

APPENDIX 308

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Elbert H. Gary _Frontispiece_

“_The story of United States Steel is the tale

of how Gary made his dreams come true._”

FACING PAGE

Andrew Carnegie 40

J. Pierpont Morgan 41

Down in a Coal Mine 56

Open Pit Mining--Canisteo Mine 57

Mine Stables 72

Modern Coal Mining by Machinery 73

Bee-hive Coke Ovens 88

Mouth of Coal Mine--Coke Ovens in Background 89

James A. Farrell 120

Transporting 222 Tons of Bridge Material in China 121

“Drawing” Bee-hive Coke Ovens 136

Two Views of Modern By-Product Oven 137

The Original Jones Mixer 152

A Bessemer Blow 153

Interior of Gary School 168

Ore Cars at Proctor Yards 184

General View of Duluth Ore Docks 185

Ore Boat and Train 200

Ore Boats at Duluth Docks 201

A Trainload of Ingots in Molds 216

Ingot on Way to Rolling Mill 217

Rails on Cooling Bed 232

Pouring Ingots 233

Part of the Duquesne Works--Detail of Unloading Ore--

a Hulett Machine 248

Making Wire Rods--Old Method 249

Coils of Red Hot Wire 264

Annealing Wire 265

Drawing Fine Wire 280

Making Wire Fencing 281

Making a Steel Tube 296

Steel Transportation by Man Power in China 297

UNITED STATES STEEL

_A Corporation With a Soul_

UNITED STATES STEEL

PROLOGUE

THE MAN AT THE HELM

Every business enterprise, however great, reflects in its dealings with

its competitors, customers, employees, and the public generally, the

individuality of some one man. Curious as it may seem at first glance,

this personal touch, far from being lost, is particularly evident in

the greatest of all business enterprises, the United States Steel

Corporation.

Many men, including some of the ablest financiers the country has

produced, have assisted in a measure in making the Corporation what it

is to-day. Morgan, Frick, Perkins, all these and others, have helped

with their counsel in bringing the Corporation to the pre-eminent place

it holds in the industrial world. But one man has stood out among all

these--Elbert H. Gary, its chairman and chief executive officer.

Throughout its ramifications the Steel Corporation is everywhere a

reflection of Gary’s spirit. His influence, from the time of its

incorporation nearly twenty years ago, has shaped its policies and,

almost from the beginning, has dominated its counsels. For what

the Corporation is, whether good or bad, Gary must accept full

responsibility.

Judge Gary himself would probably object to the use of the word

“dominated.” He would doubtless prefer “guided”, for his dominance

has never been autocratic. But his colleagues, except perhaps in the

earlier days, have confidently accepted his opinion on all matters

pertaining to the Corporation’s welfare. And the events of the last few

years have proven that they were right in so doing.

Not the Corporation alone but the entire steel trade, the most

important manufacturing industry in America, has benefited from Gary’s

wisdom. As the chief executive officer of the leading interest in the

industry his competitors have always looked to him for leadership in

periods of stress. And whenever occasion arose, as in the dark days of

the panic of 1907, he proved his right to lead.

There have been times when this leadership was in question if not

doubt. One such occasion was as recently as 1919 when the great steel

strike threatened.

Gary’s attitude toward labor was well known. He believed in “leaning

over backward” in the matter of giving justice to the worker. And when

union organizers and radical agitators attempted to force the closed

shop on the industry many of his competitors feared that he would yield

to the demands of the labor organizers.

But Gary had never flinched from responsibility, however great. Here

was a question of principle involved, concerning not the rights of

the employer alone but those of the very large number of unorganized

workers. Although pressure was brought to bear upon him from high

quarters to compromise and avoid a strike, and later to settle it once

begun, the head of the Corporation unswervingly stood his ground and

led the steel trade to a signal victory. He proved to those who doubted

him that, though he might usually adopt the attitude of “suaviter in

modo” he knew how to assume that of “fortiter in re” when occasion

warranted.

On October 24, 1919, the annual meeting of the American Iron and Steel

Institute was held in New York City, at the Hotel Commodore. Some

sixteen hundred of its members, including the majority of the leading

figures in the steel trade, attended. The steel strike had been going

on for some weeks and the steel men were gathered to hear what Gary had

to say.

