a much easier defence against an assailant from the south than against
one from the north, because the continuous valleys of the Œroë and
Asopos formed a natural highway running lengthwise along the chain,
such a highway as was conspicuous by its absence on the southern side.
By this highway an army could be moved rapidly from one point to the
other, according to the locality of the pass through which the attack
might be delivered. #CHANGE IN GREEK PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.# On the south
no such facilities existed, and an army on the north which made a
feint at one of the eastern passes, and so attracted an enemy to its
defence, could move to one of the western passes, and get through
it long before the defender could move from his original defensive
position.[186]
Thus Mardonius was well placed. He had a fortified base at Thebes, in
a rich country, and a country well adapted to his strength in cavalry;
and he had a fortified camp on the strategic line of highway which the
Asopos valley afforded.
It is little short of a calamity for the history of this time that
Herodotus has omitted to account for the absolute change in the Greek
plan of campaign which is indicated by the advance of the army from
the Isthmus into Bœotia. It had manifestly been the intention of the
Spartans up to the very last moment to await attack at the Isthmus; it
may be certain that the other Peloponnesian States entertained this
design still more emphatically. And yet, in spite of this, they follow
the enemy to Bœotia, and shortly after their arrival there develop an
offensive movement of a most unmistakable character. Athens must have
been mainly responsible for this remarkable change; but what were the
motives of Athens? It was too late to save Attica. The mischief there
had been done. And yet these Greeks were persuaded to develop a policy
whose boldness is in conspicuous contrast to the purely defensive
attitude they had hitherto adopted in all their land operations, and
to inaugurate the new policy in a region peculiarly favourable to that
arm of the enemy’s force from which they had most to fear and against
which they had nothing to match. It can only have been carried out
under the impetus of some great and well-grounded alarm; and in view
of the silence of the ancient historian, the only conclusion that it
is possible to draw from the acts of either side is that the Greeks,
through the Athenians, suspected the existence of a design to establish
a new Persian frontier at Kithæron.
It was consequently necessary to take the offensive and the risk it
involved, unless they were ready to submit to the existence of the
Persian terror at their very doors. Whether its continued existence
would have been possible without the regaining of the command of the
sea is another question; but, considering the attitude of Bœotia and
Thessaly, it would be unsafe to assert the impossibility. In any case,
the Greeks regarded those possibilities from so near a perspective,
that their field of vision must have been contracted to the one
dangerous alternative.
◆H. ix. 19.◆
The Lacedæmonian army, which was last heard of at Orestheion in
Arcadia, arrived at the Isthmus and encamped there. The patriotic
States of Peloponnese, seeing the Spartans on the move, despatched
their contingents thither also, or, rather, the complements of their
contingents, since it must be concluded that the wall had not been
without any defenders up to this time. From the Isthmus the whole army
moved forward to Eleusis, where the Athenian land-army from Salamis
joined it. The whole combined force then moved north along the road to
Dryoskephalæ.[187]
[Illustration: PLAIN OF KAPAIS, FROM THEBES.
_From Sketch by E. Lear._]
[_To face page_ 452.
]
Shortly after passing the summit of the pass the Greek army would
arrive in full view of the Bœotian plain, which from that elevated
place appears more flat than it really is. The comparative monotony
of the scenery of the plain itself is disguised by distance; and that
which strikes the eye most forcibly is the contrast between this huge
extent of comparatively low level ground, and the magnificent frame of
mountains which forms the horizon on every side. To the north-west,
Helicon descends in a long and highly serrated slope, behind which the
hump of Parnassus in the far distance towers to a great height. #LIMITS
OF THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS.# The northern horizon is bounded by that
southern extension of the Œta range which lies between Kopais and the
North Euripus, though Kopais, or what was once Kopais, is out of sight
behind a comparatively low ridge in the neighbourhood of Thebes.
To the north-east, Mount Ptoon is visible; and over its lower ridge the
great cliffs of Mount Mekistos, on the Eubœan side of the Euripus, are
just discernible. Away to the east, though hidden from sight at the top
of the pass by a high bastion of Kithæron, the truncated cone of Mount
Dirphys in Mid-Eubœa is the most prominent object.
There are but few extensive views in Greece comparable with it, and
perhaps only one which excels it, that from Thaumaki on the road from
Lamia northward, when the great plain of Thessaly, with its fringing
ranges, is spread out like a sea before the spectator.
From the pass the Greeks descended to a position which extended across
the road by which they had come, at the point at which it debouched
fully on the plain. Before describing this position in detail it may
be well to give a brief general description of the ground on which the
prolonged struggle took place.
Its limits may be clearly defined. To the south its boundary is the
limit of cultivation, where the rocky foot of Kithæron begins to rise
from the rounded ridges of the plain. Outside this line the ground
was impracticable for cavalry operations, and, though both armies at
different times traversed this ground, no fighting took place beyond
the line, or even in its neighbourhood. On the north, the limits are
equally well defined by the river Asopos, although again in this case
the major part of the Persian army was, during nearly the whole of the
operations, to the north of the stream. The only fighting, however,
which can possibly have taken place beyond it occurred during the
assault on the Persian camp after the battle. To the east the limit may
be taken as the line of the Thebes-Athens road; while to the west an
imaginary line running due north from the town of Platæa to the Asopos
will well define its utmost extent in that direction. The area of this
field is about fifteen square miles, the dimensions from north to south
and from east to west being about three and a half and four miles
respectively.
In respect to the lie of its surface it may be divided into two
parts. The southern portion of it along the foot of Kithæron consists
of ridges running south and north, divided from one another by
stream-valleys,—spurs, in fact, of the great mountain, but of no great
height.[188] Of these the easternmost is much loftier than the others.
On the westernmost is the site of the town of Platæa.
North of these ridges a distinctly marked line of depression extends
across the field from east to west. It runs up the course of a
brook,[189] in a south-westerly direction, to the site of the modern
Kriekouki. After reaching the bottom of that village it turns at right
angles and goes north-west in a line parallel to, and immediately north
of, the watershed between the basins of the Asopos and Œroë, reaching
the flat alluvial plain north of Platæa, just west of the springs of
Apotripi, the traditional Gargaphia.
This depression is of considerable importance in relation to the
general scheme of the operations of the Greek army on the field:—
(_a_) Because it forms the dividing line between the first and intended
third positions and the second position, that is to say, between the
positions which were chiefly remarkable for their defensive character,
and that position which was assumed with the manifest intention of
taking a vigorous offensive.
(_b_) Because in it the Greek army, after marching from the first
position, took up its order before occupying the second position.
(_c_) Because in it the two combats which ultimately decided the battle
were fought.
The plain which has been mentioned in reference to the western
extremity of this depression extends without any break from the north
end of the site of the town of Platæa to the Asopos river. The plain is
the only flat land in the whole battle-field.
[Illustration: PLAIN OF PLATÆA AND KITHÆRON.
_From Sketch by E. Lear._]
[_To face page_ 454.
]
#DESCRIPTION OF THE FIELD.#
North of the depression rise three ridges or hills.[190] These
ridges are separated from one another by two deep stream-valleys.[191]
The slope of these ridges northward toward the Asopos is longer and
more gradual than on the south.
In general appearance the plain of Bœotia at this part resembles the
Wantage downs in such parts as the ploughland predominates over the
pasture. The great grey wall of Kithæron to the south rises into the
air, and dwarfs into insignificance the inequalities of the plain,
rendering, moreover, all horizontal distances most deceptive to the eye.
It may be assumed with absolute confidence that the accidents of
the terrain in this region of Greece are for all practical purposes
identical with those which existed more than two thousand years ago.
There is no evidence of great surface-changes such as are brought
about in other parts of Greece by the torrents which sweep down in
violence from the mountains. In Upper Parasopia such torrents do not
exist. Their non-existence can hardly be ascribed to inferior rainfall,
for the Bœotian climate is not more dry than that of other parts of
Greece. The probable cause is the peculiarly porous nature of the
soil, and, presumably, of the underlying rock, which absorbs a large
amount of water which would in other parts of Greece escape along the
surface.[192]
In the flat plain between Platæa and the Asopos river, the courses
of the various streams which traverse it are without doubt liable to
alterations, but the characteristics of the stream-beds as to width,
depth, and so forth, are undoubtedly the same as they were in the past.
The passes which actually debouch upon the field are, as has been
already mentioned, three in number. It is remarkable that in Herodotus’
account of the battle that of Dryoskephalæ is the only one mentioned.
It is, however, quite clear from Herodotus that, while the Greeks were
in the second position on the battle-field, the Dryoskephalæ pass, and
also that on the Platæa-Athens road, were both held by the Persian
cavalry, and the supplies of the army during the time must have come
through the pass on the Platæa-Megara road.[193]
#HERODOTUS’ ACCOUNT OF PLATÆA.#
Before entering upon the actual description of the battle itself,
it may be well to say one word about the general character of the
account of it which Herodotus has given to the world. Its length
and elaboration are greater than that devoted by the author to the
description of any other single act or scene in the history of his
time. The historian had evidently expended extraordinary trouble in
its preparation, and had done his utmost to arrive at all the facts
and to relate them with accuracy. Any failure in the latter respect is
owing either to the nature of his source or sources of information, or
to a misapprehension of military details due to his want of special
knowledge and experience. But whatever these defects may be, his
narrative is by far the best of the accounts which have survived until
the present day, a fact which is capable of proof by reason of the
extraordinary manner in which, in spite of certain obscurities, it
harmonizes with the present state of the region wherein the incidents
occurred. There can be no reasonable doubt that he visited the field,
and that, where he gives topographical details, they are the result of
autopsy. Some of the difficulties which arise with reference to his
description are more probably due to want of knowledge on the part of
the modern than on the part of the ancient historian. Some, again, are
attributable to that natural difficulty, which must ever arise, when
any one attempts to follow exactly the description, however clear, of
a complicated piece of ground as seen by the eyes of another man; and
this difficulty is not decreased when the language employed does not
possess that wealth of technical vocabulary which is at the service
of the writer of the present day. It is so easy to fail to realize
these difficulties under which Herodotus wrote. Official records were
probably non-existent: written records of any kind, if existent, were
probably of the most meagre kind; and the historian must have been
obliged to have recourse to the narratives of those who were actually
present at the operations. It must have cost an infinite amount of
trouble to collect the information, and to piece together the different
narratives; and yet, despite the immense difficulty of dealing
with evidence of this kind, Herodotus has left an account of the battle
which is not merely of interest and value from the point of view of
general history, but also in the narrower field of exclusively military
history.
Platæa was no ordinary engagement. It was really a campaign of several
weeks, conducted within an extraordinarily limited field of operations.
During that brief time, and within that small area, the strength
and weakness of East and West matched in battle against one another
were exemplified in a most striking way. The lesson it taught was
so tremendous, so wide in application, that men could not grasp it.
Perhaps it was as well for the world that they did not.
◆H. ix. 19.◆
The Greeks having descended from the summit of the pass of Dryoskephalæ
towards the Bœotian plain, discovered that the Persians were encamped
upon the Asopos, and took up their position “on the foothills of
Kithæron.”[194] ◆H. ix. 22.◆ Herodotus refers later to this position as
having been at Erythræ. The site of that small town has been somewhat
in dispute; it appears to have been in the hollow on the north side of
the mountain into which the road from Dryoskephalæ descends.[195]
#FIRST POSITION OF THE GREEKS.#
The position taken up by the Greeks is recognizable without difficulty
at the present day. Their right was on the high bastion of Kithæron,
east of Erythræ, stationed for the most part, in all probability, in
the neighbourhood of the old fort which here overhangs the road. Their
centre was on the low ground, _à cheval_ of the Thebes road. Their left
was probably on the slopes of the high ridge (ridge 1 in the map) to
the east of the site of Kriekouki. The numbers present at this time are
not known. All that is known is that, after considerable reinforcements
had come in, from a hundred thousand to a hundred and ten thousand
Greeks were in the field. It is not therefore possible to say what
would be likely to be the length of the Greek front in this first
position.
