THE MIND OF THE CHILD--CHILD PSYCHOLOGY.
One of the most interesting chapters of modern psychology is that
which deals with the child. This is also one of the topics of general
concern, since our common humanity reacts with greater geniality upon
the little ones, in whom we instinctively see innocence and
simplicity. The popular interest in children has been, however--as
uncharitable as it may seem to say it--of very little service to the
scientific investigation of childhood. Even to-day, when a greater
body of valuable results are being secured, the main danger to the
proper study of the child's mind comes from the over-enthusiasm and
uninstructed assurance of some of its friends. Especially is this the
case in America, where "child study" has become a fad to be pursued by
parents and teachers who know little about the principles of
scientific method, and where influential educators have enlisted
so-called "observers" in taking indiscriminate notes on the doings of
children with no definite problem in view, and with no criticism of
their procedure. It is in place, therefore, to say clearly, at the
outset, that this chapter does not mean to stimulate parents or
unpsychological readers to report observations; and further to say
also that in the mind of the writer the publications made lately of
large numbers of replies to "syllabi" are for the most part worthless,
because they heap together observations obtained by persons of every
degree of competence and incompetence.
On the other hand, the requisites here, as in every other sphere of
exact observation, are clear enough. The student of the child's mind
should have a thorough knowledge of the principles of general
psychology, in order to know what is characteristic of the child when
he sees it, and what is exceptional; and he should also have enough
originality in his ideas and interpretations to catch the valuable in
the child's doings, distinguishing it from the commonplace, and to
plan situations and even experiments which will give him some control
upon those actions of the child which seem to be worth it. The need
of these qualities is seen in the history of the problems of the
child's growth which have been taken up even by the most competent
psychologists. The results show a gradual attainment of control over
the problem in hand, each observer criticising the method and results
of his predecessor until certain rules of observation and experiment
have been evolved which allow of the repetition and repeated
observation of the events of the child's life.
As illustrating the sort of problems in which there has been this
careful and critical work, I may instance these: the child's reflex
movements, the beginnings and growth of sensation, such as colour, the
rise of discrimination and preference, the origin of right and
left-handedness, the rise, mechanism, and meaning of imitation, the
acquisition of speech and handwriting, the growth of the child's sense
of personality and of his social consciousness, and the laws of
physical growth, as bearing upon mental development. In all these
cases, however, there is again a greater and a less exactness. The
topics with the reports of results which I am going on to give may be
taken, however, as typical, and as showing the direction of complete
knowledge rather than as having in any one case approached it.
Before we take up particular questions, however, a word may be allowed
upon the general bearings of the study of the child's mind. I do this
the more willingly, since it is still true, in spite of the hopeful
outlook for positive results, that it is mainly the willingness of
psychology to recognise the problems and work at them that makes the
topic important at present. To investigate the child by scientific
methods is really to bring into psychology a procedure which has
revolutionized the natural sciences; and it is destined to
revolutionize the moral sciences by making them also in a great
measure natural sciences. The new and important question about the
mind which is thus recognised is this: _How did it grow?_ What light
upon its activity and nature can we get from a positive knowledge of
its early stages and processes of growth? This at once introduces
other questions: How is the growth of the child related to that of the
animals?--how, through heredity and social influences, to the growth
of the race and of the family and society in which he is brought up?
All this can be comprehended only in the light of the doctrine of
evolution, which has rejuvenated the sciences of life; and we are now
beginning to see a rejuvenation of the sciences of mind from the same
point of view. This is what is meant when we hear it said that
psychology is becoming "genetic."
The advantages to be derived from the study of young children from
this point of view may be briefly indicated.
1. In the first place, the facts of the infant consciousness are very
simple; that is, they are the child's sensations or memories simply,
not his own observations of them. In the adult mind the disturbing
influence of self-observation is a matter of notorious moment. It is
impossible for me to report exactly what I feel, for the observation
of it by my attention alters its character. My volition also is a
complex thing, involving my personal pride and self-consciousness. But
the child's emotion is as spontaneous as a spring. The effects of it
in the mental life come out in action, pure and uninfluenced by
calculation and duplicity and adult reserve. There is around every one
of us adults a web of convention and prejudice of our own making. Not
only do we reflect the social formalities of our environment, and thus
lose the distinguishing spontaneities of childhood, but each of us
builds up his own little world of seclusion and formality with
himself. We are subject, as Bacon said, not only to "idols of the
forum," but also to "idols of the den."
The child, on the contrary, has not learned his own importance, his
pedigree, his beauty, his social place, his religion; he has not
observed himself through all these and countless other lenses of time,
place, and circumstance. He has not yet turned himself into an idol nor
the world into a temple; and we can study him apart from the complex
accretions which are the later deposits of his self-consciousness.
2. The study of children is often the only means of testing the truth
of our analyses. If we decide that a certain mental state is due to a
union of simpler elements, then we may appeal to the proper period of
child life to see the union taking place. The range of growth is so
enormous from the infant to the adult, and the beginnings of the
child's mental life are so low in the scale, in the matter of mental
endowment, that there is hardly a question of analysis now under
debate in psychology which may not be tested by this method.
At this point it is that child psychology is more valuable than the
study of the mind of animals. The latter never become men, while
children do. The animals represent in some few respects a branch of
the tree of growth in advance of man, while being in many other
respects very far behind him. In studying animals we are always
haunted by the fear that the analogy from him to man may not hold;
that some element essential to the development of the human mind may
not be in the animal at all. Even in such a question as the
localization of the functions of the brain described later on, where
the analogy is one of comparative anatomy and only secondarily of
psychology, the monkey presents analogies with man which dogs do not.
But in the study of children we may be always sure that a normal child
has in him the promise of a normal man.
3. Again, in the study of the child's mind we have the added advantage
of a corresponding simplicity on the bodily side; we are able to take
account of the physiological processes at a time when they are
relatively simple--that is, before the nervous system has grown to
maturity. For example, psychology used to hold that we have a "speech
faculty," an inborn mental endowment which is incapable of further
analysis; but support for the position is wanting when we turn to the
brain of the infant. Not only do we fail to find the series of centres
now known to be the "speech zone," but even those of them which we do
find have not yet taken up this function, either alone or together. In
other words, the primary object of each of the various centres
involved is not speech, but some other and simpler function; and
speech arises by development from a union of these separate functions.
4. In observing young children, a more direct application of
experiment is possible. By "experiment" here I mean both experiment
on the senses and also experiment directly on consciousness by
suggestion, social influence, etc. In experimenting on adults, great
difficulties arise through the fact that reactions--such as performing
a voluntary movement when a signal is heard, etc.--are complicated by
deliberation, habit, custom, choice, etc. The subject hears a sound,
identifies it, and presses a button--_if he choose_ and agree to do
so. What goes on in this interval between the advent of the incoming
nerve process and the discharge of the outgoing nerve process?
Something, at any rate, which represents a brain process of great
complexity. Now, anything that fixes or simplifies the brain process,
in so far gives greater certainty to the results. For this reason
experiments on reflex actions are valuable and decisive where similar
experiments on voluntary actions are uncertain and of doubtful value.
Now the child's mind is relatively simple, and so offers a field for
more fruitful experiment; this is seen in the reactions of the infant
to strong stimuli, such as bright colours, etc., as related further
on.
With this inadequate review of the advantages of infant psychology, it
is well also to point out the dangers of the abuse of it. Such dangers
are real. The very simplicity which seems to characterize the life of
the child is often extremely misleading, and this because the
simplicity in question is sometimes ambiguous. Two actions of the
child may appear equally simple; but one may be an adaptive action,
learned with great pains and really very complex, while the other may
be inadaptive and really simple. Children differ under the law of
heredity very remarkably, even in the simplest manifestations of their
conscious lives. It is never safe to say without qualification: "This
child did, consequently all children must." The most we can usually
say in observing single children is: "This child did, consequently
another child may."
