CANADA'S NEW PLACE IN THE WORLD
Laurier in England--Laurier in France--The South African War--The
elections of 1900--The conference of 1902--The Alaskan boundary
In 1837 a young girl of eighteen had come to the British throne. Many
had wished her well, but few had dreamed that, as the best beloved of
British sovereigns, she would prove an essential factor in a great
imperial movement which was to mark the close of her reign. The
extraordinary length of that reign, her homely virtues, and her
statesmanlike prudence had made her Queen indeed in all her vast
domains and the one common, personal rallying-point for all her people.
The year 1897 marked the sixtieth anniversary of her reign, her Diamond
Jubilee, which the whole Empire now planned to celebrate in fitting
fashion.
The prime minister sailed for England early in June, accompanied by
Madame Laurier. It was his first voyage across the Atlantic. It can
be imagined with what interest he looked forward to seeing both the
land from {177} which he had imbibed his political ideals and the land
from which his ancestors had come to New France more than two centuries
before. But his interest and his mission were more than personal. He
had great tasks to perform. The most immediate purpose was to secure
the denunciation or revision of the Belgian and German treaties. He
was to sit in the third Colonial Conference which had been summoned for
the occasion and in which all the self-governing colonies were to be
represented. There it would be his mission to interpret to his
colleagues from overseas the new imperial and national ideals which
were taking shape in Canada. To the general public he desired to make
better known the vast opportunities Canada had to offer both for the
venturing settler and for the trader who stayed at home. Perhaps less
purposed, but, as it proved, no less successful, was a desire to bring
together more closely the land of his allegiance and the land of his
ancestry.
From the landing in Liverpool in June until the sailing from
Londonderry in August, the Canadian prime minister passed through a
ceaseless whirl of engagements, official conferences and gorgeous state
ceremonies, public dinners and country-house week-ends. He {178} made
many notable speeches; but, more than any words, his dignified bearing
and courtly address, the subtle note of distinction that marked his
least phrase or gesture--with the striking proof which he gave, as the
French-Canadian ruler of the greatest of the colonies, of the wisdom,
the imperial secret, which Britain alone of nations had learned--made
him beyond question the lion of the hour. The world, and not least
Britain herself, realized with wonder, in the pageant of the Jubilee
ceremonies, how great and how united the Empire was; and, at this
moment, when all eyes were focussed upon London, the prime minister of
Canada seemed to embody the new spirit and the new relationship. The
press rang with Canada's praises. 'For the first time in my
experience,' declared a shrewd American observer, 'England and the
English are regarding the Dominion with affectionate enthusiasm.' When
the tumult and the shouting died and the Captains and the Kings
departed, Sir Wilfrid Laurier[1] had a proud accounting to give his
people.
{179}
The Belgian and German treaties, so long a stumbling-block in the path
of closer imperial trade relations, were at last denounced. The
definite, concrete offer of the Canadian preference proved effective,
for it was given freely, in no huckstering spirit, with no demand for
any equivalent or that Britain should reverse her whole fiscal system
for the benefit of a small fraction of her trade.
The Colonial Conference was an important incident of the Jubilee year.
Mr Chamberlain, the new colonial secretary, made the chief address and
laid before the members the proposals for discussion. He suggested the
desirability of setting up an Imperial Council, with more than advisory
power, and bound 'to develop into something still greater.' But, as
only the prime ministers of New Zealand and Tasmania gave any sympathy,
the suggestion was not pressed. He spoke in laudatory terms of the
contribution of the Australasian colonies towards the British navy, and
invited the other colonies to make similar offers. As to trade
relations, the colonial ministers decided to consider whether they
could follow Canada's example of a free preference. No definite step
by Great Britain towards _zollverein_ or protection and preference was
suggested. Fruitful {180} discussion took place on Asiatic
immigration, the Pacific cable, and imperial penny postage. All these
discussions, though without immediate results, served to outline the
problems which were to face the Colonial Conference in the
future--after the Boer War had given a new turn and a new insistence to
these problems. It was not until then, and not until Australia spoke
with one voice rather than with six, that the Colonial Conference was
to come into its own as an established body for inter-imperial
discussion.
Outside the Conference there was much discussion of imperial relations.
It was for the most part vague and rhetorical, but it showed clearly
the new-born interest which was stirring wide circles in the United
Kingdom. As yet Imperial Federation was the only scheme for closer
union which had been at all clearly formulated, and, though it had been
discredited by the failure of its advocates to find and agree upon any
feasible plan, its phraseology still held the field. Sir Wilfrid
himself sometimes expressed his vision in its formulas. In a striking
passage in his first speech at Liverpool he pictured Macaulay's New
Zealander coming not to gaze upon the ruins of St Paul's but to knock
for {181} admission upon the doors of Westminster. Yet even these
earlier speeches forecast the newer conception of the Empire as a
partnership of equal states. 'A colony,' he described Canada, 'yet a
nation--words never before in the history of the world associated
together.' Making a dramatic contrast between the rebellion and
discontent which marked the beginning of the Queen's reign in Canada,
and the willing and unquestioned allegiance which marked it now, he
showed that the secret lay in the ever-wider freedom and
self-government which had been claimed and granted.
