NATION AND EMPIRE
Imperial preferential trade--Political relations--Defence
Neither new relations with foreign lands across the sea nor new-old
relations with the United States bulked as large in these later years
as relations with the other parts of the British Empire. The question
of the Empire's future was a constant theme. It was a time of
unparalleled progress in each and all the British states. Great
Britain's vast strides towards social justice, Canada's growth and
economic activity, the similar, if lesser, expansion of Australia and
New Zealand, the unification of South Africa, all bespoke the strength
and soundness of each of the Five Nations. The steady growth of
community of feeling and of practical co-operation in many fields bore
witness that progress did not mean disunion.
Yet there were many at home, and in Great Britain and the other lands
overseas, who were far from content with the trend of events, who {271}
were convinced that the Empire was drifting to eternal smash unless
some change in policy should be effected. To some it was Britain's
free-trade policy that was the danger; to others it was the steady
growth of self-government in the Dominions. Imperial preferential
trade, political federation, colonial contributions to a central army
and navy, were all vigorously urged as remedies. Not one of these
things came to pass in the years under survey, and yet when the
testing-time arrived the Empire proved one in heart and soul.
Great Britain's free-trade policy was first called in question.
Scarcely ended were the Boer War and the disappointing Conference of
1902 when Mr Chamberlain, fresh from a tour through South Africa,
launched his great campaign for imperial preferential trade. Though
protection and retaliation later became more important phases of the
tariff-reform movement, at the outset it was its imperial side which
was emphasized. The colonies and the mother country, it was urged,
were certain to drift apart unless bound by links of material interest.
Give the colonies a preference on their wheat or wool in Britain, give
British {272} manufacturers a real preference in colonial markets, and
the Empire would cease to be merely a sentiment.
Once committed to setting up a protective tariff in order to make
reductions in favour of such colonies as would reciprocate, Mr
Chamberlain and his followers went on to find in it other great
advantages. It would aid British agriculture and British industry,
would protect both farmer and manufacturer from the competition they
were increasingly unable to bear, and would give a weapon for forcing
foreign countries to tear down their tariff barriers. The colonial
market, the home market, and the foreign market would thus all be
gained, and none too soon, if the complete decay of British industry
and the triumph of its rivals were to be averted. 'We have reached our
highest point,' declared Mr Chamberlain. 'Our fate will be the fate of
the empires and the kingdoms of the past.... Sugar has gone, silk has
gone, iron is threatened, wool is threatened, cotton will come.... We
are no longer first. We are third. We shall be fifth or sixth if
things go on as they are at present.... The trade of this country, as
measured by the exports to foreign countries and to British
possessions, {273} has during the last twenty or thirty years been
practically stationary; our export trade to all these foreign countries
which have arranged tariffs against us has enormously diminished, and
at the same time their exports to us have enormously increased.'
For a time it seemed that the tariff reformers would sweep all before
them. Their chief was the most skilful and popular leader of his time.
The inevitable growth of other countries in manufacturing had excited
the alarm of the British manufacturer, and protectionist sentiment
among the landowners, though scotched, had not been killed. The almost
universal reign of protection in foreign countries and the other
colonies appeared to prove obsolete the doctrines of Cobden and Bright.
It seemed that fifty years of unquestioned triumph in England itself
had left free trade a traditional dogma, not a living belief. To the
poor, tariff reform promised work; to the rich, a shifting of heavy
taxation from their shoulders; to the imperialist, the indissoluble
empire of his dreams.
Yet the pendulum soon swung against Mr Chamberlain. Investigation
showed that his jeremiads were largely unfounded, and gave new life to
the principles of free trade. They {274} were shown not to be obsolete
dogmas, but reasoned deductions from the actual situation of the United
Kingdom. Imperial preference meant a crippling tax on food and on raw
materials for no adequate return. The share of colonial markets which
British manufacturers did not have, for which they could compete, and
which colonial producers did not desire to keep themselves, was very
small. Mr Chamberlain was stricken soon after with lingering illness,
and of the younger men of capacity who came upon the scene practically
all were on the side of free trade. The stars in their courses fought
against him, for, from 1903 onward, British trade began to flourish as
never, or rarely ever, before. In the elections of 1906, though other
issues were also factors in the result, the sweeping victory of the
Liberals was mainly a triumph for free trade.
In Canada, also, at the outset, Mr Chamberlain's proposals were widely
welcomed. He was personally popular. The majority of Canadians
believed in protection. Some of those who did not were ready to
recognize the value of a preference in the British market. Yet as the
full implications of the proposal became clear, and as the British
free-trader made good his case, opinion in Canada became {275} as
divided as in Great Britain. It was realized that it was one thing for
Canada to give a reduced tariff, leaving the fiscal system protective
still, and quite another for Great Britain to abandon entirely her
free-trade policy in order to be able to give preferential rates to
colonies or to low-tariff foreign states. Canadian manufacturers gave
the movement a warm but vague welcome; it soon became clear that Mr
Chamberlain was much mistaken in supposing they were prepared to
relinquish any corner of the Canadian market to British manufacturers.
They declared officially that they would not favour an increase in the
British preference even on articles not made in Canada: 'we were not
prepared to admit that there was any article that could not at some
point in Canada, and in time, be successfully manufactured.'[1] They
were, however, fully prepared to give British manufacturers lower rates
than American, provided that both rates were high enough. The farmer,
who chiefly was to profit, did not appear eager for the boon of a
preference in the British market, so far as farm journals and farmers'
organizations represented his view. He would be glad {276} to have
higher prices for his wheat or stock, but did not want the British
workman to pay a halfpenny a loaf to bribe him to remain in the Empire.
To some extent opinion followed party lines. The Conservative party
had consistently supported reciprocal preference and opposed the
Laurier-Fielding free gift. The Liberals had defended that preference
as in itself a benefit to the Canadian consumer, and had deprecated
higgling with Great Britain. They would be glad to receive a
preference in Great Britain if Britain felt it in her own interest.
Convinced believers in self-government for themselves, however, they
were willing that the United Kingdom should have the same privilege,
and declined to intervene in the British campaign. Mr Borden took the
same stand as to intervention; but many of his followers were not
hampered by such scruples, and Mr Foster made eloquent speeches in
England on Mr Chamberlain's behalf.
