AN EMPIRE IN TRANSITION
The secret of empire--The old colonial system--Partner
nations--Achieving self-government--Building up the partnership--The
High Commissioner--New foreign problems--First colonial
conference--Political federation--Inter-imperial
defence--Inter-imperial trade
When Canada's problems seemed too great for her to solve unaided, many
had looked to Washington for relief, in ways which have been reviewed.
Others looked to London. The relations between Canada and the other
parts of the Empire did not become the central issue in any political
campaign. Until late in the period now under survey they aroused
little systematic public discussion. There were few acute episodes to
crystallize the filial sentiment for the motherland which existed in
the country. Yet throughout these years that readjustment in the
relations between the colonies and the mother country, which is perhaps
the most significant political development of the century, was steadily
proceeding. Steadily and surely, if for the most part unconsciously,
the transformation of the Empire went on, until in the following period
it became a fact and a problem which none could {127} blink, and the
central theme in public interest and political activity.
The story of this transformation, of how the little isles in the North
Sea ventured and blundered into world-wide empire; of how at first they
endeavoured to rule this vast domain in the approved fashion, for the
power and profit of the motherland; of how this policy was slowly
abandoned because unprofitable and impossible; of how, when this change
took place, most men looked to the ending of a connection which no
longer paid; of how acquired momentum and inherited obligations on the
one side and instinctive loyalty on the other prevented this result; of
how the new lands across the sea grew in numbers and strength and
national spirit and, withal, in the determination to work out a
permanent partnership on the new basis of equality--this is the most
wonderful story political annals have to tell. The British Empire of
to-day, tested in fire and not found wanting, is the paradox and
miracle of political achievement, full of hope for the future of the
rest of the world. In shaping the policy which made the continuance
and growth and adjustment of the Empire possible, Canadian statesmen of
both parties played a leading part. That {128} long story cannot here
be told, but a few of the significant steps must be recalled, to make
clear the development of yesterday and to-day.
In the expansion of Europe over all the five continents and the seven
seas which has marked the past five centuries, the Englishman found a
roomy place in the sun. By luck or pluck, by trusted honesty or
sublime assurance, and with little aid from his government, he soon
outdistanced Frenchman and Dutchman, Spaniard and Portuguese, in the
area and richness of the regions over which his flag floated and in
which his trading-posts or his settlements were established. This
empire was ruled, as other colonial domains were ruled, to advance the
power and the profit of the motherland. The colonies and dependencies
were plantations, estates beyond the seas, to be acquired and guarded
for the gain of the mother country. They were encouraged by bounty and
preference to grow what the mother country needed, and were compelled
by parliamentary edict to give the mother country a monopoly of their
markets for all she made. Great Britain never applied these doctrines
with the systematic rigour of the Spaniard of the seventeenth century
or the German of the twentieth, but monopoly of {129} the direct trade
with the colonies, and the political subordination of the colonies to
secure this end, were nevertheless the cardinal doctrines of imperial
policy.
[Illustration: SIR WILFRID LAURIER From a photograph by Topley]
Slowly this old colonial system broke down. It became impossible to
keep in political subjection millions of men across the seas of the
same vigorous race. This the American Revolution drove home and the
Canadian insurrections of 1837 again made unmistakable. In the views
of most men it came to appear unprofitable, even if possible.
Gradually the ideas of Adam Smith and Pitt and Huskisson, of Cobden and
Bright and Peel, took possession of the English mind. Trade
monopolies, it now was held, hampered more than they helped, even if
costless. But when maintained at heavy expense, at cost of
fortification and diplomatic struggle and war, they became worse than
useless, a drag on the development of both colony and mother country.
So the fetters which impeded trade and navigation were discarded.
There followed, from the forties onward, a period of drift, of waiting
for the coming separation. When the trade monopoly which was the
object of empire ceased, most men in Britain reasoned that the end of
the Empire, {130} in so far as it included colonies settled by white
men, could not be far distant. Yet the end did not come. Though
Radical politicians and publicists urged 'cutting the last link of
connection'; though Conservative statesmen damned 'the wretched
colonies' as 'millstones about our necks'; though under-secretaries
said farewell to one 'last' governor-general after another and the
London _Times_ bade Canadians 'take up your freedom, your days of
apprenticeship are over'; in spite of all, the colonies lingered within
the fold. Some dim racial instinct, the force of momentum, or the grip
of inherited obligations, kept them together until gradually the times
changed and the stage was set for another scene.