The strength of the position would be great. Their right and left
wings would be unassailable by cavalry, and only assailable by infantry
at a great disadvantage. Only on the flat ground in front of Erythræ
would it be possible for the Persian cavalry to attack them, and this
only along the right or east portion of the low ground, since the
left or west portion of their centre would be protected by deep and
precipitous stream-gullies which are there at this day, and must have
existed in a similar form at the time of the battle. #ATTACK BY PERSIAN
CAVALRY.# The comparatively advanced position of their centre in front
of Erythræ, instead of on the difficult ground south of its site, was
probably due to their being largely dependent on the wells of the
little town for their supply of water.
[Illustration: THE FIRST POSITION AT PLATÆA.
1. Greek right.
2. Greek centre.
3. Greek left.
4. Site of Erythræ.
5. Pass of Dryoskephalæ.
[_To face page_ 460.
]
◆H. ix. 20.◆
Mardonius, seeing that the Greeks had taken up this position, and
that they showed no disposition to come down into the plain, sent
against them the whole of his cavalry, under the command of Masistios,
a Persian of high reputation. On getting near the Greeks it did
not attack in a body,—the deep stream courses opposite the Greek
left centre would make that difficult,—but, owing evidently to the
narrowness of the front assailable, attacked in squadrons, and did
a great deal of damage. The Megareans were drawn up at the most
assailable point, and were hard pressed by an assault which evidently
aimed at cutting the Greek army in two, and seizing their direct
line of retreat by way of the pass. The narrowness of the assailable
front appears emphatically in Herodotus’ account of the message the
Megareans despatched for assistance. They speak of themselves as being
single-handed in the fight, and beg to be relieved from their position.
They threaten even that, unless help be sent, they will be obliged to
leave their post. Pausanias, who led the great Spartan contingent and
commanded the whole army, had some difficulty in finding volunteers
for the post of danger. Finally the Athenian picked troops, under the
command of Olympiodoros, accompanied by a body of bowmen, undertook to
occupy the critical position. Aristides, who commanded the Athenian
contingent, would see clearly the pressing nature of the danger. ◆H.
ix. 22.◆ The Persians continued their attack by squadrons until their
leader, Masistios, had his horse wounded by an arrow. It reared and
threw him, close, apparently, to the Greek line of battle; for the
Athenians immediately rushed towards him. He was killed, and his horse
was captured. The Persians had not noticed the fall of their commander,
and it was not until they had retired and had come to a stand-still
that the loss was discovered. With shouts of encouragement to one
another, the horsemen turned upon the Greeks, eager to gain possession
of their leader’s body. They came no longer in squadrons, but in what
must have been one column of horse, many ranks in depth. The Athenians
called on the rest of the army to aid them, but before the latter
came up the attack fell. The Athenians, only three hundred in number,
were pressed back from the place where Masistios lay; the fight was too
unequal. But when the other Greeks came up the Persian horsemen retired
and were obliged to leave the body in the hands of the enemy. After
retreating a distance of two stades, they held a consultation, and
decided that, having lost their general, the best thing they could do
was to retire to the camp.
In this combat the Persian cavalry was evidently taught a severe
lesson. They found out the mistake of attacking unshaken heavy infantry
at close quarters, a fundamental error in tactics which they did not
repeat again in the course of the battle. From this time forward the
Persians used their cavalry to inflict damage on the immobile Greek
force by assailing it with missiles from a distance, and by cutting its
lines of communication. They had learnt their lesson: the Greeks had
not.
It is evident that the latter drew a wholly mistaken conclusion from
the results of the fight, ◆H. ix. 25.◆ and that their previous fear
of the enemy’s cavalry gave place to an unwarranted confidence in
their ability to face it on any ground. They were now prepared to
carry out tactically that offensive movement which they had begun
strategically by their advance into Bœotia. It would seem as if their
original design had been to use the Dryoskephalæ-Thebes road as their
line of advance, a design which was checked in part by the nervousness
originally pervading the greater part of their army as to the result of
a rencontre with the Persian cavalry, and still more by the fact that
they could see that the fortified Persian camp was saddled, as it were,
on their proposed line of advance. From Herodotus’ description it would
appear as if that camp were on both sides of the Asopos river, and that
the point at which the Thebes-Dryoskephalæ road crosses that river at
the present day must have been well within its area.
#MOVEMENT FROM THE FIRST POSITION.#
It was, then, in consequence of their elation at the success which they
had won over the Persian cavalry, and probably also in consequence
of the decision of the Greek commanders to take the offensive
along a line other than that of the direct route to Thebes, that the
Greeks moved from the position which they had hitherto occupied. It was
plain that in that position no decisive result could be obtained. The
extreme importance of this movement makes it necessary that Herodotus’
description of it should be follow with the utmost care:—
◆H. ix. 25.◆
“After this they decided to go down towards Platæa. For the Platæan
country seemed to them to be a much more suitable place for encampment
than that about Erythræ. It was better supplied with water, and had
other advantages. They determined therefore that they must move to
that region and to the spring of Gargaphia, which is situated in it,
and form a regular encampment. Taking up their arms, therefore,
they went along the foot hills of Kithæron by Hysiæ to the Platæan
country, and on arriving there they proceeded to take up their order by
contingents near the spring of Gargaphia and the precinct of the hero
Androkrates, along hills of no great height and level country.”
* * * * *
_The Position of the Persian Camp._
Herodotus (ix. 15) describes the position of the camp as follows:
Παρῆκε δὲ αὐτοῦ (Mardonius) τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀρξάμενον ἀπὸ Ἐρυθρέων παρὰ
Ὑσίας, κατέτεινε δὲ ἐς τὴν Πλαταιίδα γῆν, παρὰ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν ποταμὸν
τεταγμένον. Οὐ μέντοι τό γὲ τεῖχος τοσουτον ἐποιέετο, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ δέκα
σταδίους μάλιστά κῃ μέτωπον ἕκαστον.
Earlier in the same chapter he speaks of the Persian force as having
arrived ἐς Σκῶλον, ἐν γῇ τῇ Θηβαίων.
I could not find any traces of the ruins of Skolos; ◆_Vide_ note on
p. 449.◆ but if the distance given in the passage of Pausanias (ix.
4, 3) already quoted is in any sense reliable, it lay four and a
half miles east of the point where the Platæa-Thebes road crossed
the Asopos; that is to say, about a mile and a half east of the
Dryoskephalæ-Thebes road. Comparing this statement with Herodotus’
description of the position of the Persian army as stretching from
Erythræ and Hysiæ, the conclusion which must be arrived at is
that its encampment was on the low ground on either side of the
Dryoskephalæ-Thebes road, and on the Asopos river.
The passage in Herodotus (ix. 31) πυθόμενοι τούς Ἓλληνας εἶναι ἐν
Πλαταιῇσι, from the use of the word πυθόμενοι, would seem to indicate
that the first phase of the second position of the Greeks was not in
view of the Persian camp. If so, that camp was on the low ground, and
did not extend southward to either of those heights called in the map
the Long ridge and the Plateau.
* * * * *
At the risk of appearing to anticipate the evidence, it is necessary
for the clear understanding of the somewhat complicated operations of
this period of the battle, to state that the movement this indicated is
not the _complete_ movement to the second position, nor, consequently,
is the position adopted the position finally taken up by the Greeks.
That second position had three phases, of which this is the first.
It is possible to follow without difficulty this movement which
Herodotus describes. It is evident that the Greek army first matched
west along the south or upper part of the ridges[196] which descend
from Kithæron towards the plain. Their object was evidently to keep, in
so far as possible, on the rocky hill slopes, where their march could
not be imperilled or interrupted by cavalry attack. In this march they
passed Hysiæ. The position of that small place is not, as has been
already said, determinable with certainty; but it seems most probable
that its site is to be looked for immediately above the village of
Kriekouki, and, if so, it would lie almost on the line of march which
Herodotus indicates.
* * * * *
_The Site of Hysiæ._
Tradition gives the site of the modern Kriekouki as that of Hysiæ.
Water being so important in this region, it is worthy of notice that,
except in case of prolonged drought, Kriekouki is well supplied in this
respect, which would render it likely that the site or its immediate
neighbourhood would have been chosen for habitation in ancient times.
As I have already indicated, I think Hysiæ stood just outside the
area of the modern village, to the south of it, _i.e._ higher up
the hillside. There is a mound there with a more or less circular
enclosure at the top, quite close to the great bend of the loop-road
above the Kriekouki. The enclosure may possibly mark the site of the
foundations of an ancient φρούριον. Other remains I could not find.
Hysiæ was at best but a little place, and, if it stood on that site,
whatever remnants of it survived till modern times would inevitably
be swept away for the building of the large village of Kriekouki, in
whose walls, too, are stones which appear to have been taken from
pre-existing buildings. This site accords with the little that is told
us in ancient authors of the position of Hysiæ. It lies east of the
line of road from Athens to Platæa, at a distance of something less
than half a mile. To the traveller coming along the road from Eleutheræ
it would therefore be, as Pausanias says (ix. 2, i), “a little to
the right of the road.” It is also west of the site of Erythræ, as
Herodotus (ix. 15) indicates Hysiæ to have been.
* * * * *
#MOVEMENT TO THE SECOND POSITION.#
After moving some distance westward along the foothills the Greek army
must have turned in a north and north-westerly direction to reach the
position which Herodotus describes. ◆H. ix. 25.◆ He mentions the spring
of Gargaphia and the precinct of Androkrates[197] as the two points
defining the position, and indicates clearly what that position was,
for the spring may be identified at the present day, and the precinct
is referred to in Thucydides’ account of the escape of the two hundred
and twelve from Platæa, in such a way that its site must lie somewhere
within a comparatively small area of ground.
* * * * *
_The Spring of Gargaphia._
The spring of Alopeki or Apotripi, at the head of the brook A 1, is
pointed to by local tradition as the ancient Gargaphia. This spring
does not give a very copious supply of water. I believe it does not
always run dry in summer; but in August, 1899, after the long drought
of that year, it was yielding no water whatever. The state of things in
that month was such that the inhabitants of Kriekouki were absolutely
dependent for water for themselves and their cattle on a group of
springs lying east of Apotripi, distant from it about three-quarters
of a mile, and forming the source of Stream A 4. These are the springs
which Colonel Leake, rightly, as I firmly believe, identified with
Gargaphia. The chief of these springs has, in modern times, been
enclosed in a wall. What is quite certain is that one of these two
groups is the Gargaphia.
Herodotus says (ix. 49) that the whole Greek army watered from the
springs. As the battle took place in September, the greater yield
of water from the eastern group of springs supports its identity as
against Apotripi.
Herodotus also says (ix. 51) that the “Island” was ten stades from the
spring.
Those who have visited the field since I was there in 1892 seem to be
agreed that I was right in my identification of the “Island.”
The distance of the eastern springs from the “Island” is just about ten
stade. Apotripi is about the same distance from it.
Herodotus says (ix. 52) that the spring was twenty stades from the
Ἥραιον which, he says, is πρὸ τῆς πόλιος τῆς Πλαταιέων. The eastern
springs are sixteen stades from the approximate position of that
temple; Apotripi is but twelve stades off.
It will, I think, be seen that the evidence of Herodotus is in favour
of the eastern springs.
