The great changes which have taken place in military science since the
year 1866 have forced all arms to adopt new methods of fighting. It
was, first and foremost, the improvement in the firearm which wrought
the transformation of the battlefield and called forth an increased
demand for cover against the murderous effect of fire. The infantry
sought safety in sparser formations and in utilising the smallest
accidents of the ground for cover, while the artillery adopted armoured
shields, covered positions, and indirect methods of fire. It was only
the cavalry that could not keep pace with these developments. Forming a
conspicuous target, capable of being concealed only behind considerable
inequalities of the ground, it could indeed seldom find cover within
the range of the enemy's fire. As, at the same time, its strength in
comparison to that of the great armies of the present day has sensibly
diminished, it might be concluded that its particular value in battle
had decreased considerably in possibility and importance.
This conclusion is thoroughly justified, but not altogether in the
way that one is inclined to assume. For one reason, the cavalry is
now supplied with an excellent firearm, which its mobility enables
it to employ against the most sensitive parts of an enemy's line of
battle. For another, the composition of modern armies offers, as I
have frequently said, many new possibilities of success. Newly raised
levies, such as will often have to take their place in the great
armies of the day, cannot possess the same steadiness as standing
permanent troops. They are, according to experience, very sensitive
to moral impressions, and will often enough, when shaken in battle,
offer a tempting and suitable object of attack to the cavalry. At the
same time, the fact remains that, by reason of its relative numerical
weakness, cavalry can no longer retain its former importance in the
battle, and that the manner of its intervention in the fight must often
be of a very different nature from what it has been in the past.
On the other hand, the duty of cavalry in the sphere of reconnaissance
has increased in importance. For all strategical movements the main
body of the modern army demands considerably more time and, generally
also, comprehensive preparatory measures. If, therefore, intelligence
as to the disposition of the enemy is to be of use in operations, it
follows that it must be procured at the earliest possible moment.
Whoever gets the earliest and best information possesses nowadays a far
greater advantage than formerly, when, with the small armies of the
day, movements and combinations of force could often be successfully
carried out in the immediate presence of the enemy's army. These are
indeed still possible in occasional cases and where sufficient depth
of formation is maintained, and it is this circumstance that has made
early and full intelligence, combined with successful screening of
one's own movements, one of the most important factors of success.
There are people who, in fancy, already see cavalry replaced in this
rôle by an air fleet. Such prophets cannot, however, be treated
seriously. The air cruisers will not be designed for all the
possibilities of war. In the period of concentration and in fortress
warfare they would doubtless be able, even in their present condition,
to render excellent service. Whether they can be adapted for use in a
war of movement remains to be seen; but, even if they can in time be
of more service for war than at present appears to be the case, their
capabilities in this direction will always be limited. They can only
observe at night under favourable conditions--such things, for example,
as large detrainments of troops or bivouacs with fires burning. They
are under all circumstances dependent upon the weather. By day the air
fleet of the enemy will seek battle with them in order to hinder their
reconnaissance. Hostile artillery will be particularly dangerous to
them, and will be able, thanks to the developments in modern ordnance,
to wage successful war against them. All detachments cannot possibly be
supplied with airships, owing to the great cost and enormous apparatus
entailed, and their usefulness will therefore only be realised with the
larger formations. Finally, one or the other of the air fleets will
be driven from the field, or rather from the air, and that side which
meets with defeat will be deprived of all means of reconnoitring unless
it can rely on its cavalry. So in the most modern war the cavalry
remains the principal means of reconnaissance. Its activity may indeed
be supplemented by airships, but will never be replaced by them.[1]
These circumstances, however, necessitate a new rôle for cavalry. It
must drive the hostile cavalry from the field, a cavalry which will do
all in its power to secure its own army against intrusion. It will find
this cavalry reinforced not only by horse artillery and machine-guns,
but also by cyclist battalions, mounted and other infantry, and will
therefore have to be prepared, in order to properly carry out its
service of exploration, to fight against detachments of all arms. But
the same thing will also happen when it seeks to veil the movements
of its own army, or to undertake some enterprise against the enemy's
communications, or to defend its own against similar hostile raids.
Our cavalry thus finds itself face to face with totally new duties of
a most real kind, towards the carrying out of which it has no previous
experience to help it.