From London Sir Wilfrid passed to Paris. It was before the days of the
_entente cordiale_. In Egypt, in Soudan, in Siam, in Newfoundland, the
interests of Britain and those of France were clashing, and there was
much talk of age-long rivalry and inevitable war. The reports which
had reached Paris of the strong expressions, uttered by a son of New
France, of attachment and loyalty to the Empire and the Queen had made
still more bitter the memories of the 'few acres of snow' lost in 1763.
There was much wonder as to what Laurier would say on French soil. His
message there was the same. The French Canadians, he said, had not
forgotten the {182} France of their ancestors: they cherished its
memories and its glories. 'In passing through this city, beautiful
above all cities, I have noted upon many a public building the proud
device that the armies of the Republic carried through Europe--Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity. Very well: all that there is of worth in that
device, we possess to-day in Canada. We have liberty absolute,
complete, liberty for our religion, our language, for all the
institutions which our ancestors brought from France and which we
regard as a sacred heritage.... If, on becoming subjects of the
British Crown, we have been able to keep our ancient rights and even
acquire new ones, upon the other hand we have undertaken obligations
which, descended as we are from a chivalrous race, we recognize in full
and hold ourselves in honour bound to proclaim. May I be permitted to
make a personal reference? I am told that here in France there are
people surprised at the attachment that I feel for the Crown of England
and which I do not conceal. Here that is called _loyalisme_. (For my
part, may I say in passing, I do not like that newly coined expression,
_loyalisme_: I much prefer to keep to the good old French word
_loyaute_.) And certainly, if there is one thing that the story {183}
of France has taught me to regard as an attribute of the French race,
it is loyalty, it is the heart's memory. I recall, gentlemen, those
fine lines which Victor Hugo applied to himself, as explaining the
inspiration of his life:
Fidele au double sang qu'ont verse dans ma veine,
Mon pere vieux soldat, ma mere vendeenne.
That double fidelity to ideas and aspirations, quite distinct, is our
glory in Canada. We are faithful to the great nation which gave us
life, and we are faithful to the great nation which has given us
liberty!'
A little later to a brilliant gathering he uttered a prophetic wish:
'It may be that here in France the memories of the ancient struggles
between France and England have lost nothing of their bitterness, but
as for us, Canadians of whatever origin, the days we hold glorious are
the days when the colours of France and of England, the tricolor and
the cross of St George, waved together in triumph on the banks of Alma,
on the heights of Inkerman, on the ramparts of Sebastopol. Times
change; other alliances are made, but may it be permitted to a son of
France who is at the same time a British subject, to salute those
glorious days with a regret which will {184} perhaps find an echo in
every generous mind on either side the Channel.' Long cheering
followed these words. Echo, indeed, they have found in these later
days of new battlefields, of a nobler cause and of bravery no less than
of old.
At last this close-pressed summer was over, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier
returned to a country that for a brief time knew no party. Every
Canadian felt that his country stood higher than before in the world's
regard, and the welcome given to the prime minister on his return
fittingly marked that nation-wide feeling. Canada's hour at last was
come.
In 1899 the outbreak of the war with the Boer republics gave occasion
for a new step in Canada's national and imperial development. By
instituting the British preference Canada had made a distinct advance
towards closer union along the line of trade. Now, by sharing for the
first time in an imperial war overseas, the Dominion made an equally
momentous advance along the line of closer union for defence.
The conflict in South Africa had been brewing for years. Over and
above the racial antagonism between Boer and Briton there was the
strife unavoidable between a primitive, {185} pastoral people and a
cosmopolitan, gold-seeking host. The Transvaal burgher feared that, if
the newcomers were admitted freely to the franchise, he and all things
that he cherished would be swamped. The Outlander was equally
determined to have the dominant voice in the country in which he was
rapidly gaining the majority. And what with corruption rife in the
little oligarchy that surrounded Paul Kruger at Pretoria; what with the
Anglo-German-Jewish mining magnates of Johannesburg in control of a
subsidized press; what with Rhodes and Jameson dreaming of a solid
British South Africa and fanatical Doppers dreaming of the day when the
last _rooinek_ would be shipped from Table Bay, and with the Kaiser in
a telegraphing mood--there was no lack of tinder for a conflagration.
Even so, the war might have been averted, for there were signs of
growth among the Boers of a more reasonable party under Joubert and
Botha. But, whatever might have been, Paul Kruger's obstinacy and
Joseph Chamberlain's firmness collided; and when, on October 9, 1899,
Kruger issued his ultimatum, demanding that Great Britain should
withdraw her troops from the Transvaal frontier and submit the dispute
to arbitration, the die was cast.
