There can be no doubt that the value and significance of cavalry in
a future war will be chiefly demonstrated in the action of the army
cavalry.[4] The army cavalry alone, by virtue of its fighting strength,
will be able to carry out the larger services of reconnaissance,
to operate against the enemy's communications, to take part in the
tactical decision with a force commensurate with modern conditions, or
to carry out a pursuit.
Reconnaissance occupies a prominent position amongst these various
duties. There will not be a battle every day. Not in every fight
will considerations of ground and other circumstances allow of the
cavalry taking part in a great decision as a mounted arm. Not always
will an effective pursuit by the cavalry mass be possible. It must
be remembered that in order not to render itself too weak to carry
out its proper rôle cavalry must not expose itself to heavy loss in
battle without sufficient reason. Only the possibility of a very great
success can justify the risk of staking the whole cavalry force in a
decisive charge during the battle. It is true that efforts will have
to be made to drive the hostile cavalry from the field to facilitate
operations against the flank and rear of the enemy's line of battle.
But such operations will generally be limited to fire action, and in
a decisive battle the weakness of the cavalry would probably debar it
from such undertakings. Engagements, also, that are fought with a view
of opening a way for reconnaissance will not be of frequent occurrence,
and must only be expected during occasional crises. They will, however,
be of decisive value for the whole future conduct of the arm and its
operative success. The same may be said of raids against the enemy's
communications. Such undertakings may exercise the greatest influence
on the course of a campaign, but can only be undertaken under specially
favourable conditions.
On the other hand, the everyday task of the cavalry which goes
hand in hand with all these various engagements and enterprises is
_reconnaissance proper_ carried out by reconnoitring squadrons and
patrols. This is the daily bread of the cavalry, a duty that throughout
a war should never cease to be performed, even if the main body of
the cavalry has been driven from the field by the enemy. It demands,
therefore, the highest training, the wisest economy of force and
systematic arrangement, if it is not to become ineffective or useless.
In close and continual relation to the above is the further task of
safeguarding and screening the army. Reconnaissance itself provides
a measure of security, but it is always liable to miscarry, and can
never secure the army against hostile observation. Reconnaissance must
therefore be supplemented by a special system of security and screening
which, however, demands the most careful organisation, and greatly
increases the difficulty of husbanding limited forces and of keeping
the troops fit by not overworking them.
Intimately connected to the services of security and reconnaissance
is that of communication, which, owing to the great distances to be
traversed in modern war and the necessity of early transmission of
intelligence, has become, at the same time, of the highest importance
and of the greatest difficulty. Here also is a daily duty for the
cavalry in which a thorough training is necessary.
All these considerations must be kept in view in arranging the
training, and a clear conception should be formed as to what is to be
aimed at in great as well as small matters. Only thus will results be
obtained which will stand the test of war.
It is only natural that in our army the greatest stress is at present
laid on the duties of the army cavalry. These are so obviously new and
important for the arm that it is easy to understand how more time is
devoted to them in peace training, and how the task of the divisional
cavalry has come to appear of less importance. It might indeed be
contended that the training which the latter has hitherto received in
garrison and at manoeuvres would suffice for its needs.
It is my opinion, on the other hand, that such a conception is faulty.
The importance of the divisional cavalry has in no way diminished, and
one is not justified in assuming that any lesser demands will be made
upon its efficiency than on that of the larger independent formations.
The exact contrary is the case, and I consider it opportune now, when
all interest is centred in the army cavalry, to lay particular stress
on the extraordinary importance of the divisional cavalry.
As in the newest phases of military development, the general value
of cavalry, according to my opinion, particularly in the organism of
an army, has increased, so also has that of the divisional cavalry.
Higher demands are made of it, and it must therefore be capable of
greater performances.
The circumstances of modern war demand that great masses of mounted
men shall be used as army cavalry and concentrated in the decisive
direction, thus weakening a great part of the front of the army in
cavalry, in order to ensure superiority at the decisive point. It
is in accordance with the universal law of military success that
a concentration of force at the decisive point can, under most
circumstances, only be ensured by a corresponding weakening of force
in other places. The front of the army, therefore, can never be
covered throughout its whole length by the army cavalry, but at the
same time it will never be possible to entirely denude of cavalry
that front or flank in front of which no army cavalry may lie. This
would be simply impossible, for every body of troops, however disposed
upon the strategic front, requires cavalry for the service of close
reconnaissance, of security, and of screening against surprise or
against hostile observation.