The Conference of 1907 was essentially an appendix to the Chamberlain
campaign. Imperial preference found vigorous advocates among colonial
prime ministers, notably Dr Jameson of the Cape, Mr Ward of New
Zealand, and especially Mr Deakin of Australia, {277} whose eloquent
appeal was one of the chief features of the Conference. All expressed
themselves as not wanting the United Kingdom to set up a protective and
preferential system unless convinced it was for her own good; but with
more persistence than success they sought to prove that it would be for
her good, and especially to show that prices to the English consumer
would not be increased, and yet that colonial producers would gain.
The representatives for the United Kingdom, ministers in the British
Government, fresh from a three-year discussion of the whole issue and
backed by the largest parliamentary majority on record, were equally
frank in their rebuttal of the arguments advanced and their refusal to
lead Britain to commit what they considered commercial suicide. Mr
Asquith and Mr Churchill were especially uncompromising; Mr Lloyd
George showed more temperamental sympathy with protection in the
abstract, but was equally clear that free trade had been proved best
for Great Britain beyond question.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier was the doyen of the Conference, the only member
present for a third time. He took a less vigorous part than in the
previous meetings, letting the younger {278} lions roar. He had opened
the debate by announcing his intention to move again the preference
resolutions of 1902, and did so in a brief speech at the close, making
his position clear. Canada had given a free preference to British
goods deliberately, and had not repented. If it had not done for the
British manufacturer all that he would like, more could be done by a
system of mutual preference. 'Yet this is a matter,' he continued,
'that is altogether in the hands of the British people, and if they
think on the whole that their interests are better served by adhering
to their present system than by yielding ever so little, it is a matter
for the British electorate. I think the best way of serving the whole
is by allowing every part to serve and recognize its own immediate
interests.' On his motion the resolutions of 1902--recognizing the
value of preferential trade, declaring free trade between the different
parts of the Empire impracticable, urging the colonies to follow
Canada's example in giving a preference to the United Kingdom, and
urging the United Kingdom to consider the expediency of granting a
preference to colonial products, either by an exemption from or
reduction of duties now or hereafter imposed--were adopted by {279} all
the Dominions, the United Kingdom dissenting. Sir Wilfrid laid more
stress upon the proposal for an All-Red line of steamers for faster and
better service on the Atlantic and on the Pacific, with joint
subsidies, urging that the best way to bind the Empire together was to
facilitate intercourse. The proposal was received with enthusiasm;
yet, though its advocacy was continued by Lord Strathcona and Mr
Sifton, little progress was made towards its adoption.
After the Conference of 1907 preferential trade ceased for a time to be
a living issue. Social reform, the budget controversy, the struggles
with the House of Lords, Home Rule, foreign affairs, in turn took the
leading place on the stage. Four years later, at the Conference of
1911, the subject was not even mentioned. The Unionist party was now
definitely pledged to protection on manufactures, but the tax on food,
essential to effective colonial preferences, had been thrown overboard
by a large section of the party. The British farmer was promised land
reform instead of protection on foodstuffs. Even Mr Bonar Law,
speaking in 1912, declared that he did not wish to impose food duties,
and would impose them only if, in a conference {280} to be called, the
colonies declared them to be essential. This endeavour to throw on the
colonies the onus and responsibility of making the Englishman pay food
taxes was denounced on every side, and after much shuffling a
compromise was reached to the effect that 'if when a Unionist
Government has been returned to power it proves desirable, after
consultation with the Dominions, to impose new duties upon any articles
of food, in order to secure the most effective system of preference,
such duties should not be imposed until they have been submitted to the
people of this country at a general election.'
Thus, after ten years of ardent agitation for tariff reform, one great
party in the state was as resolutely opposed to the scheme as ever,
and, while the other was committed to it, the duty on foodstuffs, once
declared essential to save the Empire, was made conditional and given
second place to protection of manufacturers. It was by no means
improbable that the whirligig of time would once more bring to the
front food taxes and imperial preference. Yet as far as the early
years of the century went, the years within which Mr Chamberlain
declared that the decision had to be made, no step towards preference
had {281} been taken by Great Britain, and still the Empire drew closer
together instead of drifting apart. As a matter of fact, the
empire-binding value of tariff preference was greatly exaggerated by
its advocates. The Laurier-Fielding preference was a real bond of
imperial unity simply because it was a free-will offering, given from
motives of sentiment, not of profit. A system of preferences such as
Mr Chamberlain advocated might possibly be a good business arrangement
for one or all of the countries concerned, but it could have little
force as empire-cement. It would be a matter of cold-blooded bargain,
on a par with the similar reciprocal or preferential arrangements which
the protectionists proposed to make with foreign countries. There
would be nothing exclusive about it.
Good came of the agitation. It compelled a bed-rock consideration of
British business and social conditions, and proved that if free trade
had made possible the production of great wealth, it had not been
enough to ensure its fair distribution. This searching inquest was
largely responsible for the great series of democratic and social
reforms adopted by the Asquith Government, reforms which gave the
United Kingdom the world's leadership in {282} democracy and won fresh
sympathy and loyal emulation in the Dominions. In undying words Mr
Asquith gave (1909) a definition of Liberalism which awoke immediate
sympathy in every Dominion. It expressed in concentrated form ideals
which more and more would be the common heritage of all the Empire,
particularly in those Dominions, such as Australia and Canada, where
all parties are almost equally democratic and progressive:
As regards the Empire, to secure full unity by allowing the greatest
diversity and the fullest liberty of self-government in all its parts.
As regards property, to make it secure by divesting it from injustice.
As regards political authority, to make it stable by resting it on the
broadest possible basis of popular responsibility.
As regards religion, to remove it from the odium of alliance with
political disabilities.
As regards trade, to make it world-wide by opening our own markets here
at home to everybody.
And, finally, as regards the liberty of the individual citizen, to make
it a reality instead of a sham, by universal education and by an
ever-rising standard of humane conditions both in the factory and the
home.
