THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND ENGLISH OPINION
The Revolution affected English society in two directly opposite ways. It
is unquestionable that its violence drove the majority into hostility not
only to Revolution, but to Reform. But many men and women welcomed the
triumph of its principles with an enthusiasm which was almost as
extravagant as the opposition of the rest. Those who had preached equality
in the days of Wilkes and the American War were encouraged to greater zeal,
and the bigness of the new shock awakened interest in masses of people who
had previously been apathetic. The Industrial Revolution had by this time
produced much of the social alteration of which some account has already
been given, and the artisans of the North offered a fertile soil for
doctrines which had previously fallen on barren ground. Political
speculation now for the first time attracted the serious attention of the
governing class. The new thinkers themselves belonged to all ranks, though
very few of them were to be found among the aristocracy. They all preached,
with more or less ardour, and with a more or less crude application of
logic to political conditions, the doctrine that every man had an equal
moral right with every other to control his own life. For practical
purposes the speculation of these primitive Liberals did not extend beyond
male limits. But some, of whom Mary Wollstonecraft was the most
conspicuous,[100] even made the same claim for every woman. When only one
woman in ten thousand had any substantial intellectual training, it was
natural enough that men should give little {101} thought to their political
rights. Until women were sufficiently educated to ask for equality in the
State, it was impossible that men should think seriously of granting it.
But the French Revolution, though its direct effect on the political
condition of women was insignificant, started, in their case as in that of
men, a train of events which has borne fruit in more modern times. The
emancipation of women from the control of men, which is the most profound
of all the social changes of the last fifty years, has been produced by
precisely the same changes in social ideas as those which have abolished
the political distinctions among sects and classes of men. It is only
another part of the process of the emancipation of the individual which is
called Liberalism.
The most obvious feature of this early Liberal movement is its neglect of
economic questions, and its concentration upon the mere machinery of
government. The science of political economy was indeed only in its
infancy, and Adam Smith's _Wealth of Nations_, published in 1776, had
little effect upon practical politicians of any school until the beginning
of the nineteenth century. Political argument was therefore conducted in
these early stages very largely upon a theoretical basis, and Tories,
Whigs, and Radicals contended as mightily about the abstractions of natural
rights and sovereignty as the early Churches about the difference between
Homoousion and Homoiousion. Almost the only practical grievances alleged
against the old system were expensive wars and the maintenance of
sinecures. The early Reformers, though the doctrine of _laissez faire_ was
not formulated until half a century later, in fact believed it. They were
in economics what the Whigs were in politics. They hated the interference
of the executive, and they would probably have looked upon attempts to
alter economic conditions as meddling, which would restrict the liberty of
the citizen and increase the already dangerous influence of the Crown.
This indifference, or rather hostility, to economic reforms was shared by
all parties alike. Practically everybody agreed that it was a bad thing for
Government to interfere with trade, though few went so far as to condemn
the system of Protection. {102} Arthur Young disliked Government
interference as an economist. "All restrictive forcible measures in
domestic policy are bad."[101] Burke declared that his opinion was against
"an overdoing of any sort of administration, and more especially against
this most momentous of all meddling on the part of authority, the meddling
with the subsistence of the people."[102] Adam Smith, in his _Wealth of
Nations_ said that "According to the system of natural liberty, the
sovereign has only three duties to attend to ... I. The duty of protecting
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies;
II. The duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society
from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty
of establishing an exact administration of justice; and III. The duty of
erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public
institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain, because the profit
could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of
individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great
society."[103] This was the general opinion of the manufacturers, and in
1806 it was embodied in a Parliamentary Report on industrial conditions:
"The right of every man to employ the capital he inherits or has acquired
according to his own discretion without molestation or obstruction, so long
as he does not infringe on the rights or property of others, is one of
those privileges which the free and happy constitution of this country has
long accustomed every Briton to consider as his birthright."[104] The
aristocracy and the commercial classes alike distrusted an interference
which restricted their personal freedom.
The Radicals, who professed to be, and were much more alive to the
distresses of the labourers and artisans, were hardly less emphatic. "All
government," said Dr. Price, "even within a State, becomes tyrannical as
far as it is a needless and wanton exercise of power, or is carried farther
than is absolutely necessary to preserve the peace or to secure the safety
of the State. This {103} is what an excellent writer calls 'governing too
much.'"[105] "Government," said Godwin, "can have no more than two
legitimate purposes, the suppression of injustice against individuals
within the community and defence against external invasion."[106] Most of
the Radicals were in fact of the middle class, and few of them saw things
from the workman's point of view. However far they went, they were careful
to maintain the rights of property. "The phrase 'domineering rich' is
exceptionable," said Major Cartwright, "as it may, by cavillers, be
construed into an attempt to excite the poor to invade the property of the
rich. It is not by an invasion of such property that the condition of the
poor is to be amended, but by such equal laws as would have a natural
tendency to prevent injustice, and to benefit every class of the
community."[107] A free Parliament would allow every man an equal chance of
obtaining wealth. Neither Cartwright nor any of his associates seems to
have considered that, while wealth was accumulated in the hands of a small
class, equality, even of opportunity, was impossible without some measure
of State interference. What was needed by the working class was the removal
of taxes upon food and raw materials, a helpful instead of a degrading Poor
Law, the right to combine against their employers, and factory legislation.
But the speculators were more concerned to reduce the interference of
aristocratic government with the liberty of the middle class than to
increase the interference of any sort of government with the working class,
and they failed to see that the workmen's grievances were not the same as
their own. A man who was wellnigh pressed to death with heavy weights was
to be relieved by an improvement in the ventilation of the torture-chamber.
The Radicals[108] thus, in common with the Tories and the Whigs, ignored
economic problems, or assumed that they were {104} incapable of solving
them by political action. But their opinions, so far as they went, were
Liberal opinions. They made the individual the unit of political society,
and denounced all artificial barriers between ranks and classes. In his
younger days Cartwright held principles which led directly to
Republicanism. In his pamphlet _Take Your Choice_, which was published in
1776, at the height of the American dispute, he said: "How much soever any
individual may be qualified for, or deserve any elevation, he hath no right
to it till it be conferred upon him by his fellows.... It is liberty, and
not dominion, which is held by divine right."[109] The suffrage must be
extended to all adult men. "Personality is the sole foundation of the right
of being represented; ... property has, in reality, nothing to do in the
case.... It is a very fit object of the attention of his representative in
Parliament, but it contributes nothing to his right of having that
representation."[110] "We might as well make the possession of forty
shillings per annum the proof of a man's being rational, as of his being
free."[111]
But Cartwright, though a perfect specimen of the logical politician, and
reasoning on principles as purely Republican as those of Paine himself, was
a member of the middle class, and enjoyed, during a great part of his life,
a substantial income. He openly opposed the followers of Paine, and at a
meeting of the Society of the Friends of the People, which he helped to
found in 1792, he carried a resolution in favour of King, Lords, and
Commons.[112] This Society contained not only Radicals like Cartwright, but
Whig Reformers like Grey and the Duke of Bedford. Eventually, the logicians
were squeezed out, and the Society became a Whig organization, the least
vigorous of all those which worked for reform outside of Parliament. The
best of its members were practical politicians, who concentrated on active
and notorious abuses like rotten boroughs and the disfranchisement of large
towns.[113] Grey worked in {105} Parliament very steadily, and other
representatives of the Society spoke manfully on occasion in both Houses.
But as a whole it seems to have done little to arouse the feeling of the
country, and it was as vigorous in its condemnation of its more active
associates as in its attack upon the common enemy. Its principles were
essentially Whig, and not Liberal. "We profess," wrote Lord John Russell,
the chairman of the London Society in 1794, "not to entertain a wish 'that
the great plan of public benefit which Mr. Paine has so powerfully
recommended will speedily be carried into effect,' nor to amuse our
fellow-citizens with the magnificent promise of obtaining for them 'the
rights of the people in their full extent'--the indefinite language of
delusion."[114] So even Fox, though he said that "government originated not
only for, but from the people," and "the people were the legitimate
sovereign in every community," yet declared himself "a steady and decided
enemy to general and universal representation."[115] Sir Francis Burdett
and one or two other Members of Parliament took the purely Radical view.