The entrance of the Judge into this gathering was the signal for a

most remarkable demonstration. For these staid, solid business men, on

catching sight of Gary, broke into a spontaneous salvo of cheers which

was enthusiastic and prolonged. It was a tribute to his generalship in

the struggle then being waged, an unequivocal admission of his right to

supreme command. In that storm of cheers were buried all doubts that

may ever have been entertained.

It is impossible to write of the Steel Corporation without writing

of its head. His influence on it is too direct, too personal, to be

ignored. The Corporation, in a sense, is Gary. He has infused it with

his spirit, a spirit which, it is to be hoped, will continue always to

animate it.

CHAPTER I

THE WHY AND HOW OF THE BIG COMPANY

Mere size, to the majority of us, presents a certain fascination.

Especially is this the case when it is the result of human endeavor.

Hence, were the United States Steel Corporation nothing but the largest

business aggregation in the world its immensity alone might justify

placing upon record the facts connected with its formation and its

subsequent history.

The Corporation’s vast capitalization, a billion and a half of dollars,

its yearly turnover exceeding its capital, its payroll of 275,000

workers, or, with their families, enough to populate a large city, its

productive capacity of more than 16,000,000 tons of finished steel

annually--to say nothing of other products--the volume of freight

carried in its fleet of ore boats, several times the tonnage passing

through the Suez Canal, its foreign trade of two hundred million

dollars--these alone might make the Corporation’s history worth the

telling.

But size, properly considered, is of minor importance in itself. Its

importance lies in the power it bestows to influence its surroundings.

The greatest of all industrial enterprises could not fail to affect

industrial history generally. And the management of the Corporation

has recognized its responsibility in this regard and has endeavored

to use its strength not selfishly but for the good of all concerned.

It is not too much to say that the organization of the United States

Steel Corporation marked the beginning of a new and a better era in

industrial history.

That this assertion may be challenged goes without saying. But the

facts will be permitted to speak for themselves.

The United States Steel Corporation was, in a modified sense, an

experiment in popular ownership, the ownership of industry by the

worker; it substituted for the ownership by a few men of a number of

more or less important organizations one gigantic unit owned by a

multitude. To-day the Corporation’s stockholders number around 160,000,

and this figure includes only holders of record. Perhaps 75,000,

possibly more, of its employees either own stock outright or are buying

it on the instalment plan. Counting five to the family it is probable

that close to 1,000,000 people are financially interested in the

success or failure of the Corporation.

At the time of the big company’s birth corporate publicity was

practically unknown. Important developments affecting the interests

of security holders were announced, if announced at all, at the

convenience of the so-called insiders. Curiosity into corporate

affairs was discouraged. But the new business giant set the example

of publicity by giving out at stated and frequent intervals detailed

information regarding profits, business on hand, and other facts of

interest to stockholders and the investing public. This example was

later followed by other important steel companies and, with the passage

of the years, the practice has become fairly general among large

corporate enterprises. Thus the organization of the Steel Corporation

may be said to mark the beginning of the era of corporate publicity.

But the most marked effect of the Corporation’s organization was

probably that respecting competition. In the old days of the steel

trade competition had been ruthless. The big steel merger, if the sworn

statements of its competitors may be accepted, put an end to this and

substituted an era, of competition still, but of competition clean and

aboveboard, governed not solely by greed but by the spirit of fair

play between manufacturer and manufacturer. It brought the dawn of the

epoch of the square deal between industrial competitors.

In order to get a true perspective on the events immediately leading

up to the formation of the United States Steel Corporation, it is

necessary to review briefly the history of the steel industry in the

United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and

especially during its closing decade.

In a short half century steel making in America had grown from the age

of swaddling clothes to full manhood, or rather gianthood. It stood

supreme among industries. From being unimportant among the iron and

steel producing nations, the United States, in a comparatively few

years, had forged its way to the first place. Its steel mills turned

out nearly half of the hard metal used by the world. Steel, from being

an industry composed of a few scattered mills situated as nearly as

possible to ore deposits with little regard to markets, had become one

consisting of great corporate entities each made up of many plants,

and these had in their service railroads and steamships plying to and

from ore fields situated sometimes hundreds of miles from the plants,

bringing to the mills such quantities of the raw metal as but a short

time before had not been known to exist. It had bent to its use every

modern invention, the newest discoveries of science. Fortunes had

been spent, won, and lost in building up these great structures. It

had at the same time been an industry subject to the most amazing

fluctuations, periods of feast being followed closely by periods of

famine.

