If manoeuvres are to be of real value to the cavalry, care must be
taken to demand nothing of the troops but what would be required of
them in war. This is most apparent in outpost duty, where demands are
made on the outpost cavalry, especially in regard to reconnaissance,
that in nowise correspond to the teachings of the "Field Service
Manual"; and this is the more unfortunate, as the economy of strength
demanded in the "Manual" is absolutely necessary if the divisional
cavalry, in particular, is to be prevented from failing soon after the
commencement of a war.
The duties of outpost cavalry are limited to watching a strip of
country to the front, and possibly on the flank, of the line of
infantry outposts, and to carry messages between the different sections
of the latter.
Standing patrols are the most useful for observation work. In the
case of an enemy close at hand, they should be in touch with him, and
should, if there be no close reconnaissance patrols, watch his flanks
as well; however, with proper dispositions this should be unnecessary.
The standing patrols would, in any case, have to be in a position to
detect and report any advance on the part of the enemy's outposts and
any movement of the enemy denoting an advance or retirement. If the
enemy, however, is so far away as to be out of touch with the cavalry
cordon, reconnaissance work beyond this line should be carried out
by those portions of the divisional cavalry that are _not_ assigned
to outpost duty. If, on the other hand, the outposts on either side
are in close touch, reconnaissance to the front should be carried
out by infantry patrols. It may, however, be advisable under certain
conditions to let weak mounted patrols follow such infantry patrols to
covered positions for carrying messages, or to employ them dismounted
in the place of the infantry.
If these arrangements are not strictly adhered to, it very easily
happens, during manoeuvres, that reconnaissance work is carried out
by the reconnaissance patrols in the daytime, but at night by the
outpost cavalry. In the morning the latter is then scattered in all
directions and cannot be collected again. Such dispositions are also
entirely opposed to the teachings of the "Field Service Manual," and
are unsuited to conditions of real warfare.
In time of war the reconnaissance patrols naturally continue their work
of observation during the night, and consequently they need not be
relieved by patrols of the outpost cavalry. In peace time, on the other
hand, it is still considered remarkable if the patrols remain in touch
with the enemy at night, and those that do so have been dubbed "sticky
patrols." Those, also, which should really be in touch with the enemy
throughout the night usually get under cover, and have been known to
spend a comfortable night in excellent quarters.
In making arrangements with regard to outpost cavalry, attention should
be paid to reducing the distance which messages have to be carried.
In this respect, horses are not always sufficiently considered. When
outpost companies are pushed out far to the flank, it would usually
be well to observe the instructions of the "Field Service Manual,"
and to detail small detachments of cavalry to the companies for their
independent use, as this will prevent considerable waste of strength.
It will often be necessary, on the other hand, to protect unsupported
flanks of a line of infantry outposts by special detachments of the
divisional cavalry that do not form part of the outpost cavalry. Such
detachments would, if possible, find housing for themselves and be
self-protecting, though they might, under certain circumstances, be
given a small force of infantry for local security.
It is most important that the outpost cavalry should be concentrated
in good time in the morning before the commencement of the march or
of the engagement, and that they should retire in _formed_ order
on the divisional cavalry. This requires careful preparation and
instructions; some practical method must be found which will overcome
the difficulties that now present themselves. The various squadron
commanders must act in conjunction with the officers commanding the
outposts. All the higher officers, and those directing the manoeuvres,
must, however, always keep this matter in mind, so that the present
system, which offers such serious disadvantages, may not become so
customary as to be carried on in time of war.
Having examined the flaws still to be found in our outpost system,
and which are likely to adversely affect the arm in war, we find, on
turning to the sphere of reconnaissance, that such defects are even
more prevalent.
The arrangements that are usually made in this matter often draw on
the strength of the cavalry in a manner quite out of proportion to the
demands of actual war, and weaken the squadrons to such an extent as
almost to destroy their fighting value. The weak point is, in the main,
as follows:
It is usual for every order given by a commanding officer to direct
that a reconnaissance should be carried out, even though the previous
order may have given instructions for one in the same direction. The
cavalry obeys these orders, and sends out fresh patrols each time the
order is repeated. As the patrols are always told to keep in touch with
the enemy, and as, on account of peace conditions that obtain, nobody
thinks of relieving them, they collect in one direction, whilst the
squadron becomes weaker and weaker.
I consider that every effort should be made to combat this bad habit.
Care should be taken not to send out unnecessary patrols, and to
call in, from time to time, those that have been sent out, or where
necessary, to relieve them. I believe that this would be possible if
the following rules were observed.