_The Precinct of the Hero Androkrates._
The evidence of Thucydides enables us to determine approximately the
position of this Heroön. He says (iii. 24) that the two hundred and
twelve who escaped made their way from Platæa
“along the road leading to Thebes, having on their right the
hero-chapel of Androkrates ... and for six or seven stades the
Platæans advanced along the Thebes road, and then, turning, went
along the road leading to the mountain to Erythræ and Hysiæ.”
This can only mean that the Heroön was in the angle between the road
to Thebes and the road to the mountains; and as these people only went
about three-quarters of a mile along the Thebes road, it is evident
that, if Thucydides be correct, the Heroön was to the right of the road
and within three-quarters of a mile of Thebes. I have marked in the map
the conjectural site of the building on the extremity of the last low
ridge of the mountain before it sinks into the plain. There are at that
point the remains of what has been an oblong building constructed of
good squared blocks. I am almost certain that it is Hellenic work.
Mr. W. J. Woodhouse, in a recent number of the _Journal of Hellenic
Studies_ (Part I. 1898), dissents from my view as to the position of
the Heroön of Androkrates.
His argument is as follows:—
(1) If the Heroön lay hard by the road, constituting a familiar
landmark, Thucydides’ remark is pointless.
(2) There were two other roads from Platæa to Thebes, viz. those
through Dryoskephalæ and the Pass on the Platæa-Athens road
respectively.
(3) Plutarch places the Heroön near the ancient temple of Demeter.
Mr. Woodhouse accordingly suggests that the Heroön stood on the site
of the church of St. John, on the Asopos ridge.
I would point out:—
(1) That Thucydides’ language [iii. 24] is not pointless, even if
the Heroön be near “the road leading to Thebes,” inasmuch as he
indicates a point near the road which the fugitives certainly
passed before they turned to the right, and thus diminishes the
comparative vagueness of the “six or seven stades” which follow.
It does not seem unnatural that he should wish to make quite
clear the fact that they passed the Heroön before they turned,
_i.e._ that it lay within the angle through which they turned.
I would also point out, that it is not the fact of the Heroön
being on the right of the _road_, which Thucydides emphasizes,
but it being on the right of the _Platæans_ as they went along
the road. The site of the church of St. John is eighteen stades
from Platæa. Thucydides would hardly say that persons who only
went “six or seven stades” along this road ever had that site
upon their right hand.
(2) The alternative routes Mr. Woodhouse mentions are alternative
routes from Platæa in much the same sense that the route by
Bletchley is an alternative railway route from Oxford to London.
“The road leading [from Platæa] to Thebes” could only mean the
ordinary direct road. An author using that expression would not
imagine that his meaning could be doubtful.
(3) Plutarch’s topography of Platæa is quite hopeless. It was
evidently not a side of historical inquiry in which he took the
slightest real interest
* * * * *
#PRECINCT OF ANDROKRATES.#
There can be little doubt that the Greek army on descending from the
hillside of Kithæron proceeded to form in something resembling order
of battle on the low ground near the bottom of the depression which
extends across the field, or on the flattish ridge which forms the
watershed between the Œroë and the Asopos. In this position their left
would be near, but probably north of the hero-chapel of Androkrates;
their right would be near the Gargaphia. The position of the centre
and the right would, moreover, be “on hills of no great height;”
that is to say, on the lower ends of the ridges which come down from
Kithæron, while their left would be in the plain before Platæa, the
“level country” of which Herodotus speaks. On this ground they would
be completely hidden from the Persian camp by the intervening ridges
to the north of them, which rise a hundred and twenty feet above the
Gargaphia spring, and much more than that above the plain of Platæa.
This first phase or development of the second position of the Greeks
was probably not of long duration. The nature of the ground provides an
explanation of it. After completing this march from the first position,
the Greeks seem to have been anxious to form their army in something
like order of battle before ascending to the summit of the northern
ridges (the Asopos ridge), for on arriving there they would be in full
view of the enemy, and at no great distance from the Persian camp. In
other words, they deployed their army out of sight of the enemy.
There seems to have been a certain amount of quarrelling between the
various contingents as to the order to be taken in the line of battle.
#NUMBERS OF THE GREEK ARMY.# Herodotus describes at some length such
a dispute between the Tegeans and Athenians as to who should take
position on the extreme left; but then he dearly loved that kind of
traditional history which he represents the two disputants as
having introduced into their arguments.
The matter was decided in favour of the Athenians. It is clear that the
Greeks at this time had a high opinion of the fighting qualities of the
people which had faced the Persians alone at Marathon.
◆H. ix. 28.◆
The Greek army was now larger in numbers than when it entered Bœotia.
Reinforcements had been coming in day by day. The total given by
Herodotus at this point in his narrative may be taken to represent the
largest number present at any time on the field, though it must not,
perhaps, be assumed that all these troops were actually with the army
immediately after the first development of the second position had been
completed.[198]
The total number amounts to more than a hundred and eight thousand men,
of whom more than one-third were heavy-armed infantry. When it
is remembered that with the exception of two thousand eight hundred,
all the troops were drawn from the Peloponnese, Megara, and Attica,
and that, besides these, large numbers of the men of military age
were serving on board the fleet at this time, the strenuous nature of
the effort which Greece put forth in this year can best be realized.
There is one curious point about the list in Herodotus. Manifest as is
his admiration for Aristides, it is in this passage only in his long
account of Platæa that he mentions him as commander of the Athenian
contingent.
After giving the numbers of the various contingents of the Greek army,
Herodotus closes the account with a remark which, in view of his
previous description of their position as being in the neighbourhood
of the precinct of Androkrates and the spring of Gargaphia, is
difficult to understand. He says, “These (troops) were drawn up in
regular order upon the Asopos.” If by the Asopos is to be understood
what is undoubtedly the main stream of that river, the army in the
first development of the second position cannot have been even in its
immediate neighbourhood, much less upon it. It cannot have been at any
point less than a mile and a half distant. The probable explanation is
that the name of Asopos was applied by the inhabitants of Platæa, in so
far as the upper course of that stream is concerned, to the brook which
has its rise in the springs of Apotripi.[199]
#MOVEMENT OF THE PERSIANS.#
◆H. ix. 31.◆
On receiving information of the movement of the Greeks, the Persians
moved westward along the Asopos, keeping, as it would appear from
subsequent events, to the north of the river. If Herodotus’ language
is accurate in wording,[200] it must be understood that this movement
was made before the second position of the Greeks had entered upon
its second phase; that is, while they were still out of sight of the
Persian army behind the line of the northern ridges. Herodotus gives
the Persian array in some detail. For all practical purposes of the
story of the battle it is sufficient to know that the Persians proper
were at this time on the left wing, opposite to the Lacedæmonians on
the Greek right, and with a front overlapping that of the Tegeans.
The other Asiatics formed the centre, opposite to the smaller Greek
contingents, while the Bœotians and other medized Greeks on the Persian
right were opposite to the Athenians, Platæans, and Megareans on the
Greek left.
◆H. ix. 31.◆
Of the medized Greeks the Phocians were only represented by a fraction
of their force. The remainder of that people had refused to medize, and
from their strong refuge in Parnassus were evidently doing their best
to interrupt the Persian line of communications, an operation for which
their position was admirably adapted, as it was on the flank of the
route from the north, at that point near Parapotamii and Chæronea
where the available is peculiarly restricted.
The total number of the barbarian portion of the Persian army Herodotus
gives at three hundred thousand. The numbers of the medized Greeks he
does not know, but reckons to have been about fifty thousand. Probably
there is an exaggeration in both estimates; but it cannot be very great
in the first case. The numbers opposing the Greeks were certainly much
superior to their own. The Thessalian element among the medized Greeks,
whose numbers may have been very large, renders it impossible to make
even a guess at the amount of truth in Herodotus’ estimate.
It is now necessary to consider what was the object of this movement
of the Greeks to their second position. The main motive mentioned by
Herodotus is the superiority of the water-supply at the new position.
No one who has been in this part of Bœotia in the dry season would be
inclined to under-estimate the importance of such a motive. But if the
question of water had been the only motive, an equally good supply
might have been obtained from the Vergutiani spring, and the wells or
springs which must have supplied the contemporary town of Platæa. The
position taken up in that case would have been beyond the reach of the
Persian cavalry—it would, in fact, have been nearly identical with the
proposed position at the “Island,” which became a prominent factor in
the later developments of the battle.
If the motives given by Herodotus in his account of Platæa be examined,
it will be seen that they are obviously those which would suggest
themselves to one who had been present at the battle, but who had not
been of sufficiently high military rank to be conversant with the
designs of those in command. It was on some such man that Herodotus
relied for his information; of actual official information he had
little or none. He can only say where the army went, what positions it
took up, and what were the incidents and issues of the combats which
were fought. It is further plain that, as in the case of Thermopylæ, he
supplemented this information by a personal examination of the ground.
#THE OFFENSIVE.#
It is, therefore, from the incidents of the battle that a judgment must
be formed as to the nature of the design or designs which determined
those incidents. In the present instance the three most remarkable
factors in the situation were:—
(1) The Greeks had deliberately taken up a position far more advanced
than they need have done, if guided by physical conditions alone.
(2) They had, after their march from their original position, deployed
their army in order of battle before coming in sight of the enemy.
(3) Their new position was attained, not by a direct forward movement,
but by a strong inclination to the left.
The first factor can only be interpreted in the sense that the Greeks
intended to assume a vigorous offensive; the second indicates that the
attack was to be of the nature of a surprise; the third that it aimed
at an assault on the Persian flank.
In judging from the subsequent history of the battle, it seems probable
that, had it been possible to carry out this programme in its entirety,
the result would have been a great success. It must have led to close
fighting; and in close fighting the Greek hoplite was infinitely
superior to anything which the Persian could oppose to him. The failure
of the plan—for it certainly did fail—was due to the fact that the
Persians discovered the movement of the Greeks before the latter were
ready to attack; and a surprise was impossible. Moreover, they took up
a new position in which they could not be outflanked. This the Greeks
must have discovered when they completed the second development of the
second position.
This second development of the new position is indicated though not
described in Herodotus’ narrative. Had the Greeks remained in the
position stretching from the Gargaphia to the Heroön, the Asopos could
not have played the part which it did in the subsequent fighting. ◆H.
ix. 31.◆ The historian has described the movement of the Persians as
having been to “the Asopos, which flows in this part,” that is to
say, approximately opposite the new Greek position. The Asopos here
must be the stream above and below the point where the brook
joins it. ◆But _vide_ note, p. 470. H. ix. 30.◆ The brook to which he
has previously applied the name Asopos could not form the obstacle
which is implied in the account of the fighting which occurred
subsequently.[201] It is evident what the nature of the movement of the
Greek army must have been. The whole army, after deploying on the low
ground, advanced up the slope of the Asopos ridge. The right must have
been to the east of the site of the church of St. John. Westwards the
line extended along the curve of the ridge, and the extreme left was
probably on the low ground at the north end of the plain of Platæa,
though the amount of the extension in this direction must necessarily
be a matter of uncertainty. The sight of the Persian army drawn up on
the far side of the Asopos, which must have met the eyes of the Greeks
when they reached the summit of the ridge, would clearly demonstrate
to them that the attempted surprise had failed. The position for the
moment was, indeed, one of stalemate; ◆H. ix. 33–37.◆ and that this was
recognized by both sides is shown by Herodotus’ tale of the sacrifices
offered in both camps on the day subsequent to the attainment of the
position. The conclusions drawn from them were favourable to the
maintenance of the defensive, but unfavourable to the adoption of the
offensive by crossing the Asopos. It may be suspected that the Greek
commanders assisted in the interpretation of the omens. Mardonius
also had a prophet in his employ, a Greek from Elis, whose previous
treatment by the Spartans had been such as to guarantee his loyalty
to any cause opposed to theirs. He also advised the maintenance of
the defensive, and his advice accorded with that of a third prophet
who accompanied the medized Greeks. Prophecy and tactics combined had
brought matters to an _impasse_ for the time being.
