a situation and such a design. They had not hitherto ventured to
attack the Persian. They were now forced to do so. Not until the fleet
at Aphetæ had been rendered incapable of making a movement down the
Euripus could the Greek fleet venture to meet the danger from the
south. And so the first attack took place that very night. Herodotus’
account of the action is a curious one,—that of a man who had heard
talk of certain naval technicalities without understanding them. These
very Greeks, who have been described as having, a few days before, fled
to Chalkis in consequence of the capture of three of their vessels,
and as having contemplated flight to mid Greece at the mere sight of
the Persian fleet, are now represented as making a quasi-experimental
attack on the foe they so much dreaded, from motives of purely
professional interest. “They wished to make trial of the Persian mode
of fighting, and to practise the manœuvre of cutting the line.” [141]
From the point of view of military history, the account of the first
engagement, as given by Diodorus, conveys a much stronger impression
of accuracy than that of Herodotus. ◆H. xi. 12.◆ Both represent the
Greeks as the attacking party; but Diodorus gives an excellent tactical
motive for their taking the offensive. A council of war being held,
all the commanders save Themistocles were in favour of remaining on
the defensive. He, however, persuaded them to adopt his plan of the
offensive by pointing out to them the advantage they would enjoy as
the attacking party, in that they, with their whole force prepared
for battle, would be able to choose their own time for attack, and
must take unawares an enemy whose fleet was not concentrated at one
anchorage.
This account is strongly supported by the fact that there is no single
harbour at that extremity of the Magnesian peninsula which could
accommodate more than a fraction of the Persian fleet, so that it would
necessarily be distributed over a considerable extent of coast-line.
On the general course of the engagement the two accounts are in
agreement. The Greeks, as might be expected, gained at first some
considerable success;—Herodotus says they took thirty ships; but,
when the whole of the enemy’s fleet had collected, the combat became
obstinate and indecisive, until the fall of night put an end to it.
◆H. viii. 12.◆
It was on the evening of this day that the second of those storms
took place which were destined to be so fatal to the Persian fleet.
#STORM AT THE HOLLOWS OF EUBŒA.# The quarter from which it came is not
expressly stated by Herodotus; but his accounts of its effects on the
north and south of Eubœa respectively leave no doubt that it was a gale
from the south or S.S.W.[142] At Aphetæ it caused considerable
alarm but little damage, the only effect being that the wreckage from
the battle of the afternoon was thrust in upon the Persian fleet.
In the South Euripus there was a very different tale to tell. The
Persian flying squadron, which had started from Aphetæ the day before,
appears to have been caught by the gale immediately after it had
rounded the southern Cape of Eubœa.[143] The result was a disaster
hardly less great than that which had happened at the Sepiad strand.
The whole two hundred were driven into those bays at the south end of
the west coast of Eubœa, which the ancients knew under the name of the
“Hollows.” Not a ship escaped. The destruction was complete.[144]
The effect of this disaster on the general course of the war can
hardly be over-estimated. It was not merely that the numerical
loss was great, but the position of the fleet at Artemisium must have
become exceedingly critical, had this squadron occupied the channel
south of Chalkis. Under such circumstances it is probable that the
decisive battle of the naval campaign would have been fought near that
place.[145]
◆19th day.◆
It was probably early in the night of the eighteenth day that the
disaster at the Hollows took place. The report of it was promptly
carried to Chalkis, at which place the fifty-three Attic vessels must
have ridden out the storm, since a gale from the south raises a very
ugly sea in the broader parts of the Euripus. It is evident that the
Greeks had established a regular signalling system on this coast; and
it is probable that it was by this means that the news reached the
squadron at Chalkis, which immediately started for Artemisium. ◆H.
viii. 14.◆ Herodotus’ language leaves it a somewhat open question as to
whether these ships brought the news to the fleet. All that is actually
stated is that the news arrived at Artemisium about the same time as
the fifty-three.
The Persian fleet, ignorant, no doubt, of the disaster in South Eubœa,
intended to bide quiet until some report of the two hundred reached it.
For the earlier part of the day it remained undisturbed. The Greeks
had probably found out to their dismay on the previous evening that
they were not strong enough to tackle the naval force which remained
at Aphetæ with any hope of decisive success. ◆H. viii. 14.◆ But the
arrival of the fifty-three Attic vessels, which can hardly have taken
place before midday, put new heart into them; and that afternoon they
attacked the Cilician contingent of the Persian fleet, inflicting
considerable damage.[146]
#THIRD SEA-FIGHT AT ARTEMISIUM.#
The Persian position, both at Thermopylæ and Artemisium, was at this
moment very precarious. The army had conspicuously failed to force the
pass, and the fleet had, so far, confined itself to the defensive.
◆Cf. H. viii. 15, _ad init._◆ Doubtless, urgent messages were coming
from Thermopylæ to Aphetæ, commanding that the strait should be forced
at any price. ◆20th day.◆ The Persian commanders, therefore, afraid
to defer longer the attack, took the offensive. It may well be that
the disadvantages of the position at Aphetæ from a defensive point of
view, which had been clearly demonstrated in the engagements of the
two previous days, had something to do with determining their course
of action. The battle which ensued was an obstinate one. It certainly
was not favourable to the Greeks, even less favourable, perhaps,
than is represented. ◆H. viii. 16.◆ The losses on both sides were
large, those of the Persians being the greater. It seems, however,
that, over and above the vessels actually destroyed, ◆H. viii. 18.◆
a large number were considerably damaged, and that the Athenian
contingent suffered especially in this respect. ◆H. viii. 19, 20.◆
The account which Herodotus gives of the events which took place
after the battle leaves it uncertain whether he considered that the
subsequent retirement from Artemisium was due primarily to the losses
incurred in the previous engagement, or to the receipt of the news
of the disaster at Thermopylæ. ◆Diod. xi. 13.◆ Diodorus mentions the
losses, but ascribes the retreat entirely to the news from Thermopylæ.
That disaster must have taken place early in the afternoon: the news
of it must have reached the fleet at Artemisium, by means of the
despatch-boat, very early in the evening. ◆H. viii. 21.◆ According to
Herodotus, the retreat had been discussed before the despatch-boat
arrived.[147] That it had been discussed may well have been the case;
but that it had been decided, and, above all, that Themistocles had
consented, to retire that very night, before the receipt of the news
from Thermopylæ, is doubtless untrue. Herodotus’ assertion incurs all
the more suspicion from the fact that he uses it as a peg whereon
to hang a tale illustrative of the disaster which is sure to befall
those who refuse to obey the advice of oracles. The Eubœans, he says,
had disregarded an oracle of Bakis, which had urged them to place their
sheep in security, in view of the coming war, and were now, on the
approaching retirement of the Greek fleet, in a position of extreme
difficulty as to the best means of saving their property. Themistocles’
proposal for dealing with the situation was simple and effective. He
said, “Kill the sheep: kindle fires: roast them and put them on board,
since it is better that they fall into our hands than into those of the
enemy. As to getting the fleet away in safety, I will look to that.”
He also hinted that he had a plan, which he did not then disclose, for
detaching the Ionians and Carians from the Persian fleet. So the other
Greek commanders looked to the sheep and the fires, while he devised
measures for retreat.
No tale could be more peculiarly illustrative of the wide distinction
which must be drawn between the facts of history as stated by Herodotus
and the motives which he propounds for certain courses of action.
It is doubtless perfectly true that a council of war was held that
evening, at which it was decided to retire from Artemisium; and that
Themistocles concurred in that decision. But, on the question of
motive, it may be taken as almost equally certain that this decision
was not come to in consequence of what had happened in the engagement
of that afternoon, but by reason of the news which had come from
Thermopylæ, which rendered the further presence of the fleet at
Artemisium not merely unnecessary, but, from the point of view of the
Greek commanders, unadvisable. In actual fact it may be regarded as
exceedingly doubtful whether Xerxes could have advanced southwards
without the aid of the fleet commissariat; but the idea uppermost in
the minds of the Greek commanders would be the extreme danger of such a
move on his part.
#GREEKS RETIRE FROM ARTEMISIUM.#
It is not difficult to see that the building of the fires that evening
on the Artemisium shore had probably little if any connection
with the provisioning of the fleet, but was part of the plan by which
Themistocles proposed to secure a safe withdrawal from the position.
The Persians were evidently to be deluded by the idea that the Greeks
had no intention of deserting their station; and the ruse employed to
attain this end would naturally suggest itself. It has been again and
again employed under similar circumstances.
The retreat began early in the night, the ships taking their departure
in order according to their position at the anchorage. ◆H. viii. 21.◆
The fact that the Corinthians led the way, and that the Athenians were
last to start, may merely signify that they formed respectively the
extreme left and right of the line; but, in view of the attitude of the
former at this time, it may be suspected that Herodotus had special
motives for mentioning the order of retirement.
Themistocles, with a fast sailing division, formed the rearguard. He
did not, apparently, intend so much to cover the retreat, as to visit
the various watering-places on the shores of the Euripus, and to affix
there a quasi-manifesto to the Ionian Greeks in the Persian fleet,
calling upon them to abstain, in so far as possible, from attacking
their fellow-countrymen. ◆H. viii. 22.◆ His object was, says Herodotus,
either to detach the Ionians from their allegiance to Xerxes, or to
make the king suspicious of their loyalty.
The Persians did not attempt to pursue the Greek fleet. ◆H. viii.
23.◆ The latter had, indeed, got a long start before its departure
was discovered. A Greek from North Eubœa brought the news to Aphetæ;
but his information was distrusted, and ships were sent across the
strait to discover whether it was true or not. This must have taken
place during the night, for it was at sunrise that the Persian fleet,
after receiving the report of the scouting vessels, moved across the
strait to Artemisium. At midday the Persians moved to Histiæa, where
they appear to have spent some time in ravaging the district in its
neighbourhood.
It is probable that the news of the disaster in the South Euripus
deterred the Persians from any attempt at pursuit. Nothing is said as
to how or when the news reached them; but it may be regarded as certain
that the tidings, which had arrived at Artemisium twenty-four
hours before, had in the interval made their way across the strait.
It was now possible for the Persian fleet to communicate by sea with
the captors of Thermopylæ; and it may easily be imagined that no time
was lost in sending supplies to the army. In connection with these
communications Herodotus relates a tale to the effect that Xerxes
invited the sailors to view the scene of battle, and took certain
ridiculously ineffective measures to conceal from them the magnitude of
the losses suffered. That the king did attempt to conceal the greatness
of the price he had paid for the capture of the pass may well have been
the case; but whether Greek tradition, with its marked tendency to
bring into high relief the childishness and foolishness of the Oriental
monarch, truly represented the measures taken to attain this end, may
well be doubted.
In Herodotus’ story of the great war the tale of Artemisium is perhaps
the least satisfactory of all the detailed accounts of the various acts
of the drama. It is not merely complicated by a chronological error
of considerable magnitude, the effect of which is to render the most
important part of the story, as it stands, incredible; but it is very
seriously distorted, from a historical point of view, by the addition
of material of a more than doubtful character, inserted with intent to
heighten the effect of the services of Athens at this critical time.
But the chronological error does not destroy the historical value of
his narrative, though it impairs it. Had Herodotus told his tale after
his usual manner, the error might not have crept into it. But just in
this part of his history he has tried to treat events in a somewhat
more business-like fashion than usual, and the attempt has not met with
complete success. Nature had not made him an arithmetician; and even
had it done so, his business-like method is sufficiently unbusinesslike
to render his mistake obscure until the story has been analyzed.
How far he is personally responsible for the Athenian bias of his
version, it is not possible to say at the present day. #HERODOTUS’
ACCOUNT OF ARTEMISIUM.# He was, no doubt, sufficiently philo-Athenian
to wish to place the undoubtedly great services of Athens to the
national cause at this time in the highest possible relief; and
he was sufficiently ignorant of strategical considerations to render
it probable that he could not detect in the version current at Athens
those fictitious additions, whose falsity must have become apparent
to any one who could appreciate the main lines of the strategy of
this part of the war. Had he understood not merely that there was a
connection between Thermopylæ and Artemisium, but that connection
was of so intimate a nature as to render the maintenance of the pass
absolutely dependent on the maintenance of the strait, he would have
treated with suspicion those repeated assertions of an intention on the
part of the commanders of the fleet to withdraw from their station,
or would have reduced them to a position of far less prominence in
the story, as being, what they no doubt were, mere indications of the
spirit which animated the irresponsible mass of those who formed the
crews of the Peloponnesian contingents.