We have now to review briefly the discussions which went on during
these years in {283} respect to the political relations of the
different states of the Empire. Broadly speaking, two schools or
tendencies existed. One favoured the retention of the powers of
self-government already acquired by the Dominions and the taking up of
still further duties, while at the same time aiming at full
co-operation and harmony in matters of essential common interest. The
other, declaring that the tendency towards self-government had already
gone too far and would if continued lead to the disruption of the
Empire, advocated setting up some central council or parliament with
legislative and executive control over the whole Empire, within
limitations more or less wide. One stood for a free alliance and
co-operation, the other for organic or federal union and
centralization. These two theories of empire did not, in Canada,
become party creeds; but, on the whole, Liberals were sympathetic with
free alliance, while centralization drew most of its support from
Conservative ranks. On some issues, however, there was an approach to
unanimity, and on others the division cut across party lines.
In domestic affairs self-government was almost entirely won. Some
survivals of the {284} old colonial subordination remained in the
formal inability of Canadians to amend their own constitution and in
the appeal from the decisions of Canadian courts to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council--limitations which had been wholly or
mainly removed in the case of the newer Commonwealth of Australia. But
the long-contested control over copyright was finally conceded, and the
Hutton and Dundonald incidents led to the clearer recognition that if
imperial officers entered the military service of the Dominion they
were, precisely as in the United Kingdom, under the control of the
responsible civil ministers. The provision that the commander of the
militia must be a British officer was dropped in the revision of the
Militia Act in 1904. In the words of Mr, now Sir Robert, Borden in
1902, words which became increasingly true as years went by; 'Step by
step the colonies have advanced towards the position of virtual
independence so far as their internal affairs are concerned, and in all
the important instances the claim has been made by Canada, has been
resisted at first by the imperial statesmen, and finally has been
conceded, and has proved of advantage both to the Mother Country and to
the colonies.'
{285}
In foreign affairs self-government came more slowly, in the face of
greater opposition, but still steadily and surely. Its coming was more
imperceptible; in fact, many Canadians continued to believe that they
had no voice in the control of foreign policy, and made on this very
ground a strong plea either for setting up some central authority in
which they would have representation, or else for declining to take any
part in imperial wars because they had not and could not have a real
voice in imperial policy.
This belief was well founded, so far as concerned part of the field of
foreign affairs, but it failed to recognize the striking advance made
in other areas. We were like M. Jourdain of Moliere's comedy, who was
surprised to find that he had been talking prose all his life without
knowing it. We had been carrying on a steadily increasing part of our
foreign affairs without consciously labelling them as such. For to-day
foreign affairs are largely commercial affairs, questions of trade and
tariff, of immigration and transportation, of fishery or power or
navigation rights. And it is largely with contiguous countries that
the most important questions arise. Now, as has been seen from the
review of relations with {286} the United States and other foreign
countries in an earlier chapter, Canada had come to have all but
complete control of such affairs.
In 1909, following Australia's example, Canada established a department
of External Affairs for 'the conduct and management of international or
intercolonial negotiations, so far as they may appertain to the
government of Canada.' In introducing this measure Sir Wilfrid
declared: 'All governments have found it necessary to have a department
whose only business will be to deal with relations with foreign
countries.... We have now reached a standard as a nation which
necessitates the establishment of a Department of External Affairs.'
On Sir Robert Borden's accession to power one of his first steps was to
increase the importance of this department by giving it a minister as
well as a deputy, attaching the portfolio to the office of the prime
minister. For other purposes special envoys were sent, as when Mr
Fielding negotiated trade relations in France and in the United States,
or Mr Lemieux arranged a compromise with the government of Japan upon
the immigration issue. In these cases the British ambassador was
nominally associated with the Canadian envoy. Even this formal {287}
limitation was lacking in the case of the conventions effected with
France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Italy in 1909-10, by negotiation
with their consuls in Ottawa. Finally, in the Waterways Treaty with
the United States, the international status of Canada was for the first
time formally recognized in the provision that the decision to submit
to arbitration matters other than those regarding boundary waters
should be made on the one hand by the President and Senate of the
United States, and on the other by the Governor-General in Council, the
Cabinet of the Dominion.
At the close of this period, then, every phase of our foreign relations
so far as they concerned the United States, and an increasingly large
share of our foreign relations with other powers, were under Canadian
control. It remained true, however, that Canada had no voice in
determining peace and war. In other words, it was with Britain's
neighbours, rather than with Canada's neighbours, that any serious war
was most likely to come. Diplomatic policy and the momentous issue of
peace or war in Europe or Asia were determined by the British Cabinet.
In this field alone equality was as yet to seek. The {288} consistent
upholder of Dominion autonomy contended that here, too, power and
responsibility would come in the same measure as military and naval
preparation and participation in British wars. Just as Canada secured
a voice in her foreign commercial relations as soon as her trade
interests and industrial development gave her commercial weight, so a
share in the last word of diplomacy might be expected to come almost
automatically as Dominion and Commonwealth built up military and naval
forces, or took part in oversea wars.
In this conception the Crown became the chief visible link of Empire.
Autonomists believed that 'His Majesty's Government' should remain a
manifold power. 'We all claim to be His Majesty's Government,'
declared Sir Wilfrid at the Conference of 1907. The Government at
Sydney was as much His Majesty's as the Government at Westminster. The
Canadian Privy Council was as much His Majesty's as the Privy Council
of the United Kingdom. The tendency in the Dominions had been to
magnify the powers of the king, who was equally their king, and to
lessen the powers of the parliament elected in the United Kingdom. In
fact the Crown became, if the metaphor is not too homely for such great
{289} affairs, a siphon which transferred power from His Majesty's
Government in the old land to His Majesty's Governments in the
Dominions.
It was, however, not enough to have independent control. It was
equally necessary, as the other half of the policy of co-operation, to
provide means for securing united and effective action. These were
provided in many forms. High commissioners and agents-general became
increasingly important as ambassadors to London. Departments of
External Affairs ensured more constant and systematic intercourse.
Special conferences, such as the Naval Conference of 1909 in London, or
the several exchanges of visits between the Australian and the New
Zealand ministers, kept the different states in touch with each other.