◆H. ix. 38, 39.◆
Eight days thus passed without, apparently, any active operations being
undertaken by either side. The Greeks profited most by the delay.
Reinforcements to their army kept coming in through the passes in their
rear, and their numbers were considerably increased. #EFFECTIVENESS OF
PERSIAN CAVALRY.# Mardonius’ attention was called to this fact
by a Theban named Timegenides, who suggested that the Persian cavalry
should be sent to assail the bands traversing the pass of Dryoskephalæ.
The advice was taken, and on the very next night the cavalry was
despatched. The fatal weakness of the new Greek position was now made
apparent. On its right flank a wide space of practicable ground,
traversed, moreover, by the Thebes-Dryoskephalæ road, had been left
open, by which the Persian cavalry could without difficulty and without
opposition reach the mouth not merely of the Dryoskephalæ pass, but
also of that other pass on the Platæa-Athens road, the only two really
effective lines of the Greek communications. The Greek army, by taking
up so advanced a position, had ceased to cover those passes, and even
the Platæa-Megara pass was but imperfectly protected.
The cavalry raid met with immediate and startling success. A Greek
provision-train of five hundred pack animals, with their drivers
and, presumably, their escort, was annihilated at the mouth of the
Dryoskephalæ pass.
◆H. ix. 40.◆
During the two next days there was a good deal of skirmishing on the
main line of the Asopos, but neither side crossed the stream, so
that no decisive result was arrived at. This form of fighting was
nevertheless distinctly disadvantageous to the Greeks, who suffered
from the missiles of the Persian cavalry without being able to
retaliate in any decisive fashion. The Asopos is not a large stream,
and at this time of year would be easily traversable at any point. Its
bed is sufficiently deep to render it a serious obstacle to the passage
of cavalry, if the crossing were disputed, but an undisputed passage
could be made without difficulty at almost any point of this part of
its course.
◆H. ix. 41.◆
Mardonius was becoming impatient at the indecisive character of the
operations. The two armies had now been for eleven days facing one
another on either side of the Asopos. He had evidently made up his mind
that this state of things could not continue, and that a movement of
some kind must be made. Artabazos, who had commanded at the siege of
Potidæa, advised withdrawal to Thebes, which was only six miles
north of their position; it was strongly fortified, and, as the Persian
base of operations, was, so he said, amply provided with supplies.[202]
◆H. ix. 41, _ad fin._◆ He pointed out that they were possessed of ample
funds wherewith a campaign of bribery among the leading men of the
Greek states might be instituted. The Thebans advocated the same line
of action. They knew their countrymen; so apparently did Herodotus, as
his language shows. Mardonius, however, would have none of such advice;
he believed his army to be a better fighting machine than that of the
Greeks; and it is impossible not to recognize the truth of his view as
matters then stood.
A certain amount of light seems to be thrown on this reported
discussion between the Persian commanders by an incident which
Herodotus reports to have occurred on the night of the same day.
Alexander the Macedonian, who has already appeared prominently in
the history of this time as Mardonius’ representative in the recent
negotiations with the Athenians, is said to have ridden up to the line
of the Greek outposts and to have demanded speech with the commanders
of the army.[203] After reciting his attachment to the Greek cause, he
made one startling revelation as to the state of things in the Persian
army, which, if true, would go far to explain the subsequent course of
events, and mould put a new complexion upon the advice which Artabazos
is represented to have given. He said that he believed Mardonius
intended to attack on the following day. If he deferred doing so, the
Greeks were not to retire from their position, because the Persian
supplies are running short. #EVOLUTIONS.# If this statement is true,
it accounts for the pronounced offensive which Mardonius assumed from
this time forward; and, if the enormous difficulties under which the
Persians laboured as to their line of communications be taken into
consideration, it is extremely probable that it was true. The action
of the Phocian refugees away northward was sure to make itself felt in
this department of the war.
This part of Herodotus’ narrative takes the form of a series of scenes
in which the various prominent actors on either side are introduced
upon the stage and use language suitable to the situation; but, though
unreliable in form, it can hardly be doubted that these tales indicate
in a more or less direct way the actual course of events. That tale
among them which is least easy to understand or explain relates to what
passed in the Greek camp after Alexander’s message had been reported to
the generals.
Pausanias, as commander of the Spartans, is reported to have been
alarmed at the prospect of an attack on the following day, and to have
proposed to the Athenians that they should exchange places in the line
with the Spartans, in order that they might then face the Persian
contingent of whose fighting they had had experience at Marathon. The
Athenians accepted the proposal willingly; they even said they had
been on the point of making it themselves. The exchange was made; but
the Bœotians, who noticed it, reported the matter to Mardonius, who
made a corresponding change in his own line The Greeks, noticing this,
returned to their original order.
As an account of what actually happened this can hardly be taken
literally. It seems to refer to some evolution which either Herodotus
or his informant did not understand, though what that evolution was it
is impossible to say. The Athenian element in the story is evident.
◆H. ix. 48.◆
The tale which follows, that Mardonius sent a challenge to the Spartans
to fight an equal number of his army, cannot be taken as serious
history. Mardonius was well aware that until the Greek infantry were
thoroughly shaken by his cavalry it would be unwise to assail them
with the Persian foot-soldiers. His action which immediately followed
shows this quite clearly. ◆H. ix. 49.◆ He intended,—it may be under
the stress of necessity,—to take the offensive in some form. It was
probably a case of victory or withdrawal. That being so, he
despatched the whole of his numerous cavalry against the Greek army.
Herodotus describes the attack in language which leaves no doubt as to
the gravity of the situation which it created.
“When the cavalry rode up, they harassed the whole Greek army by
hurling javelins and shooting arrows, being horsebowmen, who could
not be brought to close combat. The spring of Gargaphia, too, from
which the whole Greek army got water, they spoiled and filled up.
Lacedæmonians alone were in position by the spring; it was at some
distance from the various positions of the rest of the Greeks, while
the Asopos was near them. Being driven back, however, from the Asopos,
they resorted to the spring, for it was not possible for them to get
water from the river, owing to the cavalry and bowmen.”[204]
This remarkable passage indicates with singular clearness what took
place at this exceedingly critical moment of the battle. The Greek left
was forced by the cavalry to retire from the Asopos, where they had on
previous days been skirmishing with the enemy, and to take refuge on
the Asopos ridge away from the flat ground.[205] The second position of
the Greeks attained, in other words, its third phase or development, in
which the whole Greek army was confined to a position on the summit of
the ridge.
On the extreme right matters were no less serious. #CAVALRY ATTACK
OF THE PERSIANS.# The cavalry had got round the Greek flank to the
Gargaphia spring, and after driving away what was probably a
Lacedæmonian detachment on guard there, had rendered the spring
unserviceable. The Greek army was consequently without water, and its
retirement from the position could be at most a question of hours.
The situation of the Greek army was as critical as it well could be.
Between them and the rough ground at the immediate foot of the mountain
lay a band of country over which cavalry could ride; and they were
cut off, not merely from their water supply, but also from the lines
of communication afforded by the three passes. ◆Cf. H. ix. 50.◆ The
convoys were blocked by the Persian cavalry, and were unable to reach
the camp.
◆Cf. H. ix. 51, _ad init._ and 52, _ad init._◆
This fierce attack seems to have lasted two days. On the morning of the
second day a Council of War was held, and it was decided, if the attack
were not renewed that day, to move to a position which Herodotus calls
the “Island.” The attack was, however, renewed, and the movement had to
be postponed.[206]
The passage in which Herodotus describes and explains the nature of
the proposed movement is not merely of the greatest importance in the
history of the battle, but is perhaps still more important as showing
the pains which he took to get as accurate a knowledge as possible of
the scenes of the greatest events which he describes. It is peculiarly
noticeable in the case of Thermopylæ, and it is not less noticeable in
this account of Platæa. It is impossible to conceive that he should
have been able to write the description of the “Island,” unless he had
actually seen the ground. His informant as to the incidents of the
battle cannot be presumed to have described it to him, since no part of
the Greek army ever attained the position, and he cannot therefore be
supposed to have seen it.
“At a meeting of the Greek generals,” he says, “it was determined,
should the Persians omit to renew the attack that day, to go to the
Island. It is ten stades distant from the Asopos and from the spring
of Gargaphia, at which they were at the time stationed, in front of
the city of Platæa. This is how there comes to be an island on the
mainland: the river, flowing from Kithæron divides high up the hill,
and then flows down towards the plain, the streams being about three
stades distant from one another, and then they join.... The name of
the (combined) stream is Œroë.... To this position they determined to
move, in order that they might have a plentiful water-supply, and the
cavalry might not do them damage as when drawn up on their front. They
determined to move in the second watch of the night,[207] so that the
Persians might not see them leaving their position, and their cavalry
might not pursue them, and throw them into confusion. They determined,
further, on arriving at the new position, which the Œroë, daughter of
the Asopos, encloses in its course from Kithæron, to send the half of
their army in the course of the night to Kithæron, in order that it
might rescue the service corps which had gone for provisions; for it
was blocked in Kithæron.”
[Illustration: PLATÆA: “ISLAND,” FROM SIDE OF KITHÆRON.
1. Foot of Helicon.
2. Parnassos.
3. Plain of Platæa.
4. “Island.”
[_To face page_ 480.
]
* * * * *
_Note on the Position of the “Island.”_
In order to understand this very important passage, it is necessary to
examine the evidence, both documentary and topographical, as to the
position of the νῆσος or Island. It will be well to tabulate the facts
which Herodotus mentions with regard to it.
(1) It is ten stades from the Asopos.
(2) It is ten stades from the spring of Gargaphia.
(3) It is πρὸ τῆς τῶν Πλαταιέων πόλιος.
(4) The river divides ἄνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος, and flows down into the
plain.
(5) The streams are ὅσνπερ τρία στάδια distant from one another.
(6) The streams afterwards join one another.
(7) The name of the river is Œroë.
(8) There was a plentiful water supply at the νῆσος.
#THE ISLAND.#
(9) The cavalry could not annoy the Greeks there, ὥσπερ κατιθὺ ἐόντων.
Both Leake (“Northern Greece”) and Vischer (“Erinnerungen aus
Griechenland”) identify a strip of flat ground, lying in the plain due
north of the site of the town of Platæa between two of the stream-beds
of the Œroë, as the “Island” of which Herodotus speaks.
This identification may be tested by the facts given by Herodotus:
(1) This piece of ground is ten stades from A 1, which, as I have
said, is apparently the upper part of the Asopos of Herodotus.
(It is thirteen or fourteen stades from the branch of the river
which comes down from Leuktra.)
(2) It is considerably over ten stades, viz. fifteen or sixteen
stades, from the spring which Leake identifies, rightly, as I
think, with the Gargaphia.
(3) It is before or in full view of the city of Platæa.
(4) The words used by Herodotus do not seem to be those which he
might have been expected to use in describing this piece of land.
The streams divide at a point more than two miles above this.
(5) (6) (7) are adequately fulfilled by it.
It is when we come to (8) and (9), which are the very reasons stated by
Herodotus for the movement to the “Island,” that the position indicated
absolutely fails to accord with the conditions.
In respect to water supply it is conspicuously deficient; and of the
three streams which cross the plain at this point one was absolutely
dry at the time of my visit (Dec., 1892); and this one was that which
would have formed the side of the “Island” towards the Persian army,
viz. O 1.