And yet, in so far as can now be judged, his tale of Artemisium,—freed
from a chronological error for the correction of which the author
supplies the means, and with the essentially Athenian portions of it
reduced to their proper relief in the story,—is a reliable history of
this important period of the Great War.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII.
The Parallel Journals of Thermopylæ and Artemisium Reconstructed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
No. | Events at | Events at Artemisium. | Approximate time
of | Thermopylæ. | | of day.
day.| | |
----+------------------+---------------------------+------------------
| | |
12 | | Persian fleet leaves | Early morning.
| | Therma. |
| | Persian fleet arrives at | Evening.
| | Sepiad strand. |
| | Capture of Greek scouting | Probably before
| | vessels by Persian | midday.
| | advanced squadron. |
| | Greek fleet at |
| | Artemisium. |
| | Greek fleet receives | Evening, probably
| | news from Skiathos | late.
| | of the loss of the three|
| | vessels. |
| | |
13 | Persian army | First storm begins. |
| reaches Malis. | Wreck of part of Persian |
| | fleet at Sepiad strand. |
| | Greek fleet retires or is | Probably early
| | driven to inner strait | morning.
| | (Chalkis?). |
| | |
14 | Persian army | Storm continues. |
| inactive before| Persian fleet at Sepiad |
| Thermopylæ. | strand. |
| | Greek fleet in inner |
| | strait. |
| | Report of Persian |
| | disaster reaches Greek |
| | fleet. |
| | Greek fleet moves |
| | north [?] |
| | |
15 | Persian army | Storm continues. |
| inactive before| Fleets as on 14th day. |
| Thermopylæ. | |
| | |
16 | Persian army | Persian fleet moves to | Arrived early in
| still inactive.| and arrives at Aphetæ. | afternoon.
| | Greek fleet moves back |
| | to Artemisium. |
| | Greek fleet captures 15 |
| | Persian vessels. |
| | Greek commanders consult | Probably evening.
| | about retirement from |
| | Artemisium. |
| | |
17 | Persian army | Greek commanders on | Morning [?]
| still inactive.| Themistocles’ persuasion|
| | determine to remain at |
| | Artemisium. |
| | Persians despatch squadron| By daylight.
| | to circumnavigate |
| | Eubœa. |
| | |
18 | Persian army | Persians review their |
| makes first | fleet. |
| attack on | Skyllias carries news of | During the
| Thermopylæ. | the despatch of the | review.
| | 200 to the Greek fleet. | Arrived at
| | | Artemisium in
| | | the afternoon.
| | Greek fleet engages | Late in
| | Persian fleet at Aphetæ.| afternoon.
| | Second storm begins. | Early in evening.
| | Wreck of the 200 Persian | Early in the
| | vessels in the Hollows | night.
| | of Eubœa. |
| | Fifty-three Attic vessels |
| | at Chalkis. |
| | |
19 | Second attack on | Both fleets inactive. | Earlier part of
| Thermopylæ. | | day.
| | The 53 Attic vessels join | Earlier than the
| | the Greek fleet. | late afternoon.
| | Greek fleet receives news | About same time
| | of the wreck of the 200.| as above.
| | United Greek fleet attacks| Late afternoon.
| | Cilician contingent of |
| | Persian fleet. |
| | |
20 | Third and | Persian fleet takes |
| successful | offensive against Greek |
| attack on | fleet. |
| Thermopylæ. | General engagement. |
| | Greek commanders consult |
| | as to retirement. |
| | News of disaster at |
| | Thermopylæ reaches |
| | Greek fleet. |
| | Greek fleet retires from | Night.
| | Artemisium. |
----+------------------+---------------------------+------------------
CHAPTER IX.
SALAMIS.
Thermopylæ taken, and Artemisium deserted, the way southwards, both by
land and sea, was now open to the invading force. No doubt the general
plan of future operations was discussed in the Persian council of
war. It may be that, owing to the presence of the Spartan Demaratos,
some faint echo of the discussion reached Greek ears. It may be, too,
that Herodotus’ story of the interview of Demaratos and Achæmenes
with Xerxes after the capture of Thermopylæ contains some hint of
the general lines which it followed. According to his tale, the main
question was whether a part of the fleet should create a diversion
against Sparta in South Peloponnese, or whether such a division of the
naval forces might be undesirable. Achæmenes was strongly in favour of
keeping the fleet together and crushing the Greeks by mere weight of
numbers; and Xerxes decided in favour of this plan. It is needless to
say that the story cannot be taken _au pied de la lettre_. In its main
lines it may be true; in one of its details it contains what is almost
certainly an anachronism. That the desperate defence of the pass may
have suggested to some members of the council of war the advisability
of taking measures to distract the attention of Sparta from the general
defence is extremely likely. Herodotus puts the suggestion in the mouth
of Demaratos, who is also represented as proposing a way in which his
plan could be carried out—by the occupation of Kythera, a large island
off the mouth of the Laconian gulf. #ROUTE FROM THERMOPYLÆ.# “Chilon,”
he said, “who was the wisest man among us, asserted that it
would be better for Sparta were the island not above water but below
it, because he always expected that something of the kind which I am
describing to you would come from it, not with special reference to
your expedition, but because he dreaded all invasions alike.” Demaratos
then proposed to the king that he should make this island the base of
operations against the Lacedæmonian territory.
So runs the tale in Herodotus.
The mention of Kythera in this connection, taken in conjunction with
the evidence which this part of the history affords of its having been
composed during the early years of the Peloponnesian war, suggests that
Herodotus has probably attributed to Demaratos in 480 a strategical
proposal which was much discussed in Athens at the time at which he
wrote, ◆T. iv. 53, _ff_.◆ and which was actually carried out a few
years later when Nikias in 424 occupied this island.
The reliable part of Herodotus’ story is probably confined to the
raising of the question whether or not some diversion against Sparta
should be attempted. Into this account Herodotus has inserted a detail
borrowed from a similar strategic question of his own day.
The way in which the advance by sea should be conducted being settled,
it was necessary to decide upon the line or lines of advance by land.
From Thermopylæ to the Attic border the Greek military highway is
defined with singular clearness by the nature of the country. Œta forms
the first barrier to be passed. The question of the utility of the
Asopos ravine has been already discussed. For the purposes of a large
army it is impracticable. Infantry could only pass through it in single
file; and even a slight accident, or a slight rise in the stream, would
block it. For a lightly equipped column with numbers not so large as
to make it impossible for it to live on the country in its passage of
the Dorian and Phocian plains, it would be a practicable route under
circumstances such as existed at the time. Little opposition was to be
expected; and it would be merely the question of a day or two before a
junction could be effected with the main army, which would reach
Parapotamii where the Phocian plain ends and the Bœotian begins, by the
great route by way of Hyampolis. Besides the Asopos ravine there were
three other routes from Thermopylæ southwards. The first of these led
out of the pass up a steep ascent of one hour, and crossed the range of
Œta, by way of the modern Boudenitza, to the ancient Elatæa. It is a
mere mountain path, a way which an army without a heavy baggage train
might adopt in an emergency, or by which a force defeated at Thermopylæ
might secure its retreat. The second left the coast road near Thronion
and passed up the valley of the Boagrios river, at the head of which it
crossed the mountain ridge, and descended to Elatæa. It was certainly
of importance in later times, though not fitted for the passage of
a heavy baggage train, and difficult for cavalry. Hence, probably,
there is no trace of its having been used by the Persian army on this
occasion. The route by Atalanta and Hyampolis is admirably adapted
for the advance of a large force. It presents but few difficulties
to cavalry or baggage-train, and affords but few facilities to the
defence. In this very part of his history Herodotus, in his excursus on
the pre-existing relations between the Thessalians and Phocians, gives
an example which shows pretty clearly that it was the route by which
incursions of the Thessalian cavalry had to be feared. In an undated,
but presumably recent war between the two peoples, ◆H. viii. 28.◆ the
Phocians had inflicted a severe defeat on the raiding cavalry in the
pass near Hyampolis. They had dug a trench across it, filled it with
large pottery, and covered it with earth. Into this the Thessalian
horsemen had fallen, and had incurred signal disaster.
The three minor routes join this major route at Parapotamii. There
is, however, a loop of the main road, which, starting from Hyampolis,
passes over a ridge to Orchomenos and joins the main road again outside
the mountain gate at Parapotamii.
#ROUTE THROUGH BŒOTIA.#
Near this point in Mid Bœotia the invader from the north is faced by
a barrier of a composite character, which, though not homogeneous, is
one of the most effective in the whole of Greece. From the west
the spurs of Helicon came down to the marshy expanse of Lake Kopais,
a hundred square miles of shallow reed-covered mere, when the winter
rains had raised it to its full height. From Kopais to the Euripus
extended a narrow mountainous region, never rising to any great height,
but exceedingly rough and broken, and affording no way of passage
through it better than a mere track.
The consequence of this natural formation of the country was that
an invader from the north was confined in his advance to the narrow
breadth of land between Helicon and Kopais. So this mere ribbon of
country became the great battle-ground of Greece, and on it the fate
of the land was again and again decided at Chæronea, Koronea, and
elsewhere. This part of the great northern route may be said to end at
Thebes, which town, like Larisa and Lamia, was not merely a point where
important roads converged, but also a point which must be passed in
the passage from the North. To it came the great road which has just
been described, and also a hardly less important road, which ran from
Chalkis on the Eastern sea, and was continued through it to Kreusis
on the Corinthian Gulf. Thebes was thus one of the great strategic
positions in Greece.
Xerxes’ main object after taking Thermopylæ was to strike at Attica.
Two minor objects had to be attained by the way; the punishment of the
Phocians, and the plunder of Delphi.
The Phocians were the only people in the north, so Herodotus says,
who did not medize. The Bœotians, wavering if not disloyal before,
doubtless medized _en masse_ after Thermopylæ had shown them the
insincerity of the Council at the Isthmus with regard to the defence
of the north. It is difficult to account for the Phocian attitude. ◆H.
viii. 30.◆ Herodotus says they were simply actuated by the desire to
take the opposite side to the Thessalians. It is possible that they
dared not trust to the mercy of the Persian, seeing they had taken part
in the defence of Thermopylæ. Besides, their own deadly foes were in
the enemy’s camp. Whatever their motive was, ◆H. viii. 30, _ad
fin._◆ they took the moral ground of refusing to be traitors to their
fatherland, and rejected the offer of the Thessalians to save them at a
price.
The first step in the march south which Herodotus describes is the
invasion of Phocis. ◆H. viii. 31.◆ A body of troops, under the guidance
of the Thessalians, made their way into Doris, that dreary little
upland plain at the head of the Kephissos basin. The route taken
must have been by the Asopos defile. Doris was left unharmed. It had
medized; and, besides, the Thessalians intervened on its behalf.
Its poverty may have had something to do with its salvation on this
occasion.[148]
From Doris the invaders passed into Phocis. There is no natural
boundary between the two plains; and the records of the history of
this region, dim though they are, point to a frequent shifting of the
frontier. The Phocians had one retreat to which they could always
resort; and, before the invasion was on them, they took to the heights
of Parnassus, whose great humped mass rises more than seven thousand
five hundred feet above the plain. It was evidently the accustomed
refuge of the race. They had adopted the same plan at the time of the
undated Thessalian attack on their country.
◆H. viii. 32.◆
The actual place of refuge on this occasion was Tithorea, not
apparently at this time the city which it became later, but a strong
natural position, which could be easily defended. #PERSIAN RAID ON
DELPHI.# Many of them, however, had made their way to Amphissa, at
the head of the Krissæan plain, not far from Delphi, passing thither,
doubtless, through Dorian territory by way of the direct pass through
the mountains from Kytinion to Amphissa, which is the southern
continuation of the Thermopylæ-Delphi route by way of the Asopos ravine.
