CHAPTER XVII.

MOVEMENTS OF THE CENTRAL ARMY UNDER THE DUKE DEL INFANTADO. BATTLE

OF UCLES. RETREAT FROM CUENCA. CARTAOJAL APPOINTED TO THE

COMMAND. PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH. SIR ROBERT WILSON ENTERS CIUDAD

RODRIGO. NEGOTIATION CONCERNING THE ADMISSION OF BRITISH TROOPS

INTO CADIZ.

♦1808. DECEMBER.♦

♦THE SPANIARDS NOT DISCOURAGED BY THEIR REVERSES.♦

Sir John Moore’s movements, fatal as they were to his army and himself,

and most injurious to public opinion in England, were not without

some good effect, though far inadequate to the price at which it was

purchased. They drew into Galicia those forces which would otherwise

have taken possession of Lisbon and of Seville, and they afforded the

Junta time for raising new levies and bringing new armies into the

field. The spirit of the nation was in no degree abated; their numerous

defeats, the loss of their capital, and the treachery of chiefs in whom

they had entirely trusted, seemed rather to exasperate than dismay

them; and there would have been no lack of strength had there been

arms for the willing people, officers to discipline them, a government

which could have provided for their support, and generals capable of

directing their zeal and courage. A memorable instance of the national

disposition was displayed in the little town of Luzena. According to

a decree of the Junta, four men of every hundred were to be drawn for

military service; all who were liable to the lot assembled, 400 in

number, and when the magistrate was proceeding to ballot for sixteen,

the whole 400 volunteered, and marched off that same day to join the

troops at Seville.

♦CONDITION OF INFANTADO’S ARMY AT CUENCA.♦

Had the British army made a stand in Galicia, as there was every reason

to expect, the Duke del Infantado was to have advanced from Cuenca

upon Ocaña and Aranjuez, and in conjunction with the army collected

at La Carolina, under the Marques del Palacio, to have pushed for

Madrid. The retreat of Sir John Moore frustrated this plan; the Duke

was then ordered to remain on the defensive, and new levies were sent

to reinforce him as fast as they were raised. But in the miserable

circumstances of his army, increase of numbers was no increase of

strength. Arms, clothing, and provision were wanting; it was alike

without resources, discipline, or system; in want of efficient officers

of every rank, and those which there were, were divided into cabals and

factions. The province of Cuenca was the best point which could have

been chosen for deriving supplies from La Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia,

the two latter provinces as yet unexhausted by the war; but it was not

a military position. The city stands upon high ground, where the Huecar

falls into the Jucar at the skirts of Monte de S. Christobal, and it

is completely commanded by the ♦INFANTADO, MANIFIESTO, 32–37.♦ heights.

All that the Duke could hope for in case he were attacked was to secure

his retreat, and for this purpose he occupied some eminences on the

left bank of the Huecar, leaving the road to Valencia by Moya open

for his artillery. The van was stationed at Jabaya, four leagues from

Cuenca, in the direction of Madrid.

The Duke had acquired some reputation in the former war with France

when serving as Colonel of a regiment which he had raised himself.

He had now given the highest proof of devotion to his country, in

accepting a command under circumstances which rendered success

absolutely impossible, and yet where any disaster would compromise

his reputation, and expose him to the suspicion and fury of his own

soldiers. In endeavouring to restore order among the troops, and to

obtain food and clothing for them, he was indefatigable; no man could

have exerted himself with greater activity and zeal. The condition of

his army indeed, officers as well as men, was pitiable. The military

chest having been taken to Zaragoza, they were without pay; and a great

proportion of those who had endured the fatigue and sufferings of

the retreat were now sinking under the effects. They lay upon straw,

half-naked, in that severe season, and in the keen climate of that

high country, ... hundreds were perishing thus. The Duke established

hospitals, collected beds from the city and from all the places

within reach, appointed officers to the sole charge of seeing that the

sick were supplied, and ordered the friars to attend upon them. His

authority was exerted as far as it would extend, and when that failed,

he begged for their support. These exertions were not without effect;

the progress of disease was ♦INFANTADO, 42–44.♦ stopped, men and stores

were obtained, subordination was restored, and with little efficient

strength there was the appearance as well as the name of an army.

♦DREAMS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.♦

The Spaniards were not sensible how low they had fallen as a military

people. Remembering what they had been, no lessons, however severe,

could make them see themselves as they were; and this error was not

confined to the multitude; it was partaken by all ranks, and seemed,

indeed, inherent in the national character. It was an error which

exposed their armies always to defeat, and yet as a nation rendered

them invincible; ... the French could have invaded no people whom it

would have been so easy to rout, none whom it was so impossible to

subdue. Infantado had his full share of this delusion; he planned

extensive and combined operations, such as required good troops,

intelligent officers, and ready means; ... he thought of relieving

Zaragoza, ... of recovering Madrid; or of pursuing the left wing

of that army which was then employed against the English; ... and

this with men and leaders whose incapacity was manifest upon every

occasion. Upon intelligence that about 1500 French cavalry were

scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering great

part of the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha, he concerted a scheme

for surprising them at Aranjuez and ♦MOVEMENT AGAINST THE FRENCH AT

TARANCON FRUSTRATED.♦ Tarancon, sending Venegas with 4000 foot and 800

horse to attack them in the latter place, while D. Antonio de Senra,

with an equal force of foot and 1000 horse, was to fall upon Aranjuez,

overcome the enemy there, and intercept those who would retreat thither

in their endeavour to escape from Tarancon. The attempt failed, wholly

through mismanagement. Senra stopped short at El Horcajo, in fear of

a detachment of French cavalry at Villanueva del Cardete, though that

force had been calculated upon in the combinations of Infantado. The

division with Venegas lost their way in the night and the snow; some

went in one direction, some in another, ... the cavalry who were thus

separated had no directions how to act; and the infantry, instead of

surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised ♦INFANTADO,

45–55.♦ by them. There were, however, some good troops among them, who

stood firm, and the ♦DEC. 25.♦ French, being very inferior in number,

retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.

♦VENEGAS FALLS BACK FROM TARANCON TO UCLES.♦

This failure had the ill effect of creating discord among the

Spaniards. Infantado blamed the commanders; they reproached the

officers under them; and both were willing to excuse themselves by

supposing that what had failed in the execution had been planned

unskilfully. Yet, as some advantage had been gained, the Duke resolved

to pursue it.... The left bank being now cleared as far as Aranjuez,

he hoped to take possession of that point and of Ocaña, and as in that

rainy season the Tagus was nowhere fordable, his purpose was to remove

the boats, break down the bridges, and place himself at Toledo. Venegas

therefore was ordered to canton his troops in Tarancon, Ucles, and the

neighbouring villages, preparatory to this movement, and his force

was increased to 8000 foot and 1900 horse, ... the commander-in-chief

retaining with himself about 10,000, of whom a third part were without

arms, and a considerable number otherwise unfit for service. This

♦1809.♦ was their position at the beginning of the year. Of what was

passing in other parts they were ill-informed, and the false reports

which abound in such times were always on the favourable side. They

believed the French in Madrid were in hourly fear that this army would

appear before the capital; and that Romana had entirely destroyed the

enemy at Guadarama. Some movements, however, on the part of the French

about Aranjuez made Venegas resolve to fall back from Tarancon upon

Ucles. He apprehended that it was their intention to attack the part

of his force which was stationed at this latter place, and he resolved

therefore to march his troops thither as a better position than

Tarancon, and one where he might cover the army.

♦1809. JANUARY.

ROUT OF THE SPANIARDS AT UCLES.♦

Ucles is a decayed town, where the Knights of Santiago had their

chief convent in the bright ages of that military order: here their

banner was kept which Gregory XI. had blessed, and which the Kings of

Spain delivered to every new master on his appointment: hither the

knights from all the other provinces resorted when their services

were required, and from hence they had set forth for the conquest of

Cordoba, and Seville, and Jaen, and Murcia. To a Spaniard of these

times it was a melancholy place, for the proud as well as the mournful

recollections which it recalled; for here Alonso VI. had lost his

only son, in the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever

suffered from the Moors since the destruction of the kingdom of the

Goths. He fell in battle with the Almoravides; and because seven Counts

had died bravely in defending the Infante, the African fanatics, in

their insolent triumph, called the spot where they fell the Place of

the Seven Swine. This ill-omened ground was now to become the scene of

an action disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they

were routed, and infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness

with which they abused their victory.