But so late as 1818, when, after nearly twenty years of heated agitation,
Burdett moved resolutions in favour of manhood suffrage, annual
Parliaments, and equal electoral districts, Brougham said on behalf of the
official Whig Opposition: "As for universal suffrage, or the doctrine which
severed the elective franchise altogether from property, he begged leave to
observe that he never had at any time held it as less than the utter
destruction of the Constitution."[116] The Whig Reformers were thus
distinguished from the Radicals, and as they spoke contemptuously of the
extremists, so they were in their turn attacked as lukewarm and
time-serving. Even Fox himself did not escape censure, though he was always
careful to abstain from recrimination.[117] The real value of the Whigs was
that they opposed themselves steadily to all attempts to suspend the
ordinary law, to stifle public discussion, and to {106} govern the country
by the arbitrary power of the executive. In this cause Bedford and Grey and
Fox were heartily at one, and the various Bills for suspending the Habeas
Corpus Act, suppressing or restricting public meetings, and dissolving
political associations were always opposed by a compact body of members of
both Houses.[118] The few Whigs, who kept their heads in the face of
Revolutionary France, aimed at the old Whig objects, the supremacy of
Parliament over the executive, and the maintenance of the rule of ordinary
law.
When the Society of the Friends of the People had fallen into the hands of
the Whigs, Cartwright and Radicals like the Duke of Richmond, Dr. Price,
and Horne Tooke found a new outlet for their logical energies in the
Society for Constitutional Information, which had been founded in 1780. The
members of this Society were infinitely less experienced in practical
affairs than men like Grey, and some of their publications show a most
pedantic and ludicrous precision of reasoning from abstract principles.
Like all abstract politicians, they despised those who were content to
advance in opinion by easy stages. "How," asked Cartwright, "shall we speak
of the imbecile efforts of our professors of moderate reform--so much in
the nature of moderate honesty!--politicians whose abortive conceptions and
Sisyphean labours never can command the respect of Parliament, Prince, or
People? Can nothing cure these step-by-step Reformists of their
insanity?"[119] Their own doctrine was compressed on one occasion into the
following remarkable resolutions:
"1. Representation--'the happiest discovery of human wisdom'--is the vital
principle of the English Constitution, inasmuch as it is that alone which,
in a State too extensive for personal legislation, constitutes Political
Liberty.
"2. Political Liberty being a common right, Representation co-extensive
with direct Taxation ought, with all practicable equality, to be fairly and
honestly distributed throughout the community; the facility of which cannot
be denied.
{107}
"3. The constitutional duration of a Parliament cannot exceed one year."
The question of the ballot was on this occasion left open, and a prize,
consisting of the thanks of the Society, was offered for the best essay on
its advantages. The justification of the third proposition is a comical
instance of the way in which these theorizing politicians were carried away
from practical affairs.
"The truth of the third proposition in the Constitution or this Union is
made evident by the following, among other considerations:
"1. An Englishman, at twenty-one years of age, enters on his inheritance,
whatever it may be. 2. A greater inheritance descends to every one of us
from Right and the Laws than from our Parents; on which maxim Sir Edward
Coke (in his second Institute) remarks, 'Right is the best birthright the
subject hath; for thereby his goods, land, wife, children, his body, life,
honour, and estimation are protected from wrong.' 3. To no other 'Right'
than that of a People either personally or representatively making their
own Laws, whereby they may be 'protected from Wrong,' can this remark of
Sir Edward Coke possibly apply. 4. When Election is withholden for seven
years, then all who came of age since the preceding election are kept out
of their Inheritance and best Birthright. 5. Even supposing the
Representation of our Country were in other respects quite perfect, yet
septennial Parliaments would still deprive the whole Nation of its
political Liberty for six parts in seven of human life; and triennial
Parliaments must have a like effect for two years in every three; whence it
follows, that Parliaments of any duration exceeding One Year instead of a
protection from, would be an infliction of 'wrong'; contrary to the
Constitution, against Right, and destruction of Liberty."
This pedantry would destroy itself: by the application of the same
principles it could be proved that a General Election was necessary once a
month, or once a week, or once a day. But the real objection is that which
these _a priori_ Reformers constantly overlooked, the fact that a
Constitution is after all only {108} a machine contrived for certain
practical ends of government, that it must be arranged upon a basis of
convenience, and that infinitely greater hardship could be inflicted upon
the country by interrupting trade for one month in every twelve and
spending a million pounds in unproductive ways, than by forcing a small
portion of the population to abstain from voting even until it was as much
as twenty-eight years old.
These doctrines being based upon pure logic, and not upon practical
convenience, were naturally made applicable to all peoples without
distinction. "All being pure and genuine," said Cartwright, "the result
will be, a strict unity of form universally applicable; and exhibiting its
subject, political liberty, as evidently a common right and inheritance of
every people or nation; for to talk of English liberty, and French or
Spanish or Italian liberty, as different in nature is contrary to
reason."[120] It is easy to understand why men like Fox and Grey,
accustomed to grapple with the affairs of men who were swayed by prejudice,
tradition, interest, by everything but reason, were contemptuous of
political theories of this sort. No one who has been engaged in active
politics can fail to understand that men are infinitely variable, and that
what suits one race will not suit another. There was really only one
problem to consider. Given a society with a known history, composed of
human beings of a known character, and distributed among known conditions,
what form of government was best suited to their case? Origin, character,
social and economic distribution, and past history, are all different in
different peoples, and political institutions will inevitably differ also.
The Radicals were far enough away from real life. But with all their
incapacity for politics, they performed the great service of preaching the
political importance of individuality.
More influential than they were Tom Paine and his followers. These had
fewer men of experience in their ranks, they had less respect for existing
institutions, and they were as bitterly contemptuous of pioneers like
Cartwright as the pioneers in their turn were contemptuous of the Whigs in
Parliament. {109} Cartwright clung to King, Lords, and Commons, the
Established Church, and administration by men of property and rank. Paine
was a Republican, a theist, and a social reformer. The one had influence
among the aristocracy, the gentry, the manufacturers, and the
forty-shilling freeholders. The other was popular with the artisans and
tradesmen. But in general habit of mind the two men were very similar. The
differences were differences of class. Both belonged to the same species.
They were equally destitute of the historic sense, and equally incapable of
understanding that institutions must grow and change with society, and
cannot be praised or condemned according as, at any particular moment, they
do or do not correspond with the needs of the people who work them. Both
pushed theory to logical conclusions, irrespective of the course of events
in the past or the practical difficulties of the present. Of the two, Paine
had more political capacity. He had more genuine understanding of the
character of his audience, and his influence was infinitely more widespread
than that of any of the older men. Burke's _French Revolution_ drew a
volley of books and pamphlets from his opponents. The _Vindiciae Gallicae_
of Sir James Mackintosh was the best of these. But Mackintosh, no less that
Dr. Price, Mrs. Macaulay, and Mary Wollstonecraft, was outwritten and
outsold by Paine. Of the _French Revolution_ 19,000 copies were sold in
twelve months. In the same period Paine sold more than 40,000 copies of the
First Part of the _Rights of Man_.[121]
This famous book is marked by many of the vices of extreme opinions. Its
reading of events in France, in some of which Paine had taken part, was far
more accurate than that of Burke's treatise. Paine avoided the mistake of
taking the Revolution to be a mere outbreak of capricious violence, and
gave due weight to the intellectual revolution which had preceded it, and
to the economic distress which aggravated it. But though he knew France
better than Burke, he had not Burke's grasp of the idea of growth, of the
necessity of development rather than of reconstruction in politics, and he
could not understand that an institution, which {110} was now useless or
detrimental, might, in an older system, have been necessary to the
existence of society. Such phrases as Burke's "chain and continuity of the
commonwealth" had no meaning for him. Everything was to be cut off and
begun afresh. "Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself
in all cases as the ages and generations which preceded it."[122] "When we
survey the wretched condition of man, and the monarchical and hereditary
systems of government, dragged from his home by one power, or driven by
another, and impoverished by taxes more than by enemies, it becomes evident
that those systems are bad, and that a general revolution in the principle
and construction of governments is necessary."[123] Paine is here not
unlike the surgeon in Mr. Shaw's play, for ever eager to plunge his knife
into the vitals of the patient, without knowing either the history of the
disease or the chances of its cure. How much wiser is Burke's "I cannot
conceive how any man can have brought himself to that pitch of presumption,
to consider his country as nothing but carte blanche, upon which he may
scribble whatever he pleases. A man full of warm, speculative benevolence
may wish his society otherwise constituted than he finds it, but a good
patriot and a true politician always considers how he shall make the most
of the existing materials of his country. A disposition to preserve, and an
ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman."
