BOOK IV

ROME AFTER THE FALL OF VITELLIUS

(January-July, A.D. 70)

The death of Vitellius ended the war without inaugurating peace. 1

The victors remained under arms, and the defeated Vitellians were

hunted through the city with implacable hatred, and butchered

promiscuously wherever they were found. The streets were choked with

corpses; squares and temples ran with blood. Soon the riot knew no

restraint; they began to hunt for those who were in hiding and to drag

them out. All who were tall and of youthful appearance, whether

soldiers or civilians, were cut down indiscriminately.[228] While

their rage was fresh they sated their savage cravings with blood; then

suddenly the instinct of greed prevailed. On the pretext of hunting

for hidden enemies, they would leave no door unopened and regard no

privacy. Thus they began to rifle private houses or else made

resistance an excuse for murder. There were plenty of needy citizens,

too, and of rascally slaves, who were perfectly ready to betray

wealthy householders: others were indicated by their friends. From all

sides came cries of mourning and misery. Rome was like a captured

city. People even longed to have the insolent soldiery of Otho and

Vitellius back again, much as they had been hated. The Flavian

generals, who had fanned the flame of civil war with such energy, were

incapable of using their victory temperately. In riot and disorder the

worst characters take the lead; peace and quiet call for the highest

qualities.

Domitian having secured the title and the official residence of a 2

Caesar,[229] did not as yet busy himself with serious matters, but in

his character of emperor's son devoted himself to dissolute intrigues.

Arrius Varus[230] took command of the Guards, but the supreme

authority rested with Antonius Primus. He removed money and slaves

from the emperor's house as though he were plundering Cremona. The

other generals, from excess of modesty or lack of spirit, shared

neither the distinctions of the war nor the profits of peace.

People in Rome were now so nervous and so resigned to despotism that

they demanded that Lucius Vitellius and his force of Guards should be

surprised on their way back from Tarracina,[231] and the last sparks

of the war stamped out. Some cavalry were sent forward to Aricia,

while the column of the legions halted short of Bovillae.[232]

Vitellius, however, lost no time in surrendering himself and his

Guards to the conqueror's discretion, and the men flung away their

unlucky swords more in anger than in fear. The long line of prisoners

filed through the city between ranks of armed guards. None looked like

begging for mercy. With sad, set faces they remained sternly

indifferent to the applause or the mockery of the ribald crowd. A few

tried to break away, but were surrounded and overpowered. The rest

were put in prison. Not one of them gave vent to any unseemly

complaint. Through all their misfortunes they preserved their

reputation for courage. Lucius Vitellius was then executed. He was as

weak as his brother, though during the principate he showed himself

less indolent. Without sharing his brother's success, he was carried

away on the flood of his disaster.

At this time Lucilius Bassus[233] was sent off with a force of 3

light horse to quell the disquiet in Campania, which was caused more

by the mutual jealousy of the townships than by any opposition to the

emperor. The sight of the soldiers restored order. The smaller

colonies were pardoned, but at Capua the Third legion[234] was left in

winter quarters and some of the leading families fined.[235]

Tarracina, on the other hand, received no relief. It is always easier

to requite an injury than a service: gratitude is a burden, but

revenge is found to pay. Their only consolation was that one of

Vergilius Capito's slaves, who had, as we have seen,[236] betrayed

the town, was hanged on the gallows with the very rings[237] on his

fingers which Vitellius had given him to wear.

At Rome the senate decreed to Vespasian all the usual prerogatives of

the principate.[238] They were now happy and confident. Seeing that

the civil war had broken out in the provinces of Gaul and Spain, and

after causing a rebellion first in Germany and then in Illyricum, had

spread to Egypt, Judaea, Syria,[239] and in fact to all the provinces

and armies of the empire, they felt that the world had been purged as

by fire and that all was now over. Their satisfaction was still

further enhanced by a letter from Vespasian, which at first sight

seemed to be phrased as if the war was still going on. Still his tone

was that of an emperor, though he spoke of himself as a simple citizen

and gave his country all the glory. The senate for its part showed no

lack of deference. They decreed that Vespasian himself should be

consul with Titus for his colleague, and on Domitian they conferred

the praetorship with the powers of a consul.[240]

Mucianus had also addressed a letter to the senate which gave rise 4

to a good deal of talk.[241] If he were a private citizen, why adopt

the official tone? He could have expressed the same opinions a few

days later from his place in the House. Besides, his attack on

Vitellius came too late to prove his independence, and what seemed

particularly humiliating for the country and insulting to the emperor

was his boast that he had held the empire in the hollow of his hand,

and had given it to Vespasian. However, they concealed their ill-will

and made a great show of flattery, decreeing to Mucianus in the most

complimentary terms full triumphal honours, which were really given

him for his success against his fellow countrymen, though they trumped

up an expedition to Sarmatia as a pretext.[242] On Antonius Primus

they conferred the insignia of the consulship, and those of the

praetorship on Cornelius Fuscus and Arrius Varus. Then came the turn

of the gods: it was decided to restore the Capitol. These proposals

were all moved by the consul-designate, Valerius Asiaticus.[243] The

others signified assent by smiling and holding up their hands, though

a few, who were particularly distinguished, or especially practised in

the art of flattery, delivered set speeches. When it came to the turn

of Helvidius Priscus, the praetor-designate, he expressed himself in

terms which, while doing honour to a good emperor, were perfectly

frank and honest.[244] The senate showed their keen approval, and it

was this day which first won for him great disfavour and great

distinction.

Since I have had occasion to make a second allusion[245] to a man 5

whom I shall often have to mention again,[246] it may be well to give

here a brief account of his character and ideals, and of his fortune

in life. Helvidius Priscus came from the country town of Cluviae.[247]

His father had been a senior centurion in the army. From his early

youth Helvidius devoted his great intellectual powers to the higher

studies, not as many people do, with the idea of using a philosopher's

reputation as a cloak for indolence,[248] but rather to fortify

himself against the caprice of fortune when he entered public life. He

became a follower of that school of philosophy[249] which holds that

honesty is the one good thing in life and sin the only evil, while

power and rank and other such external things, not being qualities of

character, are neither good nor bad. He had risen no higher than the

rank of quaestor when Paetus Thrasea chose him for his son-in-law,[250]

and of Thrasea's virtues he absorbed none so much as his independence.

As citizen, senator, husband, son-in-law, friend, in every sphere of

life he was thoroughly consistent, always showing contempt for money,

stubborn persistence in the right, and courage in the face of danger.

Some people thought him too ambitious, for even with philosophers 6

the passion for fame is often their last rag of infirmity. After

Thrasea's fall Helvidius was banished, but he returned to Rome under

Galba and proceeded to prosecute Eprius Marcellus,[251] who had

informed against his father-in-law. This attempt to secure a revenge,

as bold as it was just, divided the senate into two parties, for the

fall of Marcellus would involve the ruin of a whole army of similar

offenders. At first the struggle was full of recrimination, as the

famous speeches on either side testify; but after a while, finding

that Galba's attitude was doubtful and that many of the senators

begged him to desist, Helvidius dropped the prosecution. On his action

in this matter men's comments varied with their character, some

praising his moderation, others asking what had become of his

tenacity.

To return to the senate: at the same meeting at which they voted

powers to Vespasian they also decided to send a deputation to address

him. This gave rise to a sharp dispute between Helvidius Priscus and

Eprius Marcellus. The former thought the members of the deputation

ought to be nominated by magistrates acting under oath; Marcellus

demanded their selection by lot. The consul-designate had already 7

spoken in favour of the latter method, but Marcellus' motive was

personal vanity, for he was afraid that if others were chosen he

would seem slighted. Their exchange of views gradually grew into a

formal and acrimonious debate. Helvidius inquired why it was that

Marcellus was so afraid of the magistrates' judgement, seeing that he

himself had great advantages of wealth and of eloquence over many

others. Could it be the memory of his misdeeds that so oppressed him?

The fall of the lot could not discern character: but the whole point

of submitting people to the vote and to scrutiny by the senate was to

get at the truth about each man's life and reputation. In the interest

of the country, and out of respect to Vespasian, it was important that

he should be met by men whom the senate considered beyond reproach,

men who would give the emperor a taste for honest language. Vespasian

had been a friend of Thrasea, Soranus, and Sentius,[252] and even

though there might be no need to punish their prosecutors, still it

would be wrong to put them forward. Moreover, the senate's selection

would be a sort of hint to the emperor whom to approve and whom to

avoid. 'Good friends are the most effective instruments of good

government. Marcellus ought to be content with having driven Nero to

destroy so many innocent people. Let him enjoy the impunity and the

profit he has won from that, and leave Vespasian to more honest

advisers.'