Speaking more positively, the following remarks may be useful to those
who have a mind to observe children:
1. In the first place, we can fix no absolute time in the history of
the child at which a certain mental process takes its rise. The
observations, now quite extensively recorded, and sometimes quoted as
showing that the first year, or the second year, etc., brings such and
such developments, tend, on the contrary, to show that such divisions
do not hold in any strict sense. Like any other organic growth, the
nervous system may develop faster under more favourable conditions, or
more slowly under less favourable; and the growth of the mind is
largely dependent upon the growth of the brain. Only in broad outline
and within very wide limits can such periods be marked off at all.
2. The possibility of the occurrence of a mental state at a particular
time must be distinguished from its necessity. The occurrence of a
single clearly observed fact is decisive only against the theory
according to which its occurrence under the given conditions may not
occur. For example, the very early adaptive movements of the infant in
receiving its food can not be due to intelligence and will; but the
case is still open as to the question what is the reason of their
presence--i.e., how much nervous development is present, how much
experience is necessary, etc. It is well to emphasize the fact that
one case may be decisive in overthrowing a theory, but the conditions
are seldom simple enough to make one case decisive in establishing a
theory.
3. It follows, however, from the principle of growth itself that the
order of development of the main mental functions is constant, and
normally free from great variations; consequently, the most fruitful
observations of children are those which show that such an act was
present _before another_. The complexity becomes finally so remarkable
that there seems to be no before or after at all in mental things; but
if the child's growth shows a stage in which any process is clearly
absent, we have at once light upon the laws of growth. For instance:
if a single case is conclusively established of a child's drawing an
inference before it begins to use words or significant vocal sounds,
the one case is as good as a thousand to show that thought may develop
in some degree independently of spoken language.
4. While the most direct results are acquired by systematic
experiments with a given point in view, still general observations
carefully recorded by competent persons, are important for the
interpretation which a great many such records may afford in the end.
In the multitude of experiences here, as everywhere, there is
strength. Such observations should cover everything about the
child--his movements, cries, impulses, sleep, dreams, personal
preferences, muscular efforts, attempts at expression, games,
favourites, etc.--and should be recorded in a regular daybook at the
time of occurrence. What is important and what is not, is, as I have
said, something to be learned; and it is extremely desirable that any
one contemplating such observations should acquaint himself beforehand
with the principles of general psychology and physiology, and should
seek also the practical advice of a trained observer.
As yet many of the observations which we have in this field were made
by the average mother, who knows less about the human body than she
does about the moon or the wild flowers, or by the average father, who
sees his child for an hour a day, when the boy is dressed up, and who
has never slept in the same room with him--let alone the same bed!--in
his life; by people who have never heard the distinction between
reflex and voluntary action, or that between nervous adaptation and
conscious choice. The difference between the average mother and the
good psychologist is this: she has no theories, he has; he has no
interests, she has. She may bring up a family of a dozen and not be
able to make a single trustworthy observation; he maybe able, from one
sound of one yearling, to confirm theories of the neurologist and
educator, which are momentous for the future training and welfare of
the child.
As for experimenting with children, only the psychologist should
undertake it. The connections between the body and the mind are so
close in infancy, the mere animal can do so much to ape reason, and
the child is so helpless under the leading of instinct, impulse, and
external necessity, that the task is excessively difficult--to say
nothing of the extreme delicacy and tenderness of the budding tendrils
of the mind. But others do experiment! Every time we send a child out
of the home to the school, we subject him to experiment of the most
serious and alarming kind. He goes into the hands of a teacher who is
often not only not wise unto the child's salvation, but who is,
perchance, a machine for administering a single experiment to an
infinite variety of children. It is perfectly certain that a great
many of our children are irretrievably damaged or hindered in their
mental and moral development in the school; but we can not be at all
sure that they would fare any better if they were taught at home! The
children are experimented with so much and so unwisely, in any case,
that possibly a little intentional experiment, guided by real insight
and psychological information, would do them good.
_Methods of experimenting with Children._--In endeavouring to bring
such questions as the degree of memory, recognition, association,
etc., present in an infant, to a practical test, considerable
embarrassment has always been experienced in understanding the child's
vocal and other responses. Of course, the only way a child's mind can
be studied is through its expressions, facial, lingual, vocal,
muscular; and the first question--i.e., What did the infant do? must
be followed by a second--i.e., What did his doing that mean? The
second question is, as I have said, the harder question, and the one
which requires more knowledge and insight. It is evident, on the
surface, that the further away we get in the child's life from simple
inherited or reflex responses, the more complicated do the processes
become, and the greater becomes the difficulty of analyzing them, and
arriving at a true picture of the real mental condition which lies
back of them.
To illustrate this confusion, I may cite one of the few problems which
psychologists have attempted to solve by experiments on children: the
determination of the order of rise of the child's perceptions of the
different colours. The first series of experiments consisted in
showing the child various colours and requiring him to name them, the
results being expressed in percentages of correct answers to the whole
number. Now this experiment involves no less than four different
questions, and the results give absolutely no clew to their
separation. It involves:
1. The child's distinguishing different colours displayed
simultaneously before it, together with the complete development of
the eyes for colour sensation. 2. The child's ability to recognise or
identify a colour after having seen it once. 3. An association between
the child's colour seeing and word hearing and speaking memories, by
which the proper name for the colours is brought up in his mind. 4.
Equally ready facility in the pronunciation of the various names of
the colours which he recognises; and there is the further
embarrassment, that any such process which involves association of
ideas, is as varied as the lives of children. The single fact that
speech is acquired long after objects and some colours are
distinguished, shows that results reached by this method have very
little value as far as the problem of the first perception of colours
is concerned.
That the fourth element pointed out above is a real source of
confusion is shown by the fact that children recognise many words
which they can not readily pronounce. When this was realized, a
second phase in the development of the problem arose. A colour was
named, and then the child was required to pick out that colour. This
gave results different from those reached by the first method, blue
and red leading the list in correct answers by the first method, while
by this second method yellow led, and blue came near the end of the
list.
The further objection that colours might be distinguished before the
word names are learned, or that colour words might be interchanged or
confused by the child, gave rise to what we may call the third stage
in the statement of the problem. The method of "recognition" took the
place of the method of "naming." This consisted in showing to a child
a coloured disk, without naming it, and then asking him to pick out
the same colour from a number of coloured disks.
This reduces the question to the second of the four I have named
above. It is the usual method of testing for colour blindness, in
which, from defects of vision, certain colours can not be perceived at
all. It answers very well for colour blindness; for what we really
want to learn in the case of a sailor or a signal-man is whether he
can recognise a given signal when it is repeated; that is, does he
know green or red to be the same as his former experience of green or
red? But it is evident that there is still a more fundamental question
in the matter--the real question of colour perception. It is quite
possible that a child might not recognise an isolated colour when he
could really very well distinguish the colours lying side by side. The
last question, then, is this: When does the child get the different
colour _Sensations_ (not recognitions), and in what order?
To solve this question it would seem that experiments should be made
upon younger children. The results described above were all secured
after the children had made considerable progress in learning to
speak.
To meet this requirement another method may be used which can be
applied to children less than a year old. The colours are shown, and
the child led to grasp after them. This method is of such a character
as to yield a series of experiments whose results are in terms of the
most fundamental movements of the infant; it can be easily and
pleasantly conducted; and it is of wide application. The child's hand
movements are nearly ideal in this respect. The hand reflects the
child's first feelings, and becomes the most mobile organ of his
volition, except his organs of speech. We find spontaneous arm and
hand movements, reflex movements, reaching-out movements, grasping
movements, imitative movements, manipulating movements, and voluntary
efforts--all these, in order, reflecting the development of the mind.
To illustrate this method, I may cite certain results reached by
myself on the questions of colour and distance perception, and
right-handedness in the child.