If an order has been given which entails a reconnaissance in a
certain direction, it is unnecessary that this should be repeated in
a subsequent order. Other directions rather, which are indicated by
reason of the altered conditions, should be brought to notice, and
reference made to the reconnaissance already despatched. Under no
circumstances, however, should a cavalry commander be induced, on
receiving instructions to reconnoitre in a certain direction, to send
a patrol to a point where he knows his patrols to be already in touch
with the enemy. The necessary economy of strength can only be effected
by leaving the command of the patrol service _entirely in the hands
of the cavalry commander_, who must be responsible to his superior
officer for the carrying out of the reconnaissance work entrusted to
him. The superior officer should only interfere if he discovers obvious
mistakes, or if other circumstances render such a step absolutely
necessary. He must, for his part, see that orderlies and reporting
patrols that come in remain with his staff, and that they are sent back
to the squadron when opportunity offers, so as to be available for
fighting purposes. This should be made a standing order at manoeuvres.
All patrols that are sent out must receive definite orders as to how
far they are to advance in any given direction, how long they are to
reconnoitre in that direction, and when they are to return. If, at the
expiration of such a period, renewed reconnaissance is found necessary
in the same direction, relieving patrols should be despatched in
good time, _i.e._ before the first patrols have returned; and these
fresh patrols should, if possible, meet the returning ones, in order
to exchange notes regarding the enemy. For this purpose the outward
and homeward routes of the patrols should be prearranged as far as
circumstances permit.
In manoeuvres, when one officer takes over command from another, he
must inquire as to the arrangements made for reconnaissance work, and
must take measures accordingly.
When a fresh squadron is sent out on reconnaissance, due notice must be
given to the squadron to be relieved. The two officers commanding must
act in conjunction, so that the officer being relieved can draw in his
patrols and the relieving patrols of the new squadron be sent out in
good time.
It should also be remembered that, in time of war, close reconnaissance
would gradually develop from distant reconnaissance, and would not,
as a rule, require any fresh dispositions such as are usually found
necessary at manoeuvres.
During all exercises, especially when a long advance is being made and
distant patrols are not actually sent out, the commanding officers
should be furnished by the directing staff with such information as
these patrols would in all probability have obtained. They should
also be told which of the distant patrols may be assumed to be
in touch with the enemy, and which have either returned or been
captured or wiped out. The distant patrols, which are to be in touch
with the enemy, might with advantage be despatched by the directing
staff, before the manoeuvre commences, in time to procure quarters
and receive instructions as to the situation. The troops should,
of course, be informed of the despatch of these patrols, and all
further reconnaissance will be furnished by the cavalry commander.
Every cavalry detachment must also know exactly what area it is to
reconnoitre, and what reconnaissances have been, or are assumed to have
been, carried out by neighbouring detachments.
It is a mistake to indicate the direction in which a near
reconnaissance should be made, without limiting the distance of it.
It is the duty of the distant reconnaissance to locate an opponent
who is advancing from a distance. As long as the enemy is under the
observation of the distant patrols, the close reconnaissance should
not be pushed forward to meet him, but should be advanced from one
position to the next, within definite limits. When these limits have
been reached, the close patrols should be drawn in by the squadrons
furnishing them, and fresh patrols be despatched to the next position.
It would also be well if the directing staff were to lessen the work
by stopping and sending back to their units such patrols as, by reason
of their direction, cannot possibly come in contact with the enemy; or
it may even suffice, for the purposes of the manoeuvre, to assume the
despatch of patrols in such directions. They might also be given sealed
orders, only to be opened at a certain place, containing the data
necessary for negative reports and instructions regarding their return
to their unit.
I believe that if such methods were adopted, and if the patrol leaders
confined themselves to sending such reports as would be sent in real
war, which would include a clear and concise statement regarding
the configuration of the country, it would be possible to avoid the
unwarrantable weakening of the squadrons now in vogue, which does not
even produce a correspondingly efficient service of communication. It
is, however, true that the art of sending a few, but good reports,
and of sending them at the right time requires, in the leader of the
patrol, sound tactical judgment, and a training that is nowadays but
seldom obtained.
Senior officers also are often to blame for the frequency of reports.
Appointed to a command at manoeuvres, they want to know every detail
about the enemy, and the exact minute in which an advance or a movement
is made. Every little detachment must be reported, and the slightest
movement watched. The result is that they encourage patrols, not only
to send as many detailed reports as possible, but, if necessary,
to obtain the information in a manner incompatible with service
conditions. This is a deep-seated evil that is to be seen at all
manoeuvres, and one that commanders should consistently endeavour to
eradicate.
Such procedure reacts upon the commanding officers themselves by
exercising a harmful influence on their individual training. If
everything is known about the strength, the line of advance, and
the distance of the enemy, generalship descends to the level of the
solution of an arithmetical problem, decisions of the commanding
officers being based on complete and established data. What a
difference is there in actual warfare! But meagre information is
available regarding the enemy, and decisions must, as a rule, be based
on a certain knowledge of one's own plans and a rough idea of the
numbers, intentions, and fighting strength of the enemy. In the former
case, decisions of commanding officers are the result of calculation;
in the latter--_i.e._ in actual warfare--they are a matter for
military skill, or the intuition of genius, which is a very different
thing. These are the decisions that officers should be encouraged and
trained to make; but, unless the malpractices that have crept into the
reconnaissance work are rooted out, this valuable training for actual
warfare is likely to be lost.