Marcellus replied that the opinion which was being impugned was not 8

his own. The consul-designate had already advised them to follow the

established precedent, which was that deputations should be chosen by

lot, so that there should be no room for intrigue or personal

animosity. Nothing had happened to justify them in setting aside such

an ancient system. Why turn a compliment to the emperor into a slight

upon some one else? Anybody could do homage. What they had to avoid

was the possibility that some people's obstinacy might irritate the

emperor at the outset of his reign, while his intentions were

undecided and he was still busy watching faces and listening to what

was said. 'I have not forgotten,' he went on, 'the days of my youth or

the constitution which our fathers and grandfathers established.[253]

But while admiring a distant past, I support the existing state of

things. I pray for good emperors, but I take them as they come. As for

Thrasea, it was not my speech but the senate's verdict which did for

him. Nero took a savage delight in farces like that trial, and,

really, the friendship of such an emperor cost me as much anxiety as

banishment did to others. In fine, Helvidius may be as brave and as

firm as any Brutus or Cato; I am but a senator and we are all slaves

together. Besides, I advise my friend not to try and get an upper hand

with our emperor or to force his tuition on a man of ripe years,[254]

who wears the insignia of a triumph and is the father of two grown

sons. Bad rulers like absolute sovereignty, and even the best of them

must set some limit to their subjects' independence.'

This heated interchange of arguments found supporters for both views.

The party which wanted the deputies chosen by lot eventually

prevailed, since even the moderates were anxious to observe the

precedent, and all the most prominent members tended to vote with

them, for fear of encountering ill-feeling if they were selected.

This dispute was followed by another. The Praetors, who in those 9

days administered the Treasury,[255] complained of the spread of

poverty in the country and demanded some restriction of expenditure.

The consul-designate said that, as the undertaking would be so vast

and the remedy so difficult, he was in favour of leaving it for the

emperor. Helvidius maintained that it ought to be settled by the

senate's decision. When the consuls began to take each senator's

opinion, Vulcacius Tertullinus, one of the tribunes, interposed his

veto, on the ground that they could not decide such an important

question in the emperor's absence. Helvidius had previously moved that

the Capitol should be restored at the public cost, and with the

assistance of Vespasian. The moderates all passed over this suggestion

in silence and soon forgot it, but there were others who took care to

remember it.[256]

It was at this time that Musonius Rufus[257] brought an action 10

against Publius Celer on the ground that it was only by perjury that

he had secured the conviction of Soranus Barea.[258] It was felt that

this trial restarted the hue and cry against professional accusers.

But the defendant was a rascal of no importance who could not be

sheltered, and, moreover, Barea's memory was sacred. Celer had set up

as a teacher of philosophy and then committed perjury against his

pupil Barea, thus treacherously violating the very principles of

friendship which he professed to teach. The case was put down for the

next day's meeting.[259] But now that a taste for revenge was aroused,

people were all agog to see not so much Musonius and Publius as

Priscus and Marcellus and the rest in court.

Thus the senate quarrelled; the defeated party nursed their 11

grievances; the winners had no power to enforce their will; law was in

abeyance and the emperor absent. This state of things continued until

Mucianus arrived in Rome and took everything into his own hands. This

shattered the supremacy of Antonius and Varus, for, though Mucianus

tried to show a friendly face towards them, he was not very

successful in concealing his dislike. But the people of Rome, having

acquired great skill in detecting strained relations, had already

transferred their allegiance. Mucianus was now the sole object of

their flattering attentions. And he lived up to them. He surrounded

himself with an armed escort, and kept changing his house and gardens.

His display, his public appearances, the night-watch that guarded him,

all showed that he had adopted the style of an emperor while forgoing

the title. The greatest alarm was aroused by his execution of

Calpurnius Galerianus, a son of Caius Piso.[260] He had attempted no

treachery, but his distinguished name and handsome presence had made

the youth a subject of common talk, and the country was full of

turbulent spirits who delighted in revolutionary rumours and idly

talked of his coming to the throne. Mucianus gave orders that he

should be arrested by a body of soldiers, and to avoid a conspicuous

execution in the heart of the city, they marched him forty miles along

the Appian road, where they severed his veins and let him bleed to

death. Julius Priscus, who had commanded the Guards under Vitellius,

committed suicide, more from shame than of necessity. Alfenus Varus

survived the disgrace of his cowardice.[261] Asiaticus,[262] who was a

freedman, paid for his malign influence by dying the death of a

slave.[263]

FOOTNOTES:

[228] Because they were taken for members of Vitellius' German

auxiliary cohorts.

[229] Cp. iii. 86 sub fin.

[230] Cp. iii. 6.

[231] See iii. 76.

[232] These three towns are all on the Appian Way, Bovillae

ten miles from Rome, Aricia sixteen, Tarracina fifty-nine, on

the coast.

[233] Cp. iii. 12.

[234] Gallica.

[235] Capua had adhered to Vitellius. Tarracina had been held

for Vespasian (cp. iii. 57).

[236] See iii. 77.

[237] The insignia of equestrian rank (cp. i. 13).

[238] The chief of these were the powers of tribune,

pro-consul, and censor, and the title of Augustus (cp. i. 47,

ii. 55).

[239] Vindex had risen in Gaul; Galba in Spain; Vitellius in

Germany; Antonius Primus in the Danube provinces (Illyricum);

Vespasian and Mucianus in Judaea, Syria, and Egypt.

[240] This was necessary in the absence of Vespasian and Titus.

[241] See vol. i, note 339.

[242] A triumph could, of course, be held only for victories

over a foreign enemy. Here the pretext was the repulse of the

Dacians (iii. 46).

[243] Vitellius' son-in-law (cp. i. 59).

[244] In the text some words seem to be missing here, but the

general sense is clear.

[245] Cp. ii. 91.

[246] If Tacitus ever told the story of his banishment and

death, his version has been lost with the rest of his history

of Vespasian's reign.

[247] In Samnium.

[248] i.e. shirking the duties of public life.

[249] i.e. the Stoic.

[250] See ii. 91.

[251] Cp. ii. 53.

[252] Soranus, like Thrasea, was a Stoic who opposed the

government mainly on moral grounds. The story of their end is

told in the _Annals_, Book XVI. Sentius was presumably another

member of their party.

[253] He refers to Augustus' regularization of the principate.

[254] Fifty-nine.

[255] The administration of this office was changed several

times in the first century of the empire. Here we have a

reversion to Augustus' second plan. Trajan restored Augustus'

original plan--also adopted by Nero--of appointing special

Treasury officials from the ex-praetors.

[256] His offence lay in assigning to the emperor a merely

secondary position.

[257] His ill-timed advocacy of Stoicism is mentioned iii. 81.

[258] Described in the _Annals_, xvi. 32.

[259] The description of this is postponed to chap. 40. Celer

was convicted.

[260] C. Piso had conspired against Nero, A.D. 65.

[261] They had both abandoned their camp at Narnia (cp. iii. 61).

[262] Cp. ii. 57.

[263] i.e. he was crucified.

THE REVOLT OF CIVILIS AND THE BATAVI

The growing rumour of a reverse in Germany[264] had not as yet 12

caused any alarm in Rome. People alluded to the loss of armies, the

capture of the legions' winter quarters, the defection of the Gallic

provinces as matters of indifference. I must now go back and explain

the origin of this war, and of the widespread rebellion of foreign and

allied tribes which now broke into flame.

The Batavi were once a tribe of the Chatti,[265] living on the further

bank of the Rhine. But an outbreak of civil war had driven them across

the river, where they settled in a still unoccupied district on the

frontier of Gaul and also in the neighbouring island, enclosed on one

side by the ocean and on the other three sides by the Rhine.[266]

There they fared better than most tribes who ally themselves to a

stronger power. Their resources are still intact, and they have only

to contribute men and arms for the imperial army.[267] After a long

training in the German wars, they still further increased their

reputation in Britain, where their troops had been sent, commanded

according to an ancient custom by some of the noblest chiefs. There

still remained behind in their own country a picked troop of horsemen

with a peculiar knack of swimming, which enabled them to make a

practice[268] of crossing the Rhine with unbroken ranks without losing

control of their horses or their weapons.