{186}
What of Canada? She had never before taken part in war beyond the
American continent. Yet no sooner was the ultimatum launched than
offers of service from individuals and military units began to pour
into Ottawa, and press and public to demand that a Canadian contingent
should be sent. It was a startling change from the day when Sir John
Macdonald had declined to take any step towards equipping a Canadian
contingent for the Soudan. It was not because Canada was deeply
convinced that in the Boer War Britain's cause was more just than in
the Egyptian War. The vast majority, indeed, believed that the cause
was just, that Britain was fighting to free a population suffering
under intolerable tyranny. When neutral opinion the world over
condemned Britain's policy, Mr Balfour urged in its defence that the
colonies believed in its justice. True; not because, in Canada, at
least, there was at the outset any real knowledge of the tangled issue,
but simply because of the reputation which British statesmen had
acquired in the past for probity and fairness. Nor was it that Canada
believed the Empire's existence to be at stake. Many a time leaders of
both parties had spoken fervently of coming to {187} Britain's aid if
ever she should be in serious straits. But few, if any, in Canada
believed this to be such an occasion. In the phrase of a fervent
Canadian imperialist, it seemed as if a hundred-ton hammer was being
used to crush a hazel-nut. Faith in the greatness of Britain's naval
and military might was strong, and, even more than in Britain, public
opinion in Canada anticipated a 'promenade to Pretoria,' and was only
afraid that the fighting would be all over before our men arrived. It
was just another of Britain's 'little wars.'
The real source of the demand that Canada should now take a part lay in
the new-born imperial and national consciousness. The crisis served to
precipitate the emotions and opinions which had been vaguely floating
in the Canadian mind. The Jubilee festivities and the British
preference had increased imperial sentiment; and, with returning
prosperity and rapid growth, national pride was getting the better of
colonial dependence. A curious element in this pride was the sense of
rivalry with the United States, which had just won more or less glory
in a little war with Spain. All these sentiments, fanned by vigorous
newspaper appeal, led to the wish to {188} do something tangible to
show that the day of passive loyalty was over and the day of
responsible partnership had begun.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier was faced with a difficult problem. He had not
expected war. 'I had hoped to the last,' he said later, 'that there
would be no war ... that the Uitlanders would get their rights from Mr
Kruger's Government, not by the use of force but simply by the means of
reason applied to the case.' Now he was suddenly called upon to decide
one of the most momentous issues that had ever confronted the Canadian
people. He had to decide it in the midst of a rising tide of popular
enthusiasm in the English-speaking provinces. Equally he had to take
into account the lukewarmness or hostility of Quebec. The majority of
French Canadians stood where their English-speaking fellow-citizens had
stood ten or twenty years before. They were passively loyal, content
to be a protected colony. The instinctive sympathies of many would be
for the Boer minority rather than for the English Outlanders in the
Transvaal. We may read the prime minister's thoughts on this aspect of
the problem from his own words, addressed to an audience in Toronto:
{189}
Blood is thicker than water, and the issue may not appeal to my
fellow-countrymen of French origin as it appealed to you.... Still we
are British subjects, and claim the rights of British subjects, and we
assume all the responsibilities this entails. There are men foolish
enough, there are men unpatriotic enough, to blame us and to say that I
should have rushed on and taken no precautions to guide public opinion
in my own province. That is not my way of governing the country. I
told you a moment ago that I would not swim with the current, that I
would endeavour to guide the current, and on this occasion I tried to
do so.
Moreover, parliament was not in session, and British precedent required
the consent of parliament for waging war.
In an interview given on the 3rd of October, a week before the war
broke out, Sir Wilfrid denied a report that the Government had already
decided to send a contingent, and stated that it could not do so
without parliament's consent. On the same day a dispatch was received
from Mr Chamberlain expressing thanks for individual offers of service,
and stating that four units of one hundred and twenty-five men each
would gladly be accepted, to be equipped and sent to Africa at their
own or Canada's cost, and thereafter to be maintained by the Imperial
Government. {190} Ten days later, three days after the declaration of
war, the Government at Ottawa issued an order-in-council providing for
a contingent of one thousand men.[2]
The decision once made, the Government lost no time in equipping and
dispatching the contingent. On the 30th of October the troops sailed
from Quebec. A week later the Government offered a second contingent.
Already it was becoming clear that there would be no 'Christmas dinner
in Pretoria.' Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith were besieged, and
the British were retiring in Natal. Six weeks passed before the
British Government accepted. This time the Canadian authorities
decided to send a regiment of Mounted Rifles and three batteries of
artillery. Later a battalion of infantry was raised to garrison
Halifax and thus release the Leinster regiment for the front, {191}
while Lord Strathcona provided the funds to send the Strathcona Horse.
In the last year of the war five regiments of Mounted Rifles and a
Constabulary Force, which saw active service, were recruited. All
told, over seven thousand Canadians went to South Africa.
The course of the war was followed with intense interest in Canada.
Alike in the anxious days of December, the black week of Stormberg,
Magersfontein, and Tugela, and in the joyful reaction of the relief of
Kimberley and Ladysmith and Mafeking and the victory of Paardeberg,
Canadians felt themselves a part of the moving scene. Perhaps the part
taken by their own small force was seen out of perspective; but with
all due discount for the patriotic exaggeration of Canadian newspaper
correspondents and for the generosity of Lord Roberts's high-flown
praise, the people of Canada believed that they had good reason to feel
more than proud of their representatives on the veldts of Africa.
After Zand River and Doornkop, Paardeberg and Mafeking, it was plain
that the Canadian soldier could hold his own on the field of battle.
In the words of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, replying to an attack made by Mr
Bourassa:
When we heard that our volunteers had justified fully the confidence
placed in them, that they had {192} charged like veterans, that their
conduct was heroic and had won for them the encomiums of the
Commander-in-Chief and the unstinted admiration of their comrades, who
had faced death upon a hundred battlefields in all parts of the world,
is there a man whose bosom did not swell with pride, the noblest of all
pride, that pride of pure patriotism, the pride of the consciousness of
our rising strength, the pride of the consciousness that on that day it
had been revealed to the world that a new power had arisen in the west?