Venegas supposed that the French were bringing forces against him

across the Tagus, by the ferry at Villamanrique. His danger was from a

different quarter. Victor had marched from Toledo against Infantado’s

army, knowing as little of the Spaniards’ movements as they did of his,

but with such troops, that his only anxiety was to find the enemy, and

bring them to action wherever they might be found. Victor himself, with

General Ruffin’s division, went by way of Alcazar, and General Villate,

taking the direction of Ucles, discovered the Spaniards there on the

morning of the 13th. Venegas apprehended an attack on his right, or

in the rear; but the French crossed the brook, and fell upon the left

wing of the Spaniards, who were stationed upon some high and broken

ground, commanding the convent and the town. If the general erred in

not strengthening this position, the troops allowed him no time for

remedying his error; they retreated precipitately to the town, and

when orders came to occupy the convent it was too late; ... the enemy

were within the enclosure, and fired from thence, as under cover of a

parapet. The panic presently spread, the raw levies disordered those

who would have done their duty, and many officers made a brave but vain

sacrifice of their own lives in endeavouring to rally and encourage the

men. The fugitives in one direction came upon the enemy’s artillery,

under General Cenarmont, and were cut down with grape-shot; in another

they fell in with Victor and the remaining part of the French army. One

body, under D. Pedro Agustin Giron, seeing that all was lost, made

their way desperately through the enemy in good order, and got to

Carrascosa, where they found the Duke. It was a series of errors on the

part of the Spaniards, and the consequences were as disastrous as they

could be. The French boasted of having taken 300 officers and 12,000

men, ... the whole force, however, which Venegas had with him did not

amount to this, but the loss was very great. The prisoners were marched

to ♦ROCCA, P. 79.♦ Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and

exhaustion were shot by their inhuman captors.

♦CRUELTIES COMMITTED THERE BY THE FRENCH.♦

Never indeed did any men heap upon themselves more guilt and infamy

than those by whom this easy conquest was obtained. The inhabitants

of Ucles had taken no part in the action; from necessity they could

only be passive spectators of the scene. But they had soon cause to

lament that they had not rather immolated their wives and children

with their own hands, like the Numantians of old, and then rushed upon

the invaders to sweeten death with vengeance, instead of submitting to

the mercy of such enemies. Plunder was the first object of the French,

and in order to make the townspeople discover where their valuables

were secreted, they tortured them. When they had thus obtained all the

portable wealth of the place, they yoked the inhabitants like beasts,

choosing especially the clergy for this outrage, loaded them with their

own furniture, and made them carry it to the Castle Hill, and pile it

in heaps, where they set fire to it, and consumed the whole. They then

in mere wantonness murdered above threescore persons, dragging them

to the shambles, that this butchery might be committed in its proper

scene. Several women were among these sufferers, and they might be

regarded as happy in being thus delivered from the worse horrors that

ensued: for the French laid hands on the surviving women of the place,

amounting to some three hundred, ... they tore the nun from the altar,

the wife from her husband’s corpse, the virgin from her mother’s arms,

and they abused these victims of the foulest brutality, till many

of them expired on the spot. This was not all, ... but the farther

atrocities which these monsters perpetrated cannot even be hinted at

without violating the decencies of language and the reverence which is

due to humanity. These unutterable things were committed in open day,

and the officers made not the slightest attempt at restraining the

wretches under their command; they were employed in securing the best

part of the plunder for themselves. The Spanish government published

the details of this wickedness, in order ♦GAZETA DEL GOBIERNO, APRIL

24, 1809.♦ that if the criminals escaped earthly punishment, they might

not escape perpetual infamy.

♦INFANTADO COLLECTS THE FUGITIVES.♦

Infantado was severely censured for exposing his advanced guard

fourteen leagues from his head-quarters, so that support was

impossible; and an equal want of judgement had been shown by Venegas

in not falling back upon the main body, which he knew was actually

on the way to join him. The Duke left Cuenca on the morning preceding

the action, and took up his quarters that night at Horcajada. Desirous

to know for what reason Venegas had retreated from Tarancon, he rode

forward on the 13th with his aides-de-camp, and when he reached

Carrascosa, which is a league and half from Ucles, some carriers

informed him that as they were leaving that town they heard firing at

the outposts. Part of his troops were at Carrascosa; they had heard

nothing; and the Duke was preparing to sit down to table with their

general, the Conde de Orgaz, when news came that horse and foot were

approaching in disorder. Immediately he mounted and rode forward; the

first person whom he met was the commandant of the light troops, D.

Francisco Copons y Navia, an officer in whom he had great confidence:

seeing him without his battalion, he knew that some fatal blow must

have been sustained, and asking what had happened, was told that the

troops at Ucles were all either killed or taken. His first impulse

was to rush forward, and throw himself upon the enemy’s bayonets. A

timely thought of duty withheld him from this act of desperation. The

troops under Giron, who had fought their way through the French, came

up now in good order; with these and with such fugitives as could be

brought together, he made dispositions which checked the pursuit in

this direction, and retired when the evening was ♦INFANTADO, 119–132.♦

closing to Horcajada. They rested there during the early part of the

night, and setting forward at three in the morning, reached the Venta

de las Cabrejas before daybreak.

♦RETREAT FROM CUENCA.♦

Here, while the troops were receiving their rations, the generals held

a council whether they should retreat to the borders of Valencia,

and take up a position for the defence of that kingdom, which was

threatened on the side of Daroca; or join the Marques del Palacio in La

Mancha, and if compelled, fall back to La Carolina or Despeña-Perros;

or march for Zaragoza, to attack the besiegers, and raise the siege.

This was gravely proposed; but the madness of making such an attempt

with an unprovided, undisciplined, routed army, dispirited by a long

series of disasters, and above all, by the scandalous defeat of the

preceding day, was universally acknowledged. The scheme of joining

Palacio, and making for the Sierra Morena, was likewise rejected,

because in the plains of La Mancha they would be exposed to the enemy’s

cavalry; and it was resolved without a dissentient voice to retreat

into Valencia, where there were great resources for refitting and

increasing the troops. This being determined, the army reached Cuenca

that night, and continued its retreat on the following morning, the

artillery being sent off in the middle of the night by a better road,

to join them at Almodovar del Pinar. But four-and-twenty hours of the

heaviest rain rendered this road also impassable; and in spite of every

exertion the greater number of the guns could not be got farther than

Olmedilla, one league from Cuenca, by the following midnight, and there

the escort left them. The Duke, who was with the artillery himself,

in hope of expediting the most difficult part of their movements, had

preceded them to Tortola, where a few of the guns had arrived, and

whither the rest were to be brought next day, the worst part of the

road being past. He sent orders therefore that one regiment of horse

and another of foot should be dispatched to Tortola, for the purpose

of escorting the artillery when it should be thus brought together,

and went himself to join the army at ♦LOSS OF THE ARTILLERY.♦ Valera

de arriba. On his arrival there on the evening of the 16th he found

that no infantry had been sent; being barefooted and exhausted by

marching in such weather, they had been deemed actually incapable of

the service. Presently advice arrived that a company of the Ordenes

Militares, which he had left at Tortola, had thought proper to leave

the place immediately after his departure: that a party of enemy’s

cavalry had come up, and that the regiment of dragoons at the very

sound of the French trumpets had taken flight, abandoning the guns to

them. He now ordered a battalion of infantry and the Farnese regiment

of dragoons to hasten and retake them: the night was dark, the distance

considerable, the roads in the worst imaginable state; and when at

daybreak they came to Tortola, scarcely an hundred infantry could be

mustered, the rest having lost the way, or dispersed. The dragoons

behaved well, and twice made themselves masters of the guns, but to no

purpose; they were embedded in the soil too deeply to be removed at

once; and while they were vainly labouring there, reinforcements came

up to the enemy, and many brave men were sacrificed before the regiment

desisted from the attempt at saving these guns, which with such

exertions had been brought thither from Tudela. Infantado knew that any

farther effort, considering the state of his army, must be hopeless,

and would moreover expose him to the imminent danger of having his

retreat cut off, for one column of the enemy appeared to be taking the

direction of Almodovar; and in fact when the Duke reached that place,

it was ascertained that they were within three leagues of it. After a

few hours’ rest therefore he ordered the retreat to be continued to La

Motilla del Palancar, near Alarcon; and being, however unfortunate as

a commander, willing to perform a soldier’s part to the last, took his

station with his own family and his orderly dragoons, as an outpost,

within three miles of the enemy. This had an excellent effect upon the

troops; so many indeed had deserted since the rout at Ucles, that few

perhaps remained except those who acted upon a sense of duty, and their

movements were now conducted with more composure. Infantado remained

at La Motilla till he was assured that the French had turned aside

from the pursuit; removing then to Albacete and Chinchilla, he gave

his troops a few days’ necessary ♦INFANTADO, 133–141.♦ rest, and issued

directions for the better observance of discipline and order.