In the wars of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, as well as in the
German war of Unification, there is a total absence of analogy from
which to draw conclusions that can be practically applied. The wars
in South Africa and Manchuria, on the other hand, reveal conditions
which have very little in common with those of a European war such as
the German cavalry will have to fight. Nowhere can the few experiences
of cavalry action gained in these wars be immediately applied, and
there are but few bases for the formation of judgment as to what
is practical and possible under modern conditions. The same may be
said to hold good of the Russo-Turkish war. The most interesting and
instructive campaigns for the service of modern cavalry appear to be
those of the American War of Secession, which are, however, almost
unknown in Germany, where there is a lack of opportunities to study
them.[2]
There is, therefore, for our cavalry a want of any sort of tradition
for that rôle which it will be expected to carry out in the next
war, and this want will be the more felt as it will in the future be
expected to deal with a number of technical methods of communication
which are, as a whole, still almost unknown, and as to the actual war
value of which no judgment can yet be formed. Up to now, also, cavalry
training as carried out since the war of 1870-71 has been unable to
create a sound foundation for preparation for war. Left far behind in
the march of military progress, in tactics as well as reconnaissance,
it has been led so far from the right way that it would have been
unable to stand the test of serious war. Nor have we yet fully
extricated ourselves from these trammels of the past.
For the moment, therefore, our cavalry finds itself in a state of
transition. The demands which modern war will make upon it have not yet
penetrated into its flesh and blood, that is to say, their extent and
range have not yet been clearly grasped by the arm, nor have we yet by
any means succeeded in breaking loose from the fetters of the past.
Views based on antiquated assumptions are often apt to survive and to
influence training as well as leading.
This is particularly the case as regards reconnaissance. In tactics,
too, the cut-and-dried methods of bygone days are clearly not yet
forgotten, while for enterprises against the enemy's communications
there is a want both of practical training and theoretical instruction.
This state of affairs must be regarded as a great evil, as at the
outbreak of a war there will no longer be time to collect experiences.
From the very first day onward the greatest demands will be made upon
the cavalry, not only as regards intentions, but performances. On the
achievements of the cavalry in the early days of the war will depend to
a considerable extent the success of the first great decisive encounter.
We must therefore be prepared to meet these great demands when war
breaks out. Only a clear recognition of the necessities and the
possibilities of manoeuvre and training can secure us this preparation.
There remains, then, nothing for us--with no practical war experience
to go on--but to create the groundwork of our methods of training from
theoretical and speculative reflection. With all the means of intellect
and foresight, we must endeavour to discern the probable course of the
war of the future and regulate the methods of training accordingly.
Peace exercises based upon such clearly defined principles must serve
as a further guide to what is possible and practical. They cannot,
it is true, afford realistic results, as they lack the effect of
weapons, the hostile country, the thousand causes of friction, and
the moral factors of serious war. They can, however, be regarded
as practical guides in many directions and will help us to evolve
methods unattainable by pure theory: for instance, in increasing the
capabilities of the troops, improving the practical arrangements for
communication, the transmission service, the patrol system, and the
like. Only these peace experiences must not be overrated, but subjected
to continual criticism by the light of what would be practical in war.
It thus remains our chief duty to get a clear and just idea of the
rôle that cavalry will play in a future war, in order to clear the
mind fully on this point, and so be able further to build upon the
foundations of sound reasoning.
The new Cavalry Drill Regulations,[3] in which I had the honour and
pleasure of collaborating, have undertaken the creation of these
fundamental principles of the independent rôle of cavalry. Their
teachings, however, have as yet by no means penetrated into the ranks.
The new Drill Regulations have endeavoured to give new rules for
the tactical employment of cavalry, which have not yet sufficiently
established their value, even on the manoeuvre-ground. As yet the
troops are only endeavouring to get accustomed to them.
It is also obvious that practical drill instructions, at least for
tactics, can only give general principles, and cannot be too definite,
lest they should thereby tend to limit the independence of leaders in
the thousand varied happenings of war.
It is quite another matter for him who is not called on to make
regulations, but whose task is rather to clear the understanding, to
stimulate independent thought, and to encourage the troops themselves
to form correct judgments. Thus will be moulded the efficiency which
will enable the soldier to act in the presence of the enemy according
to the Regulations, with full freedom of thought, not after the letter,
but the spirit, and even perhaps, in many cases, the intention of them.
From this point of view I have set forth my views and reflections. It
seems to me, above all things, important to discuss those points which
will be new to cavalry in a future war, and in so doing to touch on
many matters of training which long years of experience have convinced
me are practical. May I by these hints contribute towards the formation
of fresh traditions for the training of the arm that will march with
modern conditions, that will break away for good from all half-measures
and obsolete views, and thereby clear the way towards a proper conduct
of the cavalry in war, and to the winning of fresh and imperishable
laurels!
Where I have occasion to touch on views formerly expressed and set
forth in my various writings, I find no reason to retract any of them.
In certain directions they have naturally developed further, and have
become more progressive under the impress of the whole of modern
development and the latest experiences of war. On the whole, however,
I adhere to my opinions, and only seek to supplement and develop them
in order to suit them still better to the practical needs of the arm. I
hope they may act as a stimulus and serve as a guide to many a comrade
in difficulties.