Alike in the motherland and in the colonies men had stumbled upon the
secret of empire--freedom. Expecting the end to come soon, the
governing powers in London had ruled with a light rein, consenting to
one colonial demand after another for self-government. In these years
of salutary neglect the twofold roots of imperial connection had a
chance to grow. The colonies rose to national consciousness, and yet,
in very truth because of their freedom, and the absence of the {131}
friction a centralizing policy would have entailed, they retained their
affection and their sympathy for the land of their ancestors. Thus the
way was prepared for the equal partnership which it has been the task
of these later years to work out.
Two lines of development were equally essential. It was necessary to
secure complete freedom for the colonies, to abolish the old relation
of ascendancy and subordination, and it was necessary to develop new
ties and new instruments of co-operation. Nowhere in early years do we
find a more nearly adequate recognition of this twofold task than in
the prophetic words of Sir John Macdonald: 'England, instead of looking
upon us as a merely dependent colony, will have in us a friendly
nation, a subordinate but still a powerful people, to stand by her in
North America in peace as in war. The people of Australia will be such
another subordinate nation.... She will be able to look to the
subordinate nations in alliance with her and owing allegiance to the
same sovereign, who will assist in enabling her to meet again the whole
world in arms as she has done before.'[1] It was Sir John also who
urged that the new {132} union should be called the 'Kingdom of
Canada,' a name which the British authorities rejected, ostensibly out
of fear of offending the republican sensibilities of the United States.
Had that name been chosen, the equality of the status of Canada would
have been recognized much sooner, for names are themselves arguments
powerful with wayfaring men. Both in act and in word the Conservative
chieftain oftentimes lapsed from this statesmanlike view into the
prevalent colonialism; but he did much to make his vision a reality,
for it was Macdonald who, with the aid of political friend and
political opponent, laid the foundations upon which the statesmen of
the new generation have built an enduring fabric.
The first task, the assertion of the autonomy of the Dominions, had
been largely achieved. So far as it concerned domestic affairs,
practically all Canadians accepted the principle for which Liberals had
fought alone in the earlier days. In the thirties a British colonial
secretary, replying to Howe's demand for responsible government, had
declared that 'to any such demand Her Majesty's Government must oppose
a respectful but at the same time a firm declaration that it is
inconsistent with a {133} due adherence to the essential distinction
between a metropolitan and a colonial government, and it is therefore
inadmissible,' and a Canadian Tory Legislative Council had echoed that
'the adoption of the plan must lead to the overthrow of the great
colonial Empire of England.' But now, since Elgin's day (1849),
responsible government, self-government in domestic affairs, had been
an unquestioned fact, a part of the heritage of which all Canadians,
irrespective of party, were equally proud.
In foreign affairs, too, some progress had been made. Foreign affairs
in modern times are largely commercial affairs. In part such questions
are regulated by laws passed by each country independently, in part by
joint treaty. Complete autonomy as to the first mode was early
maintained by Galt and Macdonald. In 1859 Galt affirmed the right to
tax even British goods, 'the right of the Canadian legislature to
adjust the taxation of the people in the way they deemed best, even if
it should unfortunately happen to meet the disapproval of the Imperial
Ministry.' And twenty years later, in spite of British protests, Sir
John Macdonald went further in his National Policy, and taxed British
goods still {134} higher to encourage production at home. The tariff
of 1879 was the last nail in the coffin of the old colonial system.
Here was a colony which not only did not grant British manufacturers a
monopoly, but actually sought to exclude from its markets any British
wares it could itself produce.
Self-government in the regulation of foreign commercial affairs, so far
as treaties were essential to effect it, came more slowly, and with
much hesitation and misgiving.
Negative freedom was achieved first. After 1877 Canada ceased to be
bound by commercial treaties made by the United Kingdom unless it
expressly desired to be included. As to treaties made before that
date, the restrictions lasted longer. Most of these treaties bound
Canada to give to the country concerned the same tariff and other
privileges given to any other foreign power, and Canada in return was
given corresponding privileges. Two went further. Treaties made in
the sixties with Belgium and Germany--history discovers strange
bedfellows--bound all British colonies to give to these countries the
same tariff privileges granted to Great Britain or to sister colonies.
In 1891 the Canadian parliament sent a unanimous address to {135} Her
Majesty praying for the denunciation of these treaties, but in vain.
It was not until the Laurier administration had forced the issue six
years later that the request was granted.