Of their chieftains two outshone the rest. These were Julius 13

Paulus and Julius Civilis, both of royal stock. Paulus had been

executed by Fonteius Capito on a false charge of rebellion.[269] On

the same occasion Civilis was sent in chains to Nero. Galba, however,

set him free, and under Vitellius he again ran great risk of his life,

when the army clamoured for his execution.[270] This gave him a motive

for hating Rome, and our misfortunes fed his hopes. He was, indeed,

far cleverer than most barbarians, and professed to be a second

Sertorius or Hannibal, because they all three had the same physical

defect.[271] He was afraid that if he openly rebelled against the

Roman people they would treat him as an enemy, and march on him at

once, so he pretended to be a keen supporter of Vespasian's party.

This much was true, that Antonius Primus had written instructing him

to divert the auxiliaries whom Vitellius had summoned, and to delay

the legions on the pretence of a rising in Germany. Moreover,

Hordeonius Flaccus[272] had given him the same advice in person, for

Flaccus was inclined to support Vespasian and anxious for the safety

of Rome, which was threatened with utter disaster, if the war were to

break out afresh and all these thousands of troops come pouring into

Italy.

Having thus made up his mind to rebel, Civilis concealed in the 14

meantime his ulterior design, and while intending to guide his

ultimate policy by future events, proceeded to initiate the rising as

follows. The young Batavians were by Vitellius' orders being pressed

for service, and this burden was being rendered even more irksome than

it need have been by the greed and depravity of the recruiting

officers. They took to enrolling elderly men and invalids so as to get

bribes for excusing them: or, as most of the Batavi are tall and

good-looking in their youth, they would seize the handsomest boys for

immoral purposes. This caused bad feeling; an agitation was organized,

and they were persuaded to refuse service. Accordingly, on the pretext

of giving a banquet, Civilis summoned the chief nobles and the most

determined of the tribesmen to a sacred grove. Then, when he saw them

excited by their revelry and the late hour of the night, he began to

speak of the glorious past of the Batavi and to enumerate the wrongs

they had suffered, the injustice and extortion and all the evils of

their slavery. 'We are no longer treated,' he said, 'as we used to be,

like allies, but like menials and slaves. Why, we are never even

visited by an imperial Governor[273]--irksome though the insolence of

his staff would be. We are given over to prefects and centurions; and

when these subordinates have had their fill of extortion and of

bloodshed, they promptly find some one to replace them, and then there

are new pockets to fill and new pretexts for plunder. Now conscription

is upon us: children are to be torn from parents, brother from

brother, never, probably, to meet again. And yet the fortunes of Rome

were never more depressed. Their cantonments contain nothing but loot

and a lot of old men. Lift up your eyes and look at them. There is

nothing to fear from legions that only exist on paper.[274] And we are

strong. We have infantry and cavalry: the Germans are our kinsmen: the

Gauls share our ambition. Even the Romans will be grateful if we go to

war.[275] If we fail, we can claim credit for supporting Vespasian: if

we succeed, there will be no one to call us to account.'

His speech was received with great approval, and he at once bound 15

them all to union, using the barbarous ceremonies and strange oaths of

his country. They then sent to the Canninefates to join their

enterprise. This tribe inhabits part of the Island,[276] and though

inferior in numbers to the Batavi, they are of the same race and

language and the same courageous spirit. Civilis next sent secret

messages to win over the Batavian troops, which after serving as Roman

auxiliaries in Britain had been sent, as we have already seen,[277] to

Germany and were now stationed at Mainz.[278]

One of the Canninefates, Brinno by name, was a man of distinguished

family and stubborn courage. His father had often ventured acts of

hostility, and had with complete impunity shown his contempt for

Caligula's farcical expedition.[279] To belong to such a family of

rebels was in itself a recommendation. He was accordingly placed on a

shield, swung up on the shoulders of his friends, and thus elected

leader after the fashion of the tribe. Summoning to his aid the

Frisii[280]--a tribe from beyond the Rhine--he fell upon two cohorts

of auxiliaries whose camp lay close to the neighbouring shore.[281]

The attack was unexpected, and the troops, even if they had foreseen

it, were not strong enough to offer resistance: so the camp was taken

and looted. They then fell on the Roman camp-followers and traders,

who had gone off in all directions as if peace were assured. Finding

the forts now threatened with destruction, the Roman officers set fire

to them, as they had no means of defence. All the troops with their

standards and colours retired in a body to the upper end of the

island, led by Aquilius, a senior centurion. But they were an army in

name only, not in strength, for Vitellius had withdrawn all the

efficient soldiers and had replaced them by a useless mob, who had

been drawn from the neighbouring Nervian and German villages and were

only embarrassed by their armour.[282]

Civilis thought it best to proceed by guile, and actually ventured 16

to blame the Roman officers for abandoning the forts. He could, he

told them, with the cohort under his command, suppress the outbreak of

the Canninefates without their assistance: they could all go back to

their winter-quarters. However, it was plain that some treachery

underlay his advice--it would be easier to crush the cohorts if they

were separated--and also that Civilis, not Brinno, was at the head of

this war. Evidence of this gradually leaked out, as the Germans loved

war too well to keep the secret for long. Finding his artifice

unsuccessful, Civilis tried force instead, forming the Canninefates,

Frisii and Batavi into three separate columns.[283] The Roman line

faced them in position near the Rhine bank.[284] They had brought

their ships there after the burning of the forts, and these were now

turned with their prows towards the enemy. Soon after the engagement

began a Tungrian cohort deserted to Civilis, and the Romans were so

startled by this unexpected treachery that they were cut to pieces by

their allies and their enemies combined. Similar treachery occurred in

the fleet. Some of the rowers, who were Batavians, feigning clumsiness

tried to impede the sailors and marines in the performance of their

functions, and after a while openly resisted them and turned the

ships' sterns towards the enemy's bank. Finally, they killed the

pilots and centurions who refused to join them, and thus all the

twenty-four ships of the flotilla either deserted to the enemy or were

captured by them.

This victory made Civilis immediately famous and proved 17

subsequently very useful. Having now got the ships and the weapons

which they needed, he and his followers were enthusiastically

proclaimed as champions of liberty throughout Germany and Gaul. The

German provinces immediately sent envoys with offers of help, while

Civilis endeavoured by diplomacy and by bribery to secure an alliance

with the Gauls. He sent back the auxiliary officers whom he had taken

prisoner, each to his own tribe, and offered the cohorts the choice of

either going home or remaining with him. Those who remained were given

an honourable position in his army: and those who went home received

presents out of the Roman spoil. At the same time Civilis talked to

them confidentially and reminded them of the miseries they had endured

for all these years, in which they had disguised their wretched

slavery under the name of peace. 'The Batavi,' he would say, 'were

excused from taxation, and yet they have taken arms against the common

tyrant. In the first engagement the Romans were routed and beaten.

What if Gaul throws off the yoke? What forces are there left in Italy?

It is with the blood of provincials that their provinces are won.

Don't think of the defeat of Vindex. Why, it was the Batavian cavalry

which trampled on the Aedui and Arverni,[285] and there were Belgic

auxiliaries in Verginius' force. The truth is that Gaul succumbed to

her own armies. But now we are all united in one party, fortified,

moreover, by the military discipline which prevails in Roman camps:

and we have on our side the veterans before whom Otho's legions lately

bit the dust. Let Syria and Asia play the slave: the East is used to

tyrants: but there are many still living in Gaul who were born before

the days of tribute.[286] Indeed, it is only the other day[287] that

Quintilius Varus was killed, when slavery was driven out of Germany,

and they brought into the field not the Emperor Vitellius but Caesar

Augustus himself. Why, liberty is the natural prerogative even of dumb

animals: courage is the peculiar attribute of man. Heaven helps the

brave. Come, then, fall upon them while your hands are free and theirs

are tied, while you are fresh and they are weary. Some of them are for

Vespasian, others for Vitellius; now is your chance to crush both

parties at once.'

Civilis thus had his eye on Gaul and Germany and aspired, had his 18

project prospered, to become king of two countries, one pre-eminent in

wealth and the other in military strength.

FOOTNOTES:

[264] Cp. iii. 46.

[265] One of the greatest and most warlike of the German

tribes living in the modern Hessen-Nassau and Waldeck. Tacitus

describes them at length in his _Germania_.