The destruction which the Persians wrought in Phocis was complete
in so far as the plain was concerned. Its cities were plundered and
destroyed; and the great oracular shrine at Abæ, close to Hyampolis,
was robbed of its treasures and burnt to the ground.
At Parapotamii the plunderers from the plain would meet with the main
force, which must have come round by the Atalanta route, to which the
destruction of Abæ and Hyampolis may presumably be attributed.[149] It
was from this point that a flying column was sent to attack Delphi,
while the mass of the army held on its way through Bœotia. The route
followed in the march to Delphi must have been the celebrated “divided
way” (σχίστη ὁδός), made famous in the myth of Œdipus, ◆H. viii. 35.◆
for Herodotus mentions that they passed by Daulis and left Parnassus on
their right. The object of this expedition was to seize the immensely
valuable offerings at the great shrine, and especially those of Crœsus,
the Lydian king.
The element of the supernatural plays so large a part in the tale of
the adventures of this band of plunderers, that it is impossible to say
with certainty what really happened. Some catastrophe overtook them in
the immediate neighbourhood of Delphi itself; and the very remarkable
physical characteristics of the neighbourhood of the town, together
with the story in Herodotus divested of its supernatural element,
render it possible to hazard a conjecture as to what was the actual
nature of this catastrophe.
Delphi stood on a mere shelf of rock where the south slope of Parnassus
sinks into a narrow cleft-like valley more than three thousand feet
deep. On the north a perpendicular cliff of several hundred feet in
height overhangs the site, and continues both east of it towards
Amphissa until it meets the valley which comes south from that town;
and also westward, towards the modern Aráchova, some two hours distant.
South of the town the ground falls with great steepness towards the
bottom of the Pleistos valley, two thousand five hundred feet below.
◆H. viii. 36.◆
On the news of the approach of the Persians some of the inhabitants
of Delphi fled to Amphissa, in whose strong acropolis, commanding the
direct road from Kytinion and the north, some of the Phocian refugees
had shut themselves. Others, however, had taken refuge in the Corycian
cave and on the summit of the cliffs above the town; and it is to these
latter that the quasi-supernatural disaster which overtook the Persians
must be attributed. The latter, coming from the direction of Aráchova,
arrived at the temple of Pronaia Athene, which lay outside and west of
the sacred precinct, beyond the ravine down which the stream from the
Castalian spring makes its way. ◆Cf. H. viii. 39.◆ At this point the
road would pass under the cliffs, and doubtless the refugees on their
summit rained a shower of rocks on the advancing Persian band, who fled
in disorder. Nothing is said about the number of the band, but, as it
was on a mere plundering raid, it was probably not large.[150]
The war had now reached its most critical stage.
On the return of the fleet from Artemisium, the Athenians discovered
the desertion which had led to the disaster at Thermopylæ.
◆H. viii. 40.◆
“They intended to call a council to consider the situation, since their
expectation had been falsified; for they supposed that they would find
the Peloponnesians in full force in Bœotia awaiting the barbarians.
#STRATEGIC SITUATION.# They found nothing of the kind; nay, they heard
that they were fortifying the Isthmus to the Peloponnese, making
its salvation and defence their one great object, and letting the rest
of Greece take its chance.”
They had evidently supposed that some large force was on its way to
Thermopylæ at the time when the disaster took place, and had expected
to find, at any rate, an army in Bœotia. What they actually discovered
was that the Peloponnesians were fortifying the Isthmus, and were
concentrating the defence on that point. The Peloponnesian party
had at last shown its hand. Thermopylæ had been a mere pretence, an
attempt to purchase the aid of the Athenian fleet, and, possibly, of
the Northern States, at the cheapest rate possible,—at a much cheaper
rate, indeed, than the price which had been actually paid. The idea
of the Peloponnesians at this time evidently was that the Athenians
might be led to suppose that, as the defence of so strong a position
as Thermopylæ had been unsuccessful, no other position north of the
Isthmus could possibly be regarded as tenable.
That which the Athenian commanders did recognize was that, as in
their absence at Artemisium no sort of attempt had been made to
provide for the defence of either the passage by Lake Kopais or of
the Kithæron-Parnes line of mountains, the military situation must
be, perforce, accepted, and their efforts must be concentrated on
inducing the allies to take a sound view of the necessities of the
naval position. In its main outlines it was plain to the dullest
intelligence. The defence of the Isthmus was as much, if not more,
dependent on the fleet than that of Thermopylæ. If the Persians could
once land troops in Argolis, the position at the Isthmus was fatally
turned. The saving factor in the situation was that the fleet was just
as necessary an adjunct for the Peloponnesian as for the Northern
policy. But when it became a question how the fleet should act as
an aid to the defence of the Isthmus, the decision was by no means
so clear. The fighting on the last day at Artemisium had shown the
danger of meeting a greatly superior force on open water, where the
smaller fleet could be outflanked; and the coast in the immediate
neighbourhood of the Isthmus itself afforded no position which, if
taken up, would guarantee the Greek fleet from attack on either flank.
That was evidently the ruling consideration which decided the Greeks,
on the recommendation of Themistocles, to take up their station in
Salamis strait But even after that position was taken up, Themistocles
must have been painfully conscious that, if the Persians chose to
ignore the Greek fleet at Salamis, and to sail straight to the Isthmus,
the situation would be dangerous to the last degree.
It must be recognized that in this great war the darkness before the
dawn of Greek victory was intense. The strategy which led the Greek
fleet to take its station at Salamis was the strategy of despair. It
was adopted because there was no alternative. The only possibility of
success depended upon the Persians being induced to attack the fleet in
its chosen position; and this accounts for the manifest anxiety which
Themistocles showed to do everything, to run even the risk of a charge
of the grossest treachery, in order to bring about an engagement in
the strait. One thing favoured his design. The Persians had shown at
Artemisium that they intended, if they could, not merely to defeat,
but to capture the whole Greek fleet Salamis strait, consisting of two
narrow channels by which the broad bay of Eleusis communicates with
the Saronic gulf, would seem to them a position adapted by nature to
the carrying out of this purpose; and it must have been with a view to
encourage them in this idea that Themistocles left the western channel
unguarded. He was playing a desperate game, under circumstances which
were, however, sufficiently desperate to justify it. The dazzling
brilliancy of the success attained by it has blinded posterity to the
enormous risk which it entailed.
Herodotus does not enlarge on the feelings of the Athenians when they
discovered what had been going on during their absence at Artemisium.
#REMOVAL OF THE POPULATION OF ATTICA.# They must have felt bitterly
that they had been the victims of a base desertion, and they probably
expressed their feelings; but nothing in the whole course of the
war is more honourable to them than the practical spirit and energy
with which they faced the situation. It was indeed before Salamis
rather than at Salamis that Athens saved Greece. “When they learnt what
had happened,” says Herodotus, “they requested the fleet to touch at
Salamis.” They appear to have already made up their minds what to do.
It is probable that their previous experience of the selfish policy of
the Peloponnesians had prepared them for the possibility of a position
such as that in which they found themselves. The half-fulfilment of the
first oracle delivered to them at Delphi was to be accomplished. The
population of Attica was to be removed _en masse_ to refuges beyond
the reach of the Persian army; and it is not unlikely that under
certain eventualities the Athenian authorities were prepared to carry
out to the full the desperate advice which Delphi had given them. ◆H.
viii. 41.◆ The proclamation of removal was issued, and the people of
Attica fled to various places on the shores of the Saronic gulf, some
to Ægina, some to Salamis, but the majority to Trœzen. The Athenians
knew well that they could expect no mercy from the Persian. Marathon
had been an unpardonable act of _lèse mejesté_, for which they would
have in any case to pay dearly, and with the very life-blood of their
people, if they, as well as the land, fell into the enemy’s power.
It is noticeable that in choosing their places of refuge they were
careful not to give any hostages to the Peloponnesians. Trœzen was the
base of naval operations. Ægina and Salamis were islands. All three
were therefore within reach of their own powerful fleet, and out of
reach of the Peloponnesian army at the Isthmus.
The news that the fleet from Artemisium had put in at Salamis brought
thither the rest of the Greek fleet, which seems to have been gathering
for some time previously at the port of Pogon[151] in Trœzen, near
the east end of the Argolic peninsula. The numbers now available were
considerably larger than those which had fought at Artemisium.[152]
It seems to be implied by Herodotus’ language, as well as by the fact
that their addition would raise the numbers of the Athenian fleet
to two hundred, that the fifty-three Attic vessels were not part of
the _original_ fleet at Artemisium. If this be so, the net increase
in the number of triremes at Salamis is forty-two. #THE GREEK FLEET
AT SALAMIS.# Some of the original contingents, notably those of
the Æginetans and Lacedæmonians, were increased; and several small
contingents were added which had not been present at Artemisium.
The almost absolute apathy of the Western States and of Magna Græcia
is most marked. Corcyra is unrepresented.[153] The great Kroton
sends but one ship. Had Salamis turned out differently, they might
have had bitter cause to regret their lack of patriotism. It is,
however, possible that Magna Græcia, and even the towns of the extreme
north-west of Greece, had their attention distracted at this time by
the immanence of the life-and-death struggle between Gelo and the
Carthaginians in Sicily.
It is also noticeable that Herodotus makes one of his customary
mistakes in addition, putting the number of the fleet, exclusive of
pentekonters, at three hundred and seventy-eight; whereas, according to
his own list, it should be three hundred and sixty-six.[154]
As at Artemisium, Eurybiades commanded the fleet. The Athenians,
according to Herodotus, supplied the best ships.
Though the fleet had assembled at Salamis, it was by no means certain
that it would remain there. The gathering had been designed to cover
and assist the withdrawal of the population of Attica. It was quite
certain that there would be a large party in favour of withdrawal
to the Isthmus, and the risks, which have already been pointed out,
attendant upon the occupation of the strait were so palpable, that they
could hardly fail to afford a strong argument in favour of the
Peloponnesian policy.
After the fleet had collected, a Council of War was held. It soon
appeared that the majority were in favour of retiring to some point
off the Isthmus. They argued that there, in case of defeat, they
could withdraw to land held by their own troops, whereas a disaster
at Salamis would mean that they would be blockaded on that not very
fruitful island.
Before the decision was taken, an Athenian messenger arrived announcing
that the Persian was already committing devastation in Attica.
Of Xerxes’ passage from Panopeus, near Parapotamii, to Attica, little
is told by Herodotus. ◆H. viii. 50.◆ He must have taken the great route
to Thebes, whence, after burning Thespiæ and Platæa, he probably made
his way into Attica by the Dryoskephalæ and other passes.
◆H. viii. 51.◆
There is a curious and somewhat self-contradictory tale in Herodotus
about what occurred in Athens itself at this time. He says that the
Persians “came upon the city deserted, but found a few of the Athenians
in the temple, both the temple stewards and (certain) poor men, who,
having fortified the Acropolis with planks, and wooden (breastworks),
tried to defend themselves against the assailants. The reason they
had not departed to Salamis was that they had not the means to do so;
and, furthermore, because they thought that they had discovered the
meaning of the oracular response which the Pythian gave them, namely,
that the wooden wall should never be taken, and that this and not the
ships was to be their salvation.” The historian then proceeds to give
what purports to be a description of a siege of this fortification. The
Persians took up their position on Areopagus, and confined their attack
in the first place to the discharge of fire-bearing arrows against the
wooden wall. The besieged replied by rolling down boulder stones upon
the assailants, and “for a long time” Xerxes was at a loss how to force
an entrance. Finally a party scaled one of the cliffs at an unexpected
point, and the Acropolis was taken, and all its defenders massacred.
#THE SIEGE OF THE ACROPOLIS.#
Such is, in brief, the extraordinary tale.
But the strangest part of the whole story is the account of the
impression created in the fleet by the news of the capture.