The second contained water, but in a much less quantity than before
it entered the plain. The third contained water also, but not in any
quantity.
This was at a period of peculiarly heavy rains.
In September all of them would almost certainly be dry by the time they
reached this part of the plain. O 1, being a pure drainage stream,
would be, under ordinary circumstances, dry along its whole course at
that time of year.
There would, under no conceivable circumstances, have been water enough
in this conjectured νῆσος, at that time of year, to supply an army
one-tenth the number of the Greek force. We cannot even assume
exceptionally heavy rain (a most extraordinary circumstance in the
month of September), for in that case the lands of the Asopos would
have been impassable for cavalry, and even infantry would have been
unable to cross them. I speak from personal experience. I wanted to
get down to the river, in order to get points of survey upon it, since
its course is not distinguishable with certainty, even from a furlong
off; but after getting into plough, into which I sank above my knees,
and after my Albanian servant had come down and nearly disappeared with
my plane table, I gave it up. I could not reach it at that point; and
that part of the Asopos had to remain marked in my map by a dotted line
which, although it gives the course very nearly, does not pretend to
the same accuracy as the rest of the map.
Condition (9) really contains two conditions.
(1) The Persian cavalry could not damage the Greeks so much in the
former position, because—
(2) They would not attack them on the front
Applying (1) to this conjectured νῆσος, I have no hesitation in saying
that the stream-beds which bound it afford no serious obstacles to
cavalry for at least ninety out of every hundred yards of their
course. A horse could cross them in most places without even easing
from its gallop, and, apart from this, the effectiveness of the
recent attacks of the Persian cavalry had been due to the fact that
it had been fighting with missiles and not at close quarters, as
Herodotus expressly says. The Greeks could not have faced them across
a watercourse a yard or two broad, so as to be able to prevent their
passing it, even had the passage been a work of some difficulty to a
mounted man. If further argument on this point be necessary, I can
only say that it is impossible to conceive how the generals of the
Greeks, having found the Asopos an utterly insufficient protection,
could have supposed that the army would be in safety behind these much
slighter watercourses. Have the stream-beds altered in character? If
any alteration has taken place, it can only have taken the form of the
raising of the plain by earth brought down from the uplands, the result
of which would be that the channels would be deeper now than at the
time of the battle.
Condition (9, 2).—Had the Greek position been on this ground, the
attack would certainly have been on the front.
[Illustration: BŒOTIAN PLAIN, FROM PLATÆA-MEGARA PASS.]
[Illustration: PLATÆA—WEST SIDE OF Νῆσος.
[_To face page_ 482.
]
There is another point mentioned by Herodotus which is very difficult
to reconcile with the location of the νῆσος in the position in which
Leake and Vischer place it. #“ISLAND” OF LEAKE AND VISCHER.# He says
(ix. 56) that when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians did actually
begin their movement thither, οἱ μὲν (the Lacedæmonians) τῶν τε ὄχθων
ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρέης του Κιθαιρῶνος, φοβεόμενοι τὴν ἵππον.
Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κάτω τραφ θέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον, etc.
Since the Lacedæmonians, had they marched direct from the Asopos ridge
to this νῆσος, would not have had to traverse a longer stretch of
ἱππάσιμος χῶρος than if they had gone round by the ὑπωρέη (_vide_ map),
it is difficult to see why they should have adopted the infinitely more
circuitous route.
I do not, however, wish to lay too much stress upon this argument,
as I believe the real object of the course taken by the Spartans to
have been the relief of the convoys blocked up in the pass on the
Platæa-Athens road, a reason which may be deduced from Herodotus’ own
words in describing the decision to move to the “Island” (ix. 51)—“They
determined, on arriving at this place (the ‘Island’), to send off half
the army towards Kithæron in the course of this night, to recover the
attendants who had gone after the provisions, they being blocked up in
Kithæron.”
It does not seem likely that, after the damage which they had suffered
in the second position, they could have come to the decision to send
off from the νῆσος of Leake and Vischer one half of the army to the
pass. It would be obliged to march across a mile of ἱππάσιμος χῶρος
between Platæa and Ridge 4, and to venture itself, at a distance of
from two and a half to three miles from the remainder of the army.
The reason which mainly influenced both Leake and Vischer in thus
determining the site of the νῆσος was no doubt the question of distance
from the Asopos. They assumed that when Herodotus used that name he
meant the stream coming from Leuktra and the west. It is almost beyond
doubt that he does not mean this stream. The Asopos to him was the
stream A 1 with the main stream below the junction of A 1; and it is
extremely likely that what was the Asopos to him was also the Asopos
to the Platæans. It is only necessary to stand on the site of Platæa
and look northward over the plain in order to understand how this
nomenclature would arise. The course of A 1 is traceable all along the
west foot of the Asopos ridge; but the upper course of the main stream
is undistinguishable unless the river be in flood.
As this piece of ground fails in such important particulars to
harmonize with Herodotus’ account of the “Island,” it remains to be
considered whether it is possible to apply his description to any other
part of the field.
One fact is quite evident from Herodotus: the “Island” lay between the
branches of the Œroë.
I think it is to be found high up in the interval between the branch
streams, at the point indicated in the map, and that it consisted
of Ridge 4, and possibly of Ridge 3 also. Any one who takes the
higher track from Kriekouki to Kokla cannot fail to be struck by the
peculiarity of the ground, should he happen to look down towards the
plain at the point where the road passes close to the narrow strip of
land which separates the sources of the streams O 1 and O 3. These
sources, as will be seen from the map, are close together, and the
ridge which separates them is quite low at the narrowest part. The
stream O 3 (east branch) flows down towards the plain at first in a
deep valley with a very steep slope towards the “Island,” which valley
it leaves at the point where the streams which unite to form O 3 have
their junction. From this point it flows beneath the “Island,” which
rises steeply above it, whereas on the other side of the stream, _i.e._
on the west side, the ground slopes quite gradually up to the rounded
back of the low-lying Ridge 5.
The stream O 1 flows down to the plain in a deep depression.
It is true that at the present day these streams do not join
immediately on reaching the plain; but to show how possible it is that
their courses in the flat alluvial ground may have altered again and
again, within certain limits, in the course of time, I may mention that
when Colonel Leake visited this ground, the stream O 2 did not join O 3
at the point where it now joins it, but was a separate stream from it
at the point where the Kokla-Thebes track passes the branches of the
Œroë, _i.e._ more than a mile below their present junction.
There is another very striking point about this piece of ground, which
is noticeable in its contouring in the map. Its insular character is,
if I may so say, emphasized by a large hillock which rises on it close
to O 3, and which is a most prominent object, especially when viewed
from Platæa itself. This hillock may be identified by any one visiting
the ground, owing to its having on the south slope of it a white
building, the only building existing between Kriekouki and Kokla.
#THE “ISLAND.”#
It will be found on examination of the evidence that this locality
corresponds most closely with the description of the “Island,” given by
Herodotus, and furthermore that the incidents of the battle, as related
by Herodotus, support in a remarkable degree the hypothesis that this
is the island which he describes. It may be compared with the nine
conditions deducible from Herodotus with the following result:—
(1) It is, like the “Island” of Leake and Vischer, ten stades from
the stream A 1, the Asopos of Herodotus.
(2) It is, unlike their “Island,” ten stades from the Gargaphia
spring.
(3) It may be peculiarly well described as being πρὸ τῆς τῶν
Πλαταιέων πόλιος.
(_a_) Because, the site of Platæa city has a slope this way, in
fact, “verges” towards the east, as well as towards the
north.
(b) Because, looking at it from the site of Platæa across the low
Ridge 5, it [especially the hillock] stands out in a remarkable
way.
(4) The division of the streams ἄνωθεν ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος, whether it
be taken as that between O 1 and O 3, or between O 1 and O 2, is
peculiarly striking in either case, the head waters of the
streams nearly touching.
(5) O 3 and O 2 are three stades from one another. O 3 and O 1 are
nearly four stades.
(6) The streams _do_ join now, but may well have joined at a point
higher up their course at the time at which the battle was fought.
(7) The streams are the head waters of the Œroë.
(8) The water-supply of O 3 is derived, as will be seen, from seven
streams. On these streams are two large springs, one of which is
called by Leake the spring of Vergutiani, ◆Paus ix. 2, 3.◆ and is
apparently the πηγή of Pausanias. Beside these two springs there
are numerous smaller ones, and O 3 as it passes beneath the
hillock on the “Island,” is quite a large stream; but, like the
other streams which flow to the plain, its volume goes on
decreasing the further it gets into the flat country.
(9_a_) Reference to the map will show how well the condition is
fulfilled by the ground. The position would be unassailable
by cavalry on south and west. On the west, the slope of the
“Island” is very steep indeed; on the east of the valley of
the stream O 1 is deep. It would seem, too, from the large
accumulation of rocks and stones which have been removed from
the cultivated land at this part, as if this Eastern slope of
the “Island” was till recent times of the same nature as the
rocky hillside of Kithæron.
If, however, O 2 be taken as the boundary of the “Island,” then there
would be this rocky ground on the far side of it The valley of O 2 is
not, however, so deep as that of O 1.
The only point, then, at which this ground would be assailable by
cavalry would be at the north end or bottom of the slope. This brings
me to the second part of Condition 9.
(9_a_) The last fact mentioned explains Herodotus’ words, ὥσπερ κατιθὺ
ἐόντων.
Such, then, are the reasons, taken from Herodotus, which induce me to
take what may appear to be, and is, I confess, a very decided view as
to the position of the ground called the “Island.”
I think, too, that there are other considerations of a strategic
character which support this view.
A brief examination of the map will show that it would have been
difficult for the Greek generals to have chosen a spot in the whole
neighbourhood of Platæa which would have rendered their position in
case of disaster a more hopeless one than it would have been had they
withdrawn to the “Island” of Leake and Vischer. The possibility of
disaster must have been very present to their minds at the time at
which the decision was made to move to the “Island.”
Herodotus’ description of the state of the army under the continued
attacks of the Persian cavalry is brief but graphic. Its position
was, beyond doubt, exceedingly serious. But what would have been its
position had disaster overtaken it on that tongue of land in the plain
of Platæa? It would in the first place have been surrounded by the
Persian cavalry, since the ground between it and Platæa, a considerable
stretch of land, is all ιππάσιμος χῶρος, and to all intents and
purposes absolutely flat. Supposing even that it did try to cut its way
out, it would have been obliged either to retreat to the west towards
the Corinthian Gulf, or to make its way to one of the passes. In either
case the result must have been the practical, if not actual, ruin of
the Greek army.
The way to the Corinthian Gulf, however, would be outside all
calculation, since—
#MOVEMENT TO THE “ISLAND.”#
(1) There was no fleet in the gulf which could possibly have
transported even a small fraction of the force across it
(2) The only path across Kithæron west of Platæa must, from Xenophon’s
description (Xen. Hell. v. 4; and vi. 4), have been an exceedingly
difficult one. It is, moreover, some nine or ten miles distant
from Platæa. It cannot, in fact, have ever entered into the
calculations of the Greek generals.
As regards the three passes which lead on to the field, can we, if
we bear in mind the condition of the Greek army at the time of the
movement, suppose for a moment that the Greek generals would move to
a position farther away from the passes than they were before the
movement began? Surely their natural course would be to retire to
the higher ground, where they would be in comparative safety from
the Persian cavalry, and where, in the position I have indicated,
they would be exactly between the passes on the Platæa-Megara and
Platæa-Athens roads respectively, and where, too, they would be in easy
communication with both by way of the rocky part of the Kithæron slope.
The last piece of evidence bearing on this point is afforded by the
remarkable tale of Amompharetos, the Spartan officer who refused to
move from the second position with the rest of the Lacedæmonian force.