Positive freedom, a share in the making of treaties affecting Canada,
came still more gradually. When in 1870 Galt and Huntington pressed
for treaty-making powers, Macdonald opposed, urging the great
advantages of British aid in negotiation. A year later, however,
Macdonald gave expression to his changed view of the value of that aid.
As one of the five British commissioners who negotiated the Washington
Treaty (1871), he declared that his colleagues had 'only one thing in
their minds--that is, to go home to England with a treaty in their
pockets, settling everything, no matter at what cost to Canada.' In
1874 George Brown went to Washington as one of the two British
commissioners in the abortive reciprocity negotiations of that year.
In 1879 the Macdonald Government made Galt ambassador at large to
negotiate treaties in Europe, but he was hampered by being compelled to
'filter' his proposals through the various resident British
ambassadors. When in 1882 Blake moved in the House of {136} Commons a
resolution in favour of direct treaty-making powers, Sir John Macdonald
opposed it as meaning separation and independence, ending his speech
with the declaration, 'A British subject I was born, a British subject
I hope to die.' Yet action moved faster than the philosophy of action.
In 1883 Sir Charles Tupper signed the protocols of the Cable Conference
in Paris on Canada's behalf; and at Madrid, in 1887 and 1889, the same
doughty statesman represented Canada in the conduct of important
negotiations. It was in 1891, only nine years after Sir John
Macdonald's reply to Blake foreboding separation and independence, that
the House of Commons and Senate of Canada, praying for the abrogation
of the Belgian and German treaties, unanimously declared that 'the
self-governing colonies are recognized as possessing the right to
define their respective fiscal relations to all foreign nations.'
The first task had been practically achieved; freedom had been won; but
it still remained to rise through freedom to co-operation, to use the
newly won powers to work out a lasting partnership between the free
states of the Empire. This was the harder task. There was no
precedent to follow. Centralized {137} empires there had been;
colonies there had been which had grown into independent states. But
of an empire which was not an empire, of colonies which had achieved
self-government only to turn to closer union with the parent state, the
world had as yet no instance.
It had not even a model in idea, a theory of how it should be done.
Such a forecast as that already quoted from Sir John Macdonald[2] came
as near as might be, but this long remained a peroration and no more.
No man and no school divined absolutely the present fact and theory of
empire. It has worked out of the march and pressure of events, aided
by the clash of the oppositions which it has reconciled.
In the eighties and nineties four possible futures for the Dominion
were discussed. The first was the continuance of the colonial status,
the second Annexation, the third Independence, and the fourth Imperial
Federation. Colonialism had only inertia in its favour. Annexation
ran counter both to filial sentiment and to national hopes, but its
discussion served to show the desperate need of change and forced the
advocates of other ideals to set forth their creeds. Independence
meant {138} the complete severing of the ties which bound Canada to the
rest of the Empire. Imperial Federation proposed to set up in London a
new authority with representatives from all the white Dominions and
with power to tax and bind. Each played its needed part. The
advocates of Imperial Federation did much to prevent a drift towards
Annexation which might otherwise have set in. The advocates of
Independence expressed the national aspirations which must be satisfied
in any solution that would be enduring. The resultant of these forces
was of a character none had precisely anticipated. Empire and
Independence were reconciled.
In this period the two most important steps towards co-operation were
the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner in London and the
beginning of the Colonial Conferences.
The first step was taken on the initiative of the Macdonald Government
in 1879. It was found necessary to appoint a Canadian representative
in London both to act as ambassador at large in dealing with European
states, and to serve as a link between the Canadian and British
Governments. The latter purpose was especially significant. In the
days of {139} colonial subordination the governor-general had served as
the only needed link. His duty was to govern the colony in accordance
with the interest and policy of the mother country, and in carrying
that out he was responsible to the British Government. Now he was
becoming the representative, not of the British Government, but of the
king, who was king of Canada as well as of the United Kingdom, and,
like the king, he governed by the advice of the responsible ministers
in the land where he resided. This change in the governor-general's
status marked the ending of the old colonial relationship. The
appointment of a commissioner to represent to one free government the
wishes of another free government was one of the first steps in
building up the new relationship.
The initiative in the second step came from the United Kingdom. A
change was now apparent in the attitude of many Englishmen upon
imperial questions. The present value of the colonies, their possible
greater value in the future, and the need of all the help that could be
had from them, were coming to be the leading articles in the creed of
many fervent thinkers. The Imperial Federation League, founded in
London in 1884, gave {140} vigorous expression to these views; and its
Canadian branch, formed at Montreal in the next year, to be followed by
local branches from sea to sea, exercised a strong influence on the
current of Canadian thought.