Paine's prophecies were as extravagant as his reading of history was
inaccurate. "I do not believe," he said, "that monarchy and aristocracy
will continue seven years longer in any of the enlightened countries in
Europe."[124] After one hundred and twenty years Portugal alone has
attempted to follow the example of France, and it was eighty years before
even France expelled its last despot.
The truth lay midway between the two extremes. Burke was right in theory
and wrong in facts. Paine was right in facts and wrong in theory. Paine was
deceived by the events of his own time. He had personally assisted at the
making of two new {111} constitutions, and he exaggerated the ease with
which others might be made like them. This violent plucking out of ancient
loyalties seemed normal, when in fact it was altogether abnormal. In
America, separated from the old world and its old habits, the process had
been comparatively easy. In France, as subsequent events proved, it was of
enormous difficulty. Men who habitually build their houses on the sites of
abated earthquakes are not in a day to be twisted out of their habit of
submitting to illogical things like kings and nobles and Churches. Nor is
it often servility or credulity which produces that submission. In the vast
majority of cases it is only that they accept that to which they have been
accustomed, and require some outrageous provocation to make them change.
This was incredible to Paine. What was unreasonable was fraudulent, and
what was fraudulent to-day had always been fraudulent. "It is impossible
that such Governments as have hitherto existed in the world would have
commenced by any other means than a total violation of every principle,
sacred and moral. The obscurity in which the origin of all the present
Governments is buried implies the iniquity and disgrace with which they
began."[125] The obscurity seems a little less dense to us, and the King
and the Church appear as necessary in their proper order to the
consolidation of society and its advance out of barbarism. To Paine the
early king was only the head of a band of robbers, and the early Church was
contrived only to maintain him in power by investing him with superstitious
terrors. He assailed monarchy and aristocracy with a variety of scornful
epithets: "Nobility means No-ability." "Titles are but nicknames." "France
has outgrown the baby-cloaths of Count and Duke, and has breeched itself in
manhood." "The difference between a republican and a courtier with a
respect to monarchy is that the one opposes monarchy, believing it to be
something, and the other laughs at it, knowing it to be nothing." "As to
who is king in England or elsewhere, or whether there is any king at all,
or whether the people choose a Cherokee chief, or a Hessian hussar, for a
king, it is not a matter {112} that I trouble myself about." "The House of
Brunswick, one of the petty tribes of Germany." "The splendour of a throne
... is made up of a band of parasites living in luxurious indolence out of
the public taxes." "Monarchy is the master-fraud, which shelters all
others." A torrent of these gibes and sneers at things which to the
ordinary man and woman of comfortable surroundings were hardly less than
sacred, roused against Paine all that horror and aversion which in our own
day has been inspired by Mr. Lloyd George.
But the most disturbing part of Paine's book was not its epithets, but its
doctrine. Before him Radicals had argued more or less directly from the
assumption of natural rights that every man is invested at his birth with
rights against his neighbours, and that political constitutions must be
based upon these rights. The theory of natural rights came from Rousseau,
and the French Revolution claimed to be a practical consequence of it.
Paine brought it over from France in its crude simplicity, and preached it
more forcibly and more effectively than it had ever been preached before.
It was based on a false historical assumption. Every account of the
creation agreed that men are all born equal, of the same degree, and
endowed with equal natural rights. These, natural rights were the
foundation of all his civil rights. "Natural rights are those which
appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all the
intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of
acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not
injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which
appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil
right has for its foundation some natural right fore-existing in the
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in
all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate
to security and protection." The basis of liberty is contained in the first
three articles of the Declaration of Rights of the French National
Assembly, the whole of which Paine quotes in full and declares to be "of
more value to the world than all the laws and statutes that have yet {113}
been promulgated." The first of these articles, if true, destroys every one
of the distinctions of class and creed which were dear to
eighteenth-century England. "Men are born, and always continue, free and
equal in respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be
founded only on public utility." It followed from this premise that no one
class had any right to impose laws upon the rest of the community without
their consent. The nation must be the source of sovereignty, and no
individual or body of men could be entitled to any authority which was not
expressly derived from it. Monarchy, aristocracy, the Established Church,
the territorial system, and primogeniture, everything which gave artificial
advantages to one man over his neighbour, must be swept away. Given the
first assumption that all men are born equal, the rest follows as a matter
of course.
It is as easy to refute the doctrine as to state it. It is not historically
true that men are or ever have been born equal. It is not logically true
that a man is born with any rights or can ever acquire any except with the
consent of his associates. The historical basis must appear absurd to any
one who is acquainted with the theory of evolution and the early history of
family and tribal organization. The logical basis must appear equally
absurd to any one who is acquainted with the nature of a right. It is
impossible to conceive of such a thing as an abstract right apart from
definite human relationships. A right cannot exist in the air. It cannot
even attach to an isolated individual. A right is always a right against
some other, and postulates the association of its possessor with at least
one other human being. How can we with any propriety speak of the rights of
Robinson Crusoe before the arrival of Friday? The powers of Crusoe were at
first limited solely by physical considerations. When he took Friday under
his protection he acquired certain rights as against Friday, and at the
same time Friday acquired certain rights as against him. But this is only
to say that the natural power of each to do as he pleased, hitherto limited
only by natural forces, was thereafter limited also by certain rules of
conduct, recognized by both for observance so long as their {114} mutual
relations continued. The extent of those limits could only be defined by
their agreement. These are all the rights which any man can ever possess,
even in the most complex society. A right is nothing more or less than a
defined natural power. It may vary in the degree of its definition. It may
be enforced by all the authority of the whole community, and be called a
legal right. It may be enforced only by the pressure of the opinion of the
community or of a class, and be called a moral right. In neither case is it
a thing of spontaneous generation. It arises always out of the relations of
human beings with each other, and may always be tempered and qualified by
the nature of their relations.
Paine's mistake lay simply in using the word "natural" instead of the word
"moral." To assert that a man has a natural right to control his own
government is to assert what is demonstrably false. To assert that a man
has a moral right to control his own government is to assert simply that in
the writer's opinion a man ought to be allowed to control his own
government, and the dispute is simply about a particular problem of ethics.
Substitute the one word for the other in the passage above quoted, and what
is now a false statement of fact becomes a reasonable, if not an
unanswerable, argument. The quarrel between Paine and Burke, so far as it
was a practical quarrel and not merely a quarrel about terms, was a quarrel
about the precise manner in which certain common ethical principles should
be enforced. Government is merely the organization of human beings for
certain common purposes, and the structure is to be adapted solely to the
execution of those purposes. If a particular scheme means the abuse of one
section of the community by another, one of the ends of government, the
protection of all the human beings concerned, is not achieved, and the
scheme, if possible, should be altered. Once we come to the conclusion,
upon ethical principles, that every human being ought to have an equal
chance with every other of developing himself, it follows, not as a logical
deduction, but simply as a matter of practical convenience, that one class
ought not to be entrusted with the control of {115} others. A constitution
in itself has no merit. Its only value is as a piece of working machinery,
and it is to be tested not by the degree of its conformity to abstract
principles, but by its practical effects.
Burke himself, in fact, destroyed his whole argument against "natural
rights," not as a proposition of logic, but as a basis of political action.
He admitted that men had certain "real" rights: "to justice," "to the
fruits of their industry and to the means of making their industry
fruitful," "to the acquisitions of their parents, to the nourishment and
improvement of their offspring, to instruction in life, and to consolation
in death." But what is the difference between these "real" rights of Burke
and the "natural" rights of Paine? How are these rights created and
maintained, but by public opinion and current ideas of morality? And if
these, why not others? "It is a thing," said Burke, "to be settled by
convention." Tom Paine meant nothing else. But when Burke said, "As to the
share of power, authority, and direction which each individual ought to
have in the management of the State, that I must deny to be amongst the
direct, original rights of man in civil society," Paine might have asked in
what respect rights to justice and to the fruits of industry differed from
rights to control government. If the rules of justice are defined by
Government so that it becomes difficult, tedious, and expensive, how is the
poor man to exercise his right to justice? If Government taxes the raw
material of his industry, is not his right to the fruits of it being
impaired? In his _Present Discontents_ Burke had described clearly enough
the consequences of absolute power, the corruption of the governor and the
oppression of the governed. If government remains in the hands of a class,
it will inevitably be conducted in the interests of that class, and the
rules of justice and the regulation of industry will be contrived according
to its interests and not according to those of the general community. In
other words, the rights of the rest of society, however real, direct, and
original, are always liable to be diminished or destroyed by the caprice of
their governors. {116} Burke's admissions lead as inevitably to universal
suffrage as the false assumptions of Paine.