[266] i.e. a stretch of land about sixty miles in length, from

Nymwegen to the Hook of Holland, enclosed by the diverging

mouths of the Rhine, the northern of which is now called the

Lek, the southern the Waal (in Tacitus' time Vahalis). The

name Betuwe is still applied to the eastern part of this

island.

[267] In the _Germania_ Tacitus says that, like weapons, they

are kept exclusively for use in war, and are spared the

indignity of taxation.

[268] Some such word as _peritus_ or _exercitus_ must be

supplied at the end of this chapter.

[269] Probably during the revolt of Vindex. Capito governed

Lower Germany.

[270] Cp. i. 59.

[271] The loss of an eye.

[272] Governor of Upper Germany.

[273] As a subordinate division of Lower Germany the Batavian

district would be administered by 'prefects' subordinate to

the imperial legate.

[274] Vitellius had reduced the strength of the legions (cp. ii. 94).

[275] Because it would weaken the position of Vitellius.

[276] They lived north of the Batavi, between the Zuider Zee

and the North Sea.

[277] ii. 29.

[278] Mogontiacum.

[279] Caligula's only trophy had been helmetfuls of stones and

shells from the sea-shore of Germany.

[280] Living in Friesland, north-east of the Zuider Zee.

[281] Reading _applicata_ (Andresen) instead of _occupata_,

which gives no sense. The camp was probably somewhere near

Katwyk.

[282] The Nervii were a Gallic tribe living on the Sambre,

with settlements at Cambray, Tournay, Bavay. Ritter's

alteration of _Germanorum_ to _Cugernorum_ is very probably

right. They lived about a dozen miles west of Vetera, and are

thus a likely recruiting-ground. They were of German origin,

so if _Germanorum_ is right, the reference will still be to

them and the Tungri and other German Settlements on the east

of the Rhine.

[283] See ii. 42, note 301. Here, however, it is not

improbable that the word _cuneus_ means a V-shaped formation.

Tacitus' phrase in _Germ._ 6 is generally taken to mean that

the Germans fought in wedge-formation. The separation of the

three tribes in three columns was also typical of German

tactics. The presence of kinsmen stimulated courage.

[284] Presumably at the eastern end of the island, near either

Nymwegen or Arnheim.

[285] The Aedui lived in Bourgogne and Nivernois, between the

Loire and the Saône; the Arverni in Auvergne, north-west of

the Cevennes. Both had joined Vindex.

[286] 'Many' must be an exaggeration, since Augustus' census

of Gaul took place 27 B.C., ninety-five years ago.

[287] Sixty years ago, to be exact.

THE MUTINY OF THE BATAVIAN COHORTS

Hordeonius Flaccus at first furthered Civilis' schemes by shutting his

eyes to them. But when messengers kept arriving in panic with news

that a camp had been stormed, cohorts wiped out, and not a Roman left

in the Batavian Island, he instructed Munius Lupercus, who commanded

the two legions[288] in winter-quarters,[289] to march against the

enemy. Lupercus lost no time in crossing the river,[290] taking the

legions whom he had with him, some Ubii[291] who were close at hand,

and the Treviran cavalry who were stationed not far away. To this

force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who, though their

loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed the fact, because they

hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually

betrayed the Romans on the field. Civilis set the standards of the

defeated cohorts[292] round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours

before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them

of their disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters

and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be

stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they

were beaten.[293] When his line raised their battle-cry, the men

singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries

replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had

been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian cavalry, who promptly

turned against us. However, despite the confusion, the legionaries

gripped their swords and kept their places. Then the Ubian and

Treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all

over the country. The Germans pressed hard on their heels and

meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp,

which was called 'Castra Vetera'.[294] Claudius Labeo, who commanded

the Batavian cavalry, had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty

municipal dispute. Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might

offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give

rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the Frisii.

It was at this time that the cohorts of Batavians and 19

Canninefates, on their way to Rome under orders from Vitellius,

received the message which Civilis had sent to them.[295] They

promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a

special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an

increase in the number of their cavalry.[296] Although all these

things had been promised by Vitellius they had no hope of obtaining

them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many

concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour

and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. Paying no further

heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join Civilis. Flaccus

summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he

should use force to punish this defiance of authority. After a while

he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his

subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of

the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited

by a hurried levy. It was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in

camp.[297] However, he soon changed his mind when he found himself

criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed

bent on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the First

legion, who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the path of the

Batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon

their heels. The rebels might certainly have been crushed had Flaccus

and Gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and

thus surrounded them. But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote

another letter to Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass

undisturbed. This gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were

purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already

occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the

soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the

treachery of the generals.

On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a 20

messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus. Against the

Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they had no wish to make

war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of

service and wanted to go home and rest. If no one opposed them they

would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find

a passage at the point of the sword. Gallus hesitated, but his men

induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionaries, some

hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and

camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful

before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping

with their superior numbers to surround the Batavians. But these were

experienced veterans. They formed up into columns[298] in deep

formation that defied assault on front, flank, or rear. They thus

pierced our thinner line. The Belgae giving way, the legion was driven

back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp.

It was there that we suffered the heaviest losses. The trenches were

filled with dead, who were not all killed by the blows of the enemy,

for many were stifled in the press or perished on each other's swords.

The victorious cohorts avoided Cologne and marched on without

attempting any further hostilities. For the battle at Bonn they

continued to excuse themselves. They had asked for peace, they said,

and when peace was persistently refused, had merely acted in

self-defence.

FOOTNOTES:

[288] V Alaudae and XV Primigenia, both depleted.

[289] At Vetera.

[290] Waal.

[291] They lived round their chief town, known since A.D. 50

as Colonia Agrippinensis, now Cologne (cp. i. 56, note 106).

[292] See chap. 16.

[293] This was a German custom. We read in the _Germania_ that

in battle 'they keep their dearest close at hand, where the

women's cries and the wailing of their babies can be heard'.

[294] This means, of course, simply The Old Camp, but, as

Tacitus treats Vetera as a proper name, it has been kept in

the translation. It was probably on the Rhine near Xanten and

Fürstenberg, some sixty-six miles north of Cologne.

[295] Cp. i. 59; ii. 97; iv. 15.

[296] Who got better pay for lighter service.

[297] i.e. at Mainz, Bonn, Novaesium and Vetera.

[298] See note 283.

THE SIEGE OF VETERA

After the arrival of these veteran cohorts Civilis was now at the 21

head of a respectable army. But being still uncertain of his plans,

and engaged in reckoning up the Roman forces, he made all who were

with him swear allegiance to Vespasian, and sent envoys to the two

legions, who after their defeat in the former engagement[299] had

retired into Vetera, asking them to take the same oath. The answer

came back that they never followed the advice either of a traitor or

of an enemy: Vitellius was their emperor, and they would keep their

allegiance and their arms for him so long as they had breath in their

bodies. A Batavian deserter need not try to decide the destiny of

Rome; he should rather expect the punishment he richly deserved. When

this was reported to Civilis he flew into a passion, and called the

whole Batavian people to take arms. They were joined by the Bructeri

and Tencteri,[300] and Germany was summoned to come and share the

plunder and the glory.

Threatened with this gathering storm, Munius Lupercus and Numisius 22

Rufus, who were in command of the two legions, proceeded to strengthen

the ramparts and walls. They pulled down the buildings near the

military camp, which had grown into a small town during the long years

of peace, fearing that the enemy might make use of them. But they

omitted to provide a sufficient store of provisions for the camp, and

authorized the soldiers to make up the deficiency by looting, with the

result that what might have supplied their needs for a long time was

consumed in a few days. Meanwhile Civilis advanced, himself holding

the centre with the flower of the Batavi: on both banks of the Rhine

he massed large bands of Germans to strike terror into the enemy: the

cavalry galloped through the fields, while the ships were

simultaneously moved up the stream. Here could be seen the colours of

veteran Roman cohorts, there the figures of beasts which the Germans

had brought from their woods and groves, as their tribes do when they

go to battle. It seemed both a civil and a savage war at once; and

this strange confusion astounded the besieged. The hopes of the

assailants rose when they saw the circumference of the ramparts, for

there were barely five thousand Roman soldiers to defend a camp which

had been laid out to hold two legions.[301] However, a large number of

camp-followers had collected there on the break-up of peace, and

remained to give what assistance they could to the military

operations.