◆H. viii. 56.◆
“The Greeks at Salamis, on hearing what had happened to the Athenian
Acropolis, fell into such a state of panic, that some of the
commanders did not even wait for the settlement of the question under
discussion, but rushed to the ships, and set sail with intent to take
to flight. By those who remained it was decided to fight in front of
the Isthmus.”
The inconsistency between the description of the garrison and
its defensive works, and the alarm created by the capture of the
fortification, is so glaring as to be irreconcileable, and modern
historians have naturally been led to form conjectures as to what
really took place. It has been suggested that the tale is merely a
reminiscence of the fact that some stragglers who had remained in the
Acropolis were slaughtered by the Persians after their occupation of
the city, an incident exaggerated in subsequent tradition. This, if
true, would bring into still higher relief the absurdity of the panic
in the fleet at Salamis.
A much more probable theory[155] is that Herodotus, so far from
overstating what took place, has considerably understated it, and that
a real defence was attempted, and a serious disaster sustained. This
does, at any rate, account for two important points in the narrative,
(1) that the defence was successful “for a considerable time;” (2) that
the panic caused was so great.
The evidence, other than that of Herodotus, as to what took place at
this time, affords, unfortunately, but little help to the elucidation
of the mystery. Diodorus, though in his account of the actual battle
of Salamis he makes use of information which is certainly not drawn
from Herodotus, has in this particular instance transcribed Herodotus’
description almost word for word.
The question is, Was a garrison of any kind left in the Acropolis?
◆H. viii. 41.◆
Herodotus has already given the words of the proclamation for the
desertion of Attica: “The Athenians shall dispose their children and
households in any place of safety they can.” ◆Arist. Athen Polit. 23.◆
Aristotle says that the Areopagus assisted the citizens with a vote of
eight drachmas apiece. ◆Plut. Them. 10.◆ Plutarch speaks of a psephism
proposed by Themistocles to the effect that (1) the city should be
left to the care of Athene; (2) all able-bodied persons should embark
on board the fleet; (3) the rest of the population should save itself
where it could.
◆Against this cf. Thuc. i. 73.◆
It has been suggested that Plutarch is here guilty of an historical
error, (1) because Herodotus says nothing about embarkation on board
the triremes; (2) because this embarkation is incredible, since the
triremes had their complements already, and an addition to their crews
would have been an embarrassment. ◆H. viii. 95.◆ It is concluded
therefore that the land army did not as a whole embark. Some hoplites
were posted at Salamis; but there is reason, so it is urged, to suspect
that part of the army was left at Athens.
It is plain that, on the evidence available, any conjecture must
involve its maker in certain difficulties. In the present instance
one important objection immediately arises:—no adequate motive can be
urged for the suppression of the truth, if this conjecture represents
it. Had such a disaster overtaken a considerable Athenian force, would
not Herodotus, who is anxious to bring into prominence the sufferings
and self-sacrifice of the Athenians in this war, have seized upon so
noteworthy an example in point? Again, what conceivable object was
to be gained under the circumstances by garrisoning the Acropolis?
Furthermore, taking the history of the war as related, is it in the
slightest degree likely that the Persians could, even by surprise, have
taken such a position when defended by any considerable number of Greek
hoplites? It is improbable to the last degree.
But the rejection of this theory does not lead to any positive results
in the elucidation of the story. Herodotus has manifestly exaggerated
or understated some detail of it.
#THEMISTOCLES.#
His expression that the siege lasted “a considerable time” is not
perhaps to be taken as being more precise than such expressions are in
ordinary language. It may have been that some enthusiasts or belated
citizens did conceive the idea that they could defend themselves,
and possibly their property, in that remarkable stronghold until the
danger was overpast, and that, considering the resources at their
disposal, they did hold out for “a considerable time.” It may be that
“the considerable time” was inserted by the historian to emphasize
the hopelessness of the struggle against fate, as represented by the
oracle. “It was fated,” he says, “in accordance with the oracle, that
the whole of continental Attica should fall into the hands of the
Persian.”
But how is the panic in the fleet at Salamis to be accounted for? The
tale at Artemisium may suggest a solution. Herodotus shows himself
very eager to bring into prominence the difficulty which Athens had in
keeping the courage of the other Greeks to its sticking point; and this
description of the panic and the consequent determination to withdraw
to the Isthmus is identical in species with the frequent references
in the Artemisium story to withdrawals or intended withdrawals either
to Chalkis or to Mid Greece. Doubtless these stories do rest on a
very solid basis of fact, though in themselves exaggerated. The
Peloponnesians seem to have displayed an almost feverish anxiety to
remove the defence to the Isthmus.
The near approach of the crisis in the war brings into peculiar
prominence the man who was destined to play the greatest part in it.
It cannot be accounted otherwise than strange that a historian so
fair-minded as Herodotus should up to this point in his narrative
have minimized the share which this remarkable man must have taken in
determining the course of the Greek operations previous to Salamis. And
yet, even from his account of the war, it is evident that Themistocles
had been most prominent in whatever part of the Greek strategy had
been due to Athenian initiative. He had commanded the contingent sent
to Thessaly; he had commanded the Athenian fleet at Artemisium. In
both cases the adoption of a line of defence so far north of
Peloponnesus must have been due to Athenian influence; and it may be
regarded as certain that Themistocles was mainly, if not entirely,
responsible for the direction in which that influence made itself felt.
In Thessaly there had indeed been a passive failure, and Artemisium
had not been a success. It is clear, however, that in the latter case
the Athenians did not attribute the lack of success to Themistocles,
otherwise they could not have been expected to place themselves so
entirely in his hands as they did at the time of Salamis. Probably
the true significance of Thermopylæ was already surmised, if not
understood, at Athens, soon after the fleet returned from Artemisium.
Herodotus seems never to have succeeded in getting the character
of Themistocles into its true perspective. It is possible that the
tales told in after-time of his financial trickeries prejudiced the
honest old historian against him. Throughout his history he shows
himself an admirer of moral rather than intellectual greatness; and
this disposition on his part would inevitably tend to obscure his
appreciation of the great qualities of one whom tradition represented
to him as guilty of a most serious form of moral weakness. Whence he
drew the tradition he followed is another question. It may be that
during his sojourn in Athens he was associated with the political heirs
of the party opposed to Themistocles, and, if so, it may be certain
that he would hear little to Themistocles’ credit, and much that was
false to his discredit Still the tradition as to this peculiarly
bad characteristic of the man was very prevalent; and it is hardly
conceivable that the unanimity of the testimony of after-time was
founded on no sounder basis than inimical party tradition. It is, then,
possible that there was a real groundwork of truth in the accusations
which Herodotus brings against Themistocles, though the undue emphasis
which the historian lays on this side of the man’s character renders it
also probable that, if true, the accusations are not unexaggerated.
At the same time, the complete assumption of this truth is difficult,
in view of the silence of Thucydides on the matter. #THUCYDIDES’
ACCOUNT OF THEMISTOCLES.# It is plain that he considered the charges
sufficiently groundless to be ignored, and this in spite of the
fact that the course of his history forced him to recount the least
savoury portion of the great man’s career. Nor can it be assumed that
the historian’s judgment was warped by party considerations. Such
obliquities as are discernible in the biographical details in his
history are clearly traceable to personal rather than party enmities.
It is manifest that he had an intense admiration for Themistocles’
intellectual capacity; and it was fortunate for after-times that the
second great historian of the fifth century was led by circumstances
to draw the picture of the character of perhaps the most able man
which the century produced—a picture which, in the hands of the first
historian, had never got beyond the stage of mere preliminary sketches,
not artistically connected, never completed, and never perhaps intended
to be so. It is really the written judgment of Thucydides which has
enabled posterity to understand the influence of Themistocles at this
most critical period of Greek history, when the land was faced by
circumstances of a magnitude far outstripping the narrow bounds of
Greek experience. When the knowledge of experience cannot compass the
situation, the intuition of genius is the only possible means by which
the situation may be successfully met. And, if Thucydides is to be
believed, it was this special and most rare quality which Themistocles
possessed in such a remarkable degree.
◆T. i. 138.◆
“Themistocles was a man who displayed genius in the most unmistakable
way, and in this respect calls for admiration in a special and
unparalleled manner. For by his native intellectual power, unaided
by study or by the teaching of experience, he was capable of giving
the ablest opinion in emergencies only admitting of the briefest
consideration, and was skilled in forming a judgment upon coming
events even to the most distant future. Whatever came within the
range of his practice, he could explain; and he did not fail to form
an adequate judgment on that which lay beyond his experience. He
possessed a peculiar power of foresight into the good and evil of the
uncertain future. Speaking generally, by the very power of his genius,
in spite of the slightness of his application, he was unsurpassed in
devising intuitively what was required in an emergency.”
* * * * *
_Note on Translation of T._ i. 138, 3, καὶ οὔτε προμαθών
ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὐτ ἐπιμαθών.
The translation I have adopted follows in its main lines that of
Croiset in his edition of Thucydides, to which attention is called in
M. Hauvette’s work on Herodotus. “Le génie naturel de Thémistocle ne
devait rien ni à l’étude préalable ni à cette autre sorte d’étude qui
sort de l’expérience, et surtout de l’expérience malheureuse.”
Such is Thucydides’ description of the man, delivered more than
sixty years after Salamis, when his cool judgment, unaffected by
political controversy, which had in the interval wholly changed its
ground, could sift without passion and without prejudice the evidence
that he found in existence in his own time. Themistocles may have been
dishonest; but Thucydides does not seem to have been satisfied that he
was so; and, that being the case, the modern world may well have some
doubts upon the subject.
Apart from the charges of dishonesty, Herodotus shows a tendency to
discount the merit of Themistocles in proposing the design which led
to the great victory. A previous example of the same tendency has been
noticed in the reference which the historian makes to the proposal to
allot the surplus from the mines at Laurion to the construction of
a fleet. It is there implied that Themistocles did not act with the
foresight with which he was credited; that the proposal had reference
to the war with Ægina, and not to any foreseen invasion from the side
of Persia. It is easy now to see that Herodotus’ allegation is most
certainly mistaken. The Persian design of revenging Marathon, conceived
before the death of Darius in 485, cannot have been a secret; and the
mere size of the fleet proposed renders it extremely unlikely that
Athens would have assented to the expense it involved, merely for the
purposes of an attack on a state which could only place one-fifth of
the number of ships in commission.
The allegation of Herodotus in the present instance is equally
unconvincing.
#THE TALE OF MNESIPHILOS.#
He describes the panic, as he asserts it to have been, caused by
the fall of Athens, and the consequent decision to withdraw the fleet
to the Isthmus, and implies that Themistocles was a consenting party
to the withdrawal. ◆H. viii. 57.◆ “On Themistocles coming on board
his ship, Mnesiphilos, an Athenian, asked him what had been decided
by the council.” On learning from him that it had been decided to
put out to the Isthmus and fight for the Peloponnese, he prophesied
that the whole force would break up, and Greece come to ruin. He
also advised Themistocles to do all he could to dissuade Eurybiades
from a design so disastrous. The animus of the story is shown by the
assertion that Themistocles went on board the commander’s vessel,
and used these arguments as his own. Of this Mnesiphilos more is
told in Plutarch. ◆Plut. Them.◆ He represents him to have been the
political tutor of Themistocles, and says that some people attributed
to Mnesiphilos much for which Themistocles got credit with the general
public. It may be surmised that the people who took this view were not
unconnected with the various other stories current in later times to
Themistocles’ discredit. The story in Herodotus is in itself not free
from improbability, and is inconsistent with what the author’s own
account of the battle shows to have been the reason for fighting in the
strait, namely, the desire to engage the numerically superior fleet in
a channel where its greater numbers would be of but little avail. The
last fight at Artemisium had probably taught the Greeks a lesson to
whose significance they could not shut their eyes; at any rate, in the
then state of feeling, it must have been a very powerful and compelling
motive which induced the Peloponnesian contingents to abide at Salamis.
The tale of Mnesiphilos supplies none such. The argument as to the
break-up of the defence is palpably weak. There would be infinitely
more fear of a dissolution of the naval force in case Salamis were
chosen as the scene of battle, than if it were determined to fight in
the immediate neighbourhood of the Isthmus, the very determination for
which the Peloponnesian party had been intriguing ever since the war
began.