This half century, or the last two decades of it, was, as has been

suggested, a period of war to the hilt between manufacturer and

manufacturer, war in which no quarter was asked or given. The history

of the steel industry in America bristles thick with the names of

millionaires who worked their way to fortune from the slag pile. And

for every one of these there were many, whose names are forgotten,

who sacrificed health, strength, and fortune in the mad fight for the

wealth that poured in unstinted stream from the glowing furnaces of

molten iron. The law of steel was essentially that of the survival of

the fittest.

Perhaps there is no other great industry that has been so subject

to fierce and unrestrained competition as steel making once was.

To understand why this is so it is necessary to get an idea of the

conditions influencing it. The discovery of the Bessemer process--about

the middle of the nineteenth century--by which steel could be made

cheap enough to permit of its general use found a world more than ready

for it, and the demand for the metal grew by leaps and bounds. The Age

of Steel did not dawn; like the tropic day, it broke with fierce glare.

The sudden demand naturally opened up vistas of previously undreamed-of

wealth for those who could supply it, and, in the desire to secure

this wealth, production sprang forward so quickly as even to outstrip

demand, strong and increasing as it was. Then ensued the inevitable

battle for what business there was, a battle that lasted until

consumption took another spurt, which, in turn, resulted in quickening

output and a resumption of the battle.

At that time the country was just opening up. Railways were stretching

their lines into the golden regions of the West; manufacturers of

farm implements were calling for steel to be fashioned into tools to

reap the rich crops of the wide prairie lands; inventors were each

day evolving some new use for the metal. Was it any wonder then that

steel became a world necessity and that the blast furnace became a

philosopher’s stone that transmuted dull ore into precious gold? More

and larger fortunes, it has been truly said, were made out of steel

in the second half of last century than ever came out of the mines of

the West or the diamond deposits of South Africa. And in the insane

struggle for this so-freely-poured-out wealth men lost all sense of

proportion.

It is inevitable that there should be a dark side to the picture.

The boom times of the steel trade were succeeded with disheartening

regularity by periods of dearth. One year steel manufacturers were

building themselves palaces and purchasing steam yachts, the next they

were mortgaging all they had to pay wages. One year the steel worker

was a man favored above all others of his class, the next he was

getting his meals on charity from the “soup houses.” To this day steel

veterans speak of the dull times of the trade as “soup-house days.”

At these times competition, always fierce, became more ruthless than

ever. The old adage regarding love and war was stretched to include

the steel industry, and everything was considered fair that might

help to keep the mills running full. Prices were cut--and wages with

them; steel was “dumped” on foreign markets at less than manufacturing

cost, and steel makers resorted to every means that offered to divert

orders from competitors to themselves. It was case of dog eat dog, and

failures, with their unavoidable accompaniment of unemployed labor,

were all too frequent.

These were the days when the steel “pools” flourished. These pools

were simply attempts on the part of the steel makers--who thoroughly

realized that the killing competition just described could benefit no

one--to protect themselves in times of stress by binding each other not

to sell below a certain price or more than a specified tonnage, and by

making it of no avail, from a viewpoint of profit, to do so. There were

rail pools and wire pools, shafting pools and plate pools, structural

pools, horseshoe pools, and in fact a separate and distinct pool for

nearly every steel product made. These pools were merely treaties,

but treaties in which no participant trusted the other and which

consequently were usually broken by each as soon as the opportunity to

get ahead of his fellow pool member presented itself--lest the other

should get a similar opportunity first and take advantage of it.

It is doubtful if a single pool agreement, and their number was

infinite, was ever honestly kept. Old steel makers chuckle to-day as

they relate how each representative of a company taking part in a pool

sought to gain an advantage over his competitors while the agreement

was yet a-borning. Listening to them one begins to wonder if these were

indeed men who bore high and honorable reputations in the business

world.