But all that is only by the way. We are now discussing the cavalry and
not the generals, and I should like to point out the great importance
of training units themselves to report in a manner suited to service
conditions, _i.e._ to report only important matters, and these _at the
right time_, so that the commanding officer may receive information
regarding the enemy in time to make the necessary dispositions, while
at the same time the reconnoitring detachments need not unduly weaken
themselves by the too frequent despatch of messages. On the field of
battle reports could be carried by individual horsemen instead of
by patrols, but of these only a limited number should be drawn from
the squadron, as it is not possible to rely on their return. _They
must_ also be taught only to take reports to such places as they could
actually reach in war. At manoeuvres and other exercises they are often
to be seen riding about behind the firing-line in the most exposed
places, having apparently no idea of the dangers which they would run
in real warfare. This habit, acquired in peace, may in time of war
entail the loss of many riders, horses, and reports.
The best means of counteracting these bad habits is to tell the
despatch-riders exactly where to go, and to prevail on the officers
concerned to remain in certain fixed places, as in real warfare,
instead of moving about on the field of battle, even within the zone
of the enemy's fire. It is true that, by moving about and exposing
themselves, commanders can get a better idea of the engagement, and
can make dispositions more rapidly and better than they could from the
rear; but, at the same time, such procedure spoils their own training
by removing difficulties that would exist in time of war. Making
suitable dispositions from the rear, with hardly anything but reports
to go by, is quite a different matter from conducting the fight from
the front, where a clear view of the situation can be got.
As regards reconnaissance and screening, the principles evolved in
the chapter on these subjects hold good for the conduct of cavalry at
manoeuvres.
First of all, we must see whether the cavalry attached to the different
divisions should, according to its strength, be only classed as
divisional cavalry, or whether its total strength is such as to entitle
it to be considered as army cavalry.
Units detailed to act as divisional cavalry should not move about
independently in the manoeuvre area, as this would be in opposition
to the essence of their duties, nor should they, on the other hand,
remain tied to the infantry, as they unfortunately so often do. They
must learn to advance from point to point, to reconnoitre by areas, to
observe from a distance with glasses, to judge correctly which flank
is of most importance for reconnaissance, and, finally, to occupy
during the engagement such ground that may be valuable or essential for
successful reconnaissance. Regiments and squadrons detailed as army
cavalry should, on the other hand, act according to the principles
involved.
When army cavalry is taking part in manoeuvres, the leaders should be
recommended to include in the exercises reconnaissance and screening
problems on a large scale. This can generally be done. Then the merging
of the distant into the close and battle reconnaissance should be
practised, the gradual withdrawal of reconnoitring squadrons on the
approach of the enemy, the evacuation of the areas allotted to them,
and the independent action necessitated by the fresh conditions. This
stage is instructive, not only for the reconnoitring squadrons and
patrols, but also for the cavalry division itself. They will have to
decide on which flank of the troops in rear to concentrate, and in
this matter must act in conjunction with any divisional cavalry there
may be; at the same time, they must take into account the ground and
the general strategical situation. The final decision will, as a rule,
have to be made after duly weighing many varied and often conflicting
considerations.
If a general engagement of all arms should result, it is important,
even though the ground should not be suitable for a charge, that the
best use should, in any case, be made of the fighting value of the
troops. Nothing is more incorrect and more opposed to the principles
of warfare than an attitude of inactivity in anticipation of the
possibility of an attack. If écheloned forward on the flank of the
force, the cavalry should make every endeavour to develop an attack
against the flank or rear of the enemy by fire or shock action, and to
threaten and harass his artillery. The heavy artillery of the field
army will often afford a suitable object of attack, more so, perhaps,
in manoeuvres than in actual warfare. It is undoubtedly wrong, whatever
the conditions may be, to remain inactive and watch the other arms
struggling for the palm of victory. "_Activité! activité! activité!_"
cried Napoleon to his generals, and this, too, should be our first
demand from our cavalry leaders.
It would also be a useful exercise if pursuits could occasionally
be arranged for at manoeuvres, so that the cavalry may learn how to
initiate them in good time, and to push them home with energy. The
difficulties of pursuits, and the principles to be observed in their
conduct, are dealt with elsewhere.
If the cavalry endeavours to carry out the tasks I have sketched above,
and at the same time effects the necessary economy of strength, it
will reap benefits from manoeuvres that will materially assist its
training for war, provided the antiquated ideas that still prevail are
discarded.