It must not be assumed that Paine was a mere theorizer. So far as the
interests of the mass of the people were concerned, he was the most
practical of reformers. Tories and reactionary Whigs appealed to "the
glorious Revolution of 1688."[126] Cartwright and the Radicals deduced
liberty from abstract hypotheses without considering to what practical uses
liberty was to be put. Paine came boldly forward with definite proposals
for social reforms, and it was this practical application of his principles
which made him to be detested where Cartwright was only despised. It was
bad enough to assail aristocracy. Words could hardly express the feelings
with which comfortable people listened to his attacks upon property. These
would seem moderate to a generation which has grown accustomed to
Socialism, as a creed if not as an institution, and his proposals were
little more drastic than those of the present Liberal Government. He
advocated graduated death duties, old-age pensions, maternity grants, the
right to work, and international agreement for the limitation of
armaments.[127] It is true that the language of his proposals was anything
but reckless. He was far from being an advocate of violent methods. "It is
always better to obey a bad law, making use at the same time of every
argument to show its errors and procure its repeal, than forcibly to
violate it; because the precedent of breaking a bad law might weaken the
force, and lead to a discretionary violation of those which are good."[128]
"The right of property being secured and inviolable, no one ought to be
deprived of it, except in cases of evident public necessity, legally
ascertained, and on condition of a previous just indemnity."[129] This is
the language of temperance. But the owners of property have little capacity
for reflection when their interests are attacked. They are seldom concerned
to examine the justice {117} of any infringement of their privileges, and
they find it difficult to distinguish between taxation and spoliation,
between appeals to natural justice and the negation of law. Paine's
adversaries did not believe in natural rights. But they believed in what
were far worse. They believed in natural wrongs. It was monstrous to
suggest that all men were entitled to equal opportunities. But it was quite
reasonable that the vast majority should be kept in a situation where they
could not be confident even of a bare subsistence. The good cause, if not
the logical reasoning, was Paine's. The right to property is, like all his
"natural" rights, or the "real" rights of Burke, a moral right, and its
extent is to be determined upon the same principles as every other. Violent
disturbances of it are bad, as violent disturbances of every right are bad,
not because they are disturbances, but because they are violent. There is
nothing more essentially vicious in a criticism of property in land or
machinery than in a criticism of property in a negro. As Burke said, "It is
a thing to be settled by convention."
Paine's suggestions for social reform were of little immediate importance,
and it was a hundred years before the first of them, a graduated death
duty, was passed into law. His value in his own day lay, not in his
practical proposals, but in his insistence upon the equal value of
individuals in the State. What the Whigs had practised partially and
obscurely Paine preached universally and with precision. His _Rights of
Man_ was the principal textbook of the new school of politicians, who, by
basing their politics upon individuality instead of class, eventually
transformed the English theory of government. The Reformers found
government the profession of a few families of landed proprietors, at the
best prevented from active abuse by an imperfect system of representation
of classes. They made it a thing of trust and responsibility, for which
every man must prove his competence by his readiness to act directly for
the benefit of those whom he governed. They found it an incident in the
lives of men of leisure. They made it an expression of the life of men of
all ranks alike. Omitting the false historical {118} assumption, there is
nothing substantially untrue in Paine's contrast of the old spirit with the
new. "Government on the old system was an assumption of power, for the
aggrandizement of itself; on the new, a delegation of power for the common
benefit of society."[130]
These new principles did not appear on the surface of politics until forty
years later, and not a single institution was in the interval altered in
the direction of Liberalism. The Whig Opposition broke into pieces, and the
majority joined the Tories.[131] The Church of England found itself for
once allied with the Wesleyans, whose Christianity was as much repelled by
Paine's _Age of Reason_ as its own aristocratic temper was repelled by his
_Rights of Man_. The governing class was driven into a paroxysm of fear and
rage by Paine's triple assault on aristocracy, property, and orthodox
religion, and every Conservative instinct was roused in its defence. Every
Reformer, moderate and extreme, was involved together in one denunciation.
Their opinions admittedly came from France, and every atrocity which had
taken place in France was due to those opinions. Voltaire was an atheist.
Rousseau was a profligate. The French aristocracy had been massacred. The
French Church had been stripped of its possessions. The French landed
proprietors had been spoiled. All this had been done in the name of the
rights of man. The English Reformers believed in the rights of man. These
had been proved by events in France to be incompatible with law, order,
religion, and morality. All who valued these must unite in their defence
against the deadly opinions. Belief in the rights of man marked an
Englishman like a contagious disease. Atheists, Theists, and Christians,
Trinitarians and Unitarians, Churchmen and Dissenters, Reformers, Radicals,
and Republicans, landowners, manufacturers, and artisans, people who
believed in vested interests and people who did not, all were Jacobins, and
all were swept away in one turbid flood of unreasoning invective.
{119}
Every proposal for change was opposed by the same arguments. Every
institution, good, bad, or indifferent, became a foothold for shuddering
Conservatism. Alteration became synonymous with evil; there was no good
save in establishment. Even the Slave Trade was strengthened against pious
Tory gentlemen like Wilberforce by the same arguments which defended the
representative system against the profane Republican artisans of
Lancashire. Thus Lord Abingdon claimed to have "incontrovertibly proved
that the proposition for the abolition of the Slave Trade is a French
proposition, that it is grounded in and founded upon French principles,
that it means neither more nor less than liberty and equality, that it has
Tom Paine's _Rights of Man_ for its chief and best support ... that it has
had in the colonies of France all the direful effects necessarily flowing
from such principles, namely, those of insubordination, anarchy, confusion,
murder, havock, devastation, and ruin."[132] Nearly thirty years after the
publication of Paine's book, Lord Wellesley, denouncing universal suffrage,
annual elections, and voting by ballot, said that, if carried into
execution, they "would be the destruction of all regular government, the
destruction of all religion, and the destruction of all private
property."[133] But the most ludicrous expression of this fear of change
occurs in one of Windham's speeches against the Bill to suppress
bull-baiting. The House of Commons solemnly listened to a solemn assurance
that the Bill was promoted by Methodists and Jacobins, and that it was
directed to the destruction of the old English character by the abolition
of all rural sports. "Out of the whole number of the disaffected, he
questioned if a single bull-baiter could be found, or if a single sportsman
had distinguished himself in the Corresponding Society ... the antiquity of
the thing was deserving of respect, for antiquity was the best preservation
of the Church and State."[134]
The controversy was not allowed to remain a mere matter {120} of words.
Both sides set themselves to organize machinery for the dissemination of
their opinions. The Radicals used the Society for Constitutional
Information. The extremists established the Corresponding Society, whose
branches, composed chiefly of the middle and working classes, corresponded
with similar societies in France, held meetings and published their
resolutions in the newspapers, and industriously circulated copies of the
_Rights of Man_. So vigorous were their operations that a Royal
Proclamation was issued in May, 1792, denouncing these "wicked and
seditious writings" and correspondence with "persons in foreign parts," and
exhorting all subjects of the Crown to discourage them.[135] In November
the Tories formed an Association for Preserving Liberty and Property
against Republicans and Levellers, which declared that "It appears from
history and observation, that the inequality of rank and fortune in this
happy country is more the result of every man's own exertions than of any
controlling institution of the State. Men become great who have greatly
distinguished themselves by the application of talents natural or acquired;
and men become rich who have persevered with industry in the application to
trade and commerce, to manufactures, and other useful employments."[136]
Such language was hardy enough in a society where public dignities were
monopolized by a few families, whose inherited wealth was augmented as
often by jobbery as by industry. The Association seems to have acted as a
private detective agency and sent reports and secret information to the
Government. But the honours of agitation rested, as usual, with the
reforming party. If their success was small, it was due less to the private
efforts of their opponents than to the superior resources of the Government
itself.