_Distance and Colour Perception._--I undertook at the beginning of my
child H.'s ninth month to experiment with her with a view to arriving
at the exact state of her colour perception, and also to investigate
her sense of distance. The arrangements consisted in this instance in
giving the infant a comfortable sitting posture, kept constant by a
band passing around her chest and fastened securely to the back of her
chair. Her arms were left bare and quite free in their movements.
Pieces of paper of different colours were exposed before her, at
varying distances, front, right, and left. This was regulated by a
framework, consisting of a horizontal rod graded in inches, projecting
from the back of the chair at a level with her shoulder and parallel
with her arm when extended straight forward, and carrying on it
another rod, also graded in inches, at right angles to the first. This
second rod was thus a horizontal line directly in front of the child,
parallel with a line connecting her shoulders, and so equally distant
for both hands. This second rod was made to slide upon the first, so
as to be adjusted at any desired distance from the child. On this
second rod the colours, etc., were placed in succession, the object
being to excite the child to reach for them. So far from being
distasteful to the infant, I found that, with pleasant suggestions
thrown about the experiments, the whole procedure gave her much
gratification, and the affair became one of her pleasant daily
occupations. After each sitting she was given a reward of some kind. I
give the results, both for colour and distance, of 217 experiments. Of
these 111 were with five colours and 106 with ordinary newspaper
(chosen as a relatively neutral object, which would have no colour
value and no association, to the infant).
_Colour._--The colours range themselves in the order of
attractiveness--blue, red, white, green, and brown. Disregarding
white, the difference between blue and red is very slight, compared
with that between any other two. This confirms the results of the
second method described above. Brown, to my child--as tested in this
way--seemed to be about as neutral as could well be. A similar
distaste for brown has been noticed by others. White, on the other
hand, was more attractive than green. I am sorry that my list did not
include yellow. The newspaper was, at reaching distance (9 to 10
inches) and a little more (up to 14 inches), as attractive as the
average of the colours, and even as much so as the red; but this is
probably due to the fact that the newspaper experiments came after a
good deal of practice in reaching after colours, and a more exact
association between the stimulus and its distance. At 15 inches and
over, the newspaper was refused in 93 per cent of the cases, while
blue was refused at that distance in only 75 per cent, and red in 83
per cent.
_Distance._--In regard to the question of distance, the child
persistently refused to reach for anything put 16 inches or more away
from her. At 15 inches she refused 91 per cent of all the cases, 90
per cent of the colour cases, and, as I have said, 93 per cent of the
newspaper cases. At nearer distances we find the remarkable uniformity
with which the safe-distance association works at this early age. At
14 inches only 14 per cent of all the cases were refused, and at 13
inches only about 7 per cent. There was a larger percentage of
refusals at 11 and 12 inches than at 13 and 14 inches, a result due to
the influence of the brown, which was refused consistently when more
than 10 inches away. The fact that there were no refusals to reach for
anything exposed within reaching distance (10 inches)--other
attractive objects being kept away--shows two things; (1) the very
fine estimation visually of the distance represented by the
arm-length; and (2) the great uniformity at this age of the phenomenon
of Motor Suggestion upon which this method of child study is based,
and which is referred to again below. In respect to the first point,
it will be remembered that the child does not begin to reach for
anything that it sees until about the fourth or sixth week; so it is
evident at what a remarkably fast rate those obscure factors of size,
perspective, light and shade, etc., which signify distance to the eye,
become associated with arm movements of reaching. This method, applied
with proper precautions, obviates many of the difficulties of the
others. There are certain requirements of proper procedure, however,
which should never be neglected by any one who experiments with young
children.
In the first place, the child is peculiarly susceptible to the appeals
of change, novelty, chance, or happy suggestion; and often the failure
to respond to a stimulus is due to distraction or to discomfort rather
than to lack of intrinsic interest. Again, fatigue is a matter of
considerable importance. In respect to fatigue, I should say that the
first signs of restlessness, or arbitrary loss of interest, in a
series of stimulations, is sufficient warning, and all attempts at
further experimenting should cease. Often the child is in a state of
indisposition, of trifling nervous irritability, etc.; this should be
detected beforehand, and then nothing should be undertaken. No series
longer than three trials should be attempted without changing the
child's position, resting its attention with a song, or a game, etc.,
and thus leading it fresh to its task again. Furthermore, no single
stimulus, as a colour, should be twice repeated without a change to
some other, since the child's eagerness or alertness is somewhat
satisfied by the first effort, and a new thing is necessary to bring
him out to full exercise again. After each effort or two the child
should be given the object reached for to hold or play with for a
moment; otherwise he grows to apprehend that the whole affair is a
case of "Tantalus." In all these matters very much depends upon the
knowledge and care of the experimenter, and his ability to keep the
child in a normal condition of pleasurable muscular exercise
throughout.
In performing colour experiments, several requirements would appear to
be necessary for exact results. Should not the colours chosen be equal
in purity, intensity, lustre, illumination, etc.? In reference to
these differences, I think only that degree of care need be exercised
which good comparative judgment provides. Colours of about equal
objective intensity, of no gloss, of relatively evident spectral
purity, under constant illumination--this is all that is required. The
variations due to the grosser factors I have mentioned--such as
condition of attention, physical unrest, disturbing noises, sights,
etc.--are of greater influence than any of these more recondite
variations in the stimulus. Intensity and lustre, however, are
certainly important. It is possible, by carefully choosing a room of
pretty constant daylight illumination, and setting the experiments at
the same hour each day, to secure a regular degree of brightness if
the colours themselves are equally bright; and lustre may be ruled out
by using coloured wools or blotting-papers. The papers used in the
experiments given above were coloured blotting-papers. The omission of
yellow is due to the absence, in the neighbourhood, of a satisfactory
yellow paper.
The method now described may be further illustrated by the following
experiments on the use of the hands by the young child.
_The Origin of Right-handedness._--The question, "Why are we right or
left-handed?" has exercised the speculative ingenuity of many men. It
has come to the front anew in recent years, in view of the advances made
in the general physiology of the nervous system; and certainly we are
now in a better position to set the problem intelligently and to hope
for its solution. Hitherto the actual conditions of the rise of
"dextrality" in young children--as the general fact of uneven-handedness
may be called--have not been closely observed. It was to gain light,
therefore, upon the facts themselves that the experiments described in
the following pages were carried out.
My child H. was placed in a comfortable sitting posture, the arms left
bare and free in their movement, and allowed to reach for objects placed
before her in positions exactly determined and recorded by the simple
arrangement of sliding rods already described. The experiments took
place at the same hour daily, for a period extending from her fourth to
her tenth month. These experiments were planned with very great care and
with especial view to the testing of several hypotheses which, although
superficial to those who have studied physiology, yet constantly recur
in publications on this subject. Among these theories certain may be
mentioned with regard to which my experiments were conclusive. It has
frequently been held that a child's right-handedness arises from the
nurse's or mother's constant method of carrying it, the child's hand
which is left free being more exercised, and so becoming stronger. This
theory is ambiguous as regards both mother and child. The mother, if
right-handed, would carry the child on the left arm, in order to work
with the right arm. This I find an invariable tendency with myself and
with nurses and mothers whom I have observed. But this would leave the
child's left arm free, and so a right-handed mother would be found with
a left-handed child! Again, if the mother or nurse be left-handed, the
child would tend to be right-handed. Or if, as is the case in civilized
countries, nurses largely replace the mothers, it would be necessary
that most of the nurses be left-handed in order to make most of the
children right-handed. Now, none of these deductions are true. Further,
the child, as a matter of fact, holds on with both hands, however it is
itself held.
Another theory maintains that the development of right-handedness is
due to differences in weight of the two lateral halves of the body;
this tends to bring more strain on one side than the other, and to
give more exercise, and so more development, to that side. This
evidently assumes that children are not right or left-handed before
they learn to stand. This my results given below show to be false.
Again, we are told that infants get right-handed by being placed on
one side too much for sleep; this can be shown to have little force
also when the precaution is taken to place the child alternately on
its right and left sides for its sleeping periods.