♦INFANTADO FRUSTRATES A MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY AGAINST THE CAROLINA

ARMY.♦

On the 25th the army moved to Hellin and Tobarra, the object being to

cover Murcia, call off the attention of the enemy from Valencia, and

receive reinforcements from both those kingdoms and from Andalusia.

Infantado was more enterprising and more hopeful than some of the

generals under his command, who would have had him retreat to the

city of Murcia, there to refit his troops, or take shelter even at

Carthagena. The minister at war submitted to his consideration whether

it would not be advisable to take up a position between the Peñas de S.

Pedro and Carcelen, for the purpose of communicating with the Sierra

Morena by the Sierra de Alcaraz. This the Duke thought a bad position

in itself, even if it were not in a desert, and without water; and as

he had ascertained that Victor was moving upon Villarrobledo with the

intention of cutting off the vanguard of the Carolina army at Villarta,

he took measures for averting a blow, which, if it had succeeded, would

have left the passes of the Sierra Morena open to the enemy. It had

been intended that this detachment, consisting of 5000 men, should

have co-operated with him in his projected movement upon Toledo, which

had been so fatally frustrated at Ucles; they were therefore under

his command. He now ♦1809. FEBRUARY.♦ sent orders that they should

instantly retire to S. Cruz de Mudela, or to El Viso; and while he

hastened thither himself to join them, sent off 500 horse, divided

into four parties, to act as _guerillas_ in the rear of the French.

They did this with great success, imposing upon them by their rapidity

and boldness: and the Duke by forced marches reached S. Cruz de Mudela

in time to save the Carolina troops, the enemy having just arrived in

front of them. The French, seeing a force which they had not expected,

and were not in strength to attack, retired toward Toledo, leaving

the open country to the Spaniards: and Infantado then communicated

♦INFANTADO, 180–189.♦ with General Cuesta, that he might act in concert

with the army of Extremadura.

♦INFANTADO SUPERSEDED BY CARTAOJAL.♦

The troops had now recovered heart; the advanced guard, under the Duque

del Alburquerque, gained some advantage at Mora, where, ♦FEB. 18.♦

by a well-planned expedition, he surprised the French; and Infantado

thought that he had performed no inconsiderable service to his country,

in having gathered up the wreck of the central army, and brought it

into an efficient state, when he received an order from the Supreme

Junta to give up the command to the ♦FEB. 6.♦ Conde de Cartaojal.

He obeyed reluctantly, and with the feelings of an injured man. The

government at that time perhaps, like the people, attributed too large

a part of their disasters to the generals, and therefore appointed

and displaced them upon no better ground than that of complying

with public opinion. The soldiers appear to have been well satisfied

with the Duke; they indeed had seen the incessant exertions which he

had made for supporting them when the government could send them no

supplies: but the officers were divided into cabals, and there was a

strong party against him. His offended pride did not however abate

his desire of continuing to serve his country in the field, and he

requested permission to remain with the army as Colonel of the Royal

Spanish Guards; but he was informed that this was incompatible with

his elevated rank, and therefore he was ♦FEB. 12.♦ called to Seville.

No inquiry concerning the rout at Ucles was instituted; the opinion

prevailed that it was imputable to his error in exposing the advanced

guard at such a distance from the body of his army; but the faults with

which he charged Venegas were overlooked, and the government continued

to place a confidence in that General, to which, in any other capacity

than that of a commander, his honourable character and personal

qualities entitled him.

♦CALUMNIES AGAINST CASTAÑOS.♦

The French, at the commencement of their revolutionary war, sent

every unsuccessful general to the scaffold, the Convention in its

bloody acts keeping pace with the bloodiest desires of a deceived and

infuriated populace. The Central Junta contracted no such guilt, though

humanity is not the characteristic of the Spaniards, and justice in

state affairs had in that country for centuries been unknown. They

gave ♦1809.♦ no ear to vulgar or malignant accusations; but, on the

other hand, they allowed their generals no opportunity of vindicating

themselves. Upon this ground Castaños, as well as Infantado, had

cause to complain. The order which called him from the command of the

central army during its retreat intimated no dissatisfaction at his

conduct; on the contrary, it summoned him to take the presidency of the

Military Junta, saying that the fate of armies depended upon the plans

which were laid down for them. That restless intriguer, the Conde de

Montijo, who had visited him at his head-quarters at Tudela, professed

the warmest friendship towards him, and spoken of him in the language

of unbounded admiration, left the army suddenly two days before the

battle, and wherever he went reported that Castaños was a traitor,

and had sold the country to the French. This nearly proved fatal to

the General, when, in obedience to his summons, he set out to join

the Central Junta, taking with him merely such an escort as his rank

required: for he soon found that fifteen horse and thirty foot were

not sufficient to protect him from imminent danger; the clamour which

Montijo raised had spread far and wide, and they could not enter a

village without preparations as serious as if they were about to engage

in action. At Miguel-turra, in La Mancha, the Junta exerted themselves

ineffectually to restrain the populace, who were crying out, Kill

him! kill him! The members of that body, the better to secure him,

gathered round his person, and accompanied him on foot; the rabble

pressed upon them with blind fury, and their lives, as well as that of

Castaños, would have been sacrificed, if his cavalry had not charged

the multitude sword in hand, and opened the way. But the danger was

not over when he had been housed; the house was beset, and it was only

by the exertions of the better classes, and especially of a priest,

that he was enabled to leave the place before daybreak the following

morning. It became necessary for them to avoid all populous places,

and take up their lodging in the smallest and most retired hamlets;

and yet with these precautions his life was frequently threatened. In

addition to this evil there was the uncertainty of knowing whither to

direct his course: three times on his journey he found that the Central

Junta had changed their place of residence; and when he finally made

for Seville, it was with a belief that they had removed to Puerto de

Santa Maria. Upon approaching Seville, he was ordered to take up his

abode in the monastery of S. Geronimo de Buenavista, and there await

the farther determination of the government. Montijo had accused him as

an instrument of Tilly, engaged with him in treasonable designs, and

also in a scheme for rendering Andalusia independent, and making it the

head of a confederacy of ♦CASTAÑOS, REPRESENTACION, 15–18.♦ provinces.

This was the mere fabrication of a man who scrupled at no means for

promoting his own insane ambition, and as such the Junta received it;

but they deemed it expedient to treat the general as if he were under

their displeasure, lest a suspicion, which in its consequences might be

most fatal to the country, should be raised against themselves.

♦HIS MEMORIAL TO THE JUNTA.♦

Castaños was not aware of the accusation which had been thus preferred;

least indeed of all men could he have supposed that a charge of

federalism would have been brought against him, who had with so much

decision and effect opposed the dangerous disposition of the provincial

authorities to consult their own security alone. But he complained of

the injurious restraint in which he was placed, and in an able and

temperate memorial appealed to his past services, showed that the

defeat at Tudela was not imputable to any error or indiscretion on his

part (his opinion having been over-ruled by their representative, D.

Francisco Palafox), and required that his conduct might be judged of by

the circumstances in which he was placed, and the actual condition of

his army, not as if he had commanded 80,000 effective men. An army in

the field, he said, was like a musical instrument with many keys and

many registers: if these did not answer to the touch, if many strings

were wanting, and the others not in tune, the best musician would be

deemed a sorry performer by those who heard the broken and jarring

sounds which he produced, and knew not the state of the instrument.