{121}
It is difficult to discover how widely the new ideas had spread by the end
of the century. The war with France, which lasted almost continuously from
1793 to 1815, probably drew off much of the national enthusiasm. A foreign
war is always favourable to the enemies of domestic liberty, and however
much their distresses may drive common men to hate their governors, they
generally hate them less than the national enemy. Industrious as they were,
the agitators were too closely identified with France to be popular, and it
was not till the end of the war that the middle and working classes as a
whole began to lend them a favourable ear. In the meantime, they were
regarded by the Government as infinitely more powerful than they really
were, and for thirty years they worked in constant danger of imprisonment
or transportation. They had been depressed, in common with Whigs like Fox
and Grey, by the ferocity of the French mobs. But the invasion of France by
the Duke of Brunswick and the complete victory of the new national
Government, restored their confidence at the same time as it reawakened the
terrors of the Tories. The most trifling expressions of sympathy with the
French people or their principles exposed them to spies and informers and
zealous loyalists.[137] On the 8th May James Ridgway and H. D. Symonds were
sentenced to four years' imprisonment for publishing Paine's works. On the
27th, for saying in a coffee-house, "I am for equality; I see no reason why
one man should be greater than another; I would have no king, and the
constitution of this country is a bad one," Mr. Frost was struck oft the
roll of attorneys and sentenced to an hour in the pillory and six months in
Newgate. On the 1st October Mr. Pigott and Dr. Hudson were tried for
drinking "The French Republic" in a coffee-house. At Leicester a man called
Vaughan distributed a handbill criticizing the war because it inflicted
hardship on the poor. He was sent to prison for three months. Benjamin
{122} Bull distributed the _Rights of Man_ at Bath, and was imprisoned for
a year.[138] Paine himself was tried for seditious libel in 1792, and in
his absence was outlawed. But the most ferocious punishments were inflicted
in Scotland. In England, short of high treason, there was no legal offence
possible except sedition or seditious libel, for which the punishment was a
term of imprisonment. In Scotland the offenders might be transported. In
September, 1793, the Rev. Thomas Fysche Palmer, Unitarian minister at
Dundee, for publishing an address couched in very temperate language, from
which it was proved that he had struck out some more extravagant
expressions, was sentenced to seven years' transportation. The Whigs in
Parliament protested against this monstrous sentence. But the House, by a
large majority, refused even to compel the Home Secretary to detain the
convict ship pending its revision.[139] In the same year Thomas Muir, a
gentleman of acknowledged respectability, was sentenced to fourteen years'
transportation for an offence of as trivial a kind as that of Mr.
Palmer.[140] Other Reformers, chiefly members of Corresponding Societies,
met at Edinburgh in December, 1792, in what they rashly called a "National
Convention." This consisted of delegates from Societies all over the
kingdom. It passed resolutions, appointed committees, and acted as a
permanent body of political delegates is accustomed to act, in order to
further the cause of Parliamentary Reform. There was nothing violent in the
objects, the proceedings, or the language of the Convention, which passed a
resolution in favour of government by King, Lords, and Commons without a
single dissentient voice.[141] But the French Revolution had begun by the
meeting of a "Convention," and the delegates, in addition to selecting that
unfortunate title, presented an address to the French National Convention,
and habitually addressed each other, in imitation of the French, as
"citizens." This was {123} enough for the Government. A representative
body, with a French title, in communication with the French Government, and
using French forms of speech, must meditate that sort of revolution which
had been contrived by the French people. It fell upon the delegates with
all the ferocity of despotism in a panic. William Skirving, Maurice
Margarot, and Joseph Gerald were transported for fourteen years, and
Alexander Callender was outlawed. English juries were less frantic than
Scottish. The members of the London Corresponding Society had done similar
acts in England. But in 1794, when several of them, including Horne Tooke,
were tried for high treason, all were acquitted.
The precise details of all these proceedings, and the widespread suffering
which they caused, are not important for this book. It is enough to state
here that there was much expression of discontent, and that the Government
dealt with it in the worst possible way. The wise course was to detach the
respectable agitators from the agitators who were not respectable by
substantial improvements in the franchise and the distribution of seats.
But the Government were incapable of drawing distinctions, and, by
confounding all sorts of discontent in their repression, alienated and
embittered even those whom they had it in their power to conciliate.
Evidence of any general conspiracy to alter the existing order by violent
means there is none. Nothing was ever published on behalf of the Government
itself which proved anything but constitutional and orderly expressions of
dissatisfaction, with occasional outbreaks of reckless language and
exceedingly rare instances of such acts as the purchase or manufacture of
weapons.[142] There were no collections of arms, no riots, except such as
were purely industrial, and no demonstrations of force. Not a single life
was ever taken or attempted by the Reformers, and the only dangerous
political disturbance of the {124} period was the outbreak of the Tory mob,
who looted and burnt the houses of Dissenters and Radicals at Birmingham.
But the governing class was afraid, and in its fear it struck out blindly
at everything which it disliked.
The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended in 1791, and the executive received
power to arrest and detain suspects without trial. At a later date,
extraordinary powers were created. A meeting held near London in October,
1795, was followed by an attempt to assassinate the King. The meeting was
orderly, and there was not a shadow of proof that there was any connection
between the two events. But the Government took advantage of the prevailing
indignation to create new crimes, and to increase the punishments for
existing crimes. The Treason Act made it an offence, punishable on a second
conviction with seven years' transportation, to "incite or stir up the
people to hatred or dislike of His Majesty's person or the established
Government and constitution of the realm," and extended the definition of
high treason. The Sedition Act prohibited the holding of meetings without
the presence of a magistrate, made it an offence punishable with death for
twelve persons to remain together after a magistrate had called upon them
to disperse, and declared that any house, where a substantial number of
persons beyond that of the resident family assembled for a common purpose,
should be treated as a disorderly house, unless specially licensed. In
1799, after the mutiny in the fleet at the Nore and the great Irish
Rebellion, in both of which the Society of United Irishmen had been
involved, new statutes made it a criminal offence, punishable by fine and
imprisonment, to belong to the Corresponding Society, or the Societies of
United Irishmen and United Englishmen, or to take oaths of secrecy. No
printer was to be allowed to conduct his business without obtaining a
certificate from a clerk of the peace. No attempt was made to discriminate
between the Corresponding Societies, whose violence was confined to their
language, and the other two societies, which had undoubtedly been concerned
in the mutiny and the Rebellion. Individual atrocities were ascribed to
French principles. The Reform Societies preached French principles. {125}
Therefore they were as guilty as the criminals themselves. In effect, all
organized political agitation was suppressed.
All these measures were steadily opposed by the small body of Parliamentary
Whigs who had not lost their belief in free government. Fox, Grey, and
Whitbread in the Commons, and Bedford, Lansdowne,[143] Moira, and
Lauderdale in the Lords, denounced every restriction upon the right of free
discussion, and at huge meetings at Copenhagen House and in Palace Yard
they protested against the Treason and Sedition Bills. They were not in
sympathy with the extremists, who often attacked them as bitterly as the
Tories themselves. There is nothing so obnoxious to violent opinions as
moderation. It seems to add hypocrisy to wickedness. But to those who can
see historical events in proportion the good service of this handful of
statesmen is beyond question. They maintained the purely Liberal view that
toleration is not to be confined to opinions of which we ourselves approve.
"All political libels," said Fox, "he would leave to themselves;
discussions on government, so far as they did not interfere with private
character, he would permit to pass entirely unrestrained."[144] "The best
security of a Government," said Tierney, "is in the free complaints of a
people."[145] "The safety of the State," said Grey, "could only be found in
the protection of the liberties of the people.... There never was an
extensive discontent without great misgovernment. The people ought to be
taught to look to Parliament with a confident expectation that their
complaints would be heard, and protection afforded to them. When no
attention was paid to the calls of the people for relief, when their
petitions were rejected, and their sufferings aggravated, was it wonderful
that at last public discontents should assume a formidable aspect?"[146]
Protests sometimes became threats. Fox declared in 1795 that if the Treason
and Sedition Bills were carried into law, the propriety of resistance to
government would no longer be a matter of morality but of prudence only,
and in this he was supported by Sheridan and Grey.
{126}
These Whigs at least contrived to see the popular point of view, and would
have suffered opinions which they would do nothing to promote. The Tories
saw no point of view but their own. They hated free discussion, because
they saw that it meant the end of the institutions which they cherished.