In the case of the child H., certain precautions were carefully
enforced. She was never carried about in arms at all, never walked
with when crying or sleepless; she was frequently turned over in her
sleep; she was not allowed to balance herself on her feet until a
later period than that covered by the experiments. Thus the conditions
of the rise of the right-handed era were made as simple and uniform as
possible.
The experiments included, besides reaching for colours, a great many
of reaching for other objects, at longer and shorter distances, and in
unsymmetrical directions. I give some details of the results of the
experiments in which simple objects were used, extending over a period
of four months, from the fifth to the ninth in her life. The number of
experiments at each sitting varied from ten to forty, the position of
the child being reversed as to light from windows, position of
observation, etc., after half of each series.
No trace of preference for either hand was discernible during this
period; indeed, the neutrality was as complete as if it had been
arranged beforehand, or had followed the throwing of dice.
I then conceived the idea that possibly a severer distance test might
affect the result and show a marked preferential response by one hand
over the other. I accordingly continued to use a neutral stimulus, but
placed it from twelve to fifteen inches away from the child. This
resulted in very hard straining on her part, with all the signs of
physical effort (explosive breathing sounds resulting from the setting
of the larynx, rush of blood to the head, seen in the flushing of the
face, etc.). The number of experiments in each series was
intentionally made very small, from one to twelve, in order to avoid
fatigue.
The results were now very interesting. During the month ending June
15th the child showed no decided preference for either hand in
reaching straight before her within the easy reaching distance of ten
inches, but a slight balance in favour of the left hand; yet she was
right-handed to a marked degree during the same period as regards
movements which required effort or strain, such as grasping for
objects twelve to fifteen inches distant. For the greater distances,
the left hand was used in only five cases as against seventy-four
cases of the use of the right hand; and further, all these five cases
were twelve-inch distances, the left hand being used absolutely not at
all in the forty-five cases at longer distances.
In order to test this further, I varied the point of exposure of the
stimulus to the right or left, aiming thus to attract the hand on one
side or the other, and so to determine whether the growth of such a
preference was limited to experiences of convenience in reaching to
adjacent local objects, etc.
The deviation to the left in front of the body only called out the
right hand to greater exertion, while the left hand fell into still
greater disuse. This seems to show that "dextrality" is not derived
from the experience of the individual in using either hand
predominantly for reaching, grasping, holding, etc., within the
easiest range of that hand. The right hand intruded regularly upon the
domain of the left.
Proceeding upon the clew thus obtained, a clew which seems to suggest
that the hand preference is influenced by the stimulus to the eye, I
introduced hand observations into a series of experiments already
mentioned above on the same child's perception of the different
colours; thinking that the colour stimulus which represented the
strongest inducement to the child to reach might have the same effect
in determining the use of the right hand as the increased distance in
the experiments already described. This inference is proved to be
correct by the results.
It should be added that in all cases in which both hands were used
together, each hand was called out with evident independence of the
other, both about the same time, and both carried energetically to the
goal. In many other cases in which either right or left hand is given
in the results, the other hand also moved, but in a subordinate and
aimless way. There was a very marked difference between the use of
both hands in some cases, and of one hand followed by, or accompanied
by, the other in other cases. It was very rare that the second hand
did not thus follow or accompany the first; and this was extremely
marked in the violent reaching for which the right hand was mainly
used. This movement was almost invariably accompanied by an objectless
and fruitless symmetrical movement of the other hand.
The results of the entire series of experiments on the use of the
hands may be stated as follows, mainly in the words in which they were
summarily reported some time ago:
1. I found no continued preference for either hand as long as there
were no violent muscular exertions made (based on 2,187 systematic
experiments in cases of free movement of hands near the body--i. e.,
right hand, 577 cases; left hand, 568 cases--a difference of 9 cases;
both hands, 1,042 cases; the difference of 9 cases being too slight to
have any meaning); the period covered being from the child's sixth to
her tenth month inclusive.
2. Under the same conditions, the tendency to use both hands together
was about double the tendency to use either (seen from the number of
cases of the use of both hands in the figures given above).
3. A distinct preference for the right hand in violent efforts in
reaching became noticeable in the seventh and eighth months.
Experiments during the eighth month on this cue gave, in 80 cases,
right hand, 74 cases; left hand, 5 cases; both hands, 1 case. This was
true in two very distinct classes of cases: first, reaching for
objects, neutral as regards colour (newspaper, etc.), at more than the
reaching distance; and, second, reaching for bright colours at any
distance. Under the stimulus of bright colours, from 86 cases, 84 were
right-hand cases and 2 left-hand. Right-handedness had accordingly
developed under pressure of muscular effort in the sixth and seventh
months, and showed itself also under the influence of a strong colour
stimulus to the eye.
4. Up to this time the child had not learned to stand or to creep;
hence the development of one hand more than the other is not due to
differences in weight between the two longitudinal halves of the body.
As she had not learned to speak or to utter articulate sounds with
much distinctness, we may say also that right or left-handedness may
develop while the speech centres are not yet functioning. Further, the
right hand is carried over after objects on the left side, showing
that habit in reaching does not determine its use.
_Theoretical_.--Some interesting points arise in connection with the
interpretation of these facts. If it be true that the order of rise of
mental and physiological functions is constant, then for this question
the results obtained in the case of one child, if accurate, would hold
for others apart from any absolute time determination. We should
expect, therefore, that these results would be confirmed by
experiments on other children, and this is the only way their
correctness can be tested.
If, when tested, they should be found correct, they would be
sufficient answer to several of the theories of right-handedness
heretofore urged, as has been already remarked. The rise of the
phenomenon must be sought, therefore, in more deep-going facts of
physiology than such theories supply. Furthermore, if we go lower in
the animal scale than man, analogies for the kinds of experience which
are urged as reasons for right-handedness are not present; animals do
not carry their young, nor pat them to sleep, nor do animals shake
hands!
A full discussion would lead us to the conclusion that dextrality is
due to a difference in development in the two hemispheres of the
brain, that these differences are hereditary, and that they show
themselves toward the end of the first year.
It is a singular circumstance that right-handedness and speech are
controlled by the same hemisphere of the brain and from contiguous
areas. It would explain this--and at the same time it seems probable
from other considerations--if we found that right-handedness was first
used for expression before speech; and that speech has arisen from
the setting aside, for further development, of the area in the brain
first used for right-handedness. Musical expression has its seat in or
near the same lobe of the brain.
_The Child's Mental Development in General_.--The actual development
of the child, as observations from many sources indicate it, may be
sketched very briefly in its main outlines. It is probable that the
earliest consciousness is simply a mass of touch and muscular
sensations experienced in part before birth. Shortly after birth the
child begins to connect his impressions with one another and to show
Memory. But both memory and Association are very weak, and depend upon
intense stimulations, such as bright lights, loud noises, etc. The
things which most effect him at these early stages are those which
bring him into conditions of sharp physical pain or give him acute
pleasure. Yet it is a remarkable fact that at birth the pain reflex is
wanting. His whole life up to about the fourth month turns upon his
organic and vegetative needs. At three months the young child will
forget his mother or nurse after a very few days. Attention begins to
arise about the end of the first quarter year, appearing first in
response to bright lights and loud sounds, and being for a
considerable time purely reflex, drawn here and there by the
successive impressions which the environment makes. With lights and
sounds, however, movements also attract the infant's attention very
early; and the passage from reflex attention to a sort of vague
interest seems to arise first in connection with the movements of the
persons about him. This interest goes on to develop very rapidly in
the second half year, in connection more particularly with the
movements which are associated with the child's own comfort and
discomfort. The association of muscular sensations with those of touch
and sight serves to give him his first clear indications of the
positions of his own members and of other objects. His discrimination
of what belongs to his own body is probably aided by so-called "double
touch"--the fact that when he touches his own body, as in touching his
foot with the hand, he has two sensations, one in the foot and the
other in the hand. This is not the case when he touches other objects,
and he soon learns the distinction, getting the outlines of his own
body marked out in a vague way. The learning of the localities on his
body which he can not see, however, lags far behind. The movements of
his limbs in active exploration, accompanied by sight, enables him to
build up his knowledge of the world about him. Learning this he soon
falls to "experimenting" with the things of space. Thus he begins to
find out how things fit together, and what their uses are.
