As I have already indicated, the action of cavalry in the fight may
be divided, according to its character, into two quite distinct
groups--_i.e._ the fight of cavalry acting independently, and to
which is detailed only a small proportion of the other arms; and the
intervention of cavalry in the battle--in the great decision of the
other arms.
It has been proposed, even for the cavalry, to divide tactical
principles according to the idea of the prearranged battle and the
battle of encounter. I do not, however, think that this grouping
will meet the case. In a great battle the fighting is always of a
prearranged nature; in the fight of the independent cavalry it is
possible to distinguish between an encounter and an arranged affair. On
the other hand, the conditions of prearranged action in a battle and in
an independent conflict of the cavalry are quite different, and cannot
be examined from a single point of view.
The grouping, then, proposed by me is still that which best corresponds
to the actual circumstances. In this grouping, in the first case, the
cavalry appears as the chief arm, whose spirit and character set the
tone of the whole nature of the fight; in the second, it is merely
an auxiliary, and must conform to the law of the other arms in great
matters and small.
But the fight is deeply influenced, even in the first case, by
the co-operation of these other arms, and I believe that only in
exceptional cases will a purely cavalry combat take place, at all
events on a large scale. Where squadrons, regiments, and perhaps even
brigades unassisted by the other arms, come into collision with each
other, the charge may still often suffice for a decision. But where it
is an affair of larger masses it will never be possible to dispense
with the co-operation of firearms, and in most cases a combination of
cavalry combat, of dismounted fighting and artillery action, will ensue.
We must not conceal from ourselves the fact that in a future war it
will by no means be always a matter of choice whether we will fight
mounted or dismounted. Rather, by himself, seizing the rifle, will
the opponent be able to compel us to adopt dismounted action. On our
manoeuvre-grounds the charge on horseback is always the order of the
day, even against artillery or machine-guns. The umpires continually
allow such attacks to succeed, and the troops ride on as if nothing had
happened. Equally fearless of consequences do they expose themselves to
rifle-fire. But there are no bullets.
In real war it is different. Even then many a charge will naturally
be successful, but victory will mean such sacrifices that the troops
will often become too weak to carry out their further tactical
and strategical duties. Such losses will not be incurred without
necessity, and troops will give way, where possible, or themselves
adopt dismounted action. The last will often indeed be necessary, as
space and time will frequently be wanting for a turning movement, and
even if such a movement were undertaken it would often lead to a fresh
obligation to fight on foot in another place. This was repeatedly
proved by the events of the campaign of 1870-71. Again and again was it
necessary to detail infantry to the cavalry divisions in order to brush
aside by offensive action resistance that hindered the advance of the
cavalry, and which could not be broken down even by the horse artillery
which accompanied it.
That the English in the South African war were finally repeatedly
successful in forcing the mounted Boers back by turning movements
without actual attacks proves nothing for European conditions. The
explanation lies in the clumsiness of the Boers, who were hampered for
rapid movement by their wagons and possessed no offensive strength
of any kind, at least during the decisive portion of the campaign.
Otherwise they could easily have anticipated the efforts of the English
at a turning movement by the shortest line, or would have been able
by taking the offensive to punish the dispersion that the turning
movement entailed. We must not fall into any misconception of the
fact that turning movements always contain an element of danger and
can often bring about very unfavourable situations. They lay bare our
own communications or lead to dangerous dispersion of force. It is
necessary too, not only to _see_ behind the enemy, but also to _defeat_
him, in order to gain a _free hand_ for reconnaissance. To this end we
will have to attack, and often on foot, as we may be quite sure that
our possible opponent will use the rifle.
Circumstances have distinctly altered since 1870-71. If we had at that
time no real cavalry opponent to face, we may yet be certain next time
of having to deal with a numerous and determined cavalry who will
quite conceivably endeavour to meet us in shock action with the _arme
blanche_. There will always be dashing soldierly natures everywhere
who will make a bid for success by risking all. Whether the hostile
cavalry, once beaten, will return to the attack, is more than doubtful.
I do not think so.
It lies deeply embedded in human nature that he who feels himself the
weaker will act on the defensive. Both opponents will often endeavour
to exploit the advantages of the defensive. It frequently happens
during manoeuvres that the cavalry endeavours to seize some commanding
position, and so force the enemy to attack it under the fire of
artillery posted there. The other side, however, may make corresponding
endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel is the usual result of such
efforts. But if such action is frequent in peace, how much more
frequent will it be under the pressure of responsibility which war
brings with it, especially where one side is tactically the weaker?
It requires an enormous moral strength, personal influence over troops,
and firmness of character to be able to maintain the offensive spirit,
even after an unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke the
ultimate decision anew. In general, it may be relied upon that defence
will be carried out according to tactical defensive principles, and
that with the firearm. There can be no doubt upon that point to those
who have studied human nature by the light of military history.
Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted.
At all events they are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions by
cyclist battalions and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and
thereby already show a remarkable inclination to conduct the fight,
even of cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a
means of mobility, as was the custom of the Boers in Africa.
The rôle of cavalry in the fight will then apparently consist of a
combination of the various methods of fighting. In explanation of this
view I would cite a well-known example.