Nor is that all. The work of union and harmony between the chief races
of this country is not yet complete.... But there is no bond of union
so strong as the bond created by common dangers faced in common.
To-day there are men in South Africa representing the two branches of
the Canadian family, fighting side by side for the honour of Canada.
Already some of them have fallen, giving to the country the last full
measure of devotion. Their remains have been laid in the same grave,
there to lie to the end of time in that last fraternal embrace. Can we
not hope, I ask my honourable friend himself [Mr Bourassa], that in
that grave shall be buried the last vestiges of our former antagonism?
If such shall be the result, if we can indulge that hope, if we can
believe that in that grave shall be buried our contentions, the sending
of the contingent will be the greatest service ever rendered Canada
since Confederation.
Meanwhile another war, much less honourable than that on the plains of
Africa, was {193} being waged against the Government on the hustings of
Canada. The general elections of 1900 gave countless opportunities for
the unscrupulous and reckless appeals to racial prejudice and for the
charges of disloyalty which have unfortunately marked so many Canadian
political contests. Sir Wilfrid Laurier had to face the attacks of
extremists in both Quebec and Ontario. In Ontario he was denounced for
hesitating to send the first contingent, and particularly for retaining
in his Cabinet Mr Tarte, who was reported to have made anti-imperial
speeches in Paris. Blissfully unaware that before the next general
election they would be lauding the same Tarte to the skies, the chiefs
of the Opposition made their war-cry for Ontario, 'Shall Tarte rule?'
Concurrently in Quebec the prime minister was denounced for sending the
contingent at all, both by Conservatives and by one of the ablest of
his former followers, Henri Bourassa, who had broken with his leader on
this issue and on other more personal grounds. Even the veteran leader
of the Opposition, Sir Charles Tupper, played a double role. 'Sir
Wilfrid Laurier is too English for me,' he declared in Quebec, and
inveighed against the prime minister, whom he characterized as {194} an
advocate of imperialism. But at Toronto, some time later, he strove to
explain away these words and to convince his hearers that Sir Wilfrid
was 'not half British enough.'
Nevertheless, when polling day came in November, the Government was
sustained by an enlarged majority. In Ontario it lost fourteen seats,
but it gained in the maritime provinces, while Quebec still further
increased its overwhelming contingent of Liberals in the House of
Commons. The country as a whole evidently approved the Government's
policy in the war, and was not unmindful of the long-sought prosperity
which was coming under a vigorous administration at Ottawa.
Sir Charles Tupper, now over eighty, but still aggressive and full of
enthusiasm, decided to give up the leadership of the Conservative
party. He was succeeded by a fellow Nova Scotian, Mr Robert Laird
Borden of Halifax. The new leader had been only four years in
parliament, but his ability and straightforwardness had won instant
recognition. Few changes had occurred in the ranks of the 'Ministry of
all the Talents' of 1896. Sir Oliver Mowat and Sir Henri Joly de
Lotbiniere had retired to lieutenant-governorships, and their places
had been taken respectively {195} by Mr David Mills and Mr M. E.
Bernier. The permanence of this Ministry was in strong contrast to the
incessant changes which had marked the last Liberal Cabinet, that of
1873-78.
[Illustration: SIR ROBERT BORDEN From a photograph by Montminy, Quebec]
The questions of imperial relationship raised by the Boer War lent
especial interest to the Colonial Conference of 1902. Again the formal
occasion for inviting the representatives of the Dominions to Great
Britain was a royal ceremony. Good Queen Victoria had died in 1901,
and the coronation of Edward the Seventh was to take place in June.
The sudden illness of the king postponed the festivities, but the
meetings of the Conference went on as arranged.
The United Kingdom was represented by Mr Chamberlain, Lord Selborne,
and Mr Brodrick. Sir Edmund Barton and Sir John Forrest represented
Australia, now a single Commonwealth. To speak for the smaller
colonies appeared their respective prime ministers--Mr Richard Seddon
for New Zealand, Sir Gordon Sprigg for Cape Colony, Sir Albert Hime for
Natal, and Sir Robert Bond for Newfoundland. Sir Wilfrid Laurier
represented Canada. He was accompanied {196} by Mr Fielding, Sir
Frederick Borden, Sir William Mulock, and Mr Paterson. The sessions
were more formal than on previous occasions. Only the prime ministers
of the Dominions spoke, except when questions arose affecting the
special department of one of the other ministers. The earlier
conferences had been in a sense preparatory, and the issues raised had
not been pressed. Now the dramatic pressure of events and the
masterful eagerness of Mr Chamberlain alike gave to the meetings a much
more serious aspect.
English imperialists were intensely interested and intensely hopeful.