The camp was built partly on the gentle slope of a hill and partly 23

on the level ground. Augustus had believed that it would serve as a

base of operations and a check upon the German tribes: as for their

actually coming to assault our legions, such a disaster never

occurred to him. Consequently no trouble had been taken in choosing

the site or erecting defences: the strength of the troops had always

seemed sufficient.

The Batavians and the Germans from across the Rhine[302] now formed up

tribe by tribe--the separation was designed to show their individual

prowess--and opened fire from a distance. Finding that most of their

missiles fell harmlessly on to the turrets and pinnacles of the walls,

and that they were being wounded by stones hurled from above, they

charged with a wild shout and surged up to the rampart, some using

scaling-ladders, others climbing over their comrades who had formed a

'tortoise'. But no sooner had some of them begun to scale the wall,

than they were hurled down by the besieged, who thrust at them with

sword and shield, and buried under a shower of stakes and javelins.

The Germans are always impetuous at the beginning of an action and

over-confident when they are winning; and on this occasion their greed

for plunder even steeled them to face difficulties. They actually

attempted to use siege-engines, with which they were quite unfamiliar.

But though they had no skill themselves, some of the deserters and

prisoners showed them how to build a sort of bridge or platform of

timber, on to which they fitted wheels and rolled it forward. Thus

some of them stood on this platform and fought as though from a mound,

while others, concealed inside, tried to undermine the walls. However,

stones hurled from catapults soon destroyed this rude engine. Then

they began to get ready hurdles and mantlets, but the besieged shot

blazing spears on to them from engines, and even attacked the

assailants themselves with fire-darts. At last they gave up all hope

of an assault and resolved to try a waiting policy, being well aware

that the camp contained only a few days' provisions and a large number

of non-combatants. They hoped that famine would breed treason, and

counted, besides, on the wavering loyalty of the slaves and the usual

hazards of war to aid them.

Meanwhile, Flaccus,[303] who had received news of the siege of 24

Vetera, dispatched a party to recruit auxiliaries in Gaul, and gave

Dillius Vocula, in command of the Twenty-second, a force of picked

soldiers from his two legions.[304] Vocula was to hurry by forced

marches along the bank of the Rhine, while Flaccus himself was to

approach by water, since he was in bad health and unpopular with his

men. Indeed, they grumbled openly that he had let the Batavian cohorts

get away from Mainz, had connived at Civilis' schemes, and invited the

Germans to join the alliance. Vespasian, they said, owed his rise more

to Flaccus than to all the assistance of Antonius Primus or of

Mucianus, for overt hatred and hostility can be openly crushed, but

treachery and deceit cannot be detected, much less parried. While

Civilis took the field himself and arranged his own fighting line,

Hordeonius lay on a couch in his bedroom and gave whatever orders

best suited the enemy's convenience. Why should all these companies

of brave soldiers be commanded by one miserable old invalid? Let them

rather kill the traitor and free their brave hearts and good hopes

from the incubus of such an evil omen. Having worked on each other's

feelings by these complaints, they were still further incensed by the

arrival of a letter from Vespasian. As this could not be concealed,

Flaccus read it before a meeting of the soldiers, and the messengers

who brought it were sent to Vitellius in chains.

With feelings thus appeased the army marched on to Bonn, the 25

head-quarters of the First legion. There the men were still more

indignant with Flaccus, on whom they laid the blame of their recent

defeat.[305] It was by his orders, they argued, that they had taken

the field against the Batavians on the understanding that the legions

from Mainz were in pursuit. But no reinforcements had arrived and his

treachery was responsible for their losses. The facts, moreover, were

unknown to the other armies, nor was any report sent to their emperor,

although this treacherous outbreak could have been nipped in the bud

by the combined aid of all the provinces. In answer Flaccus read out

to the army copies of all the letters which he had sent from time to

time all over Gaul and Britain and Spain to ask for assistance, and

introduced the disastrous practice of having all letters delivered to

the standard-bearers of the legions, who read them to the soldiers

before the general had seen them. He then gave orders that one of the

mutineers should be put in irons, more by way of vindicating his

authority than because one man was especially to blame. Leaving Bonn,

the army moved on to Cologne, where they were joined by large numbers

of Gallic auxiliaries, who at first zealously supported the Roman

cause: later, when the Germans prospered, most of the tribes took arms

against us, actuated by hopes of liberty and an ambition to establish

an empire of their own when once they had shaken off the yoke.

Meanwhile the army's indignation steadily increased. The imprisonment

of a single soldier was not enough to terrify them, and, indeed, the

prisoner actually accused the general of complicity in crime, alleging

that he himself had carried messages between Flaccus and Civilis. 'It

is because I can testify to the truth,' he said, 'that Flaccus wants

to get rid of me on a false charge.' Thereupon Vocula, with admirable

self-possession, mounted the tribunal and, in spite of the man's

protestations, ordered him to be seized and led away to prison. This

alarmed the disaffected, while the better sort obeyed him promptly.

The army then unanimously demanded that Vocula should lead them, and

Flaccus accordingly resigned the chief command to him. However, 26

there was much to exasperate their disaffection. They were short both

of pay and of provisions: the Gauls refused either to enlist or to pay

tribute: drought, usually unknown in that climate, made the Rhine

almost too low for navigation, and thus hampered their commissariat:

patrols had to be posted at intervals all along the bank to prevent

the Germans fording the river: and in consequence of all this they had

less food and more mouths to eat it. To the ignorant the lowness of

the river seemed in itself an evil omen, as though the ancient

bulwarks of the empire were now failing them. In peace they would have

called it bad luck or the course of nature: now it was 'fate' and 'the

anger of heaven'.

On entering Novaesium[306] they were joined by the Sixteenth legion.

Herennius Gallus[307] now shared with Vocula the responsibility of

command. As they could not venture out against the enemy, they

encamped ... at a place called Gelduba,[308] where the soldiers were

trained in deploying, in fortification and entrenchment, and in

various other military manoeuvres. To inspire their courage with the

further incentive of plunder, Vocula led out part of the force against

the neighbouring tribe of the Cugerni,[309] who had accepted Civilis'

offers of alliance. The rest of the troops were left behind with 27

Herennius Gallus,[310] and it happened that a corn-ship with a full

cargo, which had run aground close to the camp, was towed over by the

Germans to their own bank. This was more than Gallus could tolerate,

so he sent a cohort to the rescue. The number of the Germans soon

increased: both sides gradually gathered reinforcements and a regular

battle was fought, with the result that the Germans towed off the

ship, inflicting heavy losses. The defeated troops followed what had

now become their regular custom, and threw the blame not on their own

inefficiency but on their commanding-officer's bad faith. They dragged

him from his quarters, tore his uniform and flogged him, bidding him

tell them how much he had got for betraying the army, and who were his

accomplices. Then their indignation recoiled on Hordeonius Flaccus: he

was the real criminal: Gallus was only his tool. At last their threats

so terrified Gallus that he, too, charged Flaccus with treason. He was

put in irons until the arrival of Vocula, who at once set him free,

and on the next day had the ringleaders of the riot executed. The army

showed, indeed, a strange contrast in its equal readiness to mutiny

and to submit to punishment. The common soldiers' loyalty to Vitellius

was beyond question,[311] while the higher ranks inclined towards

Vespasian. Thus we find a succession of outbreaks and penalties; an

alternation of insubordination with obedience to discipline; for the

troops could be punished though not controlled.

Meanwhile the whole of Germany was ready to worship Civilis, 28

sending him vast reinforcements and ratifying the alliance with

hostages from their noblest families. He gave orders that the country

of the Ubii and Treviri was to be laid waste by their nearest

neighbours, and sent another party across the Maas to harass the

Menapii and Morini[312] and other frontier tribes of Gaul. In both

quarters they plundered freely, and were especially savage towards the

Ubii, because they were a tribe of German origin who had renounced

their fatherland and adopted the name of Agrippinenses.[313] A Ubian

cohort was cut to pieces at the village of Marcodurum,[314] where they

were off their guard, trusting to their distance from the Rhine. The

Ubii did not take this quietly, nor hesitate to seek reprisals from

the Germans, which they did at first with impunity. In the end,

however, the Germans proved too much for them, and throughout the war

the Ubii were always more conspicuous for good faith than good

fortune. Their collapse strengthened Civilis' position, and emboldened

by success, he now vigorously pressed on the blockade of the legions

at Vetera, and redoubled his vigilance to prevent any message creeping

through from the relieving army. The Batavians were told off to look

after the engines and siege-works: the Germans, who clamoured for

battle, were sent to demolish the rampart and renew the fight directly

they were beaten off. There were so many of them that their losses

mattered little.