According to the statements of men who themselves took part in pools it

was no uncommon thing for a manufacturer to station a salesman outside

the building where a conference was being held and, as soon as a price

settlement was reached, to stroll casually over to a window and by

pre-arranged signal indicate to him the level agreed on, whereupon the

salesman would proceed to undercut the price which his employer was

even then pledging himself to maintain.

“Every man’s hand was against his neighbor then; we were all

Ishmaelites, every one of us,” said John Stevenson, Jr., a veteran who

had worked under Carnegie, in his testimony in the Federal suit for the

dissolution of the Corporation. Mr. Stevenson then went on to relate

the story of a wire pool conference at which a price of $1.50 a keg

for nails had been agreed on. After the morning conference he went to

the telegraph office to wire his partner and found one of his fellow

conferees there. He waited until the other had handed in his message

and walked away. While Stevenson was writing his own wire the operator,

in mistake, handed him his competitor’s, asking him to decipher a word.

And Stevenson discovered that the message was an offer to a large

consumer to sell him 10,000 kegs of nails at $1.40! Whereupon he tore

up the paper and substituted a bid of his own at the same price and got

the order!

Another instance, related by a large consumer, shows how these

agreements were evaded. He said that the company from which he

purchased his supplies of steel pleaded the force of a pool agreement

as an excuse against giving him a discount from the market price.

He then suggested that he be appointed agent of the steel company in

his town at a commission of a dollar a ton and this solution of the

difficulty was agreed to. He was the only consumer of steel in the

town and the commission was only a round-about way of giving him the

discount asked.

In the fierce and bitter struggle that was the steel trade only the

most daring or the most unscrupulous manufacturer could survive, and

under the strain for production that it necessitated only the strongest

workers could live. No one, unless he has been through a steel plant,

can imagine the conditions under which the steel maker works. The

visitor, unaccustomed to the heat that is flung from blast furnace or

rolling mill as from the gates of hell, must perforce hold his hands

before his face at times to mitigate the frying sensation. True, much

has been done of recent years to make the lot of the man at the furnace

or rolling mill easier, his work less trying on his health. But at

the time of which this is written such was not the case. Under the

most favorable conditions the steel mill, as a well-known steel maker

said once, is far from being a drawing room. Under the conditions that

prevailed toward the end of the last century, when men were worked to

the breaking point in the mad fight for “tonnage,” it was no wonder

that the majority of steel workers collapsed early under the strain and

were thrown on the human scrap pile, their vitality sapped and their

youth gone.

The one slogan of the industry then was “tonnage.” Everything was

sacrificed by the manufacturer to this single end. Machinery,

comparatively new, was scrapped to make room for more modern equipment.

Waste of this kind was not considered. Production was everything, and

nothing was spared to obtain increased output. And it must be admitted

that to this attitude on the part of producers, as much perhaps as to

her immense natural advantages, the United States owed her rapid rise

to the front rank of steel nations.

In the middle of the nineteenth century American steel making was in

its infancy. In fact, this is also true of the steel industry of the

whole world, for it was about this time that William Kelly in America

and Henry Bessemer in England discovered what is known as the Bessemer

process, which made the metal available for the numberless commercial

uses to which it is now put. As late as the early sixties the idea

of using steel for railroad rails was scoffed at. In 1867 there were

only three Bessemer plants in this country and open-hearth, the steel

of to-day, was unknown. Great Britain supplied the world’s steel. But

shortly after the third quarter of the century was passed the United

States forged to the lead, and has held it ever since. In the year

1900 the steel production of this country was 10,188,329 tons, Germany

coming next with 6,645,869 tons, and Britain third with a production of

4,901,060 tons. In 1913 the United States produced 31,300,874 tons of

steel, or more than Britain and Germany combined. In 1917 production

was 45,060,607 tons, more than two thirds the world output. To-day the

rolling mills of the Pittsburgh district alone turn out more than one

third of the world’s steel.

The name of Andrew Carnegie is inextricably bound up with the history

of steel in the United States--and the world. “The Iron Master,” the

“Steel King”--by these names he was known, and he earned them. For

more than a quarter of a century Carnegie was the most important and

spectacular figure in the world of steel and his name will not be

forgotten so long as there is a rolling mill in Pittsburgh.