This tale of Mnesiphilos is so suspicious that it cannot be
regarded as reliable history. Herodotus seems himself to have been
aware that it would convey an impression of improbability when read
beside the other tale of the motive which Themistocles urged for
fighting in the strait; for he attempts to reconcile the truth of the
two stories.
In his private interview with Eurybiades, Themistocles, so he says,
adopted as his own the argument suggested by Mnesiphilos, and with its
aid so far persuaded that much vexed but apparently honest patriot of
the inadvisability of the decision to which the Council of War had
recently come, that he consented to call another meeting to reconsider
the subject. This was the famous meeting at which the fate of Greece
was decided; and it may be regarded as certain that, as is invariably
the case with the crises of great historical tragedies, later tradition
did not allow the incidents of the situation to lose dramatic force in
the telling. Though the dramatic element is not absent from Herodotus’
version, it gives a strong impression of being in the main a true
account of what took place. The historian seems to have exercised a
powerful self-control over himself in writing the account of what he
knew well to have been the most critical moment in the history of his
race; and he has, in consequence, succeeded in making his description
of this gathering of the Greek commanders one of the most striking
pictures in his history.
◆H. viii. 59.◆
“And when they had assembled, before Eurybiades put the question about
which he had called the generals together, Themistocles spoke long and
earnestly. As he was speaking the Corinthian commander, Adeimantos,
the son of Okytos, said: ‘At the games, Themistocles, those who start
too soon are scourged.’ But he, justifying his action, answered, ‘Yes,
and those left at the post do not win the prize.’ On this occasion his
retort to the Corinthian was mild in character; but to Eurybiades he
did not use his previous arguments, to the effect that the fleet, if
it left Salamis, would disperse; for in the presence of the allies it
did not become him to accuse any one. #COUNCIL OF WAR AT SALAMIS.# He
relied on a different argument, and spoke as follows: ‘The salvation
of Greece is in your hands if you be persuaded by me to remain and
give battle in this place, and do not yield to those here present who
urge you to remove the fleet to the Isthmus. Hear now and judge
between the two plans. If you engage off the Isthmus you will fight in
the open sea, and it is highly inexpedient for us to put out thither,
because our ships are heavier and fewer in number; and, again, you
will lose Salamis, Megara, and Ægina, even if we are successful in
other respects. For the Persians’ land army will accompany their
fleet, and so you will be responsible for bringing them to the
Peloponnese, and will place the whole of Greece in peril. But if you
do as I say, you will find the following great advantages in my plan.
In the first place, by engaging in the strait with few ships against
many, we shall win a great victory, if the war takes the course that
may be expected; for it is in our favour to fight in the narrow seas,
just as it is in their favour to fight in the open. Again Salamis, in
which we have deposited our wives and children, will not fall into
the hands of the enemy. And there is this further advantage in the
plan, and one by which you set most store. Whether you remain here, or
whether you fight at the Isthmus, you will be just as much fighting
on behalf of the Peloponnese; and you will not, if you are wise,
attract the enemy towards the Peloponnese. If matters turn out as I
expect, and we win a naval battle, the barbarians will never reach the
Isthmus, nor advance further than Attica, but will retire in disorder:
and we shall be the gainers by the salvation of Megara, Ægina, and
Salamis, at which, according to an oracle, we should defeat the foe.
When men form reasonable plans they usually succeed; but if they form
unreasonable ones, the god refuses to fall in with human fancies.’
When Themistocles had made this speech, the Corinthian Adeimantos
again attacked him, bidding him hold his peace, as he had no
fatherland, and protesting against Eurybiades putting the vote for one
who had no state to represent; for he urged that Themistocles should
show of what state he was envoy, before he gave his vote with the
rest. The point of this reproach was that Athens had been captured and
was in the hands of the foe. On this occasion Themistocles spoke both
long and bitterly against him and the Corinthians, and demonstrated
that the Athenians had a State and country more powerful than that of
Corinth, so long as two hundred ships were manned by them; for none of
the Greeks could resist their attack.
“After this declaration he appealed to Eurybiades, speaking more
earnestly (than before). ‘If you,’ he said, ‘remain here and play the
man, all will be well; but if not, you will bring about the overthrow
of Hellas. For the decision of the war lies with the fleet. Therefore
be persuaded by me.
“‘But if you do not do this, we will take our families and go as
we are to Siris in Italy, which is our land of old, and the oracles
say is fated to be colonized by us. You, when bereft of such allies as
we have been, will remember my words.’
“After this speech of Themistocles Eurybiades changed his mind. My own
view is that he did so, fearing lest the Athenians should desert them
if he took the fleet to the Isthmus; for if the Athenians departed,
the remainder of the fleet was incapable of facing the enemy. He
decided therefore to remain, and give battle there.”
There are very noteworthy points about this remarkable narrative.
Despite his prejudice against Themistocles, Herodotus makes it quite
clear that he, and he alone, was responsible for the fleet remaining
at Salamis. Though the language of the story does not make it quite
clear, the remarks of Themistocles which provoked the first retort of
Adeimantos, seem to have been of the nature of individual exhortation
to the various commanders before the formal meeting opened. Apparently,
the first step in the regular Council of War was a statement made by
the president of the question to be discussed.
Herodotus is at special pains to mention that the argument suggested by
Mnesphilos was, of set purpose, not employed upon the present occasion.
It may be observed that if that argument had any applicability at
all, it could only be to the Æginetans and Megareans, whose lands
would be exposed to the Persian in case the decision to retire to
the Isthmus were persisted in. They had just as much, if not more,
cause than the Athenians had to wish the fleet to remain at Salamis,
therefore the reason given for the omission of the argument, namely,
that Themistocles did not wish to accuse any one, is highly improbable.
Had there been any soundness in it, had it, indeed, ever been used,
the Æginetans and Megareans would have recked little of being charged
with a desire to defend their own homes, if the charge had supplied an
argument for the carrying out of a policy which was a matter of life
and death to them.
#CORINTH AND ATHENS.#
The almost vindictive opposition of the Corinthian admiral to
Themistocles is not the least remarkable feature in the tale.
It will be remembered that something of a like kind had occurred at
Artemisium. When Themistocles, at the request of the Eubœans, advocated
the retention of the fleet at Artemisium, it was not merely with
Eurybiades, but also with the Corinthian admiral, that he had to deal.
It has been suggested that these tales, which were calculated in
after-time to cast discredit on the behaviour of the Corinthians at
this crisis, were invented at the period, later in the century, when
Corinth was in the forefront of hostility to Athens. It is, however,
very possible that the seeds of that hostility had been already sown,
and were bearing fruit in 480. The evidence obtainable from the remains
of this period which have been discovered in Sicily and in Magna
Græcia, make it clear that in the latter part of the sixth and early
years of the fifth century, of the great trading cities of Greece
proper, Corinth and Athens divided between them the lion’s share of the
trade with the West; There had, no doubt, been a rivalry between the
two; but up to a certain point it had been of a peaceful character,
neither party being strong enough to establish a supremacy over the
other. Still, in the twenty years preceding the war, the changes in
the coinage system of Sicily seem to indicate that Athens had been for
some time gaining ground. That there was, however, no rupture in the
peaceful, or even friendly, relations between the two towns is shown
by the fact that Corinth actually aided Athens in one of her wars with
Ægina by the loan of ships.
It is calculated that this loan of ships was made about the year
498.[156] Corinth, the Venice of Greece, was a trading state pure and
simple; and trade questions must have had a preponderating influence
on her policy. It would seem, then, that at the beginning of the fifth
century she regarded Ægina as a more formidable trade rival than
Athens. One cause for this suggests itself. The naval power of Ægina
was at the beginning of the century superior to that of Athens, as
the loan of vessels shows; and a trade rival is a much more serious
competitor if backed by naval power than if working on the lines
of purely peaceful competition. The next twenty years, however, brought
about a complete change in the relative circumstances of the three
states. Ægina had suffered severely in a war with Athens, which took
place in the decade intervening between Marathon and Salamis. The naval
power of Athens had, on the other hand, enormously increased from the
moment when, in or about 484 the Athenians began to adopt the advice
of Themistocles, and to devote the proceeds of the mines of Laurion to
the building of a fleet, the like of which Greece had never seen at the
command of any single one of her States. This is the probable cause of
the original growth of that enmity between Corinth and Athens which
was to bear fruit later in the century; and this may account for the
attitude of Corinth at the time of the Great War.
Themistocles’ first speech consists of an argument; his second of a
threat; but, as Herodotus points out, the second was delivered under
the influence of the anger he felt at the injustice of the taunt which
Adeimantos had hurled against himself and his countrymen. Never was
anger more justifiable. The necessity for the removal of the population
had been brought about by the fact that the Peloponnesian land forces
at the Isthmus had made no preparation whatever to defend Attica during
the time at which the fleet was at Artemisium.
One part of the argument is very striking, because it is, perhaps,
the only passage in Herodotus which gives an indication of what must
have been of necessity the case,—the dependence of the Persian army
on the fleet Themistocles points out to the Greeks that, if they keep
the Persian fleet at Salamis, the Persian army can never reach the
Isthmus, or even invade the Megarid. More he does not say on this
point, because he evidently assumed that his hearers would understand
him. If the situation be considered, the only interpretation which they
could pit upon his words was that the difficulty of commissariat would,
under those circumstances, be an insuperable obstacle to the Persian
advance. #ORIGINAL AUTHORITIES.# Their army, after crossing Kithæron,
had left the rich lands of Greece, the plains of Bœotia and
Thessaly, behind it. It might, indeed, have reached the Isthmus; but
the maintenance of it even for a brief period in a region which could
afford but little sustenance, and which was peculiarly inaccessible
by land from the North, owing to the interposition of the great and
difficult ridge of Geraneia, would become an impossibility.[157]
[Illustration: Map showing THE STRATEGICAL POSITION IN S. BOEOTIA, W.
ATTICA AND THE ISTHMUS WITH PASSES OF KITHAERON, PARNES & GERANEIA
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.
_Stanford’s Geographical Estab^t. London._
]
* * * * *
_Note on the Authorities for the Account of Salamis._
It is impossible to enter upon the description of the battle of Salamis
without giving some short explanation of the views on the subject which
the author has thought fit to adopt, since they differ fundamentally
from those which are put forward in the best-known modern histories
of Greece. The historians of the last generation do not seem to have
recognized that the details of the battle as given by Herodotus present
any difficulty of a serious character. His account was accepted as
correct, against all other extant evidence on the subject, which was
treated as either worthless or of inferior authority.
Apart from chance references in other writers, which are either mere
commonplaces or historically valueless, the evidence available is
supplied by four authors,—Æschylus, Herodotus, Diodorus, and Plutarch.
Those who adopt Herodotus’ views regard the evidence of the other three
authors as being, for various reasons, unreliable.
In the case of Æschylus, the obvious objection is that he was a poet,
and that all the evidence he gives is contained in the “Persæ.” It
cannot, of course, be denied that this objection would, from the
historical point of view, be a very strong one, were Æschylus merely
giving a poetical account of a most dramatic scene, the description
of which he derived from others. But when it is remembered that
the poet was actually present as a combatant on board the Greek fleet,
it is manifest that his narrative, though cast in the poetical form,
cannot be ignored by the historian. One element in it, at any rate,
must be reckoned with: the stated facts of the author’s personal
observation. These are, indeed, few in number, but it so happens that
they are of very great importance; nor are they of a character such
as might suggest that they had been modified in any way for dramatic
purposes.
The evidence of Diodorus is ignored by modern authorities simply on the
ground that that author is so notoriously unreliable. That such is the
case, no one who knows his work would care to deny; but it is a fallacy
to treat the whole of his work as unsound, and to say, as has been
said by one eminent authority, that whenever the evidence of Herodotus
and Diodorus respectively differs on any particular point, that of
Herodotus is to be unhesitatingly preferred.
In the present case, Plutarch may, for the most part, be ignored. His
evidence is secondhand of the secondhand; and most details given by him
which are not found in any one of the three first-mentioned authorities
are either unimportant, highly suspicious, or demonstrably wrong.