The task of the German army cavalry in the battle of Mars la Tour was
to relieve the left flank of the German army by a determined attack
against the right of the French, and thus to bring the apprehended
advance of the enemy to a standstill. It did not accomplish this task,
but was satisfied with trying conclusions with the French cavalry; but
did not either win a decisive victory over the latter nor reap the
necessary tactical benefit from the action. It certainly maintained
its superiority over the enemy, but it made no attempt to interfere
decisively in the course of the battle itself. This honour was left to
the 1st Dragoons of the Guard.
But if we assume for a moment that this cavalry, after driving the
French from the field, had made an attempt to operate further against
the right flank of the French army, Cissey's Division, how would
matters have stood?
The French infantry had occupied the Gréyère Farm as a support to
their right flank. The Chasseurs d'Afrique, on the other hand, who
initiated the cavalry fight, retired after they had been beaten by the
13th Dragoons in a northerly direction, and occupied with dismounted
fire the southern edge of a small wood near Ville sur Yron, which the
French call Bois de la Grange and the German official history Bois de
Gréyère. It is bordered on the south by the plateau of Ville sur Yron.
The dismounted Chasseurs here formed an échelon behind the right flank
of the French infantry.
How should the German cavalry have acted under such circumstances in
order to gain contact with the right flank of the French infantry so
protected? The strongly occupied Gréyère Farm commanded the crossing of
the Fond de la Cuve, which stretches in a northerly direction from Mars
la Tour towards Château Moncel, while to the north the wood occupied
by the Chasseurs limited freedom of movement. What else remained but
a determined attack of both objectives and their capture, and that on
foot? Artillery alone would not have sufficed against the Gréyère Farm,
for this point would have had to be strongly occupied with riflemen,
and nowadays also with machine guns, before the crossing of the Fond de
la Cuve which the farm commanded, and which divided our cavalry from
the French infantry, could be accomplished.
We can thus see that even in the action of cavalry in battle the
combination of the several methods of fighting can scarcely, if ever,
be avoided. In flank and rear, also, the opponent will endeavour to
secure himself by occupying points of support as soon as he becomes
aware of our intention to operate in these directions. Our cavalry must
thus be continually prepared to pave the way by dismounted action for
the mounted combat.
Our new Regulations mention quite incidentally (390)[12] that cavalry
will often have to combine mounted and dismounted action, that "on
occasions" also, in combination with shock action, dismounted cavalry
must be ready to hold supporting points to cover deployment or to
co-operate in the engagement (438).[13]
I do not think that this passing mention of the importance of
combination of the two methods of fighting of the cavalry sufficiently
emphasises the matter. After due reflection over all the circumstances
appertaining to the question, I am, on the other hand, firmly convinced
that the mutual relationship between the fight on foot and on
horseback will give the modern cavalry combat its peculiar character.
This relationship will _always_ have to be reckoned with, and all
tactical considerations must be guided by it.
In my opinion all the principles of cavalry tactics should spring from
this co-operation of the several methods of fighting and not from its
attitude towards the various arms considered separately. The modern
battle suffers no division of the action of one arm, or of one manner
of fighting from another. As every kind of country has to be utilised
for the fight, so also must the most varied kind of action of the arms
be taken into account. It must, of course, be clearly established how
these can best be applied against the various adversaries--cavalry,
artillery, or infantry. Such reflections, however, can refer only
to tactical formations. On the other hand, as soon as it becomes a
question of tactical leading, such combination of all arms must, from
the first, be taken into account as war may demand.
Military history affords us vivid examples of such co-operation of
the arms in a cavalry fight, not, indeed, in a European theatre of
war, but in the Civil War in America. They are woven, above all, round
the heroic figure of General "Jeb" Stuart, and if weapons and other
circumstances of the time and place were different from those obtaining
in Europe to-day, the principle of action has still remained the same.
"Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart distinguished himself as a
cavalry leader, and his strategical work in blindfolding the enemy and
in enlightening his own army has never been surpassed. As a cavalry
tactician he is not only the first, but hitherto the only, leader of
the arm who understood how to combine the effects of fire and shock,
how to render effective service in fighting on foot without losing the
power to strike on horseback when opportunity offered."[14]
There, indeed, was a man worthy of emulation.
We must, I think, be resolute in freeing ourselves from all
old-fashioned conceptions of those knightly cavalry combats which have
in reality become obsolete owing to the necessities of modern war. We
do not in this need to break with our ancient and honoured traditions,
for the spirit of tradition consists not in the retention of antiquated
forms, but in acting in that spirit which in the past led to such
glorious success. But this spirit points to the road of progress and
bids us not allow ourselves to be urged by events, but, hurrying before
them, to gain a start in development and therewith a decisive advantage
over our enemies. To maintain in the troops, under modern conditions,
the spirit of discipline and independence, and of the greatest effort
and self-sacrifice, _that_ is the old Prussian tradition, and not the
adherence to dead forms, which in our history has been bloodily enough
avenged.
This principle has been embraced in all the other spheres of military
development; it is only the cavalry that has remained behind the times.
In order to be able to deal with the functions of the mounted arm in
accordance with the old Prussian principles, we must try to get a clear
and unprejudiced conception of the spirit of the modern cavalry combat.
We must look forward and pierce the veil of the future uninfluenced
by the ghosts of the past. The probable events and conditions of the
modern battle must be our guiding star, and when we have realised how
the spirit of cavalry may be adapted to them, how the results of
modern technical improvements in arms influence and strengthen the
action of the cavalry masses, then alone can we lay down principles for
the conduct and tactics of cavalry in the fight.