Carnegie’s rise from utter obscurity until he became the dominating

figure in the leading manufacturing industry of the world reads like

a page of fiction. Only the briefest sketch can be given here. Born

in Dumferline, Scotland, in 1835, the future Monarch of Steel came to

the United States with his father at the age of thirteen and began at

the bottom of the ladder, his first job being that of bobbin boy in a

cotton mill, for which he received a weekly wage of $1.20. Two years

later he became a telegraph messenger and later an operator for the

Pennsylvania Railroad.

The youthful Scot’s ability soon attracted the attention of Col. Thomas

A. Scott, head of that great railroad system, and he made Carnegie his

private secretary, thus giving him his first foothold on the ladder of

fortune.

Industrious and saving Carnegie was soon in the investor class and

when an opportunity arose to invest in what, it seemed to him, was an

attractive business he was able to seize it, purchasing a one-sixth

interest in the Iron City Forge Co. and becoming his own man.

One of his partners in the enterprise was Henry Phipps, the playmate

of his boyhood and his friend through good fortune and through bad.

In every one of his subsequent ventures Phipps had a share, and

an important one, that of raising money to carry out Carnegie’s

manufacturing plans. In Pittsburgh they say that Phipps’ horse knew

every bank in town so often had his master stopped him before them when

seeking loans.

Those were the days of iron. Steel was still being made only “by the

spoonful.” But one day Carnegie saw in action one of the earlier

Bessemer converters, the implements that gave birth to the Age of

Steel, and this sight, impressive as it is even to the layman as a

mere spectacle, converted him from iron to steel. His keen mind saw

immediately the immense possibilities of the new process and he went

into the manufacture of steel on a large and growing scale.

And his success was phenomenal. Breaking down all obstacles in his path

to fortune he fought his way upward ruthlessly and became a terror to

competitors.

In 1901 Carnegie sold out the steel business he had created to the

organizers of the United States Steel Corporation for $303,450,000 in 5

per cent. bonds and $188,556,160 in preferred and common stocks of the

new company, a total price of $492,006,160!

The mark that Carnegie left on the industry will never be wiped out.

In his late days he set the pace for all to follow, and it was a fast

one. Although pitiless to his competitors he had the gift of drawing to

him men of high ability; he was a wonderful judge of men, and to his

intimates he was generous and open. A born commander, a Napoleon of

industry, he built up an organization that had no equal in its day, one

that was at the same time extremely efficient and utterly loyal.

Whether Carnegie made the best use possible of his unquestioned

abilities is for posterity to decide. Beyond doubt America’s

pre-eminence in steel was due largely to him. But he was also at least

partly responsible for the unstable condition that existed in the trade

of his day. Production, tonnage, was his fetish, for in this he saw the

means of reaching and keeping his supremacy, and to get it he did not

spare himself, the men under him or, least of all, his competitors.

His one effort was to keep the mills running full, and everything was

subordinated to that.

It is not generally recognized that Carnegie was to some extent

responsible for the formation of the United States Steel Corporation.

The part he played was behind the scenes. He wanted to sell out and

retire, to devote the rest of his life to philanthropy, education, and

the promotion of world peace. Even for such a master salesman as he the

task of finding a customer was gigantic, but he succeeded as he usually

did.

The frequent and prolonged periods of depression had forced upon steel

makers the conviction that some way of combining to prevent their

recurrence was desirable, even necessary, if the United States was to

keep and increase its lead in the manufacture of the metal most needed

by the age. Between the years 1890 and 1900 industrial combinations

were as thick as the leaves in autumn. And steel had not escaped this

tendency to amalgamate. The Federal Steel Company, with $100,000,000

issued capital, was the first large steel consolidation. The country’s

wire plants had been merged gradually into one company, the American

Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey, which controlled all but a small

number of mills. A somewhat similar situation existed in regard to tin

plate, tubes, and fabricated products. What might be called the steel

companies proper were themselves all mergers of small plants, the trade

being divided among several large competing units. A merger of these

units had been talked of time and again and its accomplishment was

considered inevitable, sooner or later, unless Carnegie first succeeded

in crushing all competition and establishing a virtual monopoly for

himself, as many thought he would. The time was ripe for a big steel

combine.