Still, he maintained, the French were far from being able to subdue

Spain. Castaños was not unsupported while he thus defended himself with

the confidence of an innocent and injured man. The Junta of Seville

honourably espoused his cause, and the government allowed him to remove

to his own house at Algeciras, there to remain while the inquiry into

his conduct which he demanded should be carried on.

♦INTRIGUES OF MONTIJO.♦

Montijo was one of those men who in disordered times are intoxicated

with ambition and vanity. His object in seeking the ruin of Castaños

was to obtain a command for himself. He represented to the Junta that

the resources by which the miracle of restoring the country might be

effected could only be drawn from Andalusia; but that to call them

forth activity, energy, patriotism, and above all the confidence of

the public were required. Under any other circumstances he should have

blushed to designate himself as the person in whom these qualifications

were united, and unhappily the only person who possessed the last; but

in such an emergency a good Spaniard must sacrifice even his modesty.

Spain might still be saved if he were commissioned to take what cavalry

he could raise, put himself at the head of the forces in La Mancha, and

march upon Madrid; and he pledged his sacred word of honour that he

would resign the command as soon as the French should be driven back to

the Ebro. ♦1809. JANUARY.♦ This proposal met with as little attention

as it deserved; and Montijo then joined the army of Carolina, there to

sow fresh intrigues, and meet with deserved humiliation.

♦PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH IN CASTILLE AND LEON.♦

The French themselves were at this time in such a situation, that the

desultory and harassing warfare which the Junta of Seville advised

at the commencement of the struggle might now have been pursued

against them with great effect. A disposition in some of the marshals

to disregard Joseph, and act without any deference to his wishes or

commands, had shown itself before Buonaparte left Spain; the attention

of the French cabinet was directed toward Austria, and the affairs

of Spain were left to the intrusive government, which had in fact no

control over the armies by whom alone it was to be supported. But as

there was no enemy in the field alert and able enough to take advantage

of the fair occasions which offered, the French commanders believed

the struggle was at an end, and that they had only to march over the

country and receive the submission of the inhabitants. While Victor

occupied Toledo, waiting only a convenient season to disperse the

hasty levies which were brought together for the defence of Andalusia,

General Dorneau marched against Zamora, scaled the walls of that

ancient city, and put to death those inhabitants who, in the flagitious

language of the French bulletin, were called the most guilty. Castille

and Leon were overrun, and wherever they went those scenes of

profanation, violence, and murder were exhibited, in which Buonaparte’s

soldiers were systematically allowed to glut the worst passions of

corrupted and brutalized humanity.

♦NEW LEVIES RAISED BY THE SPANIARDS.♦

Yet while the country was thus at the mercy of the French, the panic

which their appearance every where excited extended nowhere beyond

their immediate presence. In all places which were not actually

occupied by the enemy, the local authorities acted as if no enemy had

been at hand, and their own government had been as efficient as it was

legitimate. The enlisting went on, and promises of speedy triumph and

sure deliverance were held forth with a confidence which no reverses

could shake. The fugitives from the different armies no sooner reached

their own homes than they were again enrolled to be embodied, and

exposed again to privations and sufferings such as those from which

they had so hardly escaped. Before their strength was recruited, they

were sent off to form new armies, neither better disciplined, better

commanded, nor better provided than those which had been routed and

dispersed. They went hungered, half naked, and cursing their fortune,

without confidence in their officers, each other, or themselves, yet

believing fully that the deliverance of Spain would be effected with

a faith which seemed to require and perhaps very generally expected

miracles for its fulfilment. Human means indeed seem to have been

provided as little as if they had not been taken into the account.

♦TEMPORIZING CONDUCT OF CERTAIN MAGISTRATES.♦

This unreasoning confidence brought with it evil as well as good.

Many of those who had something to lose, and hoped that part at least

might be saved by submission, took either side according as the scale

inclined. When the enemy was absent, they joined the national voice,

which expressed what were their real feelings: if the French appeared,

they were ready to take the oaths, and act under them, as far as was

necessary for their own safety or advantage, longing at the same time

and looking for the day of deliverance and vengeance. In many places,

the magistracy acted with no other view than that of averting from

themselves and their immediate jurisdiction as much of the common

misery as they could. This was particularly the case in those parts of

Leon and Castille which lay most open to the enemy. The enrolment was

rigorously enforced there, and men were hurried off: but any means of

local defence were rather dreaded than desired. Offers of assistance

were made from Ciudad Rodrigo to Ledesma and Salamanca, and both cities

declined the proffered aid, as unnecessary; but in truth, because they

believed it to be unavailing, and had determined not to provoke the

enemy by resistance.

♦SIR ROBERT WILSON.♦

Ciudad Rodrigo had at that time become a point of great interest, owing

to a well-timed movement of Sir Robert Wilson’s with a small body of

Portugueze volunteers. This adventurous officer had been rewarded by

the Emperor of Germany with the order of Maria Theresa, for a brilliant

affair in which the 15th regiment of dragoons was engaged during the

siege of Landrecy. He served afterwards in Egypt, and published a

history of the British expedition to that country, in which work he

charged Buonaparte with the massacre of his prisoners at Jaffa, and the

empoisonment of his own sick and wounded. The facts were boldly denied

at the time, and willingly disbelieved by Buonaparte’s admirers; they

have since been substantiated by ample evidence, and by his own avowal;

but the merit of having first proclaimed them was Sir Robert Wilson’s,

and it marked him for an object of especial vengeance should he ever

fall into the hands of the tyrant, whose true character he had been

the first to expose. This rendered him more conspicuous than he would

have been for his rank, which was that of Lieutenant-Colonel. Having,

in pursuance of the convention, superintended the embarkation of the

French at Porto, and by great exertions contributed to save them from

the just fury of the populace, he applied himself with ♦HE RAISES A

PORTUGUEZE LEGION AT PORTO.♦ characteristic activity and enterprise to

raising and disciplining a Portugueze legion in that city. The plan

was entirely approved by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and zealously forwarded

by the Bishop. Two thousand men presently presented themselves, and

that number might have been increased five-fold could he have relied

upon resources for them; for the alertness with which they learned our

discipline, the confidence which they acquired, the pride which they

felt at being displayed, and which their officers partook in displaying

them, excited the emulation of their countrymen. Some jealousy was felt

at Lisbon, and some obstacles were thrown in his way, upon the pretext

that an invidious distinction would be occasioned between these and the

other Portugueze troops. Sir John Cradock, however, when the command in

that capital devolved upon him, authorised Sir Robert to act according

to his own judgement. His first thought had been to embark for

Carthagena, and march from thence to Catalonia. Afterwards, Asturias

seemed a nearer and more important point. But after Blake’s army had

been dispersed, and before Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird had

formed a junction, he resolved to march toward the frontiers, thinking

that he might move from Miranda or Braganza, and so to facilitate the

communication between them, and cover, as far as his means permitted,

the approach to the northern provinces. With this intent he marched the

first division of his legion, consisting of 700 men with six pieces of

cannon; they were to be followed by the second, under Baron Eben, an

Hanoverian officer in the British service; and this by the third. And

Sir J. Cradock had ordered a battalion of Portugueze infantry and a

regiment of cavalry to join him.

♦SIR ROBERT GOES TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦

When Sir Robert reached Lamego, he there found information, that a

small British detachment which had been stationed in Ciudad Rodrigo,

had, in consequence of the approaching danger, forsaken it. Always

hopeful himself, and well aware of what importance it was that that

position should be maintained, he left his troops, and hastened thither

to consult with the Junta. It was a point from which he could act

upon that division of the enemy who were then forcing their way into

Extremadura, ... or, co-operate with any Spanish force that might take

the field from Salamanca. The people, on their part, declared their

determination to defend the place resolutely; his aid, therefore, was

accepted as frankly as it was offered, and the legion accordingly

advanced from Lamego through a country almost impracticable at that

season. By dint of human exertion, carts and artillery were drawn up

steeps which hitherto had been deemed inaccessible for carriages.