The new desire to bind the colonies closer was largely due to the
revival of protection and of imperialism both in the United Kingdom and
in foreign countries. Alike in trade and in defence, colonial aid was
by many coming to be felt essential. Abroad, protection was in the
ascendant. Cobden's prophecy of the world following Britain's example
in free trade had not been fulfilled. France, Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, the United States, were rearing higher
tariffs, threatening to shut out British goods. Even Canada and
Victoria had done likewise. Moreover, France and Germany and the
United States were becoming formidable rivals to Britain, as they
turned more and more from farming to manufacturing. It was little
wonder that a section of English opinion began to sigh for protected
markets, for retaliatory tariffs to force down bars abroad, and for a
revival of the old preference or monopoly in the markets of the
colonies.
Defence, too, assumed a more anxious {141} aspect. The nations of
Europe were entering on a mad scramble for empire, for colonial
possessions overseas. Russia pushed steadily westward to the Pacific
and south to the gates of India. France sought territory in Africa and
in Asia, Germany in Africa and the Pacific, Italy in Africa.
Nationalism had gone to seed in imperialism. Long prevented by
internal dissensions from competing with England in the acquisition of
territory, the nations of Europe, now that national consolidation had
been largely effected, turned to follow her example. England could not
logically object to their desire for territory or to their plans for
larger navies. Her Palmerstons and Disraelis had boasted of the might
of the empire on which the sun never set; her Froudes and Seeleys were
singing the glories of the 'expansion of England'; the man in the
street felt the manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon to rule the 'lesser
breeds'; while the American Mahan had made clear the importance of
sea-power and had pointed the means to the end so glorified. None the
less the rivalry was felt uncomfortable, the more so as these nations
did not follow Britain's free-trade policy in their new possessions,
and sometimes manifested a lack of {142} scruple which boded ill for
future peace. And so from some quarters in Britain came the demand for
colonial contributions to the Army and Navy, or failing that, for some
form of imperial federation which would set up a central parliament
with power to tax and to control.
In August 1886 an influential deputation from the Imperial Federation
League waited upon the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, and asked him to
summon a conference of all the colonies to discuss the idea of setting
up a federal council as a first step towards centralizing authority.
The prime minister expressed his doubt as to the wisdom of discussing
political changes which, if possible, were so only in the distant
future. Believing, however, that there were other subjects ripe for
discussion, he took the momentous step, and called the first Colonial
Conference.
Every self-governing colony and several crown colonies sent
representatives. Canada sent Sir Alexander Campbell,
lieutenant-governor of Ontario, and Mr, later Sir Sandford, Fleming,
the apostle of an All-Red Pacific cable. Lord Salisbury, in opening
the proceedings, referred to the three lines upon which progress might
be made. The German {143} Empire evidently suggested the ideas which
he and others had in mind. A political federation, like that of
Germany, to conduct 'all our imperial affairs from one centre,' could
not be created for the present. But Germany had had two preliminary
forms of union, both of which might be possible, a _zollverein_ or
customs union, not yet practicable, and a _kriegsverein_, or union for
purposes of mutual defence, which was feasible, and was the real and
important business before the Conference.
In the weeks of discussion which followed the Canadian delegates took
little part except upon the question of the cable which was at Sandford
Fleming's heart. Australia agreed to make a contribution towards the
cost of a British squadron in Australasian waters, and Cape Colony
agreed to provide some local defence at Table Bay. Sir Alexander
Campbell referred to the agreement of 1865 as still in force, denied
that the naval defence of Canada had proved burdensome to Britain,
talked vaguely of setting up a naval school or training a reserve, and
offered nothing more. The Conference did not discuss political
federation and touched only lightly on preferential trade. As the
first of a series, and for its {144} revelation of the obstacles to
proposals for Germanizing the British Empire, it proved more important
than for any positive achievements.
In the stand thus taken the Canadian delegates adequately reflected the
feeling both of the general public and of the leaders of both parties
in Canada at that time, alike as to political defence and trade
relations.