On the side of his movements we find him going through a series of
remarkable adaptations to his environment. At the beginning his
movements are largely random discharges, or reflexes of an instinctive
character, such as sucking. Yet in the first month he shows the
beginning of adaptation to the suggestions of his daily life, the
first manifestations of acquired Habit. He learns when and how long he
is expected to sleep, when and how much to eat; he very soon finds out
the peculiar touch and vocal tones of this person or that, and acts
upon these distinctions. He gets to know the meaning of his food
bottle, to understand the routine movements of persons about the
room, and the results of violations of their order. His hat, wraps,
carriage, become in the first half year signals to him of the outdoor
excursion. He no longer bobs his head about when held erect, and
begins to control his natural processes. The remarkable thing about
all these adaptations is that they occur before the infant can in any
sense be said to have a Will; for, as has been said, the fibres of the
brain necessary to voluntary action--in the cortex of the
hemispheres--are not yet formed.
The realization of this extraordinary adaptiveness of the very young
child should save parents many an anxious day and sleepless night.
There is practically nothing more easy than to impress upon the child
whatever habits of daily--and nightly!--routine one wishes to give
him, if he be taken early enough. The only requirements are knowledge
of what is good for him, and then _inviolable regularity_ in
everything that concerns him. Under this treatment he will become as
"obstinate" in being "good" as the opposite so-called indulgent or
capricious treatment always make him in being "bad." There is no
reason whatever that he should be walked with or held, that he should
be taken up when he cries, that he should be trotted when he awakes,
or that he should have a light by night. Things like this are simply
bad habits for which the parents have themselves to thank. The child
adapts himself to his treatment, and it is his treatment that his
habits reflect.
During the second half-year--sooner or later in particular cases--the
child is ready to begin to imitate. Imitation is henceforth, for the
following few years, the most characteristic thing about his action.
He first imitates movements, later sounds, especially vocal sounds.
His imitations themselves also show progress, being at first what is
called "simple imitation" (repeating a distinction already spoken of
in the chapter on animals), as when the child lies in bed in the
morning and repeats the same sound over and over again. He hears his
own voice and imitates it. In this sort of imitation he simply allows
his instinct to reproduce what he hears without control or
interference from him. He does not improve, but goes on making the
same sounds with the same mistakes again and again. But a little later
he begins what is called "persistent imitation"--the "try-try-again,"
already spoken of--which is a very different thing. Persistent
imitation shows unmistakably the presence of will. The child is not
satisfied with simple imitation or mere repetition, whether it be good
or bad in its results. He now sees his errors and aims consciously to
improve. Note the child's struggles to speak a word right by imitation
of the pronunciation of others. And he succeeds. He gradually gets his
muscles under control by persistence in his try-try-again.
Then he goes further--about the beginning of his second year, usually.
He gets the idea that imitation is the way to learn, and turns all his
effort into imitations experimentally carried out. He is now ready to
learn most of the great processes of his later culture. Speech,
writing, this special accomplishment and that, are all learned by
experimental imitation.
The example of the child's trying to draw or write has already been
cited. He looks at the copy before him; sets all his muscles of hand
and arm into massive contraction; turns and twists his tongue, bends
his body, winds his legs together, holds his breath, and in every way
concentrates his energies upon the copying of the model. In all this
he is experimenting.
He produces a wealth of movements, from which, very gradually, as he
tries and tries again, the proper ones are selected out. These he
practises, and lets the superfluous ones fall away, until he secures
the requisite control over hand and arm. Or suppose a child
endeavouring, in the crudest fashion, to put a rubber on the end of a
pencil, after seeing some one else do it--just the sort of thing a
year-old child loves to imitate. What a chaos of ineffective
movements! But with repeated effort he gets nearer and nearer to it,
and finally succeeds.
On the side of action, two general principles have been formulated in
child psychology, both illustrated in the cases and experiments now
given: The one, Motor Suggestion, is, as we saw, a principle of
general psychology. Its importance to the child is that by it he forms
Habits, useful responses to his environment, and so saves himself many
sad blunders. The other principle is that of Imitation; by it the
child learns new things directly in the teeth of his habits. By
exercising in an excessive way what he has already learned through his
experimental imitations, he is continually modifying his habits and
making new adaptations. These two principles dominate the active life
of the adult man as well.
_Personality Suggestion._--A further set of facts may be cited to
illustrate the working of Suggestion, now in the sphere of the
receptive life. They are important as showing the child's progress in
learning the great features of personality.
One of the most remarkable tendencies of the very young child in its
responses to its environment is the tendency to recognise differences
of personality. It responds to what have been called Suggestions of
Personality. As early as the second month it distinguishes its
mother's or nurse's touch in the dark. It learns characteristic
methods of holding, taking up, patting, kissing, etc., and adapts
itself, by a marvellous accuracy of protestation or acquiescence, to
these personal variations. Its associations of personality come to be
of such importance that for a long time its happiness or misery
depends upon the presence of certain kinds of "personality
suggestion." It is quite a different thing from the child's behavior
toward things which are not persons. Things come to be, with some few
exceptions which are involved in the direct gratification of appetite,
more and more unimportant; things may be subordinated to regular
treatment or reaction. But persons become constantly more important,
as uncertain and dominating agents of pleasure and pain. The sight of
movement by persons, with its effects on the infant, seems to be the
most important factor in this peculiar influence; later the voice
comes to stand for a person's presence, and at last the face and its
expressions equal the person in all his attributes.
I think this distinction between persons and things, between agencies
and objects, is the child's very first step toward a sense of
personality. The sense of uncertainty or lack of confidence grows
stronger and stronger in his dealings with persons--an uncertainty
aroused by the moods, emotions, changes of expression, and shades of
treatment of the persons around it. A person stands for a group of
quite unstable experiences. This period we may, for brevity of
expression, assuming it to be first in order of development, call the
"projective" stage in the growth of the child's personal
consciousness.
It is from this beginning that the child goes on to become fully
conscious of what persons are. And when we observe his actions more
closely we find no less than four steps in his growth, which, on
account of the importance of the topic, may be stated in some little
detail.
1. The first thing of significance to him, as has been said, is
_movement_. The first attempts of the infant at anything like steady
attention are directed to moving things--a swaying curtain, a moving
light, a stroking touch, etc. And further than this, the moving things
soon become more than objects of curiosity; these things are just the
things that affect him with pleasure or pain. It is movement that
brings him his bottle, movement that regulates the stages of his bath,
movement that dresses him comfortably, movement that sings to him and
rocks him to sleep. In that complex of sensations, the nurse, the
feature of importance to him, of immediate satisfaction or redemption
from pain, is this--movements come to succour him. Change in his
bodily feeling is the vital requirement of his life, for by it the
rhythm of his vegetative existence is secured; and these things are
accompanied and secured always in the moving presence of the one he
sees and feels about him. This, I take it, is the earliest reflection
in his consciousness of the world of personalities about him. At this
stage his "personality suggestion" is a _pain-movement-pleasure_
state of mind; to this he reacts with a smile, and a crow, and a kick.
Undoubtedly this association gets some of its value from the other
similar one in which the movements are the infant's own. It is by
movements that he gets rid of pains and secures pleasures.
Many facts tend to bear out this position. My child cried in the dark
when I handled her, although I imitated the nurse's movements as
closely as possible. She tolerated a strange presence so long as it
remained quietly in its place; but let it move, and especially let it
usurp any of the pieces of movement-business of the nurse or mother,
and her protests were emphatic. The movements tended to bring the
strange elements of a new face into the vital association,
pain-movement-pleasure, and so to disturb its familiar course; this
constituted it a strange "personality."