Sometimes men and officers, breast-deep in the water, dragged the guns

through torrents so formidable, that cattle could not be trusted to

perform that service. Sometimes, where the carriages would have floated

and have been swept away, the wheels were taken off, and they were

slidden over on the foot-bridges. Sometimes they were hauled along

causeways and connecting bridges so narrow, that the wheels rested on

half their fellies upon the stones which were set edge upwards on the

verge of the road. It was the first march these troops had ever made,

but notwithstanding the severity of such labour, performed at such a

season, and during incessant rain, not a man deserted, and there was

no straggling, no murmuring amid all their difficulties: they sung as

they went along, and reached their resting-place at night with unabated

cheerfulness.

♦HE REFUSES TO RETURN TO PORTO.♦

Sir Robert had plainly stated to the Junta that his legion was not to

form part of the garrison, but that in every operation without the

walls he should think it his duty to aid, and even in defence of the

suburbs before the Salamanca gate, as long as his return over the

bridge was assured. The Junta and the people of that city displayed a

hearty willingness to co-operate with their allies in any manner that

might appear most conducive to the common cause; and from that generous

spirit they never departed during all the vicissitudes of the war. At

first there was a fair prospect of acting offensively; but when the

authorities at Ledesma and Salamanca declined the assistance which was

offered them from this quarter, Sir Robert, instead of maintaining the

line of the Tormes, as he had hoped to do, formed on the Agueda, having

his head-quarters at San Felices. When he had marched from the coast,

it was with the hope of facilitating the plans and contributing to the

success of a British army perfectly equipped and disciplined, strong

in itself, and confident in its commanders and its cause. He now learnt

that that army was retreating with a speed which the most utter defeat

could hardly have precipitated: at the same time he was privately

advised to fall back on Porto. But though weak himself, he ♦EFFECT OF

HIS MOVEMENTS.♦ had already ascertained that the French in that part of

Spain were not strong, that the activity and appearance of his little

corps had imposed upon them a salutary opinion of his strength, and

that his continuance there was of no trifling importance, not merely

as covering the removal of the British stores from Almeida, but as

checking the enemy’s advance in that direction, counteracting the

report which they busily spread and indeed believed themselves, that

the English had entirely abandoned Spain, encouraging the Spaniards,

and gaining time for them to strengthen the works of Ciudad Rodrigo,

and for training a brave and well-disposed people.

This became of more consequence when the Junta of that city had, in

their own language, “the melancholy honour of being the only one which

held out in all Castille,” Ledesma and Salamanca having, without a show

of resistance, admitted the enemy. For him to obtain intelligence was

as easy, owing to the disposition of the people, as it was difficult

for the French. Having ascertained that they had few cavalry and

only 1500 foot in Salamanca, that they were proportionally weak in

the country about Zamora and Villalpando, and that they had not

occupied Ledesma for want of men, he entered Ledesma, carried off,

in Ferdinand’s name for the Junta of Rodrigo, the treasure and money

which had been raised there for the French in obedience to requisition,

and compelled them to seek and convoy what provisions they extorted

from the country. They had given public notice that every person who

disobeyed their requisitions should be punished with death. Sir Robert

sent forth a counter-proclamation, declaring, that if this threat were

effected, he would hang a Frenchman for every Spaniard. By incessant

activity, attacking their posts in open day, he kept them perpetually

on the alarm, and made them apprehend a serious attack on Salamanca

itself. Upon that score their apprehensions would have been realized,

if the whole force which Sir Robert had raised had been then at his

command; or if even with such poor means as he possessed he had not

been withheld by orders from Lisbon. But the ♦PART OF THE LEGION

DETAINED AT PORTO.♦ remaining corps of his legion had been detained at

Porto, and when he had applied for them, and for clothing and military

stores, he had been answered that the men were wanted for the defence

of Porto itself, and that, even if stores might have been spared,

they could not be sent without imminent danger from the people. It

was in vain for him to represent that the measures which he had taken

were those which were best adapted for the protection of Portugal,

by covering her weakest side; that Portugal must be defended beyond

her frontiers; that the service in which he was engaged was of all

others that in which the troops might soonest acquire the discipline

and experience in which the Portugueze soldiers were so notoriously

deficient; that he wanted the men only; not provisions, those he could

assure to them; not money, for if what had been received from England

for the express use of the legion were withheld from it, he would

apply elsewhere. ♦DISPLEASURE OF THE AUTHORITIES THERE.♦ Reasoning

was of no avail when the danger from the side of Galicia appeared to

be so near as in reality it was; and the Bishop of Porto, though he

had warmly encouraged the formation of the legion, as an important

measure towards restoring the military character of his countrymen,

and though Sir Robert had succeeded in gaining his good opinion to a

high degree, was nevertheless offended at the disrespect which seemed

to be shown to him and the other Portugueze authorities, by the manner

in which that officer was now acting as if wholly independent of them.

From the Spanish government, however, ♦RANK GIVEN HIM BY THE SPANISH

GOVERNMENT.♦ Sir Robert received as much encouragement as he could

have desired in his most sanguine hopes. They gave him the rank of

Brigade-General, and placed the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo and the

troops in the province at his disposal. And this proof of confidence

was given at a time when a misunderstanding had arisen between the two

cabinets, which might have been fatal to the common cause, if each

party had not rendered full justice to the upright intention of the

other.

♦1809. FEBRUARY.

PROPOSAL THAT BRITISH TROOPS SHOULD BE ADMITTED INTO CADIZ.♦

As soon as the dispersion of Blake’s army was known in England, the

British government anticipating the disasters which would follow,

considered Cadiz as the ultimate point of retreat to which the

Spaniards would be driven; there, supported by that fortress on one

side, and by Gibraltar on the other, they might make a stand which

no force that France could bring against them could overpower.

Accordingly, when Sir John Moore’s first intention of retreating was

communicated, government resolved that his army should immediately be

transferred to the south of Spain, for it was impossible to foresee the

miserable state to which the manner of his retreat would reduce it. But

the representations of that general concerning the little assistance

which he received from the Spaniards, and the little patriotism which

he could discover, so far influenced ministers, that they thought it

improper to hazard an army in the south, unless a corps of it were

admitted into Cadiz. The treachery of Morla, and the danger of similar

treasons, rendered this precaution advisable. Upon this subject Mr.

Frere was instructed to communicate with the Junta, and as it was not

apprehended that the required proof of confidence would be refused,

General Sherbrooke, with 4000 men, was ordered to sail immediately for

Cadiz. He was not to require the command of the garrison, ... that

might have offended the feelings of the Spaniards. If, however, the

Junta should not admit him, he was then to proceed to Gibraltar, and

any operations in the south were necessarily to be abandoned, though

there was no intention even in that case of abandoning the cause of

Spain. Sir John Cradock also was instructed to sail for Cadiz, if he

should find it necessary to abandon Portugal; but he was not to take

this step till he had been apprized of the determination of the Spanish

government.

♦OBJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.♦

Before it was known that the Junta had quitted Aranjuez, Sir George

Smith had been sent to Cadiz on a local mission, to provide for the

possible case of British troops being necessary for the defence of that

city, at a time when it might be impracticable to obtain the opinion

of the central government. When the government was removed to Seville,

his mission ceased with the necessity of it. He, however, not only

considered it as still existing, but went beyond his instructions;

informed the governor of Cadiz that he had authority to require that

British troops should be admitted to garrison that place; and sent

to Sir John Cradock, directing him to dispatch troops thither from

Lisbon, ... a measure which was not to have been taken except at the

direct solicitation of the Spanish authorities at Cadiz. And this he

did without waiting for their consent, and without consulting or even

communicating with the English ambassador. The Junta immediately

conceived that some secret designs were on foot, with which Mr. Frere

had not been entrusted, because he had not been thought a proper

instrument; and that minister had the vexation of hearing the justice

which they did to his frankness urged as a ground for unjust ♦FEB. 7.♦

suspicions. “Cadiz,” they said, “was not threatened, and a measure

so extraordinary as that of admitting English troops there might

compromise the Supreme Junta with the nation. Many would imagine

that the prognostics of Morla, which the government had considered

as dreams, had assumed at least an air of reality; and however the

Junta might be persuaded of the purity of the motives by which Great

Britain was influenced, it would not be in their power to counteract

this imagination. Spain had addressed herself to Great Britain, and had

obtained succours and good offices, which would for ever redound to the

honour of England. Spain had opened her heart to unbounded gratitude;

but never could believe that her misfortunes obliged her to this. Let

the allied troops disembark in small divisions, so as to leave room for

each other, proceed without delay to occupy cantonments at Xeres, Port

St. Mary’s, and the neighbourhood, and then pursue their march into the

interior. It would be easy to fall back upon Cadiz if that should be

necessary; but that necessity was at all events very distant.” This,

as the final resolution of King Ferdinand, the Junta (governing in

his name) communicated to Mr. Frere: “trusting,” they said, “in his

discernment and in his religious probity, that he would feel the truth

of their representations, and give the most peremptory orders for the

British troops to abide by what had been agreed upon, and under no

pretext whatever to remain in the fortress of Cadiz.”