But by far the most important agency was the Colonial or Imperial
Conference, now a definitely established body, in which Dominions and
Kingdom met on equal footing, exchanged views, and received new light
on each other's problems. Thus the question of co-operation between
the Five Nations became much like the problem which faces any allies,
such as those of the Triple Entente, save that in the case of the
British Empire the alliance is not transitory and a {290} common king
gives a central rallying-point. Nowhere has this free form of unity,
as unique in political annals as the British Empire itself, received
clearer expression than in the words of Edward Blake in the British
House of Commons in 1900:
For many years I for my part have looked to conference, to delegation,
to correspondence, to negotiation, to quasi-diplomatic methods, subject
always to the action of free parliaments here and elsewhere, as the
only feasible way of working the quasi-federal union between the Empire
and the sister nations of Canada and Australia. A quarter of a century
past I dreamed the dream of imperial parliamentary federation, but many
years ago I came to the conclusion that we had passed the turning that
could lead to that terminus, if ever, indeed, there was a practicable
road. We have too long and too extensively gone on the lines of
separate action here and elsewhere to go back now. Never forget--you
have the lesson here to-day--that the good will on which you depend is
due to local freedom, and would not survive its limitation.
But to many this trend of affairs was far from satisfactory. They
urged that Canada should retrace her steps and take the turning that
led to imperial parliamentary federation. This agitation was carried
on chiefly in private circles and through the press. One organization
after another--British Empire League, {291} Pollock Committee, Round
Table--undertook earnest and devoted campaigns of education, which, if
they did not attain precisely the end sought, at least made towards
clearer thinking and against passive colonialism. Occasionally the
question was raised in parliament. Typical of such debates was that of
March 13, 1905, when Colonel, now General Sir Sam, Hughes moved a
resolution in favour of parliamentary federation. Mr Borden refrained
from either opposing or approving the motion, but, as did other members
of his party, made it a starting-point for a speech in favour of
imperial preference. Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared:
I do not think that it would be possible to find in any of the
self-governing colonies any desire or any intention to part with any of
the powers which they have at the present time. At present we are
proud to say and to believe that the relations of the British Empire,
within all its parts, are absolutely satisfactory.... It is not in
accordance with the traditions of British history, it is not in
accordance with the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon race, to make any
change in their institutions until these institutions have been proved
insufficient or defective in some way.... The British Empire to-day is
composed of nations, all bearing allegiance to the same sovereign.
At the Conference of 1907 it was proposed {292} that the Colonial
Conference be changed into an Imperial Council. This suggestion met
support from various quarters, but was blocked by Sir Wilfrid's firm
opposition. He agreed heartily that the Conference should be styled
Imperial rather than Colonial, but, backed by all his colleagues,
opposed any attempt to turn the Conference into a Council, with
independent powers and an overwhelming representation from the United
Kingdom. In fact the Conference was established more firmly than ever
on a basis of equality. The prime minister of the United Kingdom,
rather than the colonial secretary, became the special representative
of his country, and the Conference was declared to be 'between His
Majesty's Government and His Governments of the self-governing
Dominions overseas.'
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[Illustration: SIR WILFRID LAURIER IN ENGLAND, 1911
_Left to right_--General Louis Botha, Sir Wilfrid Laurier,
Mr. Asquith, Sir Joseph Ward
_Children standing_--Doris Harcourt, Olivia Harcourt
_Children seated_--Barbara Harcourt, Anthony Asquith]
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At this Conference, perhaps more significant than anything that was
said or done was the presence of General Botha as prime minister of the
self-governing colony of the Transvaal. It was only five years since
Botha, as commander-in-chief of the Boers who had held out to the last,
had laid down his arms. Now he sat in the highest councils of the
Empire, saying little, studying his fellow-ministers and the common
problems, and impressing all by {293} his strong common sense and his
frank loyalty. His presence there was due to the courage and
confidence which had been displayed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.
One of the first steps taken by Campbell-Bannerman's Ministry in 1906
had been to grant to the Transvaal full and immediate self-government
without any intervening period of half-freedom. The policy had been a
bold one. To a German empire-framer it would have appeared incredible
folly. The king had remonstrated against it, the leader of the
Opposition had termed it dangerous and reckless, Mr Kipling had hurled
sonnets against it. But the Government had stood firm, with the result
here seen, and with still greater justification to follow. In this and
the following Conference General Botha manifested a special regard for
his Canadian colleague, like himself a leader from a minority race.
Undoubtedly Wilfrid Laurier's example, Canada's example, counted much
in making clear to Louis Botha the path which led to loyal and lasting
co-operation.
The centralization policy found a new champion at the Conference of
1911.
Sir Joseph Ward, Mr Seddon's successor as prime minister of New
Zealand, {294} submitted some months in advance a proposal for an
Imperial Council of State advisory to the British Government, and then,
having meantime been persuaded to go the whole road, made a speech in
favour of a central parliament. The proposal met with still less
favour than before. British, Australian, South African, Newfoundland,
and Canadian prime ministers joined in pronouncing it unworkable and
undesirable. 'The proposal seems to me to be absolutely
impracticable,' declared Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 'It is not a practical
scheme; our present system of responsible government has not broken
down,' agreed Premier Fisher of Australia. 'The creation of some body
with centralized authority over the whole Empire would be a step
entirely antagonistic to the policy of Great Britain which has been so
successful in the past, and which has undoubtedly made the Empire what
it is to-day. It is the policy of decentralization which has made the
Empire--the power granted to its various peoples to govern themselves,'
added Premier Botha of South Africa. 'Any scheme of representation--no
matter what you may call it, parliament or council--of the overseas
Dominions must [give them] so very small a representation that it would
be {295} practically of no value,' said Premier Morris of Newfoundland.
Mr Asquith summed up:
We cannot, with the traditions and history of the British Empire behind
us, either from the point of view of the United Kingdom, or from the
point of view of our self-governing Dominions, assent for a moment to
proposals which are so fatal to the very fundamental conditions on
which our empire has been built up and carried on.... It would impair,
if not altogether destroy, the authority of the United Kingdom in such
grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of
treaties, the maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and,
indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, necessarily of the
most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial
Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament.
That authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with
the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body--it does not
matter by what name you call it for the moment--clothed with the
functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest
it with, would, in our judgment, be absolutely fatal to our present
system of responsible government.... So far as the Dominions are
concerned, this new machine could impose upon the Dominions by the
voice of a body in which they would be in a standing minority (that is
part of the case), in a small minority, indeed, a policy of which they
might all disapprove, a policy which in most cases would involve
expenditure, and an expenditure which would have to {296} be met by the
imposition on a dissentient community of taxation by its own government.
Mr Asquith's statement that 'that authority cannot be shared' has
sometimes been taken to mean that the United Kingdom could not and
would not admit the Dominions to a share in the control of foreign
policy. As the context and later action showed, however, it was to
sharing control with a new super-parliament that the prime minister of
the United Kingdom, in common with the prime ministers of every
Dominion except New Zealand, expressed his opposition. Later in the
Conference a further, if far from final, step was taken towards sharing
control with the Dominions. Upon Mr Fisher's demand that the Dominions
should be consulted in international agreements such as the Declaration
of London and the conventions of the Hague Conference, it was agreed
unanimously that, at further Hague Conferences and elsewhere when time
and subject-matter permitted, this would be done. Sir Wilfrid Laurier
agreed with this proposal, though stating his view that in such
negotiations the United Kingdom should be given a free hand. Some
greater share in foreign policy, most nationalists and {297}
imperialists alike agreed, the Dominions must possess. The real
question was, whether they should seek it through a central body in
which they would have a minority representation, and whose functions it
was impossible to define without serious infringement of the existing
powers of the Dominions, or whether they were to secure it along the
line so long pursued, of independence in what was overwhelmingly the
prime concern of each separate state, plus co-operation in what was
distinctly of common interest.
Hardly had preferential trade as a mooted topic receded into the
background when the question of Canada's share in the defence of the
Empire came to the front and took on a new urgency and a new interest.
The forces of Canada for land defence had been made much more effective
since the twentieth century began. The permanent militia had been
largely increased; engineer, medical, army-service, and ordnance corps
had been organized or extended; rifle associations and cadet corps had
been encouraged; new artillery armament had been provided; reserves of
ammunition and equipment had been built up; a central training-camp had
{298} been established; the period and discipline of the annual drill
had been increased; the administration had been thoroughly reorganized.
In 1911 over six times as much was spent upon the militia as in 1896.
Though the service was still very far from ideal efficiency, there was
no question that it had been greatly improved.
In Canada as in the other Dominions the problem of bringing the
military forces into relation with the forces of other parts of the
Empire was solved without any sacrifice of the principle of
self-government in command or administration. After 1902 little was
heard of the proposal to give the British War Office control over a
section of the troops of each Dominion. Matters moved rather in the
direction of co-operative action. In 1907 it was arranged that each of
the larger Dominions should organize a General Staff to act in close
touch and to exchange officers with the newly reorganized Imperial
General Staff. It followed that equipment and administration became
largely uniform. In 1909, and again in 1911, further steps were taken
to secure effective co-operation between the General Staffs.
Naval defence proved a harder problem to {299} solve. A beginning was
made. The fishery-cruiser service was extended. In 1905 the Dominion
took over the garrisons at the naval bases of Halifax and Esquimalt.
The minister of Marine, Mr Prefontaine, took some steps towards the
organization of a Naval Reserve, but with his death (1905) the movement
ceased. The belief in Britain's unquestioned supremacy, a reluctance
to enter 'the vortex of European militarism,' the survival of passive
colonialism, kept the vast majority of Canadians indifferent. And,
though a persistent minority of enthusiasts called on the country to
awake, the unwillingness of the British authorities to sanction
Dominion action along national lines blocked the most promising path.
By much effort all the self-governing colonies except Canada had been
induced to send annual cheques to the Admiralty. But the total amount
was negligible, and no permanent results had been achieved. After
fifteen years of contribution not a single Australian had been trained
as a sailor. At last, opinion in the Commonwealth took decided shape
and demanded immediate national action--demanded the creation of a
Royal Australian Navy.
{300}
Heretofore Canada had blazed the trail that led from colonialism to
nationhood. Now Australia took the lead. The reasons were clear.
Canada's chief neighbour was the United States--on the whole, not a
militarist country--and there was little fear of military aggression.
But commercial intercourse with this neighbour, along a frontier of
three thousand miles, was close and constant, making it necessary for
Canada to take into her own hands the control of commercial relations.
Australia had no such overshadowing commercial relations with any
power, but had neighbours in the Pacific--the colonies of aggressive
European states, first France and later Germany, and the teeming and
awakening powers of Asia--which gave urgency to the question of
defence. A Commonwealth which ruled a dependency of its own, in Papua,
and shared dominion of the world's second greatest island with imperial
Germany (nowhere except in this anomalous, precedent-defying British
Empire could any one have dreamt of 'the colony of a colony'), could
not long remain indifferent to naval defence. For twenty years
discussion of the issue had gone on in Australia, clarifying and
precipitating opinion. It was no wonder that Canada, which tried to
{301} concentrate the same discussion into four or five years, years of
great economic pressure, proved more confused in opinion and less
unanimous in action.
At the Conference of 1907 the Admiralty modified its former policy and
suggested that instead of a money contribution any Dominion might
'provide for local service in the imperial squadrons the smaller
vessels that are useful for defence against possible raids or for
co-operation with a squadron.' The prime minister of Australia, Mr
Deakin, welcomed the proposal as a step forward, but on his return to
Australia it was still found impossible to reconcile the national
aspirations of the Commonwealth and the desire of the Admiralty to
control all ships, however provided, and no definite action followed.
Canada for the present remained content, having extended the fishery
service and garrisoned with her own troops Halifax and Esquimalt. Both
parties in Canada agreed in giving no attention to the question.
During the general elections which followed shortly after the
Conference of 1907, neither Sir Wilfrid Laurier nor Mr Borden said one
word about naval defence. Nothing but a dramatic crisis would rouse
the people to give {302} the support necessary to enable either leader
to take a decided stand.