It is astonishing, also, what new accidental elements may become parts
of this association. Part of a movement, a gesture, a peculiar habit
of the nurse, may become sufficient to give assurance of the welcome
presence and the pleasures which the presence brings. Two notes of my
song in the night stood for my presence to H., and no song from any
one else could replace it. A lighted match stopped the crying of E.
for food in her fourteenth week, although it was but a signal for a
process of food preparation lasting several minutes; and a simple
light never stopped her crying under any other circumstances.
2. With this first start in the sense of personality we find also the
beginning of the recognition of different personalities. It is
evident that the sense of another's presence thus felt in the infant's
consciousness rests, as all associations rest, upon regularity or
repetition; his sense of expectancy is aroused whenever the chain of
events is started. This is soon embodied largely in two indications:
the face and the voice. But it is easy to see that this is a very
meagre sense of personality; a moving machine which brought pain and
alleviated suffering might serve as well. So the child begins to
learn, in addition, the fact that persons are in a measure individual
in their treatment of him; that their individuality has elements of
uncertainty or _irregularity_ about it. This growing sense is very
clear to one who watches an infant in its second half year. Sometimes
its mother gives it a biscuit, but sometimes she does not. Sometimes
the father smiles and tosses the child; sometimes he does not. Even
the indulgence of the grandmother has its times and seasons. The child
looks for signs of these varying moods and methods of treatment; for
his pains of disappointment arise directly on the basis of that former
sense of regular personal presence upon which his expectancy goes
forth.
This new element of the child's sense of persons becomes, at one
period of its development, quite the controlling element. His action
in the presence of the persons of the household becomes hesitating and
watchful. Especially does he watch the face, for any expressive
indications of what treatment is to be expected; for facial expression
is now the most regular as well as the most delicate indication.
Special observations on H.'s responses to changes in facial expression
up to the age of twenty months showed most subtle sensibility to
these differences; and normal children all do. Animals are also very
expert at this.
All through the child's second year, and longer, his sense of the
persons around him is in this stage. The incessant "why?" with which
he greets any action affecting him, or any information given him, is
witness to the simple puzzle of the apparent capriciousness of
persons. Of course he can not understand "why"; so the simple fact to
him is that mamma will or won't, he knows not beforehand which. He is
unable to anticipate the treatment in detail, and he has not of course
learned any principles of interpretation of the conduct of father or
mother lying back of the details.
But in all this period there is germinating in his consciousness--and this
very uncertainty is an important element of it--the seed of a far-reaching
thought. His sense of persons--moving, pleasure-or-pain-giving, uncertain
but self-directing persons--is now to become a sense of agency, of power,
which is yet not the power of the regular-moving door on its hinges or the
rhythmic swinging of the pendulum of the clock. The sense of _personal
agency_ is now forming, and it again is potent for still further
development of the social consciousness. It is just here, I think, that
imitation becomes so important in the child's life. This is imitation's
opportunity. The infant watches to see how others act, because his own
weal and woe depends upon this "how"; and inasmuch as he knows not what to
anticipate, his mind is open to every suggestion of movement. So he falls
to imitating. His attention dwells upon details, and by the principle of
adaptation which imitation expresses, it acts out these details for
himself.
It is an interesting detail, that at this stage the child begins to
grow capricious himself; to feel that he can do whatever he likes.
Suggestion begins to lose the regularity of its working, for it meets
the child's growing sense of his own agency. The youthful hero becomes
"contrary." At this period it is that obedience begins to grow hard,
and its meaning begins to dawn upon the child as the great reality.
For it means the subjection of his own agency, his own liberty to be
capricious, to the agency and liberty of some one else.
3. With all this, the child's distinction between and among the
persons who constantly come into contact with him grows on apace, in
spite of the element of irregularity of the general fact of
personality. As he learned before the difference between one presence
and another, so now he learns the difference between one _character_
and another. Every character is more or less regular in its
irregularity. It has its tastes and modes of action, its temperament
and type of command. This the child learns late in the second year and
thereafter. He behaves differently when the father is in the room. He
is quick to obey one person, slow to obey another. He cries aloud,
pulls his companions, and behaves reprehensibly generally, when no
adult is present who has authority or will to punish him. This stage
in his "knowledge of man" leads to very marked differences of conduct
on his part.
4. He now goes on to acquire real _self-consciousness_ and _social
feeling_. This stage is so important that we may give to it a separate
heading below.
It may not be amiss to sum up what has been said about
Personality-Suggestion. It is a general term for the information which
the child gets about persons. It develops through three or four
roughly distinguished stages, all of which illustrate what is called
the "projective" sense of personality.[2] There is, 1. A bare
distinction _of persons from things_ on the ground of peculiar
pain-movement-pleasure experiences. 2. A sense of the irregularity or
capriciousness of the behaviour of these persons, which suggests
_personal agency_. 3. A distinction, vaguely felt perhaps, but
wonderfully reflected in the child's actions, between the modes of
behaviour or _personal characters_ of different persons. 4. After his
sense of his own agency arises by the process of imitation, he gets
what is really _self-consciousness_ and _social feeling_.
[Footnote 2: It is very remarkable that in the child's bashfulness we
find a native nervous response to the presence of persons. And it is
curious to note that, besides the general gregariousness which many
animals have, they show in many instances special responses of the
presence of creatures of their own kind or of other kinds. Dogs seem
to recognise dogs by _smell_. So with cats, which also respond
instinctively with strong repulsion to the smell of dogs. Horses seem
to be guided by _sight_. Fowls are notoriously blind to shapes of
fowls, but depend on hearing the cries of their kind or their young.]
_Self-consciousness._--So far as we have now gone the child has only a
very dim distinction between himself as a person and the other persons
who move about him. The persons are "projective" to him, mere bodies
or external objects of a peculiar sort classed together because they
show common marks. Yet in the sense of agency, he has already begun,
as we saw, to find in himself a mental nucleus, or centre. This comes
about from his tendency to fall into the imitation of the acts of
others.
Now as he proceeds with these imitations of others, he finds himself
gradually understanding the others, by coming, through doing the same
actions with them, to discover what they are feeling, what their
motives are, what the laws of their behaviour. For example, he sees
his father handle a pin, then suddenly make a face as he pricks
himself, and throws the pin away. All this is simply a puzzle to the
child; his father's conduct is capricious, "projective." But the
child's curiosity in the matter takes the form of imitation; he takes
up the pin himself and goes through the same manipulation of it that
his father did. Thus he gets himself pricked, and with it has the
impulse to throw the pin away. By imitating his father he has now
discovered what was inside the father's mind, the pain and the motive
of the action.
This way of proceeding in reference to the actions of others, of which
many examples might be given, has a twofold significance in the
development of the child; and because of this twofold significance it
is one of the most important facts of psychology. Upon it rest, in the
opinion of the present writer, correct views of ethics and social
philosophy.
1. By such imitation the child learns to associate his own sense of
physical power, together with his own private pleasures and pains,
with the personal actions which were before observed, it is true, in
other persons but not understood. The act of the father has now become
his own. So one by one the various attributes which he has found to be
characteristic of the persons of his social circle, become his, in
his own thought. He is now _for himself_ an agent who has the marks of
a Person or a Self. He now understands _from_ _the inside_ all the
various personal suggestions. What he saw persons do is now no longer
"projective"--simply there, outside, in the environment; it has become
what we call "subjective." The details are grouped and held together
by the sense of agency working itself out in his imitative struggles.
This is what we mean by Self-consciousness. It is not an inborn thing
with the child. He gradually acquires it. And it is not a sense of a
distinct and separate self, first known and then compared with other
persons. On the contrary, it is gradually built up in the child's mind
from the same material exactly as that of which he makes up his
thought of other persons. The deeds he can do he first sees others
doing; only then can he imitate them and find out that he also is a
being who can perform them.