♦TROOPS ARRIVE IN THE BAY.♦

During these discussions, the two regiments under General Mackenzie,

which Sir George Smith had so precipitately ordered from Lisbon,

arrived in the bay. About the same time Mr. Frere received a copy of

the instructions intended for Sir John Moore, directing him, in case

he could not keep his ground in the north, to embark his troops, and

carry them round either to Lisbon or to the south of Spain. These the

ambassador communicated to the Junta; and at the same time informed

them that the British government expected Buonaparte would have driven

back the English army into Galicia, and marched himself into Andalusia

to make himself master of Seville, and shut the door against every

hope of succour. Expecting that he would pursue this plan, government,

while it sent these instructions to Sir John Moore, dispatched the

corps under General Sherbrooke, with a view of preventing at least the

surrender of Cadiz, and ensuring to the auxiliary army ♦MR. FRERE’S

REPRESENTATIONS TO THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦ some safe landing-place. In such

a scheme, Mr. Frere argued, there was nothing unreasonable; it did not

become the British ministers to risk their army without any place of

retreat from an enemy who was less formidable for his military force

than for the means of corruption which he employed, ... means which

the capitulation of Madrid evinced to have been not less successful

in Spain than in other countries. Should the English then expose

themselves to the danger arising from the enemy’s intrigues, only in

deference to the injurious suspicions which that very enemy wished

to excite against them in the minds of the Spanish government, ... a

government to which that of his Britannic Majesty had never ceased

to offer proofs of disinterestedness and of good faith? “The members

of the Junta,” said Mr. Frere, “will do me the justice to admit that

I have never endeavoured to promote the interests of my nation, but

as being essentially connected with those of their own. If, however,

I have always been guided by the same sentiments and the same views

which a Spanish politician might have, I do not think it is to depart

from them, if I deliver the same opinion which I should give had I the

honour of occupying a place in the council of your nation; namely,

that the whole policy of the Spanish government rests essentially on

a persuasion of perfect good faith on the part of England, and that

it is important to confirm it more and more by testimonies of mutual

confidence, and by avoiding the slightest appearance of distrust

between government and government.”

One other point Mr. Frere adverted to, which, though less important,

was of great weight. The precariousness of commerce, occasioned by the

supposed insecurity of Cadiz, was prejudicial to the finances of Spain.

There was no longer a place in the peninsula where British goods could

be deposited; and the government was therefore under the necessity of

cutting off all mercantile intercourse between the colonies and the

rest of the civilized world, or of affording to foreign commerce a

security which it could not find in the sole protection of a Spanish

garrison. On this head he appealed to the custom-house registers, and

to the applications made by neutrals for permission to reship goods,

which ♦REPLY OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. FEB. 17.♦ they did not deem

any longer safe. A note was transmitted in reply to this, saying,

that the Junta would dispatch an extraordinary courier to London, and

empower their minister there to settle a point of so much importance

in a manner agreeable to the interests of both nations. Meantime, the

English troops which were at present in the bay, and those which should

arrive there, might disembark, for the purpose of proceeding to Port

St. Mary, San Lucar, Xeres, and the other places proposed for their

cantonment. No misfortune which could happen to the Spanish cause could

prevent the English from falling back on Gibraltar and Cadiz; and this

step would prevent the inconvenience and perhaps sickness to which they

might be exposed by remaining on board ship or in Cadiz, the appointed

stations being in a country the most healthy in the world.

♦THEIR PROPOSAL FOR EMPLOYING THE TROOPS.♦

Having thus considered the convenience of the troops, the Junta

submitted two propositions to Mr. Frere, the only person, they said,

alluding to Sir George Smith’s interference, whom they acknowledged

as the representative of the British nation. First, that the British

troops should proceed to Catalonia, and garrison the maritime ports of

that principality, thus enabling the Spanish army in that quarter to

march to the relief of Zaragoza. Secondly, that they should co-operate

with Cuesta: that general was threatened by a force not very superior

in number to his own, and the assistance of the English might give him

the superiority; thus Cadiz would be secured, and time given to set on

foot the troops who were now only waiting for muskets from England.

The note concluded by expressing a feeling of honourable pain in the

Junta, that England should distrust the safety of Cadiz unless it were

garrisoned by English troops. They asserted, that the constancy and

valour of the Spanish nation, manifested in this arduous struggle,

entitled it to the respect of Europe; and, gently hinting at what had

passed in Galicia, they requested that a veil might be drawn over it.

Cadiz was not situated like Coruña, the same events therefore could not

possibly occur there.

♦CONFERENCE WITH MR. FRERE. FEB. 18.♦

Upon the receipt of this note, Mr. Frere requested a conference. They

proposed to him that he should name a governor for Cadiz. He replied,

it was a responsibility with which he would not charge himself for all

the world. Four months ago he should have chosen Morla, Espeleta six

months before that: both had been found wanting in the day of trial,

though neither had been placed in a situation so trying as that of a

governor holding out in the last remaining garrison. Then replying to

the argument, that the Junta could not act against popular opinion, “it

must likewise be recollected,” he said, “that the British government

could not proceed in opposition to an opinion equally decided in

England; and which of the two pretensions was the more just? England

was willing to expose an English army to any hazard which resulted

absolutely from the nature of things; but England would not consent

that that danger should be aggravated in the slightest degree, out of

deference to the caprice of popular opinion, or suspicions which were

unworthy of either country. England required of Spain that it should

place confidence in the British government, binding itself by the most

formal engagements; Spain offered the choice of a governor and the

chance of his fidelity. Our proposal was in every respect the fairest

and the most rational, and it could not be expected that we should

depart from a demand of right, for the sake of conferring a favour. Mr.

Frere offered to propose to General Mackenzie, that he should leave

1000 men in Cadiz, and proceed with the rest to act in concert with

Cuesta for the protection of Seville, and that when General Sherbrooke

arrived, 3000 should proceed to the same direction, and he should

content himself with garrisoning Cadiz with 2000 men, and proceed with

or forward the remainder of his own force to General Mackenzie. To

this proposition the Junta had so nearly acceded, that the agreement

was only broken off by their insisting that the public mind could not

be reconciled to the admission of 2000 troops into Cadiz, and offering

to admit half the number, a force which Mr. Frere judged altogether

inadequate to a purpose for which his own government allotted four

times that amount.

The conference, which was conducted on both sides with perfect

moderation and temper, concluded with a fair avowal from the Junta,

that they were convinced of the good faith of the British government,

and of the advantage that would result to Spain from the admission

of British troops into Cadiz, if that were to be the indispensable

condition of their co-operation; but that their own existence

as a government depended upon popular opinion; and the English

ambassador could not be ignorant what numerous and active enemies

were endeavouring to undermine them. The Junta of Seville, who gave

themselves great credit for resisting the introduction of the English

into Cadiz last year when the French were advanced as far as Ecija,

were upon the watch now, and calling the attention of the people to

the conduct of the Central Junta in the present instance. Mr. Frere

made answer, that he could not of course expect his opinion should be

submitted to upon a subject on which their existence as a government

and their personal security (for such in fact was the case) were

involved. But he advised them to consider whether the responsibility to

which they exposed themselves in the other alternative was not equally

dangerous, and whether their enemies would not be as ready and as able

to make a handle of the rejection of British assistance as of its

acceptance.