The Kaiser provided the crisis. During 1908 and 1909 cries of alarm
over the growth of the German navy awoke the United Kingdom and found
echoes in Canada. It appeared that Britain's margin of safety was
being dangerously lessened, that the Mistress of the Seas had been
challenged. The British House of Commons voted eight additional
Dreadnoughts and the Admiralty continued to withdraw ships from the
ends of the earth and to concentrate the fleet in the North Sea.
Since the eighties international affairs had shown increasing tension.
In Europe the struggle for national freedom, which marked the previous
era, had in many cases been perverted into an endeavour to impose one
nation's will upon another. Not only did France cherish the memory of
Alsace-Lorraine; not only did Italy dream of her lost provinces; not
only did the Balkan states plot to complete the half-done task of
driving out the Turk; but the German Austrian sought to dominate the
Magyar and the Magyar the Slav, while Italy swelled with visions of the
Eastern Mediterranean once more a Roman {303} lake, and Pan-German and
Pan-Slav drew and re-drew the map of Europe to their liking.
But it was not in Europe alone that these nations sought expansion.
The belief that empire overseas was necessary to national greatness,
and that sea-power was the means to that end, spread through
Continental Europe. During the thirty years following 1880 France
added three and a half million square miles to her colonial
possessions, Germany a million, and Italy a quarter-million. Even the
United States was carried away by the current, and Great Britain,
already the greatest of colonial powers, picked up nearly four million
square miles more. Europe's aggression stirred sleeping Asia, and
Japan gave promise of beating her teachers at their own game. This
hasty parcelling out of the non-white world brought friction and often
threatened war. For years a conflict with Russia was believed
inevitable in England. Then France became the inevitable foe. Next
Germany took up the role. Though felt at fewer points, her rivalry was
more serious. A state with the ideals of mediaeval feudalism and the
might of a modern industrial nation--with all the wealth and organizing
power of industry and science at the disposal {304} of a monarchy based
on 'divine right,' and a military aristocracy which moulded and
mastered the nation through control of school and press and army--was a
constant danger to its neighbours. Germany's aims were more aggressive
than those of the western democracies, and its methods were more
efficient than those of other European states of no higher ideals.
True, the democratic and anti-militarist forces were gaining ground in
Germany itself, while elsewhere the folly and waste of militarism were
rousing unprecedented efforts towards peace. But no way out was found.
It was clearly impossible for one state to disarm while its neighbours
armed to the teeth. A few fitful efforts, in which Great Britain took
an honourable part, to bring about a concerted halt came to nothing.
The world appeared convinced that the only statesmanlike way to avert
war was for each state or group of states to make itself stronger than
every other state or group. The war of armaments went on unchecked.
Europe slept on a powder-mine.
In every Dominion the new sense of peril stirred instant response. If
Britain's rivals had counted on the Dominions holding aloof in the hour
of her need, or had held their {305} resources negligible, they were
speedily awakened. In Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa, and
in Canada, press and parliament voiced the new realization of danger
and the new determination to face it more effectively.
At first the prospect in Canada of speedy and harmonious action was of
the brightest. Mr Foster gave notice in the House of Commons of a
resolution in favour of Canadian naval preparations, and the leaders of
both parties met in private conference and agreed upon the general
course to be followed. Late in March 1909 Mr Foster moved his
resolution and supported it with powerful and kindling eloquence. He
dwelt on the burden which Britain bore alone and the urgent need that
Canada should take a more adequate part in naval defence. He opposed
strongly the policy of a fixed annual contribution. The certainty of
constant friction over the amount, the smack of tribute, the radical
defect that it meant hiring somebody else to do what Canadians
themselves ought to do, the failure of such a plan to strike any roots,
were fatal objections. A Canadian Naval Service was the only possible
solution, though for himself he would agree to vote a Dreadnought as
{306} a preliminary step. Mr Borden emphasized the need of action, and
advocated 'a Canadian naval force of our own.' Sir Wilfrid Laurier
declared that Canada must realize to the full both the rights and the
obligations of a daughter nation by rising to any sacrifice that might
be needed to maintain unimpaired the power of the British Empire,
essential as it was not only for Canada's safety but for the
civilization of the world. As to the form of action, he opposed being
stampeded into any spectacular policy inconsistent with the principle
of self-government, and closed by moving a series of resolutions,
which, with some changes suggested by Mr Borden, were unanimously
accepted by the House. The resolutions recognized the duty of Canada
to assume larger responsibilities with growth in strength, declared
that under existing constitutional relations money payments to the
British Treasury would not be the most satisfactory solution, and
expressed cordial approval of any expenditure necessary to promote a
Canadian Naval Service to co-operate in close relation with the British
Navy.
During the summer a special Conference was held in London, attended by
ministers from all the Dominions. Mr M'Kenna, while {307} repeating
the orthodox Admiralty view that considerations of strategy favoured a
single navy, now recognized that other considerations had to be taken
into account, and that 'room must be found for the expression of
national sentiment.... While laying the foundation of future Dominion
navies to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces
would contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of
Imperial defence.' No wonder that the London _Times_ congratulated
Australia and Canada 'on their achievement in having at last educated
the Admiralty up to their own point of view.' Unfortunately the
convert was soon to backslide, but for the present hearty and ready aid
was given in establishing the Dominion naval policy. Australia agreed
to form a distinct fleet unit, consisting of a large armoured cruiser,
three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines, with
auxiliary ships. Canada, not an island like Australia or Great
Britain, had two seaboards to protect, ten thousand miles apart. The
Canadian representatives, therefore, while agreeing that a second fleet
unit in the Pacific would be desirable in the future, requested
suggestions, which were given, for the expenditure, first, of {308} an
equivalent and, second, of a lesser amount on two squadrons.
When the Canadian parliament met in January 1910 Sir Wilfrid Laurier
submitted the Naval Service Bill, which provided for the establishment
of fleets according to the plan finally approved by the Admiralty. The
ships were to be under the control of the Dominion Government, which
might, in case of emergency, place them at the disposal of the
Admiralty, summoning parliament to ratify such action. The bill was
passed in March. In the autumn the cruiser _Niobe_ (11,000 tons) and
the _Rainbow_ (3600 tons), purchased from the Admiralty, reached
Canadian waters, where they were to serve as training-ships.