Nightfall did not see the end of their task. They built huge fires 29

of wood all round the ramparts and sat drinking by them; then, as the

wine warmed their hearts, one by one they dashed into the fight with

blind courage. In the darkness their missiles were ineffective, but

the barbarian troops were clearly visible to the Romans, and any one

whose daring or bright ornaments made him conspicuous at once became a

mark for their aim. At last Civilis saw their mistake, and gave orders

to extinguish the fires and plunge the whole scene into a confusion of

darkness and the din of arms. Discordant shouts now arose: everything

was vague and uncertain: no one could see to strike or to parry.

Wherever a shout was heard, they would wheel round and lunge in that

direction. Valour was useless: chance and chaos ruled supreme: and the

bravest soldier often fell under a coward's bolt. The Germans fought

with blind fury. The Roman troops were more familiar with danger; they

hurled down iron-clamped stakes and heavy stones with sure effect.

Wherever the sound of some one climbing or the clang of a

scaling-ladder betrayed the presence of the enemy, they thrust them

back with their shields and followed them with a shower of javelins.

Many appeared on top of the walls, and these they stabbed with their

short swords. And so the night wore on. Day dawned upon new 30

methods of attack. The Batavians had built a wooden tower of two

stories and moved it up to the Head-quarters Gate,[315] which was the

most accessible spot. However, our soldiers, by using strong poles and

hurling wooden beams, soon battered it to pieces, with great loss of

life to those who were standing on it. While they were still dismayed

at this, we made a sudden and successful sally. Meanwhile the

legionaries, with remarkable skill and ingenuity, invented still

further contrivances. The one which caused most terror was a crane

with a movable arm suspended over their assailants' heads: this arm

was suddenly lowered, snatched up one or more of the enemy into the

air before his fellows' eyes, and, as the heavy end was swung round,

tossed him into the middle of the camp. Civilis now gave up hope of

storming the camp and renewed a leisurely blockade, trying all the

time by messages and offers of reward to undermine the loyalty of the

legions.

FOOTNOTES:

[299] Chap. 18.

[300] The Bructeri lived between the Lippe and the Upper Ems,

the Tencteri along the eastern bank of the Rhine, between its

tributaries the Ruhr and the Sieg, i.e. opposite Cologne.

[301] i.e. about 12,000 men. The bulk of the Fifth and a

detachment of the Fifteenth had gone to Italy.

[302] i.e. Frisii, Bructeri, Tencteri, &c.

[303] At Mainz.

[304] His other legion was IV Macedonica.

[305] Cp. chap. 20.

[306] Neuss.

[307] He commanded the First legion, which had joined the main

column at Bonn.

[308] Gellep. Some words are lost, perhaps giving the distance

from Novaesium.

[309] See note 282.

[310] At Gelduba.

[311] Cp. iii. 61.

[312] The Menapii lived between the Maas and the Scheldt; the

Morini on the coast in the neighbourhood of Boulogne. They

were a proverb for 'the back of beyond'.

[313] See i. 56, note 106.

[314] Düren.

[315] i.e. the gate on to the street leading to Head-quarters.

THE RELIEF OF VETERA

Such was the course of events in Germany up to the date of the 31

battle of Cremona.[316] News of this arrived by letter from Antonius

Primus, who enclosed a copy of Caecina's edict,[317] and Alpinius

Montanus,[318] who commanded one of the defeated auxiliary cohorts,

came in person to confess that his party had been beaten. The troops

were variously affected by the news. The Gallic auxiliaries, who had

no feelings of affection or dislike to either party and served without

sentiment, promptly took the advice of their officers and deserted

Vitellius. The veterans hesitated; under pressure from Flaccus and

their officers they eventually took the oath of allegiance, but it was

clear from their faces that their hearts were not in it, and while

repeating the rest of the formula they boggled at the name of

Vespasian, either muttering it under their breath or more often

omitting it altogether. Their suspicions were further inflamed 32

when Antonius' letter to Civilis was read out before the meeting; it

seemed to address Civilis as a member of the Flavian party, and to

argue hostility to the German army. The news was next brought to the

camp at Gelduba, where it gave rise to the same comments and the same

scenes. Montanus was sent to carry instructions to Civilis that he was

to cease from hostilities and not to make war on Rome under a false

pretext; if it was to help Vespasian that he had taken arms, he had

now achieved his object. Civilis at first replied in guarded terms.

Then, as he saw that Montanus was an impetuous person who would

welcome a revolution, he began to complain of all the dangers he had

endured in the service of Rome for the last twenty-five years. 'A fine

reward I have received,' he cried, 'for all my labours--my brother's

execution,[319] my own imprisonment,[319] and the bloodthirsty

clamours of this army, from which I claim satisfaction by natural

right since they have sought my destruction. As for you Trevirans and

all the rest that have the souls of slaves, what reward do you hope

to gain for shedding your blood so often in the cause of Rome, except

the thankless task of military service, endless taxation, and the rods

and axes of these capricious tyrants? Look at me! I have only a single

cohort under my command, and yet with the Canninefates and Batavi, a

mere fraction of the Gallic peoples, I am engaged in destroying their

great useless camp and besieging them with famine and the sword. In

short, our venture will either end in freedom or, if we are beaten, we

shall be no worse off than before.' Having thus inflamed Montanus he

told him to take back a milder answer and dismissed him. On his return

Montanus pretended that his errand had been fruitless, and said

nothing about the rest of the interview: but it soon came to light.

Retaining a portion of his force, Civilis sent the veteran cohorts 33

with the most efficient of the German troops against Vocula and his

army.[320] He gave the command to Julius Maximus and his nephew

Claudius Victor. After rushing the winter-quarters of a cavalry

regiment at Asciburgium[321] on their way, they fell upon the Roman

camp and so completely surprised it that Vocula had no time to address

his army or to form it for battle. The only precaution he could take

in the general panic was to mass the legionaries in the centre with

the auxiliaries scattered on either flank. Our cavalry charged, but

found the enemy in good order ready to receive them, and came flying

back on to their own infantry. What followed was more of a massacre

than a battle. The Nervian cohorts, either from panic or treachery,

left our flanks exposed; thus the legions had to bear the brunt. They

had already lost their standards and were being cut down in the

trenches, when a fresh reinforcement suddenly changed the fortune of

the fight. Some Basque auxiliaries,[322] originally levied by Galba,

who had now been summoned to the rescue, on nearing the camp heard the

sound of fighting, and while the enemy were occupied, came charging in

on their rear. This caused more consternation than their numbers

warranted, the enemy taking them for the whole Roman force, either

from Novaesium or from Mainz. This mistake encouraged the Roman

troops: their confidence in others brought confidence in themselves.

The best of the Batavians, at least of their infantry, fell. The

cavalry made off with the standards and prisoners taken in the earlier

stage of the battle. Though our losses that day were numerically

larger, they were unimportant, whereas the Germans lost their best

troops.

On both sides the generals deserved defeat, and failed to make 34

good use of their success. Their fault was the same. Had Civilis

furnished the attacking column with more troops, they could never have

been surrounded by such a small force, and having stormed the camp

would have destroyed it. Vocula, on the other hand, had not even set

scouts to warn him of the enemy's approach, and consequently no sooner

sallied out than he was beaten. Then, when he had won the victory, he

showed great lack of confidence, and wasted day after day before

moving against the enemy. If he had made haste to follow up his

success and struck at the enemy at once, he might have raised the

siege of Vetera at one blow.