And the time being ripe, the man was provided, the man destined to take

Carnegie’s place as the central figure in the steel industry, not only

of this country but of the world. He was Elbert H. Gary, then president

of the Federal Steel Company, one of the Carnegie company’s largest and

most important competitors, whose operations centred in the Chicago

district.

Born on a farm near Wheaton, Ill., and educated to the practice of

the law, Gary’s work brought him into connection with many large

corporations including the Consolidated Steel and Wire Company and the

Illinois Steel Company, for which he was general counsel. When the

Federal Steel Company was organized in 1898 as a merger of the Illinois

and other companies, Gary, then a director of the Illinois company,

took the principal part in the organization activities. The executive

ability he displayed so impressed his associates and the Morgan

interests, who financed the merger, that he was unanimously chosen

president of the new company. His selection for this post, coming as

a great surprise to himself, first gave him a prominent part on the

industrial stage, on which he has been the most striking figure almost

ever since.

Gary’s ambition, like Carnegie’s, knew no bounds; but where the little

Scotch ironmaster worked to make the steel industry an empire over

which he should reign supreme, Gary dreamed of an immense Republic of

Steel. Where Carnegie sought to unify the control of the steel trade

and bring it into his own hands, Gary sought to make the industry one

owned by the people, and particularly by the workers. Where Carnegie

stopped at the ocean and gave his attention to world business only at

times when overproduction at home compelled him to seek foreign markets

temporarily, Gary sought to establish a world-wide and permanent market

for the product of the blast furnaces and rolling mills of the United

States.

And the history of the United States Steel Corporation is the story of

how Gary made his dream come true.

But the Federal Steel Company, its president soon found, was not an

instrument big enough or suitable for the carrying out of his plans.

In the first place, its plants were located at too great a distance

from the Atlantic seaboard to render an invasion of foreign markets

feasible. Freight rates to the ocean were prohibitive. And another

hindrance was encountered in the severe ups and downs to which the

steel trade in this country was subject. He saw that, if his dreams

were ever to be made realities, the Federal Steel Company must be

enlarged and expanded, must provide itself with plants able to export

steel in competition with Great Britain and Germany, the countries

which ruled the international markets, and must so strongly entrench

itself that it would not be too greatly affected by periods of stress.

One man there was who could provide the wherewithal for the expansion

which the head of the Federal Steel Company considered necessary. This

was the late J. Pierpont Morgan. To Morgan, then, Gary took his plans,

but the banker was not enthusiastic. Perhaps he saw that many steel

concerns were not making money and feared to put so large an amount

of capital as was required into the venture; perhaps other motives

governed him; but, whatever his reasons, the great financier hesitated,

would not permit himself to be convinced. Again and again Gary tried

to persuade Morgan, but in vain, and at length Gary, satisfied that he

must seek other means to his end, turned his attention toward raising

the necessary capital elsewhere. He had already prevailed upon his

fellow directors of the Federal Steel Company to pledge subscriptions

to a large sum for the purchase or erection of new plants when

circumstances played into his hands. Morgan decided to give his backing

to the formation of a giant steel merger on the lines Gary had proposed.

The story of how Morgan was won over is an interesting one. It has

already been suggested that Carnegie was anxious to sell out, and

Carnegie usually got what he wanted. After many attempts to conclude

a satisfactory deal with different syndicates Carnegie, like Gary,

arrived at the conclusion that Morgan, and Morgan alone, was able to

finance the purchase of his properties. Therefore, he decided Morgan

must be induced to buy.

At first Carnegie tried ordinary tactics. He had mutual acquaintances

suggest to the banker the advisability of a deal by which the Carnegie

company would be absorbed. Time and again this suggestion was made,

and on each occasion Morgan listened then sent for Gary. The latter,

seeing that this would be an excellent means of accomplishing what he

desired for the Federal company, as by absorbing the Carnegie company

it would not only secure a steel-making and steel-selling organization

without equal at the time but would also add to itself plants which

could and would give battle for world trade to Britain and Germany, did

all he could to induce the financier to accept the suggestions for the

purchase of these properties. But each time Morgan hesitated.