Recruiting for these ships was begun and, while not speedy, was
reported by the department as satisfactory. The Halifax and Esquimalt
dockyards were taken over. Early in 1911 a Naval College was opened at
Halifax; and in May tenders were received, ranging from eleven to
thirteen millions, from six British and Canadian firms, for the
construction, in Canada, of four Bristol cruisers, one Boadicea
cruiser, and six destroyers. In June (1911), at the Imperial
Conference in London, agreement was reached as to the boundaries {309}
of the Australian and Canadian stations. The naval services of the two
Dominions were to be 'exclusively under control of their respective
governments'; but in time of war any fleet or ships placed at the
disposal of the British Government by the Dominion authorities would
'form an integral part of the British fleet and remain under the
control of the Admiralty during the continuance of the war.' Training
and discipline were to be generally uniform. Dominion ships were to
fly the white ensign at the stern as the symbol of the Crown's
authority and the distinctive flag of the Dominion at the jack-staff.
Then came the reciprocity fight, the blocking of supplies by the
Conservatives, and the general elections of September, all intervening
before any tender had been finally accepted.
Long before this time, however, the issue had given rise to bitter
party controversy. The unanimity of parliament in 1909 had not truly
reflected the diversity of public opinion. Mr Borden was not able to
carry his party with him. In the English-speaking provinces many
Conservatives denounced a Canadian fleet as 'a tinpot navy,' useless,
expensive, and separatist, and called for a gift of Dreadnoughts. Mr
Borden's lieutenant from Quebec, {310} Mr F. D. Monk, came out strongly
against either Canadian navy or contribution, unless approved by
popular vote. So, after a loyal attempt to defend the agreement of
1909, Mr Borden found it necessary to change his position. By
attacking the Laurier navy as inadequate, and at the same time
declaring that no permanent policy should be adopted without an appeal
to the people, he endeavoured to keep both wings of his party in line.
The opposition in Quebec was strengthened by Mr Henri Bourassa and his
following--'Nationalists' in some respects perhaps, but more rightly
labelled Colonialists or Provincialists. They dealt a shrewd blow in
defeating the Government candidate at a by-election held in November
1910 for Drummond-Arthabaska, Sir Wilfrid's old seat. And, though in
all the other provinces the general elections of 1911 were fought on
the issue of reciprocity, the navy was made the chief issue in Quebec.
Conservatives formed a close working alliance with the Nationalists,
who attacked the prime minister as a tool of the English imperialists,
and pictured to the habitants the horrors of the _marine_, of
conscription and the press-gang.
A little over a year after his accession to {311} power in 1911, Sir
Robert Borden brought down his naval proposals, providing for a gift or
loan to Great Britain of three Dreadnoughts to meet the current
emergency, and promised to submit later on his permanent policy to the
electorate. What that permanent policy would be he did not reveal. It
was stated that the Government had not definitely decided against a
Canadian navy, but the insistence upon the difficulty of building up a
naval organization in Canada, and other remarks, made it appear that
some plan of permanent contribution, with a share in the central
controlling body, was under contemplation. Sir Wilfrid Laurier
vigorously opposed the proposals and adhered to the policy of a
Canadian navy. And, not to be outdone in bigness, he now advocated two
fleet units. After a prolonged discussion and determined obstruction
by the Opposition, the Government introduced the closure and forced the
bill through the Commons, only to see it rejected by the Senate on the
motion of Sir George Ross, 'that this House is not justified in giving
its assent to this bill until it is submitted to the judgment of the
country.'
The Government's abrupt change of policy was in part due to the
activity of the first {312} lord of the Admiralty, Mr Winston
Churchill. Whether moved by his own impetuous temperament or by the
advice of others, Mr Churchill threw overboard the M'Kenna memorandum,
and endeavoured once more to revive the contribution policy. He was
not content with laying before the Canadian prime minister the opinion
of experts on the strategic questions involved, and advising on means
to reach the desired end, but sought to influence public opinion in the
Dominions by word and act. The memoranda sent at Sir Robert Borden's
request in January 1913, emphasizing the difficulty of building
battleships in Canada--which was not proposed by the Opposition--and
the difficulty of helping to man the two Canadian fleet units--though
at the same time men were declared to be available for as many as five
Dreadnoughts, if contributed--were preceded by pressure on the Malay
States to contribute a battleship, and were followed by Mr Churchill's
announcement of his intention to establish at Gibraltar an Imperial
Squadron composed of Dominion ships, under the Admiralty's control.
When Australia suggested that a special Dominion Conference to discuss
the matter should be held in Canada, New Zealand, or Australia, {313}
the United Kingdom would not consent. It was made emphatically clear
that Mr Churchill was in favour of contribution, not as an emergency
but as a permanent policy. It was his doubtless well-meant--and
invited--intervention in the dispute, ignoring the principles by which
imperial harmony had been secured in the past, which more than anything
else stirred up resentment in Canada.
The dispute in Canada turned partly on constitutional, and partly on
technical, naval considerations. A Canadian navy was opposed by some
as tending to separation from the Empire, and by others as involving
Canada in a share in war without any corresponding share in foreign
policy. It was defended as the logical extension of the policy of
self-government, which, in actual practice as opposed to pessimistic
prophecy, had proved the enduring basis of imperial union. The
considerations involved have been briefly reviewed in an earlier
section. It need only be noted here that the constitutional problem
was no more acute in December 1912 than in March 1909. Whatever the
difficulties, they had been faced and accepted by all the other
Dominions. Australia was irretrievably and proudly committed to her
{314} own navy--'His Majesty's Royal Australian Navy'; New Zealand
announced her dissatisfaction with the original contribution policy;
General Botha declared that South Africa would prefer 'a navy of our
own.' Not contribution therefore, but local navies, afforded the only
basis of uniformity throughout the Empire. Given this attitude on the
part of all the Dominions, there was little question that forms would
soon follow facts, and each of the Five Nations be given its due place
and weight in settling common issues of policy.
On the more technical issues there was equally wide divergence. A
Canadian navy was attacked by some as useless even in the long run.