Furthermore, even those bodies of troops in immediate advance of which
the great cavalry masses are on the move require their own cavalry, not
only for the purpose of ensuring and maintaining communication with the
army cavalry, but also that they may not be entirely denuded of cavalry
when, as the hostile armies approach each other, the cavalry masses
clear the front and concentrate towards a flank.
Finally, it will not always be possible to detail portions of the army
cavalry to detached forces, because it has other duties to fulfil and
other claims made upon it. Thus, for example, the army of Manteuffel
in the campaign against Bourbaki had at its disposal none other but the
divisional cavalry.[5]
The weak divisional cavalry, therefore, must be prepared to carry
out all the cavalry duties which may arise from these conditions.
Amongst them particular mention must be made of the outpost service,
which, although shared with the infantry, imposes a heavy burden on
the divisional cavalry. Any one who has once been through manoeuvres
knows how great the demands of this service are, even in peace, in the
exertions involved and the time expended. In war these exertions become
at times considerable, if less frequent, for the critical days do not
follow each other so closely as in manoeuvres.
If we consider, moreover, how every cavalry undertaking has increased
in difficulty owing to the greater size of modern battlefields and
the improvement in firearms, it will become clear that the sphere of
usefulness of the divisional cavalry, even from the purely tactical
point of view, which up to now we have alone considered, is a very
extensive and important one.
This tactical activity is closely dependent upon the whole interior
economy of the division. These few squadrons must furnish orderlies
and despatch-riders, which, in the case of the conduct of so large a
force as an infantry division, must mean a considerable drain on their
strength. They will often be deputed to collect supplies in villages
away from the roads, when the supply columns fail and the places
occupied do not afford sufficient for the troops. Although it is
possible that other troops, such as infantry in carts and bicyclists,
may be used for this service, it will never be possible to relieve
the divisional cavalry entirely of it. The relay service also makes
a greater demand on the strength than is generally supposed. In the
campaign of 1870-71 this cause contributed largely to the weakening
of the squadrons at the front. Nowadays every effort is made by means
of technical apparatus to relieve the cavalry, at least partially,
from this service. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the
relay service of cavalry can be everywhere replaced by telegraph,
telephone, signalling, bicycles, or motor. Circumstances will occur
in war in which all these methods of transmission, which are already
in themselves partially unreliable, must fail us, especially where
they are exposed to destruction from the hand of the enemy. The proper
performance of these interior services must never, however, miscarry
throughout the whole campaign, and imposes therefore still higher and
more continuous demands on the efficiency of the troops.
As the result of these reflections we may conclude that a series of
very important duties will fall to the lot of the divisional cavalry in
war, which cannot be carried out by any other troops or in any other
manner than by the divisional cavalry. Further, that these duties
have, on the whole, increased in importance, and that their fulfilment
has become considerably more difficult by reason of the conditions of
modern war.
According to these conditions the importance of the divisional cavalry
must be judged. If the decisive rôle in war falls essentially to the
lot of the army cavalry, yet must the duties of the divisional cavalry
be regarded as just as necessary for the good of the army. Methods
of training must be adopted with these points in view, and it must be
quite clearly understood that in this direction modern conditions have
to be reckoned with which demand thorough innovations.
As to the rôle of cavalry in the fight, we may conclude from the above
that it may be sharply divided into two separate groups: firstly,
in those encounters where cavalry is acting as an independent body,
and will have to carry out reconnaissance, the service of security
and raids; and secondly, where cavalry will take part in a battle in
conjunction with the other arms. It is obvious, after what has been
said, that the first group is by far the more important, and will
require particular attention as regards training. We will endeavour in
the course of this work to prove that this is the direction where the
most friction is to be overcome, and where by far the most difficult
part of our task will lie.
The chief considerations for training are naturally evolved from the
duties to be performed in war itself. The services of reconnaissance
and security come first. The technique of these services and the
method of fighting necessary for carrying them out must be fully
mastered by the troops right down to the individual soldier. Next in
importance come undertakings against the enemy's communications, and
the participation in the battle which war will demand of our arm.
These are the matters which must be studied by those who undertake to
discuss methods of training. We must be perfectly clear in our minds
what duties in the various spheres of action will fall to the lot of
the arm as a whole, to its subdivisions, or to its single members. The
relative importance of these duties must be our guide in considering
the essentials of training.