Discussion was to them only a stage on the way to rapine and murder. It
made, therefore, no difference whether discussion were honest and orderly
or not. They were resolute to maintain existing establishments, and the
most constitutional of critics was as much a public enemy as the most
ferocious of rebels. They drew no distinction between agitation and
revolution. They inquired into discontents, but only into their extent and
not into their causes. They applied violent remedies, not to the real
disease, but to its symptoms. The patient was noisy, and they beat him for
being noisy, when they ought to have cured the fever which produced his
delirium. The vice of their system lay not so much in their suppression of
disorder as in their neglect of reform. Order must be maintained by
government, even when the breach of it is the fault of government. But it
must be accompanied by redress of grievances. It is the business of a
statesman to manage his people, not to compel them, and however necessary
it may sometimes be for him to enforce the law, it remains the weakest, and
should always be the last of his instruments. It is useless for him to
maintain order unless it is accompanied by goodwill. Some men may be
constitutionally so disaffected that nothing can appease them. But the
majority can always be satisfied by a generous treatment of their
grievances. Even after the crisis of the Revolution Pitt might have made
the state of England more happy than it was. But what he did not do was not
so important as what he had not done. He believed in Parliamentary Reform,
in Catholic Emancipation, in the relief of Dissenters, in Free Trade. He
was in power from 1783 to the outbreak of the Revolution, and might have
conciliated the middle class and the Irish, diminished public corruption,
stimulated industry, and reduced the cost of living. This would not have
prevented all discontent. But it would have confined it to its essential
and irreducible minimum. {127} Whether this inaction was due to his own
lethargy or the incurable selfishness and stupidity of his associates and
supporters, it was undoubtedly responsible for a large part of his
subsequent difficulties. He left heaps of combustible material untouched,
and it was his own fault that it caught fire. In this unhappy state,
lurching between bitter discontent and savage repression, English liberty
struggled through the great war.
The affairs of Ireland furnished another battle-ground for contending
principles during this period. The complete subjugation of that country was
ended in 1782, when demonstrations of armed force wrested legislative
independence from an England surrounded by foreign enemies. The Irish
Parliament was left free to make such laws as it pleased for Ireland, and
the deliberate destruction of Irish industries in the interest of English
ceased for ever. But this independence, though won by the united efforts of
all creeds and classes, was the independence of a Protestant oligarchy. The
great bulk of the Irish people escaped an external only to submit to an
internal tyrant. The Irish Parliament, though patriotic in matters of
commerce, was hardly any more indulgent than the English in its religious
policy. Catholics were excluded from the Houses at Dublin as vigorously as
from those at Westminster, and few important mitigations of their lot were
obtained from their own countrymen. In 1792 Catholics were admitted to the
Bar, mixed marriages were allowed, and it was made legal for a Catholic to
educate his children abroad. In 1793 all public offices were thrown open to
them, except seats in Parliament and the highest places in the Army, the
Judicature, and the Civil Service. These changes removed the worst
disabilities of the upper and middle classes, who had now fewer
disabilities than their fellows in England and Scotland, and there was thus
exhibited a considerable reduction of Protestant insolence. The supremacy
of Pitt in England aroused great hopes that the last stones of the edifice
would soon be removed. Catholic emancipation would not have cured all the
ills of Ireland, any more than Parliamentary Reform would have cured all
the ills of England. An excessive population, {128} crowded into
agriculture by the destruction of manufactures, demoralized by landowners
who were too often thriftless or absentees, and deprived of education by
the laws which prohibited teaching by Catholic priests or laymen, was in a
condition which mere political reforms could do little to improve. What
Catholic disabilities did was to poison economic discontent by the memories
of racial and religious persecution. The conduct of the English Government
of the day was dangerously uncertain. The hopes of the Catholics were
roused in 1794 by the appointment of Lord Fitzwilliam as Lord-Lieutenant.
Fitzwilliam was notoriously in favour of the Catholic claims, even though
he was not authorized to make any promises on behalf of the Government. He
was too open in his professions of sympathy, and when Protestant bigotry
procured his recall, the apparent treachery only aggravated the bitterness
of old subjection. Catholic resentment and Protestant arrogance soon
brought matters to a crisis. Neither party gained credit from the rising of
1798. The excesses of the magistrates and the troops before, during, and
after the fighting were often of mediaeval atrocity, and the retaliation of
the rebels cannot be justified, though it is amply explained by the
character of the provocation. This fearful outbreak in the middle of the
French War satisfied the English Government that only by a Union could
Ireland be kept in peace. The good effects of the recent concessions had
vanished in this whirlwind of savagery, and Protestant and Catholic were
once more in the temper of the Middle Ages. Mutual goodwill could only be
restored by a common tutelage.
There was nothing bad in itself in the plan for a legislative Union. Had it
been carried through with a just regard for Irish opinion, and had it been
followed by a strict attention to the grievances of the common people, the
Union might have been one of the brilliant successes of the English race.
In fact it was itself effected by shameful means, and it was followed by
misgovernment as fatally unsympathetic as that which had preceded it.
English rule in Ireland was less ferocious in the {129} nineteenth century
than in the eighteenth. But it was no less conspicuous a failure. No
constitutional machinery can be better than the men who work it, and
Englishmen after the Union showed themselves no less unimaginative and
egoistic than their predecessors. The objects of the Union were stated by
Pitt, with perfect good faith, to be the substitution of government by an
impartial authority for government by a faction which was steeped in the
memories of old oppression. "An impartial Legislature standing aloof from
local party connection, sufficiently removed from the influence of
contending factions to be advocate or champion of neither, being so placed
as to have no superstitious reverence for the names and prejudices of
ancient families, who have so long enjoyed the exclusive monopolies of
certain public patronages and property ... this is the thing that is wanted
for Ireland."[147] That was what was wanted for Ireland. What it obtained
was a Legislature as partial, as inextricably involved in local party
connection, and as closely wrapped about with superstitious reverence for
ancient families and their patronages and property as could have been
contrived. For half a century at least the government of Ireland remained
what it has always been in the hands of England, government by armed force,
in the interests of the landlords against the tenants, of the Protestants
against the Catholics. A system which Pitt devised as a protection against
the old abuses was converted into an effective engine for their
maintenance. Pitt was himself partly to blame for this disastrous failure.
He probably never saw the need for economic reorganization. But he saw
clearly enough the need for the ending of religious strife, which poisoned
the whole temper of the people and wasted on the jealousies of sects and
the hatred of government energy which would otherwise be free to run in
healthy and productive channels. His weakness in not pushing on with Lord
Fitzwilliam made the rebellion of 1798 inevitable. Similar weakness after
the Union made the constitutional change useless. It was undoubtedly part
of his original plan to emancipate the Catholics. But the King, the {130}
Church, and Protestant Ireland were too strong for him. Pitt resigned. The
Whigs came into office, with a Ministry which was united at least on the
Catholic question. The King again had his way, and rather than hold office
without fulfilling their Catholic pledges, they resigned in their
turn.[148] Pitt's course was clear. He should have refused to come back
without permission to do what he thought right. But he preferred the
convenience of the King, and accepted office on condition that the Catholic
question was left open. This was as effective as a definite refusal.
Canning persuaded the House of Commons in 1812, but Eldon in the Lords
defeated his colleague's Bill, and until Eldon could be expelled there was
no hope for Ireland. The friendly Tories would never unite with the Whigs
to defeat the hostile Tories. Nothing was done to solve the problem, and
Ireland, for a generation after the Union, was governed by coercion.
Throughout this wretched dispute the Whigs maintained the ancient doctrines
of their party with regard to religious disabilities. But the problem
aroused controversy about a second conception of more recent growth, the
conception of nationality. Burke had tried to treat Ireland as an equal
nation for commercial purposes. The Whigs of 1801 extended the idea to its
extreme limits. Had the Irish Parliament the right to surrender its powers
to a Parliament of the United Kingdom without receiving the approval of its
own electors? Unquestionably it had the legal right. Had it also the moral
right? The Whigs held that it had not. "What right," asked Sheridan, "has
the Irish Parliament to resolve that, instead of going back to their
constituents, they shall form part of a foreign legislature?"[149] "The
Union," said Fox, "is not an alteration, but a destruction and annihilation
of the Irish Constitution. Union therefore, like revolution, cannot be
justifiable but by the unequivocal {131} consent of the people."[150] Pitt
opposed this doctrine on the usual Tory ground. It led, he said,
immediately "to the system of universal right of suffrage in the people, to
the doctrine that each man should have a share in the government of the
country by having a choice for his representative; and then goes back to
the whole system of Jacobinism."[151]
The Union was therefore carried through the instrumentality of a
legislature bribed to betray its constituents. This transaction was much
worse than it appeared. The English Government which neglected the wishes
of the Irish people in this matter would neglect them in all others. The
Union was a supreme act of despotism, the fitting prelude to the systematic
disregard of Irish opinion which followed it. "There must," wrote Fox a few
years later, "be a fundamental change in the system of governing Ireland,
to give even a chance of future quiet there.... That there should be a part
of the United Kingdom to which our laws, nominally at least, extend, and
which is nevertheless in such a state as to call for martial law, etc., so
repeatedly, is of itself ground for reconsidering, at least, the system by
which it is governed."[152] The Tories could not understand, even in the
case of England, that it is the business of a governor to manage and not to
coerce the governed, and race and religion combined to obscure still
further their view of Ireland. The system remained what it had been and
was, and the consequences of this fatal negligence are with us to this day.