As for political relations, the only proposal for change came from the
Imperial Federationists. The idea had some notable advocates in
Canada--Grant, Parkin, Denison, M'Carthy and others. But many of them
advocated it simply because it was the only theory of closer imperial
relations then in the field. At first it was too hazily pictured to
make clear the extent to which the Canadian and other parliaments would
be subordinated to the proposed new central parliament. When faced
with a concrete plan, few Canadians were eager to give up control of
their destinies to a parliament in which they would have only one-tenth
of the representation. The responsible politicians did not at any time
endorse the scheme. Sir John Macdonald, as a practical man, saw at
once a fatal objection {145} in the sacrifice of Canadian
self-government which it involved.[3] Some of the members of the
Imperial Federation League urged with plausibility that political
federation would bring the colonies new power in the shape of control
over foreign policy, rather than take old powers away, but Macdonald
much doubted the reality of the control it would give. Nevertheless
the Imperial Federation League and its branches did useful educational
work. Owing to differences of opinion among its members it was
dissolved in 1893, but was revived and reorganized two years later as
the British Empire League.
Nor was Canada greatly interested in questions of defence. In the
sixties and seventies, it is true, the larger colonies had agreed, with
some reluctance, to assume the increasing share of the burdens of
defence made necessary by the increasing control of their own affairs.
{146} Gradually the British troops stationed in Australia, New Zealand,
and Canada (save for a small garrison force at Halifax) had been
withdrawn, and their places taken by local militia. But as yet it was
understood that the responsibilities of the colonies were secondary and
local. As a result of long discussion, the British House of Commons in
1862 unanimously resolved that 'colonies exercising the right of
self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing
for their own internal order and security and ought to assist in their
own external defence.' The duty of the United Kingdom to undertake the
general defence of the Empire was equally understood; the Committee on
Colonial Defence (1860), whose report led to the adoption of this
resolution, agreed that since 'the Imperial Government has the control
of peace and war, it is therefore in honour and duty {147} called upon
to assist the Colonists in providing against the consequences of its
policy,'--a position affirmed by Mr Cardwell's dispatch of June 17,
1865.
Given the fact and theory of political relationship as they existed in
this period, this compromise was the natural result. Under the old
colonial system the empire was Britain's, governed for its real or
fancied gain, and imperial defence was merely the debit side of
colonial trade monopoly. The myth that Britain had carried on her wars
and her diplomacy for the sake of the colonies, which therefore owed
her gratitude, had not yet been invented. True, the day had passed
when Britain derived profit, or believed she derived profit, from the
political control of the white empire, yet the habits of thought begot
by those conditions still persisted. If profit had vanished, prestige
remained. The Englishman who regarded the colonies as 'our
possessions' was quite as prepared to foot the bill for the defence of
the Empire which gave him the right to swagger through Europe, as he
was to maintain a country estate which yielded no income other than the
social standing it gave him with his county neighbours. As yet,
therefore, there was no thought in official {148} quarters that Canada
should take part in oversea wars or assume a share of the burden of
naval preparation. When an English society proposed in 1895 that
Canada should contribute money to a central navy and share in its
control, Sir Charles Tupper attacked the suggestion as 'an insidious,
mischievous, and senseless proposal.' He urged that, if Canada were
independent, 'England, instead of being able to reduce her army by a
man or her navy by a ship, would be compelled to increase both, to
maintain her present power and influence.' He quoted the London
_Times_ to the effect that the maritime defence of the colonies was
only a by-product of that naval supremacy which was vital to England's
very existence as a nation, and cost not a penny extra, for which
reason the control of the fleet must always remain unconditionally in
the hands of the responsible government of the United Kingdom.[4] Sir
Charles, too, was wont to stress the strategic importance of the
Canadian Pacific Railway as Canada's contribution to the defence of the
Empire. His arguments had much force, but they were obviously the
product of a time of transition, {149} uneasy answers to the promptings
of the slow-rising spirit of nationhood.
Action, or inaction, corresponded to words. In 1885, when Britain was
waging war in the Soudan, New South Wales offered to raise and equip a
regiment. The secretary for war at once spread the news of this offer
through the other colonies. Sir John Macdonald's only reply was to
offer to sanction the raising of troops in Canada, the whole cost to
fall on Great Britain. The offer was declined with thanks. A company
of voyageurs, largely French-Canadian, however, was recruited in
Canada, at Britain's expense, and did good service in the rapids of the
Nile. Sir John Macdonald did not, of course, proclaim Canada's
neutrality in this war, any more than Hincks and MacNab had done in the
Crimean War, when hired German troops garrisoned Dover and Shorncliffe.
Canada simply took no part in either war.