'I cannot conceal from myself,' declared Mr Chamberlain in his opening
address, 'that very great anticipations have been formed as to the
results which may accrue from our meeting.' The enthusiasm of Canadian
and Australian and New Zealander for the cause of the mother country in
the war had led many to believe that the time was ripe for a great
stride toward the centralization of the Empire. The policy of autonomy
as the basis of union was attacked as obsolete. According to the new
imperialism, the control of the Empire should be centralized, should be
vested in the British Government, or in an Imperial Council or {197}
parliament sitting at London, in which numbers and the overwhelming
force of environment and social pressure would give Great Britain
unquestioned dominance. Mr Chamberlain himself shared these hopes and
these limitations. He was, indeed, more popular in the colonies than
any other British statesman, because he had recognized more fully than
any other their strength and the value of their support. Yet he, too,
laboured under the delusion that Australia and Canada were simply
England beyond the seas. He not only looked at imperial questions from
the point of view of one who was an Englishman first and last, but
expected to find Australians and Canadians doing the same.
These expectations were destined to be rudely shattered. The new
imperialism did not give scope for the aspirations of the Dominions.
Its apostles had failed to recognize that if the war had stimulated
imperial sentiment in the Dominions it had also stimulated national
consciousness. The spectacular entry upon the world's stage involved
in sending troops half-way across the globe, the bravery and the
steadfastness the troops had displayed, had sent a thrill of pride
through every Dominion. The achievement {198} of federation in
Australia and the new-found prosperity of Canada gave added impetus to
the national feeling. And, as a cross-current, opposed alike to the
rising nationalism and to any kind of imperialism, there was still the
old colonialism, the survival of ways of thought bred of the days when
Englishmen regarded the colonies as 'our possessions' and colonials
acquiesced. These three currents, colonialism, nationalism, and
imperialism, ran strong in Australian and Canadian life, and none of
them could be disregarded. A free imperialism, consonant with and
allied to national ambitions, the Dominions would have, had indeed
already, but the idea of Mr Chamberlain and his followers, which
contravened both the new nationalism and the old colonialism, could not
prevail.
As before, the chief subjects dealt with by the Conference fell into
three fields--political relations, commercial relations, and defence.
In opening the Conference Mr Chamberlain declared that the problem of
future political relations had been simplified by the federation of the
Australian colonies and the coming closer union of South Africa. The
next step would be the federation of the Empire, which he believed was
within the limits of {199} possibility. This might come by sending
colonial representatives to the existing House of Commons at
Westminster, but perhaps a more practical proposal would be the
creation of a real Council of the Empire, which in the first instance
might be merely advisory but in time would have executive and perhaps
legislative powers. Elsewhere Mr Chamberlain had made more clear the
extent of the power which he hoped this central council would in time
acquire: he had defined it as 'a new government with large powers of
taxation and legislation over countries separated by thousands of
miles.'
The appeal met with little response. The prime ministers seemed in no
haste to abandon the policy by which they had already acquired powers
so many and so wide. No resolution was moved in the direction Mr
Chamberlain urged. Instead, a step was taken towards making the
Conference itself a more organic body by providing that it should meet
at intervals not exceeding four years. The vital difference between
the Conference and the Imperial Council which Mr Chamberlain desired,
was that the Council when full-fledged should be an independent
government exercising direct control over all parts of the Empire,
{200} and with a dominating representation from the United Kingdom;
whereas the Conference was simply a meeting of governments in which all
the countries met on an equal footing, with no power to bind any
Dominion or to influence its action otherwise than by interchange of
information and opinion.
As to defence, a determined attempt was made to induce the colonies to
contribute to the support of the British army and navy. Mr Chamberlain
submitted a memorandum showing that the United Kingdom spent annually
for military and naval purposes 29s 3d per head--while Canada spent 2s,
New Zealand 3s 4d, and Australia 4s--and urged that it was inconsistent
with the dignity of nationhood that the Dominions should thus leave the
mother country to bear the whole or almost the whole cost of defence.
He trusted that no demands would be made which would appear excessive,
and that something would be done to recognize effectually the
obligation of all to contribute to the common weal. Lord Selborne for
the Admiralty followed by urging contributions of money as well as of
men to the navy. And Mr Brodrick for the War Office proposed that
one-fourth of the existing colonial militias should be specially
trained {201} and earmarked for service overseas in case of war.
These suggestions met with a limited measure of success. Cape Colony
agreed to grant L50,000 a year and Natal L35,000 to the maintenance of
the navy, while Australia[3] and New Zealand increased their grants for
the maintenance of the Australasian squadron respectively to L200,000
and L60,000 a year. Canada declined to make any grant or promise of
the kind desired. Her representatives stated that their objections
arose, not so much from the expense involved, as from a belief that
acceptance of the proposals would entail an important departure from
the principles of colonial self-government, which had proved so great a
factor in the promotion of imperial unity. They recognized, however,
the need of making provision for defence in proportion to the
increasing wealth and population of the country. They were prepared,
in the development of their own militia system, to take upon Canada the
services formerly borne by the Imperial Government, and would consider
the {202} possibility of organizing a naval reserve on the coasts.
Mr Brodrick's proposal to have a special body of troops earmarked for
imperial service was endorsed by the small states, New Zealand, the
Cape, and Natal, but strongly rejected by the nation-states, Australia
and Canada. The latter countries were of the opinion 'that the best
course to pursue was to endeavour to raise the standard of training for
the general body of their forces, leaving it to the colony, when the
need arose, to determine how and to what extent it should render
assistance.... To establish a special force, set apart for general
imperial service, and practically under the absolute control of the
Imperial Government, was objectionable in principle, as derogating from
the powers of self-government enjoyed by them, and would be calculated
to impede the general improvement in training and organization of their
defence forces.'