The foreign policy of the Government gave not a few opportunities for
expressions of Liberalism. The rights of nationalities were in issue in the
beginning of the French War, in the treatment of Ireland, in the descent
upon Copenhagen, and in the negotiations which followed the downfall {132}
of Napoleon. In all these cases the Whig Opposition stated the pure Liberal
doctrine. In that of the war with France, one section of them carried the
doctrine to an absurd extent. In origin, the war was unquestionably a war
of interference, an attempt to force upon the French people an obnoxious
government, and to compel them to abandon those new and revolutionary
principles which they had adopted for themselves. Pitt himself had
apparently no such object, and was hurried into the war partly by the
French threats of assisting other peoples to revolt, and chiefly by the
irresistible pressure of the English governing class. It is impossible to
read contemporary literature, the debates in Parliament, the newspapers,
the pamphlets of Burke and other acknowledged leaders of opinion, the
resolutions of corporations and public meetings, and the private
correspondence, without coming to the conclusion that the great bulk of
influential political society was inspired by a fanatical hatred of the new
opinions. Whatever pretexts may have been urged in public, and may have
been in fact held by comparatively sober people like Pitt, the impelling
force behind the English armies was dread of French principles. The sword
of the invader could not have been feared more than the fatal contagion of
his ideas. The Germans and Austrians, who invaded France in 1792 to restore
the monarchy, were less concerned to hide their motives than the English
Government. But there was little difference in substance between them. The
Continental Sovereigns moved of their own motion. The English Ministers
were carried on by their supporters.
Against a war of this kind the Whigs spoke forcibly and with justice.
Lansdowne described it as "a war, the alleged object of which was to repel
unprovoked aggressions, but the real one to prescribe laws to an
independent country."[153] It was "a metaphysical war; it was declared
against France on account of her internal circumstances."[154] Fox said it
was no better than the methods of the Inquisition. We were killing people
because they thought differently from ourselves. "How could we blame all
{133} those abominable acts of bloodshed and torture, which had been
committed from time to time under the specious name of religion, when we
ourselves had the presumption to wage a similar war?"[155] It was "the most
gross violation of everything sacred which could exist between nation and
nation, as striking at the root of the right which each must ever possess
of internal legislation."[156] "Whatever our detestation of the guilt of
foreign nations may be, we are not called to take upon ourselves the task
of avengers; we are bound only to act as guardians of the welfare of those
with whose concerns we are immediately entrusted."[157]
This language was wise, and its wisdom was proved by events. The Bourbons
were not restored. The temper of the French people was incredibly
stimulated. The new system which might have repelled by its violence and
rapacity became the centre of the national enthusiasm. It inflicted a
crushing defeat upon its foreign invaders and then proceeded to avenge this
additional injury by the massacre of those whom the invasion was intended
to assist. Whether Napoleon would have appeared in French history or not
without this strengthening of the Revolutionary system, it is impossible to
say. Certainly the foreign interference with the first Government
consolidated the nation, and prepared for Napoleon's use the most
formidable weapon that he could have obtained for the braying of Europe.
There is a tragic instance of that insight which is not foresight in the
correspondence of Castlereagh, and it shows how completely the English
Government misunderstood what they had done. "The only thing ... which
really dispirits me is, the unprecedented struggle of order against
anarchy, and the unfortunate facility with which France recruits her army
as fast as the sword exterminates it. A few days transforms their
ragamuffins into troops, which are not contemptible even when opposed to
the best soldiers in Europe.... It is the first time that _all_ the
population and _all_ the wealth of a great kingdom has been concentrated in
the field: what may be the result is beyond my perception."[158] {134} What
was going on was that anarchy was being reduced into order within the
boundaries of France, and no hatred of early extravagance or subsequent
tyranny need blind us to the courage, energy, and skill of those French
statesmen who, in the face of their enemies, built up the new system upon
the ruins of the old. The war made their task comparatively easy, and if it
diminished their strength, it made their material more workable. The
foreign invasion operated like a powerful electric current, and fused the
scattered particles of French nationalism into a solid bulk. The whole
fiery mass of France was being beaten and welded and forged into something
which Castlereagh could not understand: a nation, every member of which had
a personal interest in and a personal devotion to his nationality. Such a
thing had not been known before in France. But it was not long before even
Castlereagh was made to feel that in the councils of Europe the rights of
man might count for as much as government by orders.
The Whigs carried their maintenance of the equal rights of nationalities to
its inevitable conclusion that nations, no less than individuals, must be
bound by moral rules in their dealings with each other. Fox declared that
"the greatest resource a nation can possess, the sweet source of power, is
a strict attention to the principles of justice. I firmly believe that the
common proverb of honesty being the best policy is as applicable to nations
as to individuals ... and that cases which may sometimes be supposed
exceptions arise from our taking narrow views of the subject, and being
unable at once to comprehend the whole."[159] When he was almost at the
point of death he proceeded to suggest an international congress for
settling disputes. "He disapproved ... of any government pursuing under the
title of indemnities a system of partition of States, making some
republics, some monarchies, and annihilating the political existence of
others, without regard to moral rectitude or to the common feelings of
mankind, which considerations had more influence on the affairs of the
world than some politicians were aware. The partition {135} of Poland, the
seizure of Holland, the subjugation of Switzerland, and the division of
States, by the agreement of some, and by the fraud and rapacity of others,
had done more to destroy the confidence of mankind in each other than all
the other misconduct of the powers put together. In private society, when
men lost their confidence in one another, the compact was dissolved. The
same rule applied to States, for they were only aggregates of individuals.
He recommended to all the powers of Europe a system of justice and
moderation, as the only means of putting an end to the evils under which we
labour. He recommended a general congress, and that these principles should
be prevalent in its deliberations."[160]
These principles of international morality were applied most forcibly to
the destruction of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen in 1805. The Danes were
not hostile to us, and in common with all the other small peoples of Europe
they had every reason to fear Napoleon. The English Government knew that
Napoleon intended, if he could, to use the Danish fleet against them. The
English fleet accordingly was sent to Copenhagen to demand the surrender of
the Danish ships, and on receiving a very natural refusal, destroyed some
and carried off the rest. This proceeding is generally treated in English
schools as a matter for national gratification. To Liberals it appears a
very dangerous abuse of arbitrary power. Contemporary Europe was of the
same opinion, and the direct consequence of the affair was to range all the
Northern States on the side of Napoleon. We deprived him of the Danish
ships, and we threw into his hands the Danish army, and all the forces of
Sweden, Norway, and Russia as well. The chorus of denunciation in
Parliament was for once not confined to the Whigs. Even Windham said "he
would sooner have seen the Danish fleet in Buonaparte's hands than in ours,
under all the circumstances of the case."[161] Erskine lamented that the
whole course of civilization had been interrupted by this act. "If anything
could give delight in reading the history of civilized nations, it was the
progressive improvement that was to be traced {136} in law and civilization
amongst the nations of the world. This was the first instance in which the
principles of that amelioration had been trampled upon by us."[162] Lord
Moira spoke in the same strain. "As long as there was a power in Europe
which, from its regard to justice and to the rights of other States, could
form a sort of rallying-point to the oppressed, there was some probability
that the nations who were groaning under the yoke of a pitiless and
inexorable tyrant would have watched for some opportunity, and made some
exertion in common to throw it off. Such a power was this country, previous
to the late most unjustifiable and unfortunate attack upon Denmark; but by
this attack that hope had been completely extinguished."[163] Grey disposed
of the argument that reasons of State could justify immorality. "So far
from adding to the safety of the country, that point on which its safety
most particularly depended, he meant its honour, had not only been greatly
weakened, but had in fact received a mortal stab."[164] Prior to this
oppression of the Danes, England had had the chance of heading a European
movement for emancipation from Napoleon. Every small State might have
supported her as a protector, and every large one as an ally against a
dangerous rival. After the attack it became for the small States simply a
choice between two protectors, either of whom seemed to offer security
against the other if not against itself. The exasperation of the moment
swung the balance to the side of Napoleon, and England found herself face
to face with a hostile Continent.[165]
Fortunately for the country, the Government soon effected a great change in
their policy. For the first time they enlisted on their side what the
French had had from the beginning, the idea of nationality. The war had
entirely changed its character. Beginning as an interference with the
internal affairs of the French people, it had merged, since the rise of
Napoleon, into a struggle against a power which was as universal in its
appetite {137} as it was unscrupulous in its methods. Against this force,
which was so astonishing that it appeared to many pious Christians as
Anti-Christ himself, schemes and combinations had proved powerless. England
had escaped disaster because she was an island. The rest of Europe, with
the exception of Russia, had been beaten to the ground. These dynastic
contrivances of kings and emperors wanted the national spirit which
supported their adversary. To the common people in many parts of Europe
Napoleon appeared as a deliverer from their domestic oppressors, and the
little states of Germany and Italy, which he had carved out of the bigger,
were ready enough to see a champion of freedom in one who tyrannized only
over tyrants. The end began when he deposed a Spanish king and put his own
brother on the throne of the proudest and most exclusive nation of Europe.