The reason which prompted (H. ix. 53) him in his refusal is stated by
Herodotus to have been the disgrace of retreating before the enemy.
The feeling is hardly comprehensible if the movement was to be to the
“Island” in the plain; it is comprehensible if it was to be towards
Kithæron, since he might well suspect that the real design of Pausanias
was to retreat through the mountain into Attica.
* * * * *
At the time at which this resolution was taken the Greeks were for
the moment a beaten army. What might have happened had the proposed
movement ever become an actual fact cannot of course be said, but it
is extremely probable that a leakage through the passes would have
commenced, by which its numbers would have been so rapidly reduced that
an absolute withdrawal from Bœotia would have shortly become necessary.
Had that been the case, Northern Greece must have been lost. It would
have been very difficult after what had happened to keep together
so composite a force in an advanced but purely defensive position. As
far as the Greek generals were concerned, their design, doubtless, was
to remain on the defensive in Bœotia, now that their offensive strategy
had not met with success, and to starve the enemy out of the country.
Alexander of Macedon had reported to them the approaching failure of
the Persian supplies.
They had failed in attempting to take the offensive in a country which
was peculiarly adapted for the operations of cavalry. They had been
led by the success they had achieved in the first position into the
mistake of remaining in a position which could only be justified by an
active offensive, not recognizing that their success on that occasion
had been due to the wrong use which Mardonius or Masistios had made of
their numerous cavalry. The passes formed, as it were, their immediate
base; and they had not recognized that by leaving an interval between
themselves and that base they exposed their line of communications
to the attacks of an arm against whose mobility they had nothing to
match, and had rendered themselves assailable from all sides by a
mode of assault which made it impossible for them to retaliate in
adequate fashion. It was their first experience of the possibilities
of cavalry action on a large scale; and it is noticeable that in the
many subsequent years of warfare with Persia in that century they never
again willingly exposed themselves to the possibility of such a reverse
as they had suffered in the second position at Platæa.
The curious piece of land, with its curious name of the “Island,” which
was fixed upon by the Greek commanders as the goal of the proposed
movement, is easily recognizable at the present day, owing to the
accuracy with which Herodotus describes it. It is one of those ridges
which extend northwards into the plain from the foot of the rocky slope
of Kithæron; but it is remarkable among them for two peculiarities.
#LAST HOURS ON THE ASOPOS RIDGE.# The streams which bound it on either
side have their sources on the mountain slope above it within but a few
yards of one another, so that it may be said to be all but surrounded
by water; and the ordinarily rounded back of these northward
stretching ridges is varied in this case by a steep and very noticeable
natural mound which rises upon it. It is nearly two miles due south of
the ridge which formed the Greek second position, and about one mile
due east of the town of Platæa. As a position it offered the distinct
advantage of being within touch of the Platæa-Athens and Platæa-Megara
passes, and of affording the army comparative immunity from cavalry
attack.
The Greek commanders were disappointed in their hope or expectation
that the cavalry attack would not be renewed on that day, on the
morning of which the Council of War was held. The Persians had plain
evidence of the effectiveness of the method they were employing; and
for the whole of a second day the Greeks had to support a series of
assaults without being able to inflict any proportionate damage on
the foe. Those who have been in the plains of Bœotia during the heat
of the late summer and early autumn will best appreciate the terrible
hardships which the army suffered. For at least forty hours it must
have been wholly cut off from water, and for a considerable part of
that time must have been undergoing severe exertion and supporting
severe losses under a burning sun upon that dusty, rolling plain. It
is evident indeed that the Persian cavalry withdrew during the night;
but they had, before doing so, rendered the Gargaphia spring unusable.
The longed-for darkness came at last, and at the appointed hour the
movement began. It began, indeed,—but it ended vary differently
from what had been intended. With the exception of the Spartans and
Athenians, the Greek army, without waiting for further orders, started
off in haste at the time appointed, —but not to the “Island,” so says
Herodotus. They never even thought of so doing, but were glad to take
refuge just outside the town of Platæa, around the temple of Hera.[208]
It is quite plain that Herodotus believed that the centre of the
Greek army fled in something resembling a panic, and neither obeyed,
nor intended to obey, orders. When the story is examined it is found to
contain several features which are very difficult to reconcile with the
colouring which Herodotus has given to it. If these Greeks intended to
fly, why did they not make directly for the Platæa-Megara pass, which
must have been open? Why did they go to Platæa?
Having gone thither, why did they not seize upon the town?
It has been suggested that in going thither they were carrying out
orders, and that the position at the Heræon was part of the position of
which the “Island” was another part. The nature of the ground between
the two positions, and their distance apart, does not render this very
probable.
The probability is that, like so many stories of incidents in Greek
history, this particular one has suffered from the exaggeration of some
of its true details, and the loss of others.
It is not strange that the events of the last two days’ fighting on
the Asopos ridge should have created disposition to panic throughout
the Greek army. Doubtless such a disposition did exist, and showed
itself in the hurried departure of a large portion of the army. But
even Herodotus does not say that the departure was premature. So far,
the tale may give a true representation of the facts of the case.
#RETIREMENT OF GREEK CENTRE.# What in all probability took place was
that the retiring force started without taking due precautions to
ascertain the exact line of retreat, or to provide itself with
guides who could lead it amid the darkness of the night to the position
which had been appointed as the rendezvous of the army. If that were
so, a mistake was not merely possible, but almost inevitable. In that
country of rise and fall which lies between Kithæron and the Asopos,
one slope resembles another, and one stream is similar in character
to its neighbours, so that there is a conspicuous absence of those
landmarks which may serve as a guide to one who traverses it by night.
It is not difficult to imagine their position when they found
themselves at the Heræon. They must have arrived there in the night,
and may have thought it well to wait until dawn disclosed the true
position of the rallying point of the Greek army. From the Heræon
the “Island” would be full in sight, when the advance of daylight
had rendered the surrounding country visible. But the dawn can have
brought but little comfort to them. It is more easy to realize the
scene that met their eyes than the intensity of this anxiety which
that scene aroused. Away to the east the “Island”—empty, unoccupied.
To the north-east the Persian army pouring in streams over the ridge
which they had evacuated during the night, and from the hollow beneath
that ridge two clouds of dust arising, sole indication of the terrible
struggle which was going on beyond the intervening ridges. This is not
merely a picture of the imagination and no more. It is what these men
_must_ have seen from their position at Platæa; for the narrative of
Herodotus indicates with sufficient clearness the time and the locality
of the battles which were fought on that fatal morning by the right and
left wings of the Greek army.
It would be unjustifiable to pass a decisive judgment on the conduct of
those Greeks. The extent of their cowardice is not indeed calculable.
The tradition which Herodotus followed tended manifestly to depict the
whole attitude of the Peloponnesian Greeks, both on this and other
occasions in the war, in the most unfavourable light. There can be
little doubt that the tradition was Athenian in origin.
It is not, however, necessary to assume that in this or any other
particular instance the truth was distorted in order to cloke Athenian
failings. The animosities of that later time at which Herodotus wrote
his history are quite sufficient to account for the discoloration of
facts, and in this particular instance there does not appear to be any
valid reason for supposing that the Athenians had anything to conceal.
Much had happened during the night of which the Greek centre was wholly
unaware.
Pausanias on the right wing, on seeing that the troops in the centre
had begun the movement of retirement, gave orders to the Spartans to do
the same. He supposed that the other Greeks would, according to orders,
withdraw to the “Island;” and, as has been seen, it is probable that
the latter had every intention of so doing.
A question now arises which is of very great importance with regard
to the history of the battle. Was it the intention of Pausanias that
his Spartans on the right wing should likewise withdraw direct to the
“Island,” or did he intend to carry out some other operation before
joining the rest of the army in that position? Herodotus, whose
attention is at this point in his narrative distracted by the not
unimportant tale of Amompharetos, makes no direct statement on the
subject, but he furnishes sufficient indirect evidence to render it
almost certain that the march of the Spartans neither was, nor was
intended to be, directed straight to the “Island,” but aimed first at
the accomplishment of a design which was at the moment of the utmost
importance to the army. It is further noticeable that the indirect
evidence of Herodotus is peculiarly supported by the light which is
thrown upon the further incidents of the battle by the topography of
the field.
In describing the resolution to move to the “Island,” Herodotus,
it will be remembered, says that it was the intention of the Greek
commanders to send half the army to relieve the provision trains which
were blocked in the passes; and the other evidence shows that the
Spartans’ movement from the second position had this immediate object
in view.[209]
#OBSTINACY OF AMOMPHARETOS.#
When, therefore, Pausanias saw the Greek centre was starting for the
“Island,” he gave orders to his division of forty thousand Spartans
and helots to move also, intending to march towards the pass on the
Platæa-Athens road, and, possibly, towards Dryoskephalæ pass also. For
the moment, however, his plan was completely upset by the obstinacy and
insubordination of one of his captains, Amompharetos, who, so Herodotus
says, commanded the Pitanate division of the Lacedæmonian force.[210]
The refusal to obey was evidently based on the supposition that the
withdrawal from the position was nothing less than a preliminary to
a retreat.[211] Orders and expostulations proving alike unavailing,
persuasion was tried, but with no better effect. The whole night seems
to have been wasted in the dispute, for it was not until day was
dawning that Pausanias moved away, reluctant to leave the regiment
to its fate, but hoping that when Amompharetos found himself alone he
would make up his mind to follow. The Tegeans accompanied the Spartans
in their movement.
That movement is described in some detail by Herodotus. While the
Athenians, who had been suspiciously waiting for the Spartans to move,
turned down towards the plain, the latter kept to the hills, and made
for the slopes of Kithæron, from fear of the Persian cavalry.[212]
Amompharetos, on seeing that the rest of the Spartan army was leaving
him in good earnest, started slowly after it, which movement being
perceived by Pausanias, he stopped the main body in order to wait for
him. He had by that time advanced ten stades, or a little more than a
mile, from his previous position, and he waited at a place which is
described as having been near the river Moloeis, in what was called the
Argiopian country, where was a temple of Eleusinian Demeter.
* * * * *
_The Temple of Eleusinian Demeter, etc._
Herodotus, in the words recently quoted, gives the following facts:—
(1) That Pausanias, with the main body of the Spartans, advanced ten
stades, and then waited for Amompharetos and his regiment.
(2) That he waited at the river Moloeis, in what is called the
Argiopian country.
(3) That there is a temple of Eleusinian Demeter in that part.
To which may be added from an earlier chapter:—
(4) Pausanias, after failing to persuade Amompharetos, starts at dawn:
his movements Herodotus describes as having been as follows:—
◆H. ix. 56.◆
“He gave the signal and led away the whole of the rest of his
force through the hills; the Tegeans also followed him.... For the
Lacedæmonians intended to keep to the hilly ground and the foot-slopes
of Kithæron, because they feared the cavalry.”
#TEMPLE OF ELEUSIAN DEMETER.#
Circumstances (1) and (2) may be taken together.
This is the first mention of the river Moloeis.
Nothing is known of the position of the Argiopian country; but it may
be surmised that it had some more or less striking characteristic which
caused it to be called by a special name.
Any identification of these two geographical features must be a matter
of extreme uncertainty.
After my stay at Kriekouki in 1892–1893, I was disposed to identify the
brook A 5 with the river Moloeis. I am inclined, after revisiting the
country in August, 1899, to think that the brook A 6 is more probably
the stream mentioned by Herodotus. It is the largest of the streams
which traverse the field, save, of course, the Asopos itself, and
Leake, in his map, assigns to it the name of the main stream. Though
the Spartan army after advancing ten stades from the Asopos ridge would
not be actually on this brook, yet, even granting to the measurement
given a greater accuracy than perhaps it can claim, the position
attained might be described as περὶ ποταμὸν Μολόεντα.