Thus, so far as the Dominions had awakened to the need of greater
outlay for defence, they desired to make that outlay as they made all
other expenditure, under the direction and control of their own
Governments. It may be asked, Why then did not Canada, in the
succeeding decade, make better progress along {203} this line? The
reasons were many. One was the engrossment in the tremendous task of
opening up and subduing vast continental wildernesses, a task more
costly than outside opinion often realized, a task which rose to such
proportions that the per capita burden of taxation on the Canadian
became decidedly greater than that borne by the Englishman for navy,
army, social reform, and all other expenditure. Then, too, there was
the old colonialism, the habits of thought acquired under different
conditions, which, by force of momentum, persisted after these
conditions had passed away. Though Canada had ceased to be a
'possession' and was emerging into nationhood, she awoke but slowly to
the idea of taking up her own burden of defence. There was the lack of
any pressing danger. The British navy was still unchallenged in its
supremacy. Canada had only one near neighbour; and with that neighbour
war was fast becoming unthinkable. In fact, the United States was
regarded by some as being as much a protection in case of German or
Japanese attack as a menace in itself, though doubtless most Canadians,
if put to the test, would have refused to accept such patronizing
protection as that afforded by the Monroe Doctrine; the {204} day had
not yet come, however, when the similar refusal of the South American
states to be taken under any eagle's wing, however benevolent, was to
lead to the transformation of that relationship into a self-respecting
quasi-alliance of pan-American republics. There was the view strongly
advanced by Sir Charles Tupper and others, that if Canada were
independent the United Kingdom would require not a ship the less to
protect its world-wide trade. True; and few Canadians saw the equal
truth that in such a case Canada would require many a ship the more.
And if it seemed probable, or even as certain as reasoning from the
experience of others could make it, that an independent Canada would
have been involved in wars of her own, it was also certain, as an
actual fact, that through her connection with Britain she had been
involved in wars that were not her own. All such ideas and forces not
only ran counter to Mr Chamberlain's new imperialism, but set a
stumbling-block in the path of any rapid progress in defence upon
national lines. The unwillingness of the British authorities to
sanction Dominion fleets equally blocked progress along the most
promising path.
As to commercial relations, Mr Chamberlain {205} stated that his ideal
was 'free trade within the Empire,' presumably with a common customs
tariff against all foreign countries. This proposal met with no
support. None of the colonies was prepared to open its markets to the
manufacturers of the United Kingdom. For the present, protection was
their universal policy. It was recommended, however, that those
colonies which had not done so should follow Canada's example in giving
a preference to British goods, and that the United Kingdom should in
turn grant a preference to the colonies by exemption from or reduction
of duties then or thereafter imposed. Mr Chamberlain belittled the
value of the preference already given by Canada. The Canadian
ministers had no difficulty in showing the unfairness of his
conclusion. The preference, which had been increased to thirty-three
and a third per cent, and made to apply specifically to Great Britain
and to such other parts of the Empire as would reciprocate, had not
only arrested the previous steady decline in imports from Great
Britain, but had led to a substantial growth in these imports. Canada
would agree, however, to go further, and grant some increased
preference if Britain would reciprocate. These proposals for
reciprocal {206} preference turned upon the fact that, as a war revenue
measure, the British Government had recently imposed a duty of a
shilling a quarter upon wheat. A few months later the tax was
abolished, and reciprocal preference again became merely an academic
topic.
Canada, still leading the way in the matter of commercial relations,
secured the passing of a resolution favouring cheap postage rates on
newspapers and periodicals between different parts of the Empire.
Already in 1898, Canada had lowered the rates on letters to any part of
the Empire from five to two cents per half-ounce, and her example had
been widely followed.
For the much cry there was little wool. Neither in trade nor in
political relations had Mr Chamberlain's proposals received any
encouragement, and in defence matters only small and precarious advance
had been made towards centralization. Mr Chamberlain did not conceal
his disappointment. In Sir Wilfrid Laurier he had met a man of equally
strong purposes and beliefs, equally adroit in argument, and much
better informed than himself in the lessons of the Empire's past and in
the public opinion overseas on questions of the day. He was plainly
inclined to attribute {207} the policy of the Canadian prime minister
to his French descent. Divining this, Sir Wilfrid suggested that he
should invite the other Canadian ministers to a private conference. Mr
Chamberlain accepted the suggestion with alacrity; a dinner was
arranged; and hours of discussion followed. To his surprise Mr
Chamberlain soon found that the four responsible Canadian ministers of
the Crown, all of British stock, two of Nova Scotia and two of Ontario,
took precisely the same stand that their French-Canadian leader had
maintained. They were as loyal to the king as any son of England, and
were all determined to retain Canada's connection with the Empire.
But, as Canadians first, they believed, as did Mr Chamberlain himself,
that the Empire, like charity, began at home. The outcome was that the
colonial secretary perceived the hopelessness of endeavour along the
lines of political or military centralization, and henceforth
concentrated upon commerce. The Chamberlain policy of imperial
preferential trade, which eventually took shape as a campaign for
protection, was a direct result of the Conference of 1902.