The rejection of Herodotus’ account of the tactics pursued by the two
fleets rests on two grounds:—
(1) The evidence of the eye-witness Æschylus, which is quite
irreconcileable with Herodotus’ description.
(2) Objections of a most important character which must suggest
themselves to the mind of any one who has seen the strait, and might
well be suggested to any one who possesses a reliable map of it.
In so far as I am aware, Professor Goodwin, in an article on “Salamis”
in the _Journal of the Archæological Institute of America_, 1882–83,
was the first to point out the serious difficulties involved, not, as
he thought, in Herodotus’ account, but rather in the interpretation
which later historians had put upon it.
As the main basis of his argument he enunciated the necessity of taking
the evidence of Æschylus into serious consideration; he laid it down,
indeed, that that evidence, in so far as it was plainly drawn from
personal observation, must be regarded as superior in authority to any
evidence on the same point contained in other extant descriptions of
the fight. #INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE.# I venture to think that, in so
doing, Professor Goodwin rendered a most important service to the
study of a great chapter in Ancient History.
He further argued that the discrepancies between Æschylus and Herodotus
are apparent and not real, and are due to a mistaken interpretation of
Herodotus’ narrative.
It will be seen that I do not agree with the second part of Professor
Goodwin’s proposition. My belief is that the modern historians have
correctly interpreted Herodotus’ account; and that, so far as his
evidence is concerned, the mistake is in the evidence, and not in the
interpretation of it.
Though the detail must be reserved for discussion when the incidents of
the fight come to be examined in detail, it may be convenient for the
understanding of the problem involved, to give a brief sketch of the
line of argument which will be followed.
It is generally agreed—in fact, the evidence is unanimous on this
point—that the Persians drew up their fleet in some way so as to block
the eastern end of the Salamis strait; though the way in which they did
this is disputed. But the main points in dispute are:—
(1) As to the locality of the part of the other end of the strait
which they blocked so as to prevent the Greek fleet from escaping,
viz. whether it was the narrow portion of the eastern strait at the
point where it enters the bay of Eleusis, or whether it was the strait
between Salamis island and the Megarid coast.
(2) As to the position of the Persian fleet, especially at daybreak, on
the morning of the battle.
The scheme of the battle given in nearly all the modern histories of
Greece, represents the Persian fleet as drawn up on the morning of the
battle along the Attic coast, from the narrows at the entrance of the
bay of Eleusis almost to the mouth of Piræus harbour, while the Greek
fleet is opposite, extending from a point some way north of the island
of St. George almost to the end of Kynosura (_vide_ Grote, etc.).
I notice that this scheme has been adhered to in various histories of
Greece which are either new or have been re-edited since Professor
Goodwin’s article was published.
The objections to it which Professor Goodwin urged seem to me so
strong that I am surprised that the scheme is still adhered to by
great authorities on Greek history. The reason for this adherence I
have not seen stated in print I can only suppose that those who retain
the old view reject wholly the version of Diodorus, where it
differs from that of Herodotus, and would hold that the latter is not
contradicted in any essential respect by the, for historical purposes,
imperfect account of Æschylus. Professor Goodwin lays down the canon
that on any detail which Æschylus _does_ mention, he is the authority
to be followed, because he was an eye-witness. He further seeks to
reconcile Herodotus’ account with that of Æschylus, with the result
that he reproduces a history of the battle which is in nearly all
essential respects that of Diodorus.
The thesis which I propose to put forward is that we have in the tale
of Salamis one of the rare cases in which Diodorus has either obtained
better information than Herodotus or made better use of his information.
The arguments against the old scheme, of which the most convincing have
been already stated by Professor Goodwin, are:—
Since the passage between Attica and Psyttaleia is one thousand
three hundred yards wide;
And that between Ægaleos and Salamis one thousand five hundred
yards;
And between Ægaleos and St George Island one thousand two hundred
yards; _i.e._ the whole channel is very narrow;
(_a_) How could the Persian movement of cutting off be accomplished so
secretly that the Greeks got no wind of it? (H. viii. 78; Plut Them.
12; Arist. 8.)
How could the Persians have slipped along the other side of the narrow
strait in the night unperceived?
(_b_) Can we believe that the Greek fleet was allowed to form quietly
in line of battle at the other side of this narrow strait, in the very
face of the Persian fleet only a few hundred yards distant?
Surely the Persian fleet, being eager to capture the Greek fleet, would
have seized the ships while the crews were preparing to embark.
(_c_) Æschylus, an eye-witness, testifies that it was only after the
Greeks had rowed forward from their position that they were fairly seen
by the Persians (Æsch Pers. 400).
(_d_) Æschylus, Pers. 443–466; H. viii. 76, 95; Plut. Aris. 9, concur
in the statement that Xerxes landed a body of Persians on Psyttaleia,
because he thought that it would be a central point of the sea-fight.
Such are Professor Goodwin’s objections to the old scheme.
#NATURE OF ERROR IN HERODOTUS.#
To the last I would add that Herodotus expressly describes the measures
taken with regard to Psyttaleia as being synchronous with those for
blocking the straits (viii. 76).
Of these objections:—
(_a_) is strong, as being Herodotus’ own evidence; and it is on
Herodotus that the old scheme must rely. The passages quoted from
Plutarch are, however, manifestly from the Herodotean source.
Objections (_b_), (_c_), (_d_) seem to me unanswerable. As I read the
narrative, the old scheme of Grote and others cannot stand in face of
them.
In so far as my experience goes, I think that it may be demonstrated
that Herodotus’ mistakes, in his military history generally, arise
almost wholly from—
(1) Misreading of sources.
(2) Use of defective or mistaken sources; not from the invention of
imaginary facts.
His painful conscientiousness seems to be genuine, not fictitious. But,
eminently unmilitary himself, he was peculiarly liable to misunderstand
the information at his disposal with regard to military matters; and
this, as it seems to me, is exactly what has happened with regard to
his account of Salamis, and in the following way:—
It is, of course, a commonplace of criticism to say that Herodotus
gives us no account of the general movements or manœuvres of the two
fleets on the actual day of the battle, save that he mentions that the
Æginetan vessels fell on the Phœnician ships which the Athenians put to
flight. What I may call the enunciation of my proposition is this:—
This failure of information in this part of his narrative is due to
the fact that he had already, in the previous part of it, used up his
information on this point.
He antedated a movement made on the night preceding the battle to the
previous afternoon, and further antedated the movements in the battle
itself to the night preceding the battle.
It is curious and noticeable that, when this correction is made in
Herodotus’ dating, and in the mistaken accounts of movements which the
chronological error entailed, there is so close a resemblance between
the narratives of Herodotus and Diodorus that they may be suspected of
having been derived from sources which, if not absolutely identical,
were close in similarity.
The fleet of Xerxes was now at Phaleron, in the bay lying east
of the peninsula on which stood the town of Piræus. After spending
three days at Histiæa, subsequent to the departure of the army from
Thermopylæ, it had taken three days more to reach Phaleron. It is
probable, therefore, that it arrived there shortly before the army
reached Attic territory. Herodotus is of opinion that, despite the
losses at the Sepiad strand, at Thermopylæ, at Artemisium, and in the
Hollows of Eubœa, the net strength of the land and sea forces was,
owing to the accession of reinforcements, not less than before these
losses were incurred. For the numbers of the land forces he makes
out something resembling a case. It is probable that the addition
of the full contingents of Dorians and Locrians, and of all the
Bœotians, except the Platæans and Thespians, largely, if not entirely,
compensated for the losses suffered at Thermopylæ, great as they had
been. But that the naval contingents of Karystos, Andros, Tenos, and
the other islands, can have in any sensible measure compensated for the
losses suffered at Sepias, Artemisium, and the Hollows of Eubœa, is
plainly absurd. Herodotus has evidently, in his desire to magnify the
force opposed to the Greeks at Salamis, forgotten the enormity of the
losses he represents the Persians to have suffered in the two storms.
◆H. viii. 67–69.◆
It is difficult to say how much truth there is in the account given
of the Persian Council of War held before Salamis. It could hardly be
treated as serious history, were it not that Artemisia, a countrywoman
of Herodotus, is represented as having been present on the occasion,
and as having taken a prominent part in the discussion. She alone
advised against the attack; but her reported speech is so noticeably
marked by knowledge after the event, that much of the matter of it
cannot be regarded as genuine. At the same time, it is plain that
Herodotus did obtain from her, either directly or indirectly, details,
whether true or false, both of what happened at this meeting, and
of many personal incidents in the coming battle; and despite the
exultation with which he chronicles the Greek victory, he is evidently
anxious to record the wisdom of the queen of his native city.
#DESCRIPTION OF THE STRAIT.#
The theatre of the impending operations was the channel between Salamis
island and the mainland of Attica, or, rather, that eastern part of
it which stretches from the harbour of Piræus to the sharp bend which
the strait makes beyond Salamis town. After rounding the promontory
of Piræus, a fleet entering the strait would sail nearly due north.
The island of Psyttaleia lies across the entrance, and being of
considerable size (nearly three-quarters of a mile in length), greatly
detracts from the width of the channel, dividing it into two, the
western arm, between the elongated rocky promontory of Kynosura and the
island, being exactly half a mile wide, the eastern, between the island
and the mainland of Attica, being slightly more than three-quarters of
a mile in width. After passing Psyttaleia the channel turns west at
right angles, and now runs between Kynosura and Mount Ægaleos, with a
width of about two thousand yards, contracting opposite the site of the
ancient town of Salamis to a width of about thirteen hundred and fifty
yards. The strait then once more turns at right angles, and goes due
north to the bay of Eleusis, the fairway being blocked by the island
of St. George, where it is only twelve hundred yards in width on the
side towards Attica. Just before entering the bay of Eleusis it once
more contracts to the width of slightly more than fourteen hundred
yards. Taking a line down the centre of the channel, the distance from
Psyttaleia to the narrows of old Salamis is two miles and a half, and
from the latter point to the narrows at the entrance of the bay of
Eleusis about a mile and three-quarters. The scenery in the strait is
beautiful. Looking from the mainland of Attica north of Piræus harbour
along the arm of the channel which goes westward, the deep blue of the
water is contrasted with the brilliant yellows, reds, and browns of the
somewhat fantastically shaped hills of Salamis; while on the right the
pine woods of Ægaleos add a mingled dark and brilliant light green to
the colouring of the picture. Behind the hills of Salamis the grey hump
of Geraneia upon the Isthmus rises high into the air.
From Ægaleos, the view southward towards Psyttaleia is somewhat
different in character. The island, which rises to a considerable
height out of the water, occupies the central part of the middle
distance. The easternmost of the two channels is seen at its full
width. Piræus is in sight, and away behind it the somewhat featureless
shore of South Attica stretches into an apparent infinity towards
Sunium. The channel to the west of the island appears greatly
contracted, because Kynosura, with its serrated back, almost overlaps
the west end of Psyttaleia. Behind Kynosura rise the hills of South
Salamis; and in the far background the hills of Ægina are in sight.
Such is the scene of the great battle, as it shows itself in the
present day.
◆H. viii. 63.◆
The effect of Themistocles’ speech at the Council of War was to
persuade Eurybiades of the absolute necessity of remaining at Salamis.
Herodotus believes, [probably rightly,] that the threatened defection
of the Athenian fleet was what decided him to change the determination
to which the previous Council of War had come; and, if Herodotus’
language is to be taken as it stands, the decision was his own. There
is no mention of any further voting on the question. This decision
seems to have been taken on the day but one preceding the battle.
The position on the evening of that day was that the Persian fleet was
at Phaleron, while the Greek fleet lay at Salamis.
From the historical point of view, the critical point in the various
parallel accounts of the battle is the description of the events of the
next day, the eve of the great fight.
◆H. viii. 64.◆
At sunrise an earthquake occurred which was felt both by land and sea.
The Greeks determined, in consequence of it, to summon the sacred
heroes, the Æacidæ, to their aid, and despatched a ship to Ægina to
fetch their images, which were deposited in that island. Other ominous
events, less credible than the earthquake, are reported to have taken
place at this time.