The matter, however, is so uncertain, that it is impossible to insist
on either of these two identifications against the other.
The name Argiopian has been supposed to mean “white rock,” and,
adopting this interpretation, one visitor to the region has discovered
that there is a patch of white rock on the side of Kithæron which
is a prominent object from the plain. As we were in August, 1899,
encamped in the plain near the head of brook A 5, I had ample
opportunity for observing the north slope of Kithæron. No such patch
was then visible on the dull grey-green rock slopes of the mountain.
As to the interpretation of the name I am, I confess, sceptical. The
interpretation of place-names in Greece, as elsewhere, is a most
dangerous though fascinating pastime; and it is but too often the case
that the most obvious interpretation is the most incorrect. All, I
think, that can be safely assumed in the present instance is that the
Argiopian country was a stretch of land marked off in some way from
its surroundings, and I venture to think that either the Long Ridge or
the Plateau has sufficient peculiarities, _quâ_ ground, to render it
possible that either of them might in ancient times have been known by
a distinctive local name.
The temple of Eleusinian Demeter is a more important landmark in the
history of the battle.
I venture to think that the ruins of the church of St. Demetrion
are probably on or near the site of that temple, and that the τέμενος
of the temple was on the flat top of that mound of the Long Ridge. The
reasons which may be adduced for this identification are as follows:—
(_a_) The Christians, in cases in which they adopted an ancient
temple, or the site of an ancient temple, for a church, were apt, in
dedicating the new sanctuary, to make a pious pun on the dedication
of the pre-existing pagan shrine. This kind of nomenclature has been
peculiarly common in Greece.
(_b_) It is true that Pausanias mentions several temples of Eleusinian
Demeter as having existed in this immediate neighbourhood, no one of
which can be supposed to have stood in this position.
But it is also clear that the temple mentioned by Herodotus is not any
one of these mentioned by Pausanias.
Cf. Paus. ix. 4, 2, at Platæa; ix. 4, 3, at Skolos; ix. 9, 1, Grove of
Demeter at Potniæ on the road from Thebes to Platæa, ten stades from
Thebes, _i.e._ about sixty stades from Platæa.
The omission of Pausanias to mention the one to which I refer may
possibly be accounted for by the fact that it lay, if I am right, _not_
near the great road from Athens to Thebes, _viâ_ Dryoskephalæ, but near
the alternative and probably much less frequented route between the two
towns by way of the Platæa-Athens pass.
(_c_) Pausanias (ix. 2, 6) says: “The trophy of the battle of Platæa
which the Greeks set up stood about fifteen stades from the city.”
It would be in accordance with Greek custom that this trophy should be
set up in that part of the field where the decisive engagement took
place. If, as I take it, it was fought just south of the hill on which
the ruined church of St Demetrion stands, a trophy placed on or near
that site would be almost exactly two miles from the town of Platæa, or
a little more than seventeen stades.
(_d_) This hypothesis as to the site of the temple receives peculiar
confirmation, as I shall show, from the account given by Herodotus of
the subsequent incidents of the battle, but it will, I think, be best
to take the order of the incidents as given by Herodotus.
In Plutarch’s life of Aristides (xi.) is a topographical detail which
would present considerable difficulty, were it not accompanied by
other details which show the absolute valuelessness of Plutarch as an
authority on the topographical question. He is speaking of the time at
which a move from the first position was contemplated: “Near Hysiæ
Kithæron is a quite ancient temple called (the shrine) of Eleusinian
Demeter and Kore.” He says further on that the rocky slope of Kithæron
meets the plain near the temple, and then adds that the Heroön of
Androkrates was there also, surrounded by a thick grove of trees.
Pausanias mentions (ix. 2, 1) a temple of Apollo among the ruins of
Hysiæ, but says not a word of any temple of Eleusinian Demeter being
found there.
But the reference to the position of the Heroön of Androkrates shows
that either Plutarch has made a great error, or that his language is
hopelessly inexact.
If latter be assumed to be the case, the temple of Demeter to which I
have referred might, I think, be described as being near what I take to
be the site of Hysiæ. It might even, owing to the height of Kithæron,
be described as underneath that mountain. As to the position of the
temple being near the edge of the ύπωρέη, it may be pointed out that
the site of the modern Kriekouki is a part of the rocky mountain-side
which projects far into the plain, but stops far short of the church of
St. Demetrion.
But even the utmost looseness of language will hardly account for the
assertion that the Heroön of Androkrates was near this temple, still
less that it was near the site of Hysiæ.
The explanation of the difficulty is, I take it, that Plutarch was
a biographer and not an historian; and consequently he may not
have thought, nay, he evidently did not think it necessary to deal
intimately with the topography of the battle. There is very little
topographical detail given by him, though as a Bœotian he had most
probably traversed one or more of the roads which cross the field. He
makes no mention of the νῆσος, either directly or indirectly:—a most
strange omission if he insisted at all on topographical detail.
There is in the passage above referred to a clause which is in direct
conflict with Herodotus’ narrative. Plutarch speaks of τὰς
ὑπωρείας ... ἄφιππα ποιούσας τὰ καταλήγοντα καὶ συγκυροῦντα τοῦ πεδίου
πρὸς τὸ ἱερόν, whereas Herodotus describes a cavalry attack as having
taken place upon this ground. Furthermore,—and this is a most important
point if Herodotus’ account of the fighting be correct,—the temple of
Demeter certainly lay on the Persian line of retreat after they had
been defeated by the Spartans; that is to say, it was almost certainly
between the place where the final action took place or began and the
Persian camp.
Again, I think that the words of Herodotus, in describing the first
phase of the second position of the Greeks as “near the Spring of
Gargaphia and the τέμενος of Androkrates the Hero, through hills of no
great height and level country,” can only mean that the τέμενος was
on the left of the Greek line; for the ἀπέδος χῶρος can only be the
plain between Platæa and the Asopos which comes from Leuktra, and this
position for the τέμενος accords with the details given by Thucydides.
How, then, the τέμενος be described as near the temple of Demeter, if
the latter was near Hysiæ?
On the question of the value of Plutarch’s evidence relative to the
battle, I agree with Colonel Leake:—
“It is scarcely worth while to advert to the particulars in which the
other ancient authors who have related this great event differ from
Herodotus; Diodorus and Plutarch lived so long afterwards that they
cannot have much weight against the testimony of the contemporary
historian. The former does not, however, deviate from it in any
important point, and the contradictions of the latter are undeserving
of much respect, as being those of a Bœotian angry with Herodotus for
having spoken freely of the disgraceful conduct of his countrymen,
and thinking no mode of exculpation so effectual as that of throwing
general discredit on the historian’s accuracy.” (“Travels in Northern
Greece,” vol. ii. p. 353.)
The movement of the Spartans was directed towards the pass on the
Platæa-Athens road. It was evidently their object to avoid as much as
possible the unimpeded ground of the plain on which the Persian cavalry
could act, and with this intent they seem to have diverged slightly
from the direct route to the pass in order to gain the northern end of
that rocky bastion of Kithæron whereon the modern Kriekouki stands,
a point at which the rocky mountain foot projects for some distance
into the plain. #SPARTANS LEAVE THE SECOND POSITION.# They would thus
take a direction S.S.E. from their position on the Asopos ridge, and
must have passed the now useless Gargaphia spring on their way.
After proceeding thus for ten stades, or about a mile and a furlong,
they waited for Amompharetos and his company, whose reluctant movement
from the late position they would be able to see from the moment that
it began. It must therefore have been near the head waters of the two
streams which run northwards on either side of the Long Ridge that this
delay took place; and either the easternmost of these streams or the
larger brook which skirts the site of Kriekouki on the west would seem
to be the river Moloeis of which Herodotus speaks. Looking northward
from that position, the highest point of the Long Ridge would rise
in front of them in the form of a flat-topped table-land, bounded on
either flank by the steep-sided stream valleys,[213] with the temple
of Eleusinian Demeter, of which Herodotus speaks, upon its summit. The
flat table-land itself formed doubtless that sacred precinct of the
goddess of which Herodotus has something more to tell. Somewhere in the
neighbourhood was the Argiopian country of which the historian speaks,
all trace of whose name and identity has long vanished into the past.
Possibly the plateau to the east of the Long Ridge bore that name in
ancient times.
It was in the position which they had thus attained that they were
fated to fight the decisive engagement by which the long-drawn struggle
was won. They never reached that rocky projection where Kriekouki now
stands.[214]
◆H. ix. 57.◆
“Those with Amompharetos joined them, and the whole of the barbarian
cavalry assailed them,” says Herodotus, in one significant sentence.
In the gathering light of the dawn the Persians beyond the Asopos had
noticed that the ridges which the Greeks had occupied for more than
a fortnight past were vacant, and had sent forward their cavalry to
overtake the retreating enemy. Amompharetos seems to have just managed
to reach the main body before the attack fell; but the reunited force
had no time to move before the cavalry was upon it. The ground on which
it stood at the time was as unfavourable as it well could be. The
bottom of the ridge lying west of Kriekouki sinks into the depression
in a long gentle slope, affording a terrain admirably suited to the
operations of the Persian cavalry; and it was on this ground that the
Spartans were obliged to make their stand. The object of the cavalry
attack was evidently to prevent the Greeks from attaining, before the
Persian infantry should have time to come up, the strong position
which the rocky slopes of Kithæron would afford. Mardonius made the
fatal mistake of supposing that the Greeks were a broken as well as a
beaten army,[215] and his sole anxiety seems to have been to render the
victory complete. Had he been able to appreciate the real circumstances
of the case, had he been content to abide by the tactics he had
employed on the previous days, the whole history of the battle might
have been changed.
◆H. ix. 59.◆
Having despatched his cavalry in pursuit of the Greeks, Mardonius lost
no time in hurrying forward his infantry across the Asopos on the
track of the retreating foe.[216] It is interesting to notice that it
was against the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans alone that his efforts were
directed, the line of retreat of the Athenians on the right wing of the
Greeks being hidden from him by the hills.[217]
It was with the Persian infantry that Mardonius led the way; but the
rest of the army followed with much speed and little order, eager to
take part in the rout of the enemy with whom they had been so long face
to face. They must have ascended the long gradual slope of the theatre
which is formed by the curve of the Asopos ridge on its north front,
and, arrived at its summit, they would see on the low ground southward
the large mass of the Lacedæmonian contingent engaged by their cavalry.
#BEGINNING THE GREAT FIGHT.#
Pausanias had no illusions as to the serious nature of the cavalry
attack, but sent an urgent message to the Athenians, who were at this
time making straight for the Island, to come to his help with all
speed.[218] The message is recorded, after the manner of Herodotus, in
what purport to be the words actually used. Without unduly insisting
upon the letter, its spirit is remarkable. The Spartans are represented
as having placed the worst construction upon the conduct of the Greek
centre in withdrawing from the position on the Asopos ridge before they
had done so themselves. And yet it will be remembered that Herodotus
expressly says that these “runaways” did not leave that position until
the hour which had been originally fixed for that movement. But here
these allies are represented as cowards and traitors to their friends.
The whole question of the conduct of the Greek centre at this stage
of the battle is an exceedingly difficult one; the only thing which
seems to be clear is that those Greeks who bore the burden and heat of
this day of decisive battle rightly or wrongly regarded them as having
yielded to a panic of fear. The condemnation was probably unjust; but
it is not possible to demonstrate conclusively that it was so.