It is not without interest to note that the policy of the Canadian
prime minister as to {208} political and defence relations was not once
called in question by the leader of the Opposition when parliament next
met. Sir Wilfrid Laurier had faithfully voiced the prevailing will of
the people of Canada, whether they willed aright or erringly.
We must now turn to see what relations existed during these years
between Canada and the neighbouring land which Canadians knew so well.
In 1896, when the Liberal Government took office, there still remained
the disputes which had long made difficult friendly intercourse with
this neighbour; and as yet there seemed few grounds for hope that they
could be discussed in an amicable temper. In the same year the
Republicans came again to power, and presently their new tariff
out-M'Kinleyed the M'Kinley Act of 1890, raising the duties, which the
Democrats had lowered, to a higher level than formerly. Little had yet
occurred to change the provincial bumptiousness of the American
attitude towards other nations--though there had been a reaction in the
country from President Cleveland's fulminations of 1895 on the
Venezuelan question--or to arouse towards Great Britain or Canada the
deeper feelings of friendship {209} which common tongue and common
blood should have inspired. Moreover, the special difficulty that
faces all negotiations with the United States, the division of power
between President and Congress, remained in full intensity, for
President M'Kinley made the scrupulous observance of the constitutional
limits of his authority the first article in his political creed. In
Canada a still rankling antagonism bred of the Venezuelan episode made
the situation all the worse. Yet the many issues outstanding between
the two countries made negotiation imperative.
A Joint High Commission was appointed, which opened its sessions at
Quebec in August 1898. Lord Herschell, representing the United
Kingdom, acted as chairman. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Richard
Cartwright, Sir Louis Davies, and John Charlton represented Canada.
Sir James Winter sat for Newfoundland and Senator Fairbanks, Senator
Gray, Congressman Dingley, General Foster, Mr Kasson, and Mr Coolidge
for the United States. The Commission sat at Quebec until October and
adjourned to meet at Washington in November. There it continued its
sessions and approached a solution of most of the difficulties. It
seemed possible to give {210} permanence to the existing unstable
arrangements for shipping goods through in bond, to abolish the
unneighbourly alien labour laws, to provide that Canadian sealers
should give up their rights in Bering Sea for a money payment, and to
arrange for a measure of reciprocity in natural products and in a
limited list of manufactures. But the question of the Alaskan boundary
proved insoluble, and the Commission broke up in February 1899.
Step by step the long and often uncertain border between Canada and the
United States proper had been defined and accepted. Only the boundary
between Canada and Alaska remained in dispute. There was a difference
of opinion as to the meaning of certain words in the treaty of 1825
which defined, or purported to define, the boundary between British and
Russian America on the Pacific. That treaty gave Russia a panhandle
strip of coast half-way down what is now British Columbia; and, when
the United States bought Alaska in 1867, the purchase of course
included this strip of coast. As British Columbia grew, the
disadvantage of this barrier became seriously felt, and repeated
attempts were made to have the boundary defined and, if possible, a
port awarded to Canada. The discovery of gold {211} in the Klondike in
1896 made this all the more urgent. The treaty of 1825 provided that
north of Portland Channel the boundary should follow the summit of the
mountains parallel to the coast, and where these mountains proved to be
more than ten marine leagues from the coast, the line was to be drawn
parallel to the windings of the coast at ten leagues' distance. Canada
contended for an interpretation of this wording which would give her a
harbour at the head of one of the fiords which ran far inland, while
the United States, following the usual international doctrine that a
disadvantage to your neighbour must be an advantage to yourself,
insisted that its spite fence should be as high and as gateless as
possible.
The main point of difference between the two countries was as to the
way of settling the dispute. The United States proposed a commission
of three representatives from each side. Given a desire for fair
dealing, such a commission is perhaps most satisfactory, at least for a
permanent body, as the experience of the Waterways Commission has since
shown. But for a temporary purpose, and in the spirit which then
existed, the Canadian negotiators knew too well that such a board {212}
could reach a decision only by the weakening of one of the British
members. They urged, therefore, that a board of three arbitrators
should be appointed, one of them an international jurist of repute who
should act as umpire. This was the course which the United States had
insisted upon in the case of Venezuela, but what was sauce for the
Venezuelan goose was not sauce for the Alaskan gander. The United
States asserted that the Canadian case had been trumped up in view of
the Klondike discoveries, and would not accept any medium of settlement
which did not make it certain beforehand that, right or wrong, the
claim of Canada would be rejected.
The deadlock in this issue proved hopeless, and the Commission's
labours ended without definite result upon any point for the time. Yet
the months of conference had done good in giving the statesmen of each
country a better idea of the views and problems of the other, and had
contributed not a little to the final solution or the final forgetting
that the problems existed. Later, during Mr, now Lord, Bryce's term of
office as ambassador at Washington, most of the provisional
arrangements agreed upon were taken up and embodied in separate
agreements, accepted by {213} both countries. When the new era of
neighbourliness dawned, a few years later, some of the difficulties
which had long loomed large and boding ceased to have any more
importance than the yard or two of land once in dispute between farmers
who have since realized the folly of line-fence lawsuits.