♦MR. FRERE REQUESTS CUESTA’S OPINION.♦

Mr. Frere was aware that the uppermost feeling in the minds of some

of the Junta was an apprehension of the resentment which Cuesta might

entertain against them, convinced as that general must have been of

their weakness by the manner of his appointment. Being desirous,

therefore, of obtaining his opinion in favour of the measure which the

British government proposed, or at least in such terms as would remove

all fear of his declaring himself in opposition to it, he wrote to

him, explaining what Great Britain was willing to do in aid of Spain,

and what condition was required. That condition, he said, was to be

considered as indispensable, not only in the opinion of government,

but in that of the nation, the individuals of which did not at that

moment consider Cadiz as sufficiently secure even for a place of

disposal for their merchandize, so that they were daily soliciting

permission to re-export it; and it might easily be judged whether the

nation would risk its army upon an assurance which individuals did not

consider sufficient for their woollen and cotton. Lisbon had twice been

garrisoned by British troops, without the smallest inconvenience to

the Portugueze government. Madeira had in like manner been garrisoned:

the Portugueze knew us by long experience; they knew also the internal

state of England; knew that the English government never entertained

a thought of abusing the confidence of its allies; and the state of

public opinion was such in England, that it could not do this, even

though it wished it. Under the present circumstances, the political

question came before General Cuesta, both as a commander and a patriot,

who, as he must be interested in any thing that might appear to injure

the honour and independence of his country, so also he could not regard

with indifference any thing that might derange the military plans

of his government, and perhaps its political relations, by repeated

acts of mistrust and mutual displeasure. 4300 good British troops

might at this time march to co-operate with him upon the frontier of

Extremadura, they would be followed by 1500 more as soon as General

Sherbrooke arrived, and the auxiliary army would be delayed no longer

than was necessary to dispose of its wounded and prisoners, and to

be re-equipped. The question therefore was, whether General Cuesta

could dispense with the present reinforcement, and Spain with the aid

of an auxiliary army; for these were the points to be decided by the

resolution of admitting or sending back the British troops, such being

the alternative in which those troops were placed by the orders under

which they left Lisbon.

♦CUESTA’S REPLY.♦

Cuesta returned a reply in terms of proper respect, both for the

British government and his own. He did not, he said, discover any

difficulty which should prevent the British troops from garrisoning

Cadiz; but he was far from supposing that the Central Junta could be

without good ground for their objections, and that they should have

objections was sufficient to prevent him from giving any opinion unless

they consulted him. With regard to the 4300 men, there could be no

doubt but that he stood in need of them; and he hoped that England

would lend him much greater assistance, particularly if from any change

of circumstances the Central Junta should no longer appear repugnant

to the condition which the British government required. This reply did

not alter the determination which Mr. Frere had made, of sending the

troops back to Lisbon, considering Seville as comparatively safe, and

conceiving that the principle which the English ministry had originally

laid down, of not attaching small corps of British troops to a Spanish

army, was one he should not be justified in departing from, for any

object less important than the security of Cadiz or the capital. He

communicated this determination to Don Martin de Garay, alleging that

the information which he had lately received from Lisbon rendered such

a measure necessary.

♦CLOSE OF THE DISCUSSION.♦

Garay’s answer closed the discussion. It was meant to be at the same

time conciliatory, and capable of being produced for the exculpation

of the Junta. He represented, “that if any immediate attack upon Cadiz

was to be feared, ... if the Spanish forces were incapable of defending

that point, ... if there were no others of the greatest importance

where the enemy might be opposed with advantage, the Junta would not

fear to hurt the public feeling by admitting foreign troops into

that fortress, because public feeling would then be actuated by the

existing state of things. But no such emergency existed; the armies

were strengthening themselves in points very distant from Cadiz; the

enemy had much ground to pass, and many difficulties to conquer, before

he could threaten it; time could never be wanted for falling back upon

that fortress; it was easy to be defended, ... it was to be considered

as a last point of retreat, and extreme points ought to be defended

in advance, never in themselves, except in cases of extreme urgency.

The army of Extremadura defended Andalusia on that side, those of the

centre and La Carolina at the Sierra Morena; the enemy for some time

past had not been able to make any progress; and there if superior

forces could be collected against him, a decisive blow might be

struck. Catalonia too was bravely defending itself, and Zaragoza still

resisted the repeated attacks of an obstinate and persevering besieger.

Either in Extremadura, or with the central army or in Catalonia, the

assistance of Great Britain would be of infinite service. This was the

opinion of the Junta; this was the opinion of the whole nation, and

would doubtless be that of every one who contemplated the true state

of things. If the auxiliary troops already in the bay, or on their

passage, should disembark in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and proceed

to reinforce General Cuesta, they would always find a safe retreat in

Cadiz in case of any reverse; but should a body of troops, already very

small, leave part of its force in Cadiz, in order to secure a retreat

at such a distance, the English ambassador himself must acknowledge

that such assistance could inspire the Spaniards with very little

confidence, particularly after the events in Galicia. But it appeared

to Mr. Frere that the presence of these troops was necessary at Lisbon,

and therefore he had given orders for their return. Of this measure

the same might be said as of the proposed one for securing Cadiz.

Lisbon was not the point where Portugal could be defended; the greatest

possible number of troops ought to be employed in those advanced lines

where the enemy was posted, and where he might be routed decisively.

For all these reasons the Supreme Junta were persuaded, that if

the British government should determine that its troops should not

act in union with theirs, except on the expressed condition, this

non-co-operation could never be imputed to them. The Junta must act

in such a manner, that if it should be necessary to manifest to the

nation, and to all Europe, the motives of their conduct, it might

be done with that security, and with that foundation, that should

conciliate to them the public opinion, which was the first and main

spring of their power.”

Thus terminated the discussion concerning the admission of English

troops into Cadiz. Mr. Frere warned the Junta of the ill consequences

which must result to Spain, if it should appear that the efforts and

offers which the King of England had made should have the effect of

producing embarrassment to his government at home. It appears, indeed,

as if both governments acted more with reference to their enemies at

home, than from any real importance which they could attach to the

point in dispute. With the Spanish government this was confessedly the

case; they did not, and could not, possibly suspect the good faith

of England: ... between Spain and England, the honourable character

of one country was sufficient security for the other; but they stood

equally in fear of a set of men who criticised all their measures with

factious acrimony, because their own enthusiastic hopes of complete

triumph and thorough reformation had not been fulfilled; and of Morla

and the other traitors, whose aim was to excite suspicion of Great

Britain. Under the influence of this feeling, they opposed a measure

which they did not think otherwise objectionable, but which they

opposed the more firmly because they did not perceive that it was

necessary. The English ministry on their part wanted a point of defence

against the opposition, who, as they omitted no means of wounding the

pride and calumniating the character of the Spaniards, were continually

saying that they did not desire our assistance, and that they had no

confidence in us. It was against this party at home that Cadiz was

wanted as a point of defence, ... not as a point of retreat upon a

coast where we possessed Gibraltar, and where also we were sure of

the disposition of the people in Cadiz itself, whatever might be the

conduct of its governor. The governor at Coruña had failed in his duty,

but still the embarkation of the English was protected by that fortress.

Mr. Frere concluded this unpleasant transaction according to his

own judgement. He had the satisfaction of finding that the ministry

perfectly accorded with him. They sent him Sir George Smith’s

instructions, authorising him, if he thought proper, to communicate

them to the Supreme Junta. They recalled Sir George, and assured the

Junta that no such separate or secret commission, as they apprehended

to have been given to him, ever had been, or ever would be, entrusted

to any officer or other person; and that it never could be in the

contemplation of the English government to select any other channel of

communication than the King’s accredited minister, in a transaction

of such importance, much less to engage in such a transaction without

the entire consent and concurrence of the Spanish government. They

dispatched orders after General Sherbrooke, directing him to proceed to

Lisbon instead of Cadiz. Nevertheless, if at any time the Junta ♦PAPERS

RELATING TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, C.♦ should require a British force

for the actual garrison of Cadiz, Mr. Frere was authorized to send to

Lisbon for that purpose, and the commanding officer there was ordered

to comply with his requisition.