Meanwhile Civilis had been playing upon the feelings of the besieged

by pretending that the Romans had been defeated and success had

favoured his arms. The captured standards and colours were carried

round the walls and the prisoners also displayed. One of these did a

famous deed of heroism. Shouting at the top of his voice, he revealed

the truth. The Germans at once struck him dead, which only served to

confirm his information. Soon, too, the besieged saw signs of harried

fields and the smoke of burning farms, and began to realize that a

victorious army was approaching. When he was in sight of the camp

Vocula ordered his men to plant the standards and construct a trench

and rampart round them: they were to deposit all their baggage there

and fight unencumbered. This made them shout at the general to give

them the signal; and they had learnt to use threats too. Without even

taking time to form their line they started the battle, all tired as

they were, and in disorder. Civilis was ready waiting for them,

trusting quite as much to their mistakes as to the merits of his own

men. The Romans fought with varying fortune. All the most mutinous

proved cowards: some, however, remembered their recent victory and

stuck to their places, cutting down the enemy, and encouraging

themselves and their neighbours. When the battle was thus renewed,

they waved their hands and signalled to the besieged not to lose their

opportunity. These were watching all that happened from the walls, and

now came bursting out at every gate. It chanced that at this point

Civilis' horse fell and threw him; both armies believed the rumour

that he had been wounded and killed. This caused immense consternation

to his army and immense encouragement to ours. However, Vocula failed

to pursue them when they fled, and merely set about strengthening the

rampart and turrets, apparently in fear of another blockade. His

frequent failure to make use of his victory gives colour to the

suspicion that he preferred war.[323]

What chiefly distressed our troops was the lack of supplies. The 35

baggage-train of the legions was sent to Novaesium with a crowd of

non-combatants to fetch provisions thence by land, the enemy being now

masters of the river. The first convoy got through safely, while

Civilis was recovering from his fall. But when he heard that a second

foraging-party had been sent to Novaesium under guard of several

cohorts, and that they were proceeding on their way with their arms

piled in the wagons as if it was a time of perfect peace, few keeping

to the standards and all wandering at will, he sent some men forward

to hold the bridges and any places where the road was narrow, and then

formed up and attacked. The battle was fought on a long straggling

line, and the issue was still doubtful when nightfall broke it off.

The cohorts made their way through to Gelduba, where the camp remained

as it was,[324] garrisoned by the soldiers who had been left behind

there. It was obvious what dangers the convoy would have to face on

the return journey; they would be heavily laden and had already lost

their nerve. Vocula[325] accordingly added to his force a thousand

picked men from the Fifth and Fifteenth legions who had been at Vetera

during the siege, all tough soldiers with a grievance against their

generals. Against his orders, more than the thousand started with him,

openly complaining on the march that they would not put up with famine

and the treachery of their generals any longer. On the other hand,

those who stayed behind grumbled that they were left to their fate now

that part of the garrison had been removed. Thus there was a double

mutiny, one party calling Vocula back, the others refusing to return

to camp.

Meanwhile Civilis laid siege to Vetera. Vocula retired to Gelduba, 36

and thence to Novaesium, shortly afterwards winning a cavalry skirmish

just outside Novaesium. The Roman soldiers, however, alike in success

and in failure, were as eager as ever to make an end of their

generals. Now that their numbers were swelled by the arrival of the

detachments from the Fifth and the Fifteenth[326] they demanded their

donative, having learnt that money had arrived from Vitellius. Without

further delay Flaccus gave it to them in Vespasian's name, and this

did more than anything else to promote mutiny. They indulged in wild

dissipation and met every night in drinking-parties, at which they

revived their old grudge against Hordeonius Flaccus. None of the

officers ventured to interfere with them--the darkness somehow

obscured their sense of duty--and at last they dragged Flaccus out of

bed and murdered him. They were preparing to do the same with Vocula,

but he narrowly escaped in the darkness, disguised as a slave.

When the excitement subsided, their fears returned, and they sent 37

letters round by centurions to all the Gallic communities, asking for

reinforcements and money for the soldiers' pay.

Without a leader a mob is always rash, timorous, and inactive. On the

approach of Civilis they hurriedly snatched up their arms, and then

immediately dropped them and took to flight. Misfortune now bred

disunion, and the army of the Upper Rhine[327] dissociated itself

from the rest. However, they set up the statues of Vitellius again in

the camp and in the neighbouring Belgic villages, although by now

Vitellius was dead.[328] Soon the soldiers of the First, Fourth, and

Twenty-second repented of their folly and rejoined Vocula. He made

them take a second oath of allegiance to Vespasian and led them off to

raise the siege of Mainz. The besieging army, a combined force of

Chatti,[329] Usipi, and Mattiaci,[330] had already retired, having got

sufficient loot and suffered some loss. Our troops surprised them

while they were scattered along the road, and immediately attacked.

Moreover, the Treviri had built a rampart and breastwork all along

their frontier and fought the Germans again and again with heavy loss

to both sides. Before long, however, they rebelled, and thus sullied

their great services to the Roman people.

FOOTNOTES:

[316] The end of October, A.D. 69 (see iii. 30-34).

[317] Caecina, as consul, had probably while at Cremona issued

a manifesto in favour of joining the Flavian party.

[318] Cp. iii. 35.

[319] See chap. 13.

[320] At Gelduba (chap. 26).

[321] Asberg.

[322] From the north-east frontier of the Tarragona division

of Spain, of which Galba had been governor. Hordeonius

explained (chap. 25) that he had summoned aid from Spain.

[323] Mr. Henderson calls this sentence 'a veritable

masterpiece of improbability', and finds it 'hard to speak

calmly of such a judgement'. He has to confess that a military

motive for Vocula's inaction is hard to find. Tacitus, feeling

the same, offers a merely human motive. Soldiers of fortune

often prefer war to final victory, and in these days the

dangers of peace were only equalled by its ennui. Besides,

Tacitus' explanation lends itself to an epigram which he would

doubtless not have exchanged for the tedium of tactical truth.

[324] Cp. chap. 26.

[325] Having strengthened the defences of Vetera, he was now

going back to Gelduba.

[326] From the Vetera garrison.

[327] i.e. the troops which Flaccus at Mainz had put under

Vocula for the relief of Vetera (chap. 24).

[328] It was therefore later than December 21.

[329] Cp. chap. 12.

[330] The Usipi lived on the east bank of the Rhine between

the Sieg and the Lahn; the Mattiaci between the Lahn and the

Main, round Wiesbaden.

ROME AND THE EMPIRE UNDER VESPASIAN

During these events Vespasian took up his second consulship and 38

Titus his first, both in absence.[331] Rome was depressed and beset by

manifold anxieties. Apart from the real miseries of the moment, it

was plunged into a groundless panic on the rumour of a rebellion in

Africa, where Lucius Piso was supposed to be plotting a revolution.

Piso, who was governor of the province, was far from being a

firebrand. But the severity of the winter delayed the corn-ships, and

the common people, accustomed to buy their bread day by day, whose

interest in politics was confined to the corn-supply, soon began to

believe their fears that the coast of Africa was being blockaded and

supplies withheld. The Vitellians, who were still under the sway of

party spirit, fostered this rumour, and even the victorious party were

not entirely displeased at it, for none of their victories in the

civil war had satisfied their greed, and even foreign wars fell far

short of their ambition.

On the first of January the senate was convened by the Urban 39

Praetor,[332] Julius Frontinus, and passed votes of thanks and

congratulation to the generals, armies, and foreign princes.[333]

Tettius Julianus,[334] who had left his legion when it went over to

Vespasian, was deprived of his praetorship, which was conferred upon

Plotius Grypus.[335] Hormus[336] was raised to equestrian rank.

Frontinus then resigned his praetorship and Caesar Domitian succeeded

him. His name now stood at the head of all dispatches and edicts, but

the real authority lay with Mucianus, although Domitian, following

the promptings of his friends and of his own desires, frequently

asserted his independence. But Mucianus' chief cause of anxiety lay in

Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus. The fame of their exploits was still

fresh; the soldiers worshipped them; and they were popular in Rome,

because they had used no violence off the field of battle. It was even

hinted that Antonius had urged Crassus Scribonianus[337] to seize the

throne. He was a man who owed his distinction to famous ancestors and

to his brother's memory, and Antonius could promise him adequate

support for a conspiracy. However, Scribonianus refused. He had a

terror of all risks, and would hardly have been seduced even by the

certainty of success. Being unable to crush Antonius openly, Mucianus

showered compliments on him in the senate and embarrassed him with

promises, hinting at the governorship of Nearer Spain, which the

departure of Cluvius Rufus[338] had left vacant. Meanwhile he lavished

military commands on Antonius' friends. Then, having filled his empty

head with ambitious hopes, he destroyed his influence at one stroke by

moving the Seventh legion,[339] which was passionately attached to

Antonius, into winter-quarters. The Third, who were similarly devoted

to Arrius Varus, were sent back to Syria,[340] and part of the army

was taken out to the war in Germany. Thus, on the removal of the

disturbing factors, the city could resume its normal life under the

old regime of law and civil government.