Canada could not build up an adequate naval administration in half a
century. Inefficiency and jobbery would mark the navy's management.
The sea was one and the navy should be one; concentration at the
supreme danger point, defence by attack, were the latest maxims of
naval strategy. On the other hand, it was urged that what Australia
had done Canada could do, and that the German navy itself had been
built up in twenty years. The sea was one, but it was tens of
thousands of miles in width; {315} the trade routes required
protection, and the coasts must be guarded against sudden raids.
Greater stress, however, was laid on the 'short-run' arguments. That
there was only one possible enemy, Germany; that war with her in a few
years was inevitable; that when it came Great Britain's fleet would be
overmatched, or perilously equalled, were the insistent contentions of
one party. That the Pacific required watching as well as the North
Sea; that relations with Germany, on Sir Edward Grey's testimony, were
improving and war unlikely; that if war came in a few years the naval
power of Britain, to say nothing of that of France and Russia, would be
overwhelming, was the other party's oft-reiterated answer. It was
urged, also, that the Canadian Government's belief in the seriousness
of the emergency must be judged by its acts, not its words. Had it
believed war imminent and the naval situation so dangerous that its
three Dreadnoughts were required, it would unquestionably have been too
patriotic to think for a moment of any other course but to bring on a
general election in 1913 to override the Senate.
That is now ancient history. The outbreak of the Great War threw the
Canadian naval {316} question, along with so many greater questions,
into the melting pot. The temporary easing of the international
situation after 1912 was followed by acute tension again, and this time
the restraining forces gave way. The rivalry of Teuton and Slav in the
Balkans, where of late the balance had tilted against the Central
Powers because of the defeat of their quasi-ally, Turkey, provided the
setting. The murder of an Austrian prince by a Servian subject gave
the occasion, and Germany set the fatal drama in motion. What part was
played in her decision by dreams of world conquest or dread of being
hemmed in by ever-stronger foes, what part by the desire of a
challenged autocracy to turn the people from internal reform to
external policy, will not be certain until the chancelleries of Europe
have given up their secrets, if certain then; but, whatever the motive,
all the world outside Germany has agreed that had she willed she could
have averted the fatal ending of those tense days of July 1914.
When the intervention of the United Kingdom was made inevitable and
practically unanimous by the brutal attack on Belgium, Canada never
hesitated for a moment as to her attitude. The rights of the immediate
issue {317} were clear; the whole world's liberty was plainly at stake;
the struggle promised to task, if not to overtask, every resource of
the mother country. Sir Robert Borden acted promptly and effectively,
and parliament when called in special session unanimously backed his
actions. In a few weeks the largest force that had ever crossed the
Atlantic sailed to England, and throughout the war ten thousand upon
ten thousand followed. The Dominions surprised the world, and not
least themselves, by the greatness and effectiveness of the efforts
made in the common cause. At first, distance or over-confidence
prevented a full grasp of the crisis by the general public, and even by
the leaders of opinion; but, as time went on, the sense of the
greatness of the issue deepened, resolution hardened, and the only
measures of effort were what the crisis called for and what Canada
could give.
The country was united as on few occasions. Here and there undigested
groups of immigrants from the enemy lands stood out from the common
enthusiasm, but gave little overt trouble. In Quebec some, but not
all, of the Nationalists opposed Canada's participation in the war,
taking either the belated colonial view that it was Britain's part to
fight the {318} Empire's wars, or the more logical but inopportune view
that Canada should not fight in a war when she had had no part in
shaping the policy that went before it. They claimed to stand where
practically all Canadians had stood a generation before. They forgot
that meanwhile the world, and Canada, had moved forward.
The ordeal of battle put to the test the facts and the theories of
empire which had been shaping in the years which have been reviewed.
The splendid response of the whole Empire to the call of need proved
that it was not the weak and crumbling structure that enemies had hoped
and zealous friends had feared. Of their own free will the Dominions
and even India poured out their treasures of men and money in measure
far beyond what any central authority could have ordained. Freedom was
justified of her children, and the British Empire proved its right to
exist by its very difference from the Prussian Empire. When General
Botha and General Smuts, after crushing with ease a rebellion which
under a different imperial policy would have been triumphant, led the
army of the Crown in triumph against the German dominions to which it
had once been proposed to banish {319} them, they gave a most dramatic
proof of the power of the unseen bonds of confidence and liberty.
Yet, as the war proved, the Empire had not yet reached its final stage.
Now that the Dominions helped to pay the piper, henceforth they would
insist on a share in calling the tune. That the decision as to peace
and war must no longer rest solely with the government of Great
Britain, however wisely that power had been used in this instance,
became the conviction of the many instead of the few. It was still
matter for serious debate how that greater voice could be attained, and
the conflict between the policy of consultation between existing
governments and the policy of creating a new central over-government,
which had marked the years before, bade fair to mark the years after
the war as well.
The subsidiary question of naval defence had also its after-lights.
Those in Canada who had urged the contribution policy had the gloomy
satisfaction of seeing their prophecy of speedy war with Germany
fulfilled. Those who had urged the policy of a Canadian navy had the
more cheerful satisfaction of seeing that the only 'emergency' was that
which faced the Kaiser's fleet, bottled up by {320} the vastly superior
allied forces. The battle of the Falkland Islands, redeeming the
defeat at Coronel, proved the wide range of action of fast cruisers
based on European waters, while on the other hand the raids of the
_Emden_ proved the need of cruisers for defence on every sea; and the
exploits of the _Sydney_, sister ship of Canada's unbuilt Bristols,
ended all talk of tin-pot navies. The lessons of the war as to ships
and weapons and strategy were all important for the reconsideration of
the question. Still more vital for the decision as to this and
weightier matters were the secrets the future held as to the outcome of
the war, as to the future alignment of nations, and, above all, as to
the possibility of building up some barrier against the madness, the
unspeakable sufferings, and the blind, chaotic wastes of war, more
adequate than the secret diplomacy, the competitive armaments, and the
shifting alliances of the past.
[1] Report of Annual Meeting, Canadian Manufacturers' Association, in
_Industrial Canada_, 1912, p. 334.
{321}