After the adjournment of the Joint High Commission in 1899 the two
countries agreed upon a temporary Alaskan boundary-line for purposes of
administration, and it was not until early in 1903 that a treaty for
the settlement of the dispute was arranged between Great Britain and
the United States and accepted by Canada.
By this treaty the American proposal of a commission of three members
from each side was adopted. The Canadian Government agreed to this
plan with the greatest reluctance, urging to the last that arbitration
with an outside umpire was preferable. Seemingly, however, fairness
was secured by a clause in the treaty which provided that the members
should be 'impartial jurists of repute, who shall consider judicially
the questions submitted to them, and each of whom shall first subscribe
an oath that he will impartially consider the arguments and evidence
{214} submitted to the tribunal and will decide thereupon according to
his true judgment.' Further, the United States now agreed to abandon
its former position, that in any case territory then settled by
Americans should not be given up. That the United States risked
nothing by withdrawing this safeguard became clear when the American
commissioners were named--Elihu Root, a member of President Roosevelt's
Cabinet, which had declined to make any concession, Senator Lodge, who
had only a few months before declared the Canadian contention a
manufactured and baseless claim, and Senator Turner from Washington,
the state which was eager to retain a monopoly of the Klondike trade.
Undoubtedly these were able men, but not impartial jurists. In the
words of an American newspaper, 'the chances of convincing them of the
rightfulness of Canada's claim are about the same as the prospect of a
thaw in Hades.'
The Dominion Government at once protested against these appointments.
The British Government expressed surprise, but held that it would be
useless to protest, and suggested that it was best to follow this
example and appoint British representatives {215} of a similar type.
Canada, however, declined the suggestion, and carried out her part
honourably by nominating as arbitrators, to sit with the lord chief
justice of England, Lord Alverstone, Mr Justice Armour of the Canadian
Supreme Court, and Sir Louis Jette, formerly a judge of the Superior
Court of Quebec. Later, on the death of Mr Justice Armour, Mr (now Sir
Allen) Aylesworth, K.C., was appointed in his place.
The case was admirably presented by both sides, and all the evidence
clearly marshalled. Late in October the decision of the tribunal was
announced. A majority, consisting of Lord Alverstone and the three
American members, had decided substantially in favour of the United
States. Sir Louis Jette and Mr Aylesworth declined to sign the award,
and declared it in part a 'grotesque travesty of justice.'
In Canada the decision met with a storm of disapproval which was much
misunderstood abroad, in Great Britain and still more in the United
States. It was not the petulant outburst of a disappointed litigant.
Canada would have acquiesced without murmur if satisfied that her
claims had been disproved on judicial grounds. But of this essential
{216} point she was not satisfied, and the feeling ran that once more
Canadian interests had been sacrificed on the altar of American
friendship. The deep underlying anti-American prejudice now ran
counter to pro-British sentiment, rather than, as usual, in the same
direction. Had Mr Aylesworth, on his return, given a lead, a
formidable movement for separation from Great Britain would undoubtedly
have resulted. But while repeating strongly, in a speech before the
Toronto Canadian Club, his criticism of the award, and making it clear
that the trouble lay in Lord Alverstone's idea that somehow he was
intended to act as umpire between Canada and the United States, Mr
Aylesworth concluded by urging the value to Canada of British
connection; and the sober second thought of the country echoed his
eloquent exhortation. While Canada had shown unmistakably at the
Colonial Conference that the Chamberlain imperialists would have to
reckon with the strong and rising tide of national feeling, she showed
now that, strong as was this tide, it was destined to find scope and
outlet within the bounds of the Empire. Now imperial sentiment, now
national aspirations, might be uppermost, but consciously or
unconsciously {217} the great mass of Canadians held to an idea that
embraced and reconciled both, the conception of the Empire as a free
but indissoluble league of equal nation-states.
When the terms of the treaty were first announced Mr Borden declared
that it should have been made subject to ratification by the Canadian
parliament. After the award Sir Wilfrid Laurier went further,
contending that the lesson was that Canada should have independent
treaty-making power. 'It is important,' he said, 'that we should ask
the British parliament for more extensive powers, so that if ever we
have to deal with matters of a similar nature again, we shall deal with
them in our own way, in our own fashion, according to the best light we
have.' The demand was not pressed. The change desired, at least in
respect to the United States, did come in fact a few years later,
though, as usual in British countries, much of the old forms remained.
[1] Shortly after arriving in England Mr Laurier had been made a Knight
Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George. Though on
personal grounds sincerely reluctant to accept such honours, he had
bowed to circumstance and the wishes of his friends.
[2] The reason for the Government's action was clearly stated by Mr
David Mills, minister of Justice, as follows: 'There were two things
that presented themselves to the minds of the administration. One was
to call parliament together and obtain its sanction for a proposition
to send troops to South Africa. The other was to await such a
development of public opinion as would justify them in undertaking to
send the contingent ... the general sanction of the political
sovereignty of this country from which parliament derives its
existence. Now there was such an expression of opinion in this country
as to justify the government in the course which they took.'--Senate
Debate, February 6, 1900.
[3] The Australian representatives afterwards met with much difficulty
in securing the consent of the Commonwealth parliament to this
arrangement. A majority of the members who took part in the debate
expressed the opinion that an Australian navy must sooner or later take
the place of direct contributions.
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