The Peninsular War at last found England in her right place, at the head of
a league of nationalities. The Whig Opposition, always weak in numbers, was
now broken to pieces. Part of it repeated the old arguments, which applied
to everything but the present facts, hailed Napoleon as the champion of
liberty, and even expressed regret at his downfall at Waterloo. The wiser
men saw at once the significance of the Spanish expedition. Canning was now
the Tory Foreign Secretary. He found a hearty supporter in Grey among the
Whigs, and both felt an idea in what for Castlereagh was still no more than
a matter of business. "Of all the infamies ever incurred by a nation," said
Grey, "I think the greatest would have been to have appeared to abandon the
Spaniards."[166] "The allies have now been placed by France in the
situation in which France was originally placed by the allies. The success
of both has been occasioned by the spirit of resistance, produced by injury
and oppression; and my great hopes of the present confederacy are chiefly
derived from this, that it has arisen rather from the feeling of the
peoples than the policy of the Governments which it embraces."[167] The new
principle succeeded at last. The Spanish people, with English {138} help,
crippled Napoleon, the Russian people wore him out, and the German people
overwhelmed him. In 1815 the victory of Waterloo completed his destruction,
and the European peoples had at last leisure to look to themselves.
Comparing the England of 1815 with the England of 1790, the Liberals of the
time would find little cause for satisfaction. The economic problems of the
country were more acute, and the attempts to remedy them directly by
legislation and indirectly by encouraging combinations of workmen had been
defeated. A solitary Act of 1802, which did something to regulate the
conditions of parish children who had been apprenticed to private
employers, was the only measure of protection which had passed into law.
Parliamentary Reform and Religious Emancipation seemed more remote than
ever. The principle of nationality had been violated in Ireland, and if the
recognition of it in the later stages of the war gave some ground for
future confidence, hope was soon to be dispelled.
Unhappily for the common people, the spirit of nationality had been used
only as a means and not as an end by the various enemies of Napoleon. No
sooner was the common enemy destroyed than the victorious monarchs sat down
to cut up and distribute Europe among themselves. They had fought, not the
French, but the French Revolution, and when the main conflagration had been
extinguished, they had still to stamp out the burning embers which had been
blown about its borders. The young Republics which had been created were to
be restored to their old rulers, and all the ancient monarchies were to be
re-established, and where necessary strengthened by the acquisition of new
territory. There is something almost ludicrous to modern eyes in the
spectacle of these kings and emperors and their chancellors and envoys
assigning and allotting human beings, by millions together, without
inquiring into the wishes or interests of those with whom they dealt.
England participated in the game, and Toryism and Liberalism were again
brought into conflict. {139}
The Tory view, expressed by Castlereagh and Liverpool, was hardly less
callous than that of the Tzar Alexander himself. There is hardly a word in
any of their speeches or dispatches which shows any tenderness for men and
women as such. Human beings to them were only subjects. The old form of
Europe was to be restored, subject only to such changes as were necessary
to strengthen the principal enemies of Revolutionary France. To the balance
of power was to be sacrificed all local or national independence. "Upon the
subject of Austria and Prussia," wrote Lord Liverpool, "we must always
expect a degree of jealousy on the part of every French Government. It is
quite essential, however, to any balance of power that these two monarchies
should be made respectable. The principle recognized in the early part of
this year, that Austria should have a population in the whole of about
27,000,000 of souls, and Prussia one of about 11,000,000, appears to be
quite reasonable, and ought to give no umbrage to France."[168] Lord
Liverpool wrote of "souls," but if he had been writing of cattle his
language would have been no different. Castlereagh was no better. The
Congress of Vienna, at which this vivisection of a continent took place,
had in his eyes two objects, to check France and to check Russia. Prussia
and Austria must therefore be aggrandized. Italy might be the next free
people and become as dangerous as France, and the dream of her unity and
independence must be subordinated to the necessity of at once strengthening
Austria against Russia and of suppressing those small states upon which
Napoleon had conferred independence. Venice, an ancient Republic, was
handed over to Austria. Lest France should infect Italy, the Genoese
Republic must be annexed to the Kingdom of Piedmont. Lest Russia should
dominate Sweden, Norway must be taken from Denmark and given to Sweden. In
order that Holland might be strengthened against France in the North, she
must be allowed to annex Belgium. Prussia must be strengthened, but not too
much, and accordingly the Kingdom of Saxony was cut in half. The Poles had
been {140} divided between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1792. They now
expressed a desire for independence, but in vain.[169] Austria and Prussia
must be maintained at all costs. Castlereagh regretted that they should be
sacrificed and left them to their fate.
The Whigs protested warmly against this infamous disposition of the affairs
of unconsenting peoples. Particular acts, in particular the partition of
Poland, it was not in the power of England to prevent. But that was no
reason why she should give them her formal sanction. "England," said the
young Lord John Russell, "might have appeared as a member of a confederacy
to oppose France without sanctioning any of those acts of pillage by which
the deliverance of Europe has been disgraced. If she was not able to
prevent those acts, she need not have soiled her fair fame by appearing to
countenance them."[170] But other matters were entirely within the control
of England. She had entered into a treaty with Russia and Sweden, by which
she bound herself not only formally to transfer Norway from Denmark to
Sweden, but actually to compel the Norwegians by force of arms to submit to
their new masters. Even Canning, who, though a member of the Government,
held Liberal opinions in foreign affairs, declared that "if the question
now was, whether consent should be given to the treaty, he had no
hesitation in saying that he would refuse it."[171] Wilberforce "considered
the partitioning of States against their will a most despotic sacrifice of
public rights."[172] Lord Grenville appealed "to the old-established and
true principles of national law in opposition to the new-fangled doctrine
of utility, or, in other words, the subversion of all moral principle," and
denounced "the horrible injustice by which an unoffending people were to be
bent to the dominion of a foreign power."[173] Grey expressed the complete
Liberal theory. "The principles are the same in the one case and the other,
whether between individuals or {141} between States. No matter to what
degree the impunity of power might silence the claims of right, its nature
cannot be altered; it is equally sacred, equally important, and is equally
to be recognized, in every attempt to protect the weak against the
strong.... The rights of the Sovereign over his subjects are not the rights
of property. They do not confer the privilege of transferring them from one
to another like cattle attached to the soil.... The Sovereign might
withdraw himself from their protection. He might absolve them from their
allegiance to himself; but he had no right to transfer their allegiance to
any other State. It became, then, the right of the people to decide to whom
their allegiance should be given."[174] He dealt in fitting terms with the
contention that it was after all for the benefit of the Norwegian people.
"Can it be argued," he asked, "that any country shall be obliged to accept
what a foreign State thinks proper to consider as happiness? No sort of
tyranny can, in my judgment, be conceived more complete than that a
Government should undertake to force another people to submit to that
system which such Government may regard as happy, although that people may
think quite the contrary."[175] Neither the reluctance of Canning nor the
attacks of the Whigs could prevent the outrage. The British fleet blockaded
the Norwegian ports, and the Norwegian people submitted to their new
masters.
* * * * *
{142}