◆H. viii. 70.◆
It is to this day that Herodotus ascribes the first movement of the
Persian fleet from Phaleron towards the mouth of the strait. He says
that it put out towards Salamis, but that the day was too far spent for
it to attempt to engage the Greek fleet before nightfall. #THE MESSAGE
OF THEMISTOCLES.# It must be concluded, therefore, that he attributes
this movement to the late afternoon. It seems highly probable that
the very serious difficulties which are raised by the later part of his
narrative of the movements preceding the battle are originally due to
his mistiming of this movement. ◆Cf. H. viii. 75.◆ He represents it as
having been made before Xerxes received Themistocles’ message to the
effect that the Greeks intended to fly, and, therefore, as not being
in any way causally connected with that message. On this point his
evidence is in conflict with that of Æschylus and Diodorus.
◆Æsch. Pers. 357, _ff_.◆
Æschylus’ account is, in brief, as follows: A message came to Xerxes
from the Greek fleet, and told him that the Greeks would, during the
night, disperse and seek safety in flight. Xerxes, failing to discern
the crafty nature of the message, ordered his captains, when night
came, to range the fleet in three lines, and “to guard the exits and
the roaring firths.” Furthermore, ships were ordered to make the
circuit of the “Island of Ajax,” so as to cut off the Greek retreat.
Æschylus evidently attributes the Persian movement to the receipt of
this message. But the most important point in his narrative is that
he attributes this first Persian movement to the night preceding the
battle, and not to the afternoon of the previous day. Had it taken
place on the afternoon of that day, as Herodotus alleges, those on
board the Greek fleet must have known of it. The movement of the whole
Persian fleet to the mouth of the strait could not have remained
a secret to the Greeks at Salamis, less than three miles from its
entrance.
To return to the message: Æschylus describes Xerxes as giving his
orders immediately on receipt of it, but bidding his officers wait till
nightfall. This raises a certain amount of probability that the receipt
of the message is to be dated to the late afternoon. ◆H. viii. 75, 76.◆
Furthermore, this very time of the despatch of the message is indicated
in Herodotus’ account.
The circumstances under which it was sent are as follows: Eurybiades’
decision had been taken on the previous day. It seems, as has been
already pointed out, as if the decision had been his own. If so, it is
not surprising that there should have been a considerable amount
of dissatisfaction existent among those commanders of contingents whose
opinions he had ignored.[158] ◆H. viii. 74.◆ They were anxious for
the safety of the Isthmus, and not without reason; ◆H. viii. 70.◆ for
Herodotus states that a few hours after this time, during the ensuing
night, the Persian army started on its march thither.
Another Council of War assembled. It was no longer proposed that the
whole fleet should sail away to the Isthmus; that proposition, in view
of the attitude taken up by the Athenians, could have had no real
effect if carried, and the decision of the council was apparently that
the Athenian, Megarean, and Æginetan contingents should remain at
Salamis, while the remainder of the fleet went to the Isthmus. This,
had it ever been carried out, could not have failed to be absolutely
disastrous to the Greek cause; nothing, under the circumstances, could
have been more fatal than the division of the Greek fleet at this
crisis of affairs. Though no such decision is mentioned by Æschylus
or Diodorus, there is every probability that the story is founded
upon fact. Diodorus’ evidence as to the extreme state of panic which
prevailed in the fleet at this moment is just as emphatic as that of
Herodotus.
There can be little doubt that the design of the Peloponnesians was
to transfer themselves from the sea to the land defence. ◆H. viii.
71.◆ For months past they had been fortifying the Isthmus, and by this
time they had brought their defensive works practically to a state of
completion, for they had employed large numbers of workers, and the
toil had been continuous, day and night. They had also taken measures
to render impassable the Skironid way, that most difficult coast road,
which ran along a mere shelf of the precipices of Geraneia above the
Saronic gulf. Why, instead of walling the Isthmus, they did not, after
blocking the Skironid way, provide for the defence of the two other
very difficult passes by which alone Geraneia could be traversed, it
is impossible to say. #THE PELOPONNESIANS.# It may be that their own
notorious incompetence in attacking artificial fortifications led
them to over-estimate the effectiveness of this form of defence.
Diodorus mentions that the wall ran from Lechæum to Cenchrea, and that
it was forty stades, or between four and a half and five miles, in
length. That such a work would require a very large number of men for
its effective defence in those days of short-range missiles and close
fighting is evident. Still, the numbers requisite might have been
supplied, had all the Peloponnesian states furnished contingents, and
had not part of the available forces of those who did come forward been
engaged on board the fleet. Argos and Achaia were unrepresented; and
if so low a number as one hundred and fifty be taken as the average
crew of each of the triremes furnished by the Peloponnesians, more than
thirteen thousand of their men were, for the time being, not available
at the Isthmus. It is highly probable the predominant feeling among
the Peloponnesian members of the fleet at Salamis was one of extreme
anxiety as to whether the force available with Kleombrotos at the wall
was sufficient to defend works so extensive.
Of the three main authorities for the incidents of this time, it is
Herodotus who gives the message of Themistocles in its fullest form.
His account is that, on finding the majority in the last Council of War
against him, Themistocles went quietly away and despatched a message to
Xerxes.[159] Sikinnos was the name of the messenger, so he says—a slave
of Themistocles, and tutor to his son.[160] Æschylus merely says that
he was a Greek, and Diodorus does not mention his name or quality.
It is interesting to note the terms of the message. It represents
the sender as being desirous for the success of the Persians. It
then proceeds to give two reasons why the king should attack
immediately: (1) because otherwise the Greek fleet would disperse;
(2) because, in case of the Persian attack, a section of the fleet
whose views coincided with those of the sender would attack the other.
◆Diod xi. 17.◆ Diodorus gives a brief account of the matter, and only
mentions the first of the two reasons.
The terms of the message must not be taken to indicate the motives
of the sender, other than his desire to induce the Persian to attack
without delay.
A very little consideration will show that the reasons urged in it
are not necessarily, either in whole or in part, identical with those
private motives which led to its being sent. Still, no Greek who knew
his countrymen at that time could have much doubt that the Persian
authorities would be kept fairly well informed of the main currents of
feeling in the Greek fleet. They must, for example, have been perfectly
well aware of the dissensions with regard to the place at which the
invasion should be resisted; and this knowledge alone would render
Xerxes and his advisers liable to credit the plausible but exaggerated
statement with reference to the length to which those dissensions had
gone. It is purely an accident that the first reason stated in the
message conveyed little more than the truth. Two dangers threatened
the strategy which had kept the fleet at Salamis: (1) the secession of
the Peloponnesian contingent; (2) the advance of the Persian fleet, or
even of a part of it, to the Isthmus, without risking an engagement
in the narrows. There is absolutely no reason why it should not have
gone there as a whole. The Greek fleet could not have remained at
Salamis had it done so, and would have been forced to fight at a
comparative disadvantage in the open. The ultimate result might not
have been different; but it would have been infinitely more uncertain.
Both strategical dangers were avoided, if only the Persians could be
persuaded to fight; and the long-headed Athenian had wit enough to
hold out to Xerxes the two inducements which would have most weight
with him,—the prospect of the capture of the Greek fleet, and the
desirability of striking while the dissension in it was at its height.
#PERSIAN MOVEMENT TO THE STRAIT.#
Xerxes fell into the trap laid for him, and modified his plans
accordingly. For the successful accomplishment of the new Persian
design three conditions were necessary:—the action must be prompt; it
must be secret; the blocking of the eastern and western channels of
Salamis strait must be carried out simultaneously. Even were there
not more conclusive reasons for rejecting the time of the movement of
the Persian fleet to the eastern strait as given by Herodotus, the
fact that it would have conspicuously failed to fulfil the two most
important of these evident conditions would render the accuracy of his
statement a matter for serious consideration.
But this does not afford any reason for rejecting Herodotus’ evidence
as to the _nature_ of the movement. His description of it clearly
identifies it with part of the movement which Æschylus and Diodorus
attribute to the night preceding the battle. The identity is further
confirmed by the fact that in all three historians no previous movement
on the part of the Persian fleet at Phaleron is mentioned. ◆H. viii.
70.◆ Herodotus says that the Persian fleet, on being ordered to put out
from Phaleron, sailed towards Salamis, and quietly took up its order in
its various divisions.
◆Æsch Pers. 366, _ff_.◆
Æschylus says that Xerxes’ orders were that the fleet should put out
after nightfall, and that “the close array of ships should be drawn
up in three ranks to guard the exits of the straits and the roaring
firths,” while others should circumnavigate the “Island of Ajax,” so as
to close that line of retreat to the Greek fleet.
Diodorus is practically in agreement with Æschylus in so far as the
latter goes. ◆Diod xi. 17.◆ The king, he says, placed credence in the
message which he had received, and hastened to prevent the naval forces
of the Greeks from getting near the land army. He therefore immediately
despatched the Egyptian contingent, ordering it to block the passage
between Salamis and the Megarid.[161] ◆Cf. Plut. Them. 12.◆ The rest
of the ships he sent towards Salamis, ordering them to attack the
enemy, and decide the struggle by a naval battle.
It is clear, then, that neither Æschylus nor Diodorus has any mention
of a movement of the Persian fleet from Phaleron until after the
receipt of Themistocles’ message; and Æschylus expressly states that
the movement to the east end of the strait was made after the fall of
night. ◆Plut. Them. 12.◆ As has been already pointed out, if it had
been made during the daytime, the Greeks on board the fleet, among whom
was Æschylus, could not have failed to know of it.
Plutarch, though unreliable as an independent witness, is in agreement
with Æschylus and Diodorus as to the Persian movement being subsequent
to the receipt of Themistocles’ message.
In connection with the blocking of the eastern strait an important
measure was taken. ◆♠H. viii. 76.◆ Persian troops were landed on the
island of Psyttaleia. Herodotus describes this as being subsequent to
the receipt of Themistocles’ message. ◆Æsch. Pers. 452.◆ Both he and
Æschylus say that the measure was taken in order that the troops there
might save such Persians and destroy such Greeks as were driven on to
it in the stress of the battle.
♠ “H. vii. 76.” replaced with “H. viii. 76.”
For some reason, then, the Persian commanders supposed that the island
would play a prominent part in the battle as designed by them. It is
impossible that they could have held any supposition of the kind, had
their plan of attack been such as is described in Herodotus, for in
that case the battle must have taken place several miles away up the
strait.
* * * * *
_Note on the Movement of the Persian Fleet on the Night
before the Battle, as described by Herodotus._
Before taking the historian’s account into consideration, it is
necessary to realize, in so far as possible, the exact nature of the
difficulties in which, as a historian, he was involved by his
mistiming of the Persian movement from Phaleron. He had failed to
connect the movement to the east end of the strait with Themistocles’
message. Despite this, he seems to be aware that the Persians _did_
make a movement in the night in consequence of the receipt of that
message, and that part of that movement consisted in closing the
western channel,—at some point or other near Salamis, he is led to
think. He is also aware that this movement during the night, including
the blocking of the western strait, was made after, and in consequence
of, the receipt of Themistocles’ message. He had already, without
knowing it, exhausted his sources of information with regard to the
major part of this night-advance. What those sources of information
were, it is impossible to say. The probability is that, in the form in
which he used them in composing this chapter of his history, they were
of a written kind,—possibly notes he had himself made on the subject of
the battle, taken years before from the verbal description of one who
was present at it.
Turning to his notes to seek for details of this night-movement, he
would, under the circumstances, suppose, naturally enough, that the
movements indicated in them as succeeding the movement he had already
described, were those made by the Persian fleet in the night. Two
pieces of evidence support this conjecture:—
(1) In spite of the confusion of his description, arising from the
misapplication of his information, it is possible to identify the
movements which he attributes to the fleet during the night with the
movements of the fleet in the actual battle, in so far as they are
indicated from other sources.
(2) The complete absence in his account of the actual battle of any
details of the general movements of the fleets is accounted for, if, as
is suggested, he had misapplied the information which he possessed on
this point,—if he had, in fact, used it up beforehand.