On the day of his first appearance in the senate Domitian spoke a 40

few moderate sentences regretting the absence of his father and

brother. His behaviour was most proper, and, as his character was

still an unknown quantity, his blushes were taken for signs of

modesty.[341] He moved from the chair that all Galba's honours should

be restored, to which Curtius Montanus proposed an amendment that some

respect should also be paid to the memory of Piso. The senate approved

both proposals, though nothing was done about Piso. Next, various

commissions were appointed by lot to restore the spoils of war to the

owners; to examine and affix the bronze tablets of laws, which in

course of time had dropped off the walls; to revise the list of public

holidays, which in these days of flattery had been disgracefully

tampered with; and to introduce some economy into public expenditure.

Tettius Julianus was restored to his praetorship as soon as it was

discovered that he had taken refuge with Vespasian: but Grypus was

allowed to retain his rank.[342] It was then decided to resume the

hearing of the case of Musonius Rufus against Publius Celer[343]

Publius was convicted and the shade of Soranus satisfied. This strict

verdict made the day memorable in the annals of Rome, and credit was

also due to private enterprise, for everybody felt that Musonius had

done his duty in bringing the action. On the other hand, Demetrius, a

professor of Cynic philosophy, earned discredit for defending an

obvious criminal[344] more for ostentatious motives than from honest

conviction. As for Publius, courage and fluency alike failed him at

the critical moment. This trial was the signal for further reprisals

against prosecutors. Junius Mauricus[345] accordingly petitioned

Domitian that the senate might be allowed access to the minutes of the

imperial cabinet, in order to find out who had applied for leave to

bring a prosecution and against whom. The answer was that on such a

question as this the emperor must be consulted. Accordingly, at 41

the instigation of its leading members, the senate framed an oath in

these words, 'I call heaven to witness that I have never countenanced

any action prejudicial to any man's civil status, nor have I derived

any profit or any office from the misfortune of any Roman citizen.'

The magistrates vied with each other in their haste to take this oath,

and the other members did the same, when called upon to speak. Those

who had a guilty conscience were alarmed, and managed to alter the

wording of the oath by various devices. The house meanwhile applauded

every sign of scruple, and protested against each case of perjury.

This kind of informal censure fell most severely on Sariolenus Vocula,

Nonius Attianus, and Cestius Severus, who were notorious as habitual

informers under Nero. Against Sariolenus there was also a fresh charge

of having continued his practices with Vitellius. The members went on

shaking their fists at him until he left the house. They next turned

on Paccius Africanus, trying to hound him out in the same way. He was

supposed to have suggested to Nero the murder of the two brothers

Scribonius,[346] who were famous for their friendship and their

wealth. Africanus dared not admit his guilt, though he could not very

well deny it. So he swung round on Vibius Crispus,[347] who was

pestering him with questions, and tried to turn the tables by

implicating him in the charges which he could not rebut, thus shifting

the odium on to his accomplice.

On this occasion Vipstanus Messala[348] gained a great reputation, 42

both for dutiful affection and for eloquence, by venturing to

intercede for his brother Aquilius Regulus,[349] although he had not

attained the senatorial age.[350] Regulus had fallen into great

disfavour for having brought about the ruin of the noble families of

the Crassi and of Orfitus. It was supposed that, though quite a young

man, he had voluntarily undertaken the prosecution, not to escape any

danger which was threatening him, but from purely ambitious motives.

Crassus' wife, Sulpicia Praetextata, and his four sons were anxious to

secure revenge if the senate would grant a trial. Messala therefore

made no attempt to defend the case or the accused, but tried to

shelter his brother, and had already won over some of the senators.

Curtius Montanus now attacked him in a savage speech, and even went so

far as to charge Regulus with having given money to Piso's murderer

after Galba's death, and with having bitten Piso's head.[351] 'That,'

said he, 'Nero certainly did not compel you to do. You purchased

neither position nor safety by that savage piece of cruelty. We may

put up with the pleas of those wretches who prefer to ruin others

rather than endanger their own lives. But your father's banishment had

guaranteed your security. His property had been divided amongst his

creditors.[352] You were not of an age to stand for office. Nero had

nothing either to hope or to fear from you. Your talents were as yet

untried and you had never exerted them in any man's defence, yet your

lust for blood, your insatiable ambition, led you to stain your young

hands in the blood of Rome's nobility. At one swoop you caused the

ruin of innocent youths, of old and distinguished statesmen, of

high-born ladies; and out of the country's disaster you secured for

yourself the spoils of two ex-consuls,[353] stuffed seven million

sesterces into your purse, and shone with the reflected glory of a

priesthood. You would blame Nero's lack of enterprise because he took

one household at a time, thus causing unnecessary fatigue to himself

and his informers, when he might have ruined the whole senate at a

single word. Why, gentlemen, you must indeed keep and preserve to

yourselves a counsellor of such ready resource. Let each generation

have its good examples: and as our old men follow Eprius Marcellus or

Vibius Crispus, let the rising generation emulate Regulus. Villainy

finds followers even when it fails. What if it flourish and prosper?

If we hesitate to touch a mere ex-quaestor, shall we be any bolder

when he has been praetor and consul? Or do you suppose that the race

of tyrants came to an end in Nero? That is what the people believed

who outlived Tiberius or Caligula, and meanwhile there arose one more

infamous and more bloody still.[354] We are not afraid of Vespasian.

We trust his years and his natural moderation. But a good precedent

outlives a good sovereign. Gentlemen, we are growing effete: we are no

longer that senate which, after Nero had been killed, clamoured for

the punishment of all informers and their menials according to our

ancestors' rigorous prescription. The best chance comes on the day

after the death of a bad emperor.'

The senate listened to Montanus's speech with such sympathy that 43

Helvidius began to hope that it might be possible to get a verdict

even against Marcellus. Beginning with a eulogy of Cluvius Rufus, who,

though quite as rich and as eloquent as Marcellus, had never brought

any one into trouble under Nero, he went on to attack Marcellus, both

by contrasting him with Rufus and by pressing home the charge against

him. Feeling that the house was warming to this rhetoric, Marcellus

got up as though to leave, exclaiming, 'I am off, Helvidius: I leave

you your senate: you can tyrannize over it under Caesar's nose.'

Vibius Crispus followed Marcellus, and, though both were angry, their

expressions were very different. Marcellus marched out with flashing

eyes, Crispus with a smile on his face. Eventually their friends went

and brought them back. Thus the struggle grew more and more heated

between a well-meaning majority and a small but powerful minority; and

since they were both animated by irreconcilable hatred, the day was

spent in vain recriminations.

At the next sitting Domitian opened by recommending them to forget 44

their grievances and grudges and the unavoidable exigences of the

recent past. Mucianus then at great length moved a motion in favour of

the prosecutors, issuing a mild warning, almost in terms of entreaty,

to those who wanted to revive actions which had been begun and

dropped. Seeing that their attempt at independence was being

thwarted, the senate gave it up. However, that it might not seem as if

the senate's opinion had been flouted and complete impunity granted

for all crimes committed under Nero, Mucianus forced Octavius Sagitta

and Antistius Sosianus, who had returned from exile, to go back to the

islands to which they had been confined. Octavius had committed

adultery with Pontia Postumina, and, on her refusal to marry him, had

murdered her in a fit of jealous fury. Sosianus was an unprincipled

scoundrel who had been the ruin of many.[355] The senate had found

them both guilty, and passed a heavy sentence of exile, nor had their

penalty been remitted, although others were allowed to return.

However, this failed to allay the ill-feeling against Mucianus, for

Sosianus and Sagitta, whether they returned or not, were of no

importance, whereas people were afraid of the professional

prosecutors, who were men of wealth and ability and experts in crime.

Unanimity was gradually restored in the senate by the holding of a 45

trial according to ancient precedent, before a court of the whole

house. A senator named Manlius Patruitus complained that he had been

beaten before a mob of people in the colony of Siena by order of the

local magistrates. Nor had the affront stopped there. They had held a

mock funeral before his eyes, and had accompanied their dirges and

lamentations with gross insults levelled at the whole senate. The

accused were summoned; their case was tried; they were convicted and

punished. A further decree of the senate was passed admonishing the

commons of Siena to pay more respect to the laws. About the same time

Antonius Flamma was prosecuted by Cyrene for extortion, and exiled for

the inhumanity of his conduct.