◆H. ix. 61.◆
The Athenian help never reached the Spartans, and so they were left to
fight the battle alone. It was no small combat. Over fifty thousand
Greeks on the one side were face to face with what must have been
numerically a still more formidable force—a force which may have been
indeed several times their own in number. The Persian cavalry adhered
to the tactics which had been so effective on the previous days,
avoiding close fighting, and making the assault with arrows and missile
weapons from behind a barrier of shields. Many of the Lacedæmonians
fell, and many more were wounded in this unequal combat, in which
they must have been able to inflict but little damage on their mobile
opponents. The sacrifices were unfavourable; and so the Greeks did not
take the offensive. Pausanias must have been wholly in agreement
with the sacrifices, knowing well, it may be apprehended, that his only
chance of salvation lay in offering a firm front to the attack, and in
preventing the assailant horse from finding its way through the line
of Greek shields. The Persian infantry was, of course, by this time
aiding the assault, and it must indeed have been their shields which
were set up to form the extemporized stockade. This went on for a long
time. Pausanias was probably waiting till the press of the enemy became
sufficiently great to deprive their front ranks of that mobility from
which the Greek hoplite had most to fear. When this state of things
supervened he let his men loose upon the foe, after offering up a
prayer to Hera, which that goddess answered by rendering the sacrifices
favourable. It is probable that the attention which the Greek commander
paid to sacrificial omens was due rather to their effect on the minds
and courage of the common soldiers than to any undue trust which he
placed in them as indications of the tactical policy to be pursued.
◆H. ix. 62.◆
The Tegeans were the first to attack the mass of barbarians opposed to
them, and after an interval the Lacedæmonians did the same. They first
had to break through the barricade of shields; then the battle became
a fierce hand-to-hand struggle. Herodotus bears testimony to the fact
that the Persians were no whit inferior in courage, but being without
heavy defensive armour, they were no match for the most experienced
and best drilled infantry in Greece. ◆Cf. ix. 62, _ad fin._◆ They
evidently made fierce efforts to break through the iron-clad line of
the enemy, charging singly and in groups. But it was all of no
avail; not even the most desperate courage could compensate for the
immense disparity of weapons, and the men who had “made the tour of
Asia on foot,” and had fought and conquered the numerous peoples of
the East, found themselves utterly unable to cope with an army drawn
from one small corner of the Western Continent. Mardonius had made a
terrible miscalculation when he launched his comparatively light-armed
infantry against the Greek hoplites. He paid for his mistake with his
own life. ◆H. ix. 63.◆ Surrounded by a picked #FLIGHT OF THE PERSIANS.#
body of Persians, he was himself in the midst of the _mêlée_, and
was naturally marked out by the Greeks for attack. At last he fell, but
not until the assailants had paid dearly for their success.
[Illustration: PLATÆA: PANORAMA FROM SCENE OF LAST FIGHT.
1. Hills North of Kopais.
2. Mount Kandili (Mekistos) in Eubœa.
3. Hills between Kopais and Euripus.
4. Mount Dirphys in Eubœa.
5. Valley of Stream A 4.
6. Temenos of Demeter.
7. Valley of Stream A 5.
8. The Plateau.
[_to face page_ 502.
]
It is not difficult at the present day to follow the course of this
struggle.[219] After their commander’s fall the Persians gave way, and
were pushed down the gradual slope towards the stream valleys which
ran on either side of the precinct of Demeter,[220] affording them
direct lines of retreat to their camp. The stream of fugitives would
divide where the rise of the ground towards the precinct begins, and
would naturally take the easier and quicker routes afforded by these
valleys. ◆H. ix. 65.◆ They fled in disorder to their camp and stockade.
Herodotus notes with pious emphasis the fact that, though the fight
had raged near the temple, none of the sacrilegious destroyers of
her temple at Eleusis fell within the consecrated ground about this
shrine of Demeter. On more materialistic grounds it would be extremely
unlikely that men flying for their lives in panic flight should ascend
the hill whereon the sanctuary and its precinct stood, when easier
avenues of retreat were ready for them on either side of it.[221]
Such were the fortunes of what had been the Greek right wing. It is
now necessary to follow the movements of the Athenians who had been
stationed on the left of the second position.
It is clear that the two days’ cavalry attack had driven back the Greek
left from the Asopos; and, in the final phase of its tenure of the
second position, the army must have been massed on the summit of the
Asopos ridge; so that the left would be at no great distance from the
right.
◆H. ix. 54.◆
The Lacedæmonian delay in starting upon the movement of retirement
seems to have aroused suspicion in the minds of the Athenians,
if Herodotus’ narrative is to be believed. He does not mention any
specific cause for the distrust in the present instance, other than the
delay caused by the obstinacy of Amompharetos, attributing it rather to
general grounds: “They knew the Lacedæmonians had a way of intending
one thing and saying another.” The conduct of the Athenians is not
consistent with the tale of suspicion; and the tale itself probably
does something less than justice to the Athenian motives for remaining
at their post of danger. It is noticeable that when they do move they
take a wholly different line to the Spartans, showing that they did not
suspect them of any intention of deserting the army, and consequently
the only conceivable motive they can have had in waiting must have been
the desire that the withdrawal should be covered, if necessary, by a
sufficient number of the Greek army. As, however, the Spartans started
just before daylight, and the Persians did not immediately discover the
movement, the Athenians evidently thought that there would be no danger
in carrying out the original design; so, while their allies made their
way towards the passes, they took the easiest route to the Island.
They apparently started on their movement about the same time as the
Lacedæmonians. Their course can be traced with fair certainty. From
their position on the Asopos ridge north of the ruins of the church of
St John, they did not take the direct line for the Island, which would
have led them past the site of that modern sanctuary, but descended to
the western slope of the ridge to the Platæan plain.[222]
On reaching it they would pass up the course of that stream which
Herodotus identifies with the upper Asopos,[223] and would be marching
in a straight line for the Island. #ATHENIANS AND MEDIZED
GREEKS.# The route adopted was indeed but little longer than the
direct route, and would be easier, as it lay along the level plain. ◆H
ix. 60.◆ It must have been at some point in the course of this march
that the message from Pausanias reached them, announcing the attack
of the Persian cavalry, and urgently entreating them to come to his
assistance, or at any rate to send their bowmen to his help. ◆H. ix.
61.◆ On receiving this the Athenians diverged from the line of march,
and started towards the place where the Spartans were being sore
pressed by the cavalry. Shortly after this change of direction had
taken place they were attacked by the medized Greeks who were with the
Persian force, and were thus prevented from assisting the Spartans. The
circumstance that this fight seems to have been out of sight of that
part of the Greek army which was at Platæa, renders it probable that
the Athenians had turned from the plain along the line of the modern
track which leads from Leuktra to Dryoskephalæ, and that the medized
Greeks, coming up over the Asopos ridge in the neighbourhood of the
church of St. John, overtook them in the hollow near the springs of
Apotripi, where a fierce engagement took place. ◆H. ix. 67.◆ Although
the rest of the medized Greeks voluntarily played the coward on this
occasion, the Bœotians showed that they had not espoused the Persian
cause to no purpose, and for a long time maintained an obstinate
struggle, losing three hundred of their best and bravest in the battle.
In the end they had to give way, and fled in disorder to Thebes.
◆H. ix. 68.◆
The whole Persian army was now in full flight, save the cavalry, which
made a brave and, for the time being, a successful effort to cover
the retreat, though it could not prevent the pursuing Greeks from
inflicting severe losses upon the fugitives.
◆H. ix. 69.◆
It was at this time, says Herodotus, that the Greeks at Platæa first
heard that a battle had taken place, and that Pausanias and his men
had won the day. They must have spent an anxious morning on that rocky
slope near the Heræon, not venturing to move, because uncertain what
they ought to do, and knowing nothing of their friends save that they
were not at the Island, where, according to arrangement, they
should have been. They may perhaps have seen the Athenians moving
along the foot of the Asopos ridge shortly after dawn, and the Persian
army as, a little later, it streamed across that ridge, must have been
plainly visible; but from the moment when the Athenians disappeared
into the hollow near the springs of Apotripi, until they received this
message, all they can have seen or heard must have been the clouds of
dust rising from two points in the depression beneath the northern
ridges, and the confused and distant noise of an engagement. They seem
to have played an inglorious, if not a cowardly, part in sitting still
while these things were going on; but if it be borne in mind that
the little they did see of the movements of their friends and of the
enemy on the fatal morning was wholly inexplicable by the orders they
themselves had received, or by anything that had happened within their
knowledge, their inaction may seem natural. Herodotus is not inclined
to put the best construction on the conduct of those who were drawn
largely from those Greek states which had advocated what seemed to him
the cowardly blunder of confining the defence to the Isthmus.
The receipt of the message, therefore, put them for the first
time in possession of certain information as to what had happened
since they had parted from their allies on the Asopos ridge on the
preceding night. The news, such as it was, was good; and they started
immediately with a view to take part in the victory. The details which
Herodotus gives of their movements afford conspicuous proof of his
remarkable excellence as a topographer, though they also illustrate his
limitations as a military historian.
The Greeks at Platæa divided into two bodies; and from the description
which the historian gives of the lines of advance which they adopted
there can be little doubt that, though he does not mention the fact,
they marched respectively on the two places where fighting was going
on. ◆H. ix. 69.◆ The advance was hurried and disorderly. The one body
was composed of the Corinthians and those with them—the right centre.
#THE GREEK CENTRE.# It took a line along the rocky slope of Kithæron
and through the hills, along the upper way leading straight to
the temple of Demeter. Its course was evidently along the rocky slope
at the south end of the ridge[224] which intervenes between Platæa
and the Island, over the head waters of the streams which form the
Island,[225] and then over the open and unimpeded ridges towards the
temple.[226] This division of the Greek centre seems to have reached
the Lacedæmonians in safety, and may even have taken part in the last
stages of the struggle near the temple. The other division, composed of
Megareans, Phliasians, and the rest of the Greek left centre, was not
so fortunate. ◆H. ix. 69.◆ They took “the most level way through the
plain.” Herodotus is evidently under the impression that they also were
making for the temple of Eleusinian Demeter; but the course they took,
which must have been along the base of the ridge between Platæa and the
Island,[227] together with the fact that they came across the Bœotian
cavalry at a time at which it cannot have been covering the retreat
of the medized Greeks,—at a time, that is to say, at which they were
still engaged with the Athenians,—suggests that they aimed at giving
assistance to their friends in that part of the field, and that the
Bœotian cavalry sought, not in vain, to prevent them from so doing. The
conjecture is further supported by Herodotus’ statement that they were
“near the enemy” when the Theban horse caught sight of them; and that
cavalry must presumably have been engaged at the time in battle with
the Athenians. Their disorderly and hurried advance cost them dear. The
Thebans cut them to pieces, killing six hundred of them, and driving
the rest in headlong rout towards Kithæron.
This was the only disaster which befell any section of the Greek army
on that eventful day. No doubt the Athenians and Lacedæmonians suffered
severely—more severely than the Greeks ever admitted; but in any case
they paid but a cheap price for their great victory.
◆H. ix. 63.◆
Herodotus is fully aware that it was to the superiority of
their weapons that the Greeks owed their success. “The main cause of
the Persian defeat was the fact that their equipment was devoid of
defensive armour. They sought, exposed as they were, to compete with
heavy armed infantry.”
The enthusiasm with which he hails the victory is rare with him.
Salamis left him comparatively cold; but of Platæa he says that there
“Pausanias the son of Kleombrotos the son of Anaxandrides gained the
most glorious victory on record.”[228]
The historian was right in thus attributing to Pausanias and his
Lacedæmonians the chief credit of the victory. The decisive conflict
was fought beneath the shadow of the temple of Eleusinian Demeter.