But, if political federation and inter-imperial defence thus fell on
deaf ears in Canada, the question of trade relations received more
serious attention. In urging the Pacific cable and a service of fast
steamships on each ocean, Sandford Fleming had hit upon the line along
which progress eventually was to be made. {150} Tariff preferences,
inter-imperial reciprocity, began to be discussed. As early as 1879
Sir John Macdonald, on finding in England much dissatisfaction over his
high taxation of British imports, proposed to give British goods a
preference if the United Kingdom would give Canada a preference in
return. Thus, on the ruins of the old colonial system imposed by the
mother country's edict, would be built a new colonial system based on
free negotiation between equal states. In view of Britain's rooted
adherence to free trade, nothing, of course, came of the proposal. Ten
years later there was in England some discussion of protection or 'fair
trade,' and in Canada, during the elections of 1891, the idea of an
imperial _zollverein_ was rhetorically mooted as an alternative to
reciprocity with the United States. Three years later still (1894) the
second Colonial Conference met at Ottawa, on the invitation of the
Dominion Government. The object was to arrange treaties of reciprocity
in trade between the various colonies, to serve until such time as the
mother country should renounce her free-trade errors. There were many
forceful and eloquent speeches, notably one by Mr, now Sir George,
Foster, and a resolution was {151} passed in favour of an Imperial
Customs Union. But, save for a limited arrangement with New Zealand in
1895, no definite result followed.
The policy of the Liberal Opposition in Canada in respect to
inter-imperial trade may be briefly stated. Mr Laurier's first speech,
as leader of the party, at Somerset, in 1887, has already been
mentioned. There he declared that if commercial union with Great
Britain were feasible, he would favour it. But he had more hope of
commercial union with other British colonies, which had protective
tariffs. Two years later, speaking at Toronto, he referred to the
obvious difficulties in the way of commercial union with Britain
itself. 'I would favour with all my soul,' he said, 'a more close
commercial alliance of Canada with Great Britain. But, sir, if there
is any man who believes that any such an alliance between Canada and
Great Britain can be formed upon any other basis than that of free
trade, which prevails in England, that man is a Rip Van Winkle, who has
been sleeping not only for the last seven but for the last forty-four
years. The British people will not to-day go back upon the policy of
free trade, and Canada is not in a position at the moment, {152} with
the large revenue which she has to collect, to adopt any other tariff
than a revenue tariff at best.' That free trade among all the British
communities would some day be to their advantage, and that it would
come in time, he stated elsewhere, but added that it could not for many
years be a practical issue.
A notable step forward was taken in 1892. Hitherto Liberal and
Conservative alike had been considering the trade question chiefly from
the standpoint of the producer, seeking fresh markets by offering in
return concessions in the Canadian tariff. Now the Liberals, and the
M'Carthy wing of the Conservatives, began to speak of the consumer's
interests. The reduction of the tariff would be more important as a
relief to the consumer than as a means of buying markets abroad for the
producer. Instead of waiting for the distant day when Great Britain
should set up a tariff and give Canada reciprocal preference, the
Liberals now pressed for giving an immediate and unconditional
preference on British goods. A resolution to this effect, moved in the
House of Commons by Mr, now Sir Louis, Davies, was voted down by the
Conservative majority, but it was to bear notable fruit later.
[1] _Confederation Debates_, p. 44.
[2] See p. 131.
[3] 'During the last few years of his life, when asked if he were an
Imperial Federationist, he would reply somewhat after this fashion:
"That depends on what you mean by Imperial Federation. I am, of
course, in favour of any feasible scheme that will bring about a closer
union between the various portions of the Empire, but I have not yet
seen any plan worked out by which this can be done. The proposal that
there should be a parliamentary federation of the Empire I regard as
impracticable. I greatly doubt that England would agree that the
parliament which has sat during so many centuries at Westminster,
should be made subsidiary to a federal legislature. But, however that
might be, I am quite sure that Canada would never consent to be taxed
by a central body sitting at London, in which she would have
practically no voice; for her proportionate number of members in such
an assembly would amount to little more than an honorary
representation. That form of Imperial Federation is an idle dream. So
also, in my judgment, is the proposal to establish a uniform tariff
throughout the Empire. No colony would ever surrender its right to
control its fiscal policy."'--Pope, _Memoirs of Sir John Macdonald_,
vol. ii, p. 213.
[4] Address on Canada and her Relations with the Mother Country.
Newcastle-on-Tyne, November 21, 1895.
{153}