♦INSURRECTION AT CADIZ.♦

While this question was discussed at Seville, Cadiz itself became the

scene of an insurrection, in which the popular feeling in favour of

the English was unequivocally expressed. The people of that city were

dissatisfied with the Central Junta; they complained that, instead of

informing them of the true state of affairs, their government kept

them in ignorance; and having been deceived by Morla, the slightest

circumstance sufficed to make them suspect any one who had the means

of betraying them. A corps of foreigners had been raised from the

prisoners taken at Baylen; they consisted chiefly of Poles and

Germans, who might have fought with a better will against Buonaparte

than for him, but who were less to be relied on than deserters, because

they had enlisted to escape confinement. This corps was ordered to do

garrison duty at Cadiz; while the volunteers of that city and of Port

St. Mary’s were drafted to other parts. But the people, thinking that

if Cadiz wanted defenders, it could by none be so faithfully defended

as by its own children, determined to oppose both measures, and on the

morning of the 22d of February they broke out in insurrection. Their

first act of violence was to seize a courier charged with dispatches

from the Junta to the Marquis of Villel, a member of that body, and its

representative in this important fortress. The Marquis had rendered

himself suspected by setting persons at liberty who were confined for

their supposed attachment to the French, and by imposing restrictions

upon the public amusements. A report that he had committed women of

respectable rank to the house of industry, and threatened others with

the same scandalous punishment, excited indignation in the rabble;

they seized and were dragging him to the public jail, where, if he

had arrived alive, it is little probable that he could long have been

protected from popular fury. But P. Moguer, a capuchin friar, persuaded

them to commit him to the capuchin convent, and pledged himself to

produce his person, that he might suffer condign punishment, if his

treason should be proved.

Luckily the confidence of the people was possessed by the governor,

Don Felix Jones, and in a still greater degree by the guardian of

the Capuchins, Fr. Mariano de Sevilla. The former represented to

General Mackenzie, that it would tend to re-establish tranquillity

if an assurance were given that the English would take no part in

the tumult; for they had been called upon to land and assist against

the traitors. Accordingly the British General sent some officers who

could speak the Spanish language, and they, in the presence of the

governor and the principal capuchin friars, distinctly declared, that

the British troops would by no means interfere in any thing relating

to the internal concerns of the people, but that they were ready to

assist in defending the town to the last extremity. This seemed for a

time to allay their agitation. In the course of a few hours they again

became tumultuous; still an opinion prevailed that they were betrayed,

and that measures were arranged for delivering up Cadiz to the French.

They called for the dismissal of those whom they suspected, and they

required that two British officers should be appointed to inspect the

fortifications, jointly with two Spanish officers, and to direct the

preparations ♦CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ENGLISH.♦ for defence.

General Mackenzie deputed two officers for that purpose; and all those

of his staff accompanied the most active and popular of the friars to

a balcony, from whence these orators harangued the people, assuring

them of the co-operation of the British troops and the support of the

British nation, and frequently appealing to the British officers to

confirm by their own voices the pledges given in their name and in

their presence. This satisfied the populace, and they dispersed with

loud huzzas, in honour of King George and King Ferdinand.

♦PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERNOR.♦

On the following morning the governor issued a proclamation, in which,

considering the discontent which had been manifested, “and keeping

in mind,” he said, “the loyalty of the inhabitants at all times, but

particularly under the present circumstances, and the good and signal

services which they had done, and daily were doing, he dismissed from

office four persons whose discharge had been loudly demanded; and

declared also, that if the people wished to have the Junta of Cadiz

suppressed, their desire should be fulfilled. He assured them that no

foreign troops should be admitted; but that officers of their faithful

ally the British nation were invited to examine the posts and works of

the city and its dependencies, and that every thing necessary for its

defence should be concerted with them. He promised that the papers of

the Marquis should be examined without delay; that there should be no

longer any cause of complaint respecting the ignorance in which the

people were kept of public affairs, for that whatever occurred should

punctually and faithfully be made public; that the enlistment of

the inhabitants for the provincial regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo should

cease till further consideration; and that no part of the volunteers,

the light troops, and companies of artillery should be ordered away.”

Notwithstanding the popularity of Don Felix Jones, it was thought

advisable that this proclamation should be countersigned by the

guardian of the Capuchins.

♦MURDER OF D. J. DE HEREDIA.♦

Still the tumult continued. Caraffa, who had been second in command of

the Spanish troops in Portugal, was confined in the Castle of Catalina,

under a charge of misconduct or treachery, with the viceroy of Mexico

and other prisoners, who had been sent home from New Spain. The mob

proceeded thither, and demanded the prisoners, that they might put them

to death. Colonel Roche, who had just arrived from Seville with another

English officer, interposed, addressed the people, and succeeded in

dissuading them from their purpose. But shortly afterwards they fell

in with Don Joseph de Heredia, a particular object of their suspicion,

who that very day had at their demand been dismissed from his office of

collector of the public rents. He was stepping into a boat to make his

escape to Port St. Mary’s: the attempt cost him his life, and he was

murdered upon ♦THE TUMULT SUBSIDES.♦ the spot. The popular fury seemed

now to have spent itself, and the clergy and friars, who throughout

the whole insurrection had exerted themselves to pacify the people,

and protect the threatened victims, succeeded in restoring peace. To

have attempted to quell the mob by force would have occasioned great

bloodshed, for they had got possession of arms and of the park of

artillery.

♦PROCLAMATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦

Fifty of the rabble, who had been most conspicuous for violence, were

seized by the volunteers of Cadiz, and imprisoned. The Central Junta

addressed a proclamation to the people of that city, reprehending them

with dignified severity for their conduct. “It was absurd,” they said,

“to apprehend danger in so populous and so brave a city from a single

battalion of foreigners, even if there could be any reason to doubt

the fidelity of Poles and Germans, who had been forcibly dragged into

Spain, and were in every quarter deserting from the flag under which

they had been compelled to march. As little reason was there for their

suspicion of the Marquis. His papers were now before the Junta, and

nothing was expressed in them but zeal for the country, and diligence

to promote all means for the security of Cadiz. Let the state of those

means before his arrival be compared with the works projected and

executed since. And had the people no other way of manifesting their

disapprobation than by tumult? No one came to the Junta to complain of

the Marquis’s conduct; no one informed them that their commissioner at

Cadiz had lost the confidence of the people. Some anonymous letters

only had reached the government, some on one side, some on the

other, but all contemptible in the eye of equity. But what was the

course which would have become the open and generous character of the

Spaniards? To have made their complaint frankly and nobly, and the

government would have done them justice.”

The Junta then warned them to beware of the insidious arts of the

enemy. “It is not,” said they, “the traitors who fled with the French

and returned with them who do most injury to their country; but it

is the obscure agitators, hired by them or by the tyrant, who abuse

the confidence and mislead the patriotism of the people. It is they

who, disseminating distrust and suspicion, lead you through crooked

and guilty paths to the precipice, and to subjugation; it is they who

convert loyalty into rage, and zeal into sedition. The Junta have

proofs enough of these infernal machinations in the intelligence

which they receive every day, and in the correspondence which

they intercept.” But, notwithstanding the government declared its

persuasion of Villel’s innocence, it was not thought proper completely

to exculpate him without such farther inquiry as might satisfy the

people: this proclamation, therefore, announced that a commission

would be appointed to examine his conduct, and that it would not be

composed of members of the Central Junta, in order to avoid all shadow

of partiality in an affair so serious. “Any person,” said the Junta,

“shall be heard who desires to accuse him, and the sentence will be

adjudged according to law. He himself demands in justice that this may

be done; his honour, the estimation of the government, and the public

satisfaction, necessarily prescribe it. If the Marquis be culpable,

he shall be punished in proportion to his abuse of the high functions

and national confidence which he has enjoyed; but if he be declared

innocent, it is necessary that the reparation made to his good name be

as solemn and public as the aggression was cruel and scandalous.” These

proceedings satisfied the people, of whom the better sort were grieved

at the excesses which had been committed; and their suspicions against

the Marquis were in some degree removed when Don Felix Jones, to whom

his papers were delivered, declared that no indication of treason was

to be discovered in them.