His description of this night-movement is given in the following words
“When midnight arrived, the west wing put out and made a turning
movement towards Salamis; and those about Keos and Kynosura put out
in order, and occupied the whole strait as far as Munychia with their
ships. The object of these movements was to rob the Greeks of the
possibility of retreat, so that vengeance might be taken upon them
when cut off in Salamis for the battles fought near Artemisium.”
◆H. viii. 76.◆
He then recurs to the occupation of Psyttaleia.
“Persians were disembarked on the island called Psyttaleia, in order
that, when the battle took place, as the damaged vessels and their
crews would be for the most part carried in that direction (for the
island lay in the line of the approaching sea-fight), they might save
their friends and destroy their foes.
“These measures they carried out quietly, so that the enemy might not
get wind of them.”
Any attempt to apply this description to the movement made on the night
preceding the battle renders the passage absolutely incomprehensible.
No useful end can be gained by discussing the difficulties at length.
It will be sufficient to point them out, in order to make their
insoluble character quite clear.
(1) What does Herodotus mean by the “west wing” of the Persian fleet?
He distinguishes it from the ships about Keos and Kynosura. Where were
their positions? Keos is not identifiable. Some suppose it to be an
alternative name for Kynosura. But of the identity of the latter there
can be no doubt. It is certainly the long narrow “dog’s tail” of a
peninsula to the west of Psyttaleia, jutting out from the island of
Salamis. There is an exactly similar peninsula at Marathon, which was
called by the same name. This being so, the ships about Kynosura could
only be the west wing of the fleet! How, then, does the distinction
arise in Herodotus?
(2) This “west wing” put out towards Salamis with intent, according to
Herodotus’ language in the next sentence, to prevent the Greeks from
escaping by the western strait. If so, they must have occupied the
narrows either at or just north of the island of St. George.
How did they get there unknown to the Greek fleet of over three hundred
vessels on the other side of the narrow strait, which, as has been
pointed out, contracts to a width of about three-quarters of a mile
opposite to old Salamis town? Could such a movement on the part of a
large body of ships have escaped their notice, even under the highly
improbable supposition that they had taken no precaution whatever to
prevent surprise? #THE NIGHT BEFORE THE BATTLE.# Is it conceivable that
the commanders who had at the time of Artemisium sent scouting vessels
up the Thessalian coast, and inaugurated a signalling system which
extended probably from Skiathos to South Eubœa, would have allowed
the fleet to lie at Salamis without placing sentinel vessels to observe
the straits in their immediate neighbourhood?
[Illustration: SALAMIS FROM THE SURVEY OF ATTICA MADE BY THE BERLIN
GENERAL STAFF.
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.
_Stanford’s Geographical Estab^t. London._
]
(3) What did Herodotus suppose to be the position of the rest of the
fleet which held “all the strait as far as Munychia”?
Attempts have been made to argue that his language with regard to the
movement of ships “about Keos and Kynosura” refers to a blocking of the
strait at about the line of which Psyttaleia was the centre. The object
of this argument is, manifestly, to bring Herodotus into agreement with
Æschylus and Diodorus.
But can this interpretation of his description be maintained, when it
is remembered that Herodotus has already described a movement as having
taken place the previous afternoon with a view to blocking the strait
at that point? Again, Herodotus mentions Munychia as one end of the
line of ships, and evidently implies that at the other end it came in
contact with the ships which had been sent πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα to block
the western exit at the narrows before the bay of Eleusis. In other
words, it seems impossible to doubt that the interpretation which Grote
and others have put upon his description of the position taken up by
the Persian fleet on the night before the battle is perfectly correct.
It stretched in a long line (κατεῖχόν πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν), from the bend
of the strait at the end of Mount Ægaleos, along the shore of Attica to
Munychia. This interpretation is furthermore overwhelmingly supported
by his language in chapter 85, when he says:—
“Opposite to the Athenians were the Phœnicians, for these occupied
the wing on the side of Eleusis and the west. Over against the
Lacedæmonians were the Ionians. These occupied the wing towards the
east and the Piræus.”
The acceptance of this plan of the battle involves several difficulties
which are of a very serious character. If such was the position of the
Persian fleet,—
(1) How can Xerxes have supposed, as both Herodotus and Æschylus assert
he did, that the island of Psyttaleia would play a prominent part in
the battle?
(2) How can a movement on such a scale have been carried out during the
night, unknown to the Greek fleet on the opposite side of the narrow
strait? Any one who has been to Salamis can only give one answer
to this question.
(3) What possible protection on either flank would the narrow seaway
have afforded to the Greek fleet when advancing to meet the Persians in
this position? It must have been outflanked.
How, then, did it come to pass that in after-time the success at
Salamis was ascribed to Themistocles’ strategy, and this not merely in
the tradition of the battle, but by the commanders who actually fought
there? The success of that strategy was absolutely dependent on the
narrowness of the possible front of the fighting line.
(4) If such were the position of the two fleets when the fatal morning
dawned, they must have been in full view of one another, at a distance
of a few hundred yards, across the narrow strait.
◆Æsch. Pers. 400.◆
If so, how is it that the evidence of the eye-witness Æschylus is
utterly at variance with such a supposition?
It is really only possible to come to one conclusion on the subject. As
a description of the movement made in the night by the Persian fleet,
this passage in Herodotus is wholly mistaken. He has almost certainly
used in his description notes of the movements of the fleet made in
the actual battle, for the very good reason that he had previously
used his notes of the night-movement in describing a movement which he
supposed to have taken place on the previous afternoon. Either he did
not possess or he overlooked any note which he had made on the blocking
of the western strait; and in order to describe what he knew to have
taken place, as his reference to the arrival of Aristides shows, he
stretched what was probably only a note on the advance of the Persian
right wing in the battle, such as actually took place, as is known from
other evidence, into an advance of that wing so far as the narrows by
the island of St. George.
It is now possible to hazard a conjecture as to what he means by the
“west wing” in his description of the movement. It is probable that
when he used this term he had in his mind the position of the fleet
as he supposed it to be, not when the movement started, but when the
movement was complete; and it is noticeable that in chapter 85 he
expressly speaks of the wing which would be the eastern wing in the
original position, as the western wing.
#THE MORNING OF THE BATTLE.#
Occasion will be taken in discussing the details of the actual battle
to point out how nearly Herodotus’ description of the movement
during the night, when this exaggerated advance of the Persian right
wing has been eliminated, coincides with such evidence as is extant
elsewhere on the movements in the actual battle.
* * * * *
The movement of the Persian fleet seems not to have been completed
until shortly before dawn on the day of the battle. Its position at
that time appears to have been: (1) the main body was drawn up in a
line across the eastern strait, blocking the channels on either side
of Psyttaleia; while that island, between or in front of the bodies
of ships at either side, was occupied by Persian troops;[162] (2) the
western channel between Salamis island and the Megarid was occupied by
the two hundred vessels of the Egyptian squadron. The fairway in this
channel is quite narrow, as the depth of water on either side of it
is not sufficient to admit of the passage of even the shallow-draught
trireme. The Egyptian squadron would therefore be sufficiently numerous
to block it effectively, though the distance of this part of the strait
from the scene of the battle must have precluded all idea of the ships
posted there taking part in the actual fight. The Persians thought, no
doubt, that by sheer weight of numbers they would be able to force the
enemy’s fleet into the bay of Eleusis, and so into the clutches of the
blockading squadron.
◆H. will 78.◆
During the earlier part of the night, the Greek commanders, unaware
of the Persian movement, continued to dispute on the question of the
policy to be pursued. Themistocles must have known by that time that
his message had had its effect; but, until the western passage was
blocked, there was always the possibility of his plan turning out a
failure. It may well be that he fomented this “wrangle,” as Herodotus
calls it, in order to gain time. There is a partial conflict
of evidence between Herodotus and Diodorus as to the means by which
the news of the encircling movement was conveyed to the Greek camp.
◆Diod. xi. 17.◆ Diodorus says that a messenger sent by the Ionian
Greeks announced the fact. Herodotus, on the other hand, says that
the celebrated Aristides, who now for the first time appears on the
stage of his history, arrived from Ægina with the news. The tale is a
somewhat dramatic one, for the appreciation of which it is necessary to
gather together the fragmentary evidence which is available as to the
last few preceding years in the life of this famous Athenian statesman.
Herodotus’ introduction of him is brief, and certainly inadequate for
a true comprehension of his actual position at this critical time.
He speaks of his character in terms of the highest praise: “After
inquiring into the character of this man, I am disposed to think that
he was the best and most righteous man in Athens,”—a judgment which
the unanimous verdict of his own and after-time confirmed. But of his
previous career he says but little: he had been ostracized by the
people, and he was an enemy of Themistocles. There is no mention of
this ostracism having been withdrawn.
◆Plut. Them. 11; Arist. 8.◆
Plutarch refers to the incident at some length in his life of
Themistocles, and more briefly in his life of Aristides. The ostracism
seems to have resulted from bitter political strife between the
Aristocratic party, of which Aristides was the leader, though not
apparently an extremist member, and the Democratic party, led by
Themistocles. This took place, it seems, in 482.[163] The time of the
revocation of the decree is stated to have been “while Xerxes was
marching through Thessaly and Bœotia.” It must therefore have taken
place a few weeks at most before Salamis. Herodotus seems either
to have misunderstood or to have been misinformed as to the exact
political status of Aristides at this time. #ARISTIDES.# From what
he himself says, it is plain that the ostracism had been withdrawn,
though he does not mention the fact. Had Aristides appeared in the
fleet in a purely private capacity at the great crisis, it might be
conceivable that both he and his opponents tacitly agreed to ignore the
purely political sentence which had been passed upon him. But there is
evidence in Herodotus’ own narrative that Aristides was present in a
high official capacity as one of the Strategoi. It is hardly credible
that he could in any other capacity have entered the meeting of the
Council of War on his return from Ægina,[164] still less that towards
the close of the fight at Salamis he should have commanded the hoplites
who were landed at Psyttaleia.[165] How could he command hoplites on
active service unless he were a Strategos? Herodotus, for some reason
which it is impossible to explain, seems never to have studied the
system of command in the higher branches of the service which prevailed
at this time in Athens. His account of Marathon shows that to have
been the case. It is at the same time true that very considerable
modifications of the system had been introduced during the decade which
intervened between Marathon and Salamis.
Aristides’ action on his arrival from Ægina is somewhat remarkable.
Though he entered the Council of War, he did not communicate his
information, important though it was, to the meeting, but called out
his great political enemy, Themistocles, and imparted his news in the
first instance to him alone.
“Our political quarrels,” he said, “we must defer to another time;
our emulation at this moment must be as to which of us can render
the greatest services to his country. I tell you that it makes no
difference whether we say much or little to the Peloponnesians with
regard to their departure hence. For I say, from what I have myself
seen, that the Corinthians, and Eurybiades himself, will not, even
if they so desire, be able to sail out of the strait, for we are
surrounded by the enemy. Go into the meeting and tell them this.”
It is not difficult to conjecture what Aristides had actually
seen. He had come from Ægina, and evidently, in the course of the
voyage, had narrowly escaped capture by the squadron of two hundred
which had been sent round to the western strait.
His special mention of the Corinthians serves to emphasize what has
been already said with regard to the attitude of that people at this
particular time. They were evidently in the forefront of opposition to
Athens.
The concord between the views which the two ablest Athenians of this
time held with regard to the strategy to be pursued is shown by the
nature of Themistocles’ answer to Aristides’ communication. He makes
no secret to the latter of his having sent a message to Xerxes, an
avowal he would not have dared to make had he not been assured that
Aristides would agree with the motives which had induced him to send
the message. They must have had ample opportunity for discussing the
policy to be pursued. The return of Aristides from Ægina is not to be
taken as his first appearance in the fleet since the withdrawal of his
ostracism. One or two reasons may account for his having been to that
island at this time; either that he had been sent in command of the
ship which had been despatched to fetch the Æakidæ;[166] or that he had
superintended the deportation of the Attic refugees to that place.