So it goes all through our lives. Our sense of Self is constantly
changing, constantly being enriched. We have not the same thought of
self two days in succession. To-day I think of myself as something to
be proud of, to-morrow as something to be ashamed of. To-day I learn
something from you, and the thought that it is common to you and to me
is the basis of my sympathy with you. To-morrow I learn to commit the
unworthy act which Mr. A. commits, and the thought that he and I are
so far the same is the basis of the common disapproval which I feel of
him and me.
2. The second result of this imitative learning about personality is
of equal importance. When the child has taken up an action by
imitation and made it subjective, finding out that personality has an
inside, something more than the mere physical body, then he reads this
fact back into the other persons also. He says to himself: "He too, my
little brother, must have _in him_ a sense of agency similar to this
of mine. He acts imitatively, too; he has pleasures and pains; he
shows sympathy for me, just as I do for him. So do all the persons
with whom I have become so far acquainted. They are, then, 'subjects'
as I am--something richer than the mere 'projects' which I had
supposed." So other persons become essentially like himself; and not
only like himself, but identical with himself so far as the particular
marks are concerned which he has learned from them. For it will be
remembered that all these marks were at first actually taken up by
imitation from these very persons. The child is now giving back to his
parents, teachers, etc., only the material which he himself took from
them. He has enriched it, to be sure; with it he now reads into the
other persons the great fact of subjective agency; but still whatever
he thinks of them has come by way of his thought of himself, and that
in turn was made up from them.
This view of the other person as being the same in the main as the
self who thinks of the other person, is what psychologists mean when
they speak of the "ejective" self. It is the self of some one else as
I think of it; in other words, it is myself "ejected" out by me and
lodged in him.
_The Social and Ethical Sense._--From this we see what the Social
Sense is. It is the feeling which arises in the child or man of the
real identity, through its imitative origin, of all possible thoughts
of self, whether yourself, myself, or some one else's self. The bond
between you and me is not an artificial one; it is as natural as is
the recognition of personal individuality. And it is doing violence to
this fundamental fact to say, as social science so often assumes, that
the individual naturally separates himself or his interests from the
self or the interests of others. He is, on the contrary, bound up with
others from the start by the very laws of his growth. His social
action and feeling are natural to him. The child can not be selfish
only nor generous only; he may seem to be this or that, in this
circumstance or that, but he is really social all the time.
Furthermore, his sense of right and wrong, his Ethical Sense, grows up
upon this sense of the social bond. This I can not stop to explain
further. But it is only when social relationships are recognised as
essential in the child's growth that we can understand the mutual
obligations and duties which the moral life imposes upon us all.
_How to Observe Children, with Especial Reference to Observations of
Imitation._--There are one or two considerations of such practical
importance to all those who wish to observe children that I venture to
throw them together--only saying, by way of introduction, that nothing
less than the child's personality is at stake in the method and matter
of its imitations. The Self is really the form in which the personal
influences surrounding the child take on their new individuality.
1. No observations are of much importance which are not accompanied by
a detailed statement of the personal influences which have affected
the child. This is the more important since the child sees few
persons, and sees them constantly. It is not only likely--it is
inevitable--that he _make up his personality_, under limitations of
heredity, by imitation, out of the "copy" set in the actions, temper,
emotions, of the persons who build around him the social enclosure of
his childhood. It is only necessary to watch a two-year-old closely to
see what members of the family are giving him his personal "copy"--to
find out whether he sees his mother constantly and his father seldom;
whether he plays much with other children, and what in some degree
their dispositions are; whether he is growing to be a person of
subjection, equality, or tyranny; whether he is assimilating the
elements of some low unorganized social personality from his foreign
nurse. The boy or girl is a social "monad," to use Leibnitz's figure
in a new context, a little world, which reflects the whole system of
influences coming to stir his sensibility. And just in so far as his
sensibilities are stirred, he imitates, and forms habits of imitating;
and habits?--they are character!
2. A point akin to the first is this: the observation of each child
should describe with great accuracy the child's relations to other
children. Has he brothers or sisters? how many of each, and of what
age? Does he sleep in the same bed or room with them? Do they play
much with one another alone? The reason is very evident. An only child
has only adult "copy." He can not interpret his father's actions, or
his mother's, oftentimes. He imitates very blindly. He lacks the more
childish example of a brother or sister near himself in age. And this
difference is of very great importance to his development. He lacks
the stimulus, for example, of games in which personification is a
direct tutor to selfhood, as I shall remark further on. And while he
becomes precocious in some lines of instruction, he fails in variety
of imagination, in richness of fancy, at the same time that his
imaging processes are more wild and uncontrolled. The dramatic, in his
sense of social situations, is largely hidden. It is a very great
mistake to isolate children, especially to separate off one or two
children. One alone is perhaps the worse, but two alone are subject to
the other element of social danger which I may mention next.
3. Observers should report with especial care all cases of unusually
close relationship between children in youth, such as childish
favoritism, "platonic friendships," "chumming," in school or home,
etc. We have in these facts--and there is a very great variety of
them--an exaggeration of the social or imitative tendency, a narrowing
down of the personal sensibility to a peculiar line of well-formed
influences. It has never been studied by writers either on the genesis
of social emotion or on the practice of education. To be sure,
teachers have been alive to the pros and cons of allowing children and
students to room together; but that has been with view to the
possibility of direct immoral or unwholesome contagion. This danger is
certainly real; but we, as psychological observers, and above all as
teachers and leaders of our children, must go deeper than that.
Consider, for example, the possible influence of a school chum and
roommate upon a girl in her teens; for this is only an evident case of
what all isolated children are subject to. A sensitive nature, a girl
whose very life is a branch of a social tree, is placed in a new
environment, to engraft upon the members of her mutilated self--her
very personality; it is nothing less than that--utterly new channels
of supply. The only safety possible, the only way to conserve the
lessons of her past, apart from the veriest chance, and to add to the
structure of her present character, lies in securing for her the
greatest possible variety of social influences. Instead of this, she
is allowed to meet, eat, walk, talk, lie down at night, and rise in
the morning, with one other person, a "copy" set before her, as
immature in all likelihood as herself, or, if not so, yet a single
personality, put there to wrap around her growing self the confining
cords of unassimilated and foreign habit. Above all things, fathers,
mothers, teachers, elders, give the children room! They need all that
they can get, and their personalities will grow to fill it. Give them
plenty of companions, fill their lives with variety; variety is the
soul of originality, and its only source of supply. The ethical life
itself, the boy's, the girl's, conscience, is born in the stress of
the conflicts of suggestion, born right out of his imitative
hesitations; and just this is the analogy which he must assimilate and
depend upon in his own conflicts for self-control and social
continence. So impressively true is this from the human point of view
that, in my opinion--formed, it is true, from the very few data
accessible on such points, still a positive opinion--friendships of a
close exclusive kind should be discouraged or broken up, except when
under the immediate eye of the wise parent or guardian; and even when
allowed, these relationships should, in all cases, be used to entrain
the sympathetic and moral sentiments into a wider field of social
exercise.
One of the merits of the great English schools and of the free schools
of America is that in them the boys acquire, from necessity, the
independence of sturdy character, and the self-restraint which is
self-imposed. The youth brought up to mind a tutor often fails of the
best discipline.
4. The remainder of this section may be devoted to the further
emphasis of the need of close observation of children's games,
especially those which may be best described as "society games." All
those who have given even casual observation to the doings of the
nursery have been impressed with the extraordinary facility of the
child's mind, from the second year onward, in imagining and plotting
social and dramatic situations. It has not been so evident, however,
to these casual observers, nor to many really more skilled, that they
were observing in these fancy plays the putting together anew of
fragments, or larger pieces, of the adult's mental history. Here, in
these games, we see the actual use which our children make of the
personal "copy" material which they get from you and me. If a man
study these games patiently in his own children, and analyze them out,
he gradually sees emerge from within the inner consciousness a picture
of the boy's own father, whom he aspires to be like, and whose actions
he seeks to generalize and apply. The picture is poor, for the child
takes only what he is sensible to. And it does seem often, as Sighele
pathetically notices on a large social scale, and as the Westminster
divines have urged without due sense of the pathetic and home-coming
point of it, that he takes more of the bad in us for reproduction than
of the good! But, be this as it may, what we give him is all he gets.