Then Carnegie resorted to coercion. Morgan was heavily interested

in the National Tube Company which was itself an amalgamation of a

number of smaller tube companies. Carnegie made no tubes. His entrance

into the business of manufacturing tubular products would undoubtedly

have brought the National Tube Company face to face with more serious

competition than it had ever encountered. And Carnegie threatened to

build a tube mill. This action had two purposes. It was apparently

intended to force Morgan to consider the purchase of the Carnegie

properties, and it was also a retaliatory measure against the decision

of the National Tube management to erect steel mills which would

render the company independent of the Carnegie Steel Company for its

supplies of raw material and would incidentally deprive Carnegie of

a large customer. Carnegie announced his plans for the proposed tube

mill publicly and bought a site for it at Conneaut, Ohio. But although

Morgan knew that the steel maker was able and ready to carry out his

project he gave no sign of having changed his mind.

Carnegie’s next step was more important and serious. He threatened

to build a railroad paralleling the Pennsylvania Railroad from

Pittsburgh to the coast, a project which, if carried through, would

without question have materially damaged the earning power of the

great railroad system and would have been a heavier blow to the Morgan

interests than the erection of a tube mill. But again Morgan paid no

attention. It is extremely doubtful if Carnegie, powerful as he was,

could have seriously intended to attempt such an undertaking, and

therein may have lain the reason for the banker’s seeming indifference.

On the other hand, those who knew Carnegie declared that he would have

found means to build the suggested road, even as he had in the past

done other things deemed to have been impossible.

That Carnegie had no desire to enter into a pitched battle with the

powerful Morgan interests seems to be fairly well established by his

next act. Coercion having failed, he again resorted to peaceful tactics

and fired what, possibly, was his last shot. And here it might be

interjected that, while the event that directly led up to the formation

of the Steel Corporation has been narrated scores, probably hundreds

of times, the part that Carnegie played therein has usually been

overlooked.

Among the Carnegie partners was a young man, Charles M. Schwab,

president of the Carnegie Steel Company. Schwab not only represented

the top notch of efficiency as a steel maker, a salesman, and an

executive, but he had a veritable tongue of gold. To listen to him was

to be converted to his views; he could talk the legs off the proverbial

brass pot. And Carnegie saw that if the man lived who could convince

Morgan to finance a purchase of the Carnegie Steel Company that man

was “Charlie” Schwab. Carnegie therefore decided to bring together the

financier and the president of the Carnegie Steel Company and to let

loose on Morgan the flood of Schwab’s eloquence.

On the night of December 12, 1900, Edward Simmons and Charles Stuart

Smith, both close friends of Carnegie, gave a dinner to which Morgan

was invited. And to Schwab was assigned the duty of making the speech

of the evening. Ostensibly the dinner was merely a social affair with

no ulterior motive, but in the light of subsequent events it may be

considered certain that it was arranged at the suggestion of Carnegie,

and that its purpose was the sale of his properties to Morgan.

Everything went off as planned. Schwab chose for his subject the steel

company of the future. He played upon this theme as upon a harp to an

attentive audience, not the least attentive of whom was the banker,

and, while he never referred directly to the Carnegie company, he made

it very clear that the concern which he described in glowing terms

would of necessity own and control the Carnegie plants.

Schwab foretold a future of wonderful brilliance for the steel

industry. He drew a word picture of a company big enough to insure

the greatest economies in the securing and distribution of its raw

material, but highly specialized by departments, each and every plant

confining its attention to one particular product so as to secure the

highest degree of efficiency. He described such an organization as able

to dominate the markets of the world and to set a pace that neither

England nor Germany could follow. The ideal structure he painted

was such an one as was well worthy the attention of the greatest of

bankers, an industrial enterprise for which even the great Morgan might

well be proud to stand sponsor.

And the youthful Carnegie president swept the financier off his feet

and along with him in the flood of his oratory. The United States

Steel Corporation was not actually incorporated for some months, as

an undertaking so immense naturally took a great deal of time to put

through, but it was by that speech that the idea of a vast steel

merger, sown in Morgan’s mind by Gary, was quickened into life. In

that half hour the United States Steel Corporation, to all intents and

purposes, became an actual fact.

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