Heredity does not stop with birth; it is then only beginning. And the
pity of it is that this element of heredity, this reproduction of the
fathers in the children, which might be used to redeem the new-forming
personality from the heritage of past commonness or impurity, is
simply left to take its course for the further establishing and
confirmation of it. Was there ever a group of school children who did
not leave the real school to make a play school, setting up a box for
one of their number to sit on and "take off" the teacher? Was there
ever a child who did not play "church," and force the improvised
"papa" into the pulpit? Were there ever children who did not "buy"
things from fancied stalls in every corner of the nursery, after they
had once seen an elder drive a trade in the market? The point is this:
the child's personality grows; growth is always by action; he clothes
upon himself the scenes of the parent's life and acts them out; so he
grows in what he is, what he understands, and what he is able to
perform.
In order to be of more direct service to observers of games of this
character, let me give a short account of an observation of the kind
made some time ago--one of the simplest of many actual situations
which my two little girls, Helen and Elizabeth, have acted out
together. It is a very commonplace case, a game the elements of which
are evident in their origin; but I choose this rather than one more
complex, since observers are usually not psychologists, and they find
the elementary the more instructive.
On May 2 I was sitting on the porch alone with the children--the two
mentioned above, aged respectively four and a half and two and a half
years. Helen, the elder, told Elizabeth that she was her little baby;
that is, Helen became "mamma," and Elizabeth the "baby." The younger
responded by calling her sister "mamma," and the play began.
"You have been asleep, baby. Now it is time to get up," said mamma.
Baby rose from the floor--first falling down in order to rise!--was
seized upon by "mamma," taken to the railing to an imaginary
washstand, and her face washed by rubbing. Her articles of clothing
were then named in imagination, and put on, one by one, in the most
detailed and interesting fashion. During all this "mamma" kept up a
stream of baby talk to her infant: "Now your stockings, my darling;
now your skirt, sweetness--O! no--not yet--your shoes first," etc.,
etc. Baby acceded to all the details with more than the docility which
real infants usually show. When this was done--"Now we must go tell
papa good-morning, dearie," said mamma. "Yes, mamma," came the reply;
and hand in hand they started to find papa. I, the spectator,
carefully read my newspaper, thinking, however, that the reality of
papa, seeing that he was so much in evidence, would break in upon the
imagined situation. But not so. Mamma led her baby directly past me to
the end of the piazza, to a column in the corner. "There's papa," said
mamma; "now tell him good-morning."--"Good-morning, papa; I am very
well," said baby, bowing low to the column. "That's good," said mamma,
in a _gruff, low voice_, which caused in the real papa a thrill of
amused self-consciousness most difficult to contain. "Now you must
have your breakfast," said mamma. The seat of a chair was made a
breakfast table, the baby's feigned bib put on, and her porridge
carefully administered, with all the manner of the nurse who usually
directs their breakfast. "Now" (after the meal, which suddenly became
dinner instead of breakfast), "you must take your nap," said mamma.
"No, mamma; I don't want to," said baby. "But you must."--"No; you be
baby, and take the nap."--"But all the other children have gone to
sleep, dearest, _and the doctor says you must_," said mamma. This
convinced baby, and she lay down on the floor. "But I haven't
undressed you." So then came all the detail of undressing; and mamma
carefully covered her up on the floor with a light shawl, saying:
"Spring is coming now; that'll be enough. Now shut your eyes, and go
to sleep."--"But you haven't kissed me, mamma," said the little one.
"Oh, of course, my darling!"--so a long siege of kissing! Then baby
closed her eyes very tight, while mamma went on tiptoe away to the end
of the porch. "Don't go away, mamma," said baby. "No; mamma wouldn't
leave her darling," came the reply.
So this went on. The nap over, a walk was proposed, hats put on, etc.,
the mamma exercising great care and solicitude for her baby. One
further incident to show this: when the baby's hat was put on--the
real hat--mamma tied the strings rather tight. "Oh! you hurt, mamma,"
said baby. "No; mamma wouldn't draw the strings too tight. Let mamma
kiss it. There, is that better, my darling?"--all comically true to a
certain sweet maternal tenderness which I had no difficulty in
tracing.
Now in such a case what is to be reported, of course, is the facts.
Yet knowledge of more than the facts is necessary, as I have said
above, in order to get the full psychological lesson. We need just the
information which concerns the rest of the family and the social
influences of the children's lives. I recognised at once every phrase
which the children used in this play, where they got it, what it meant
in its original context, and how far its meaning had been modified in
this process, called in a figure "social heredity." But as that story
is reported to strangers who have no knowledge of the children's
social antecedents, how much beyond the mere facts of imitation and
personification do they get from it? And how much the more is this
true when we examine those complex games of the nursery which show the
brilliant fancy for situation and drama of the wide-awake
four-year-old?
Yet we psychologists are free to interpret; and how rich the lessons
even from such a simple scene as this! As for Helen, what could be a
more direct lesson--a lived-out exercise--in sympathy, in altruistic
self-denial, in the healthy elevation of her sense of self to the
dignity of kindly offices, in the sense of responsibility and agency,
in the stimulus to original effort and the designing of means to
ends--and all of it with the best sense of the objectivity which is
quite lost in wretched self-consciousness in us adults, when we
personate other characters? What could further all this highest mental
growth better than the game by which the lessons of her mother's daily
life are read into the child's little self? Then, in the case of
Elizabeth also, certain things appear. She obeys without command or
sanction, she takes in from her sister the elements of personal
suggestion in their simpler childish forms. Certainly such scenes,
repeated every day with such variation of detail, must give something
of the sense of variety and social equality which real life afterward
confirms and proceeds upon; and lessons of the opposite character are
learned by the same process.
All this exercise of fancy must strengthen the imaginative faculty
also. The prolonged situations, maintained sometimes whole days, or
possibly weeks, give strength to the imagination and train the
attention. I think, also, that the sense of essential reality, and its
distinction from the unreal, the merely imagined, is helped by this
sort of symbolic representation. Play has its dangers also--very
serious ones. The adults sometimes set bad examples. The game gives
practise in cunning no less than in forbearance. Possibly the best
service of observation just now is to gather the facts with a view to
the proper recognition and avoidance of the dangers.
Finally, I may be allowed a word to interested parents. You can be of
no use whatever to psychologists--to say nothing of the actual damage
you may be to the children--unless you _know your babies through and
through_. Especially the fathers! They are willing to study everything
else. They know every corner of the house familiarly, and what is done
in it, except the nursery. A man labours for his children ten hours a
day, gets his life insured for their support after his death, and yet
he lets their mental growth, the formation of their characters, the
evolution of their personality, go on by absorption--if no worse--from
common, vulgar, imported and changing, often immoral attendants! Plato
said the state should train the children; and added that the wisest
man should rule the state. This is to say that the wisest man should
tend his children! Hugo gives us, in Jean Valjean and Cosette, a
picture of the true paternal relationship. We hear a certain group of
studies called the _humanities_, and it is right. But the best school
in the humanities for every man is in his own house.
With this goes, finally, the highest lesson of sport, drama,
make-believe, even when we trace it up into the art-impulse--the
lesson of _personal freedom_. The child himself sets the limitations
of the game, makes the rules, and subjects himself to them, and then
in time pierces the bubble for himself, saying, "I will play no more."
All this is the germ of self-regulation, of the control of the
impulses, of the voluntary adoption of the ideal, which becomes in
later life--if so be that he